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ABSTRACT

AMERICAN RECONSTITUTION:
HOW THE STATES STABILIZE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT
Robinson Woodward-Burns
Rogers M. Smith

The American Constitution is exceptionally stable. Americans have proposed and ratified
only one national constitution with only twenty-seven amendments. In contrast, the
American states have proposed 354 constitutions, held 250 conventions, and ratified 146
constitutions with at least 5,900 amendments. Why is the federal Constitution so much
more stable than the state constitutions? Many scholars cite the federal Constitution’s
higher procedural barriers to revision. But this dissertation asserts that ongoing state
constitutional revision resolves national constitutional controversies, preempting federal
constitutional amendment and quieting national inter-branch conflict. The dissertation
tests this claim in two ways. First, it compares all attempted federal and state
constitutional revision since 1776, drawing on an original dataset of all proposed state
constitutions to show that federal and state constitutional revision are closely associated
over time. Second, the dissertation disaggregates this trend by topic, offering case studies
in which state constitutional revision preempted or resolved national constitutional
conflicts. Since the states constrain the scope of national constitutional controversies, one
cannot fully understand the political development of the national branches or Constitution
without the states.
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PART I: CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY

1

CHAPTER 1: EXPLAINING FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONAL
REVISION
“The question of the relation of the States to the Federal Government is the cardinal
question of our constitutional system. At every turn of our national development we have
been brought face to face with it, and no definition either of statesmen or of judges has
ever quieted or decided it.”
Woodrow Wilson, 19081
I. Question: What Determines Constitutional Duration?
Constitutions vary in duration. Some last a year, while others last centuries. Why
is this, and what ought to be done about it?
This question is particularly important in the United States, home to the world’s
first and oldest formal written national constitution.2 Americans have proposed and
ratified only one national constitution and passed only twenty-seven national
amendments in the 230 years since the Constitution’s drafting. In contrast, the American
states have proposed 354 state constitutions, held 250 conventions, and ratified 146
constitutions and 5,900 amendments. The average state constitution lasts only 64 years.3

1

Woodrow Wilson, Constitutional Government in the United States (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1908), 173.
2
The question is much older than the United States. Plato and Aristotle prescribed constitutions to calm
Greek factions, Machiavelli revived Roman institutions to reconcile warring Florentine classes, and Hobbes
and Locke bound the English crown and republicans to a common contract. Inspired by these constitutions,
Madison framed a document to survive “the mortal diseases under which popular governments have
everywhere perished.” Theorists return to the question because it is central to politics – constitutions shape
formal institutions and statutes and informal civic norms – and because it remains unsolved. Madison’s
mortal diseases plague modern national constitutions, which last on average only nineteen years. For the
quote see Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, The Federalist: With Letters of Brutus, ed.
Terence Ball (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1788), 40. For the estimate of nineteen years see
Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg, and James Melton, The Endurance of National Constitutions (Cambridge ;
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 129.
3
The federal Constitution is also the tersest and perhaps most stable written constitution in the world, too
extreme an outlier to represent other national constitutions. While the state constitutions resemble many
national constitutions, this project does not speculate on constitutions outside the United States. For the
comparison of American state to other national constitutions, see Mila Versteeg and Emily Zackin,
“Constitutions Unentrenched: Toward an Alternative Theory of Constitutional Design,” American Political
Science Review 110, no. 4 (2016). This dissertation uses a dataset including all 146 ratified state
constitutions to calculate that a ratified state constitution on average lasts 64 years. This figure is roughly
affirmed by Hammons. Christopher W. Hammons, “Was James Madison Wrong? Rethinking the American
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What explains the difference? Why is the federal Constitution so much more stable than
the state constitutions and what does this mean for American constitutional development?
The federal Constitution is stable for a few well-known reasons.4 Almost all
proposed amendments have fallen short of the supermajority requirements in Article V.
Amendments must first clear two-thirds of both congressional houses or both houses of
two-thirds of state legislatures, and then clear three-quarters of the state legislatures for
ratification. Between 1788 and 2014, only twenty-seven of 11,792 proposed amendments
passed.5
Additionally, the Constitution’s brevity and ambiguity might allow activist federal
judges to fundamentally reinterpret the document, achieving constitutional reform
without amendment. But judges rarely use this power. The president and Congress
nominate and confirm sympathetic and restrained judges, can strategically constrain
federal courts’ jurisdiction, and may keep contentious issues off the federal docket to
prevent constitutional reinterpretation.6 And even an activist judiciary cannot unilaterally
enforce its decisions without executive enforcement and congressional financing.7 So the
courts usually use their interpretive power to resolve or preempt constitutional disputes

Preference for Short, Framework-Oriented Constitutions,” The American Political Science Review 93, no. 4
(December 1, 1999): 837–49, doi:10.2307/2586116. For the number of state amendments, see G. Alan Tarr,
Understanding State Constitutions (Princeton University Press, 1998), 24.
4
A stable constitution is one that is infrequently amended, replaced, or reinterpreted.
5
See Michael G. Kammen, A Machine That Would Go of Itself: The Constitution in American Culture (St.
Martin’s Press, 1986), 11; “Amending America: Proposed Amendments to the United States Constitution,
1787 to 2014,” National Archives and Records Administration Data Catalog, 2016,
http://www.archives.gov/open/dataset-amendments.html.
6
Robert Alan Dahl, “Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker,”
Journal of Public Law 6 (1957): 279; Mark A. Graber, “The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Legislative
Deference to the Judiciary,” Studies in American Political Development 7, no. 01 (1993): 35–73,
doi:10.1017/S0898588X00000687.
7
Gerald N Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change?, 2nd ed (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 2008).
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that might otherwise force constitutional amendment or crisis, gradually easing
America’s eighteenth-century Constitution into new contexts.
Instead, the public might reinterpret the Constitution. Bruce Ackerman describes
America as a “dualist democracy,” with entrenched representatives passing ordinary
statutes and the people in rare moments of crisis electing radicals to amend or reinterpret
the Constitution to legally bind these entrenched representatives.8 But these radical,
landslide majorities and constitutional realignments, circumventing ordinary politics, are
by definition exceptional. Larry Kramer trusts popular mobs to circumvent legislators,
judges, and formal amendment and assert new, informal interpretations of the
Constitution.9 Yet this rarely results in formal amendment. Further, most ordinary
Americans subscribe to the same core constitutional commitments, shying from rejecting
these hallowed values for radical new constitutional readings.10
But the state constitutions complicate this story. American scholars largely
neglect the 146 state constitutions for the federal one, missing almost all of American
constitutional revision. Far easier to amend or replace, the state constitutions include
many more provisions on citizenship, the franchise, education, police powers, and
economic and positive rights. Myopic focus on the federal Constitution, designed for

8

These radicals win landslide election during times of unusual crisis, gaining the massive legislative
majorities – sometimes extralegally – needed to revise the Constitution. For example, Northern voters
elected a Republican majority to the Thirty-Ninth Congress, which in December of 1865 excluded
representatives from all Confederate states save Tennessee. This granted Republicans four-fifths of
congressional seats, enough to score the 13th and 14th Amendments, constraining subsequent conservative
Democratic congresses. Though procedurally legal, this violated Article V’s spirit of consensual revision,
and the antebellum Constitution’s commitment to slavery. Bruce Ackerman, We the People:
Transformations, vol. II (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1998), 15–17, 99–119.
9
Larry D. Kramer, The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial Review (Oxford
University Press, 2004).
10
Americans interpret these shared values in diverse and sometimes conflicting ways, but rarely escape
them. On veneration for the federal Constitution, see for example Kammen, A Machine That Would Go of
Itself; Sanford Levinson, “Pledging Faith in the Civil Religion; Or, Would You Sign the Constitution?,”
William and Mary Law Review 29 (1988 1987): 113.
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inflexibility and permanence, exaggerates the stability of civic inclusion, constitutional
reform, and American politics generally.
A few factors unique to the state constitutions explain their relative instability.
First, the state constitutions are easy to amend, and so are packed with politically
motivated, contentious provisions, which are subject to continuous repeal or replacement.
Further, while the federal Constitution enjoys broad public veneration, most Americans
ignore or denigrate their state constitutions and have few reservations with state
constitutional revision. Finally, state constitutions are perennially embroiled in
citizenship law disputes, and thus are subject to frequent revision.
But most importantly, the state and federal constitutions evolve jointly. Many
scholars describe federal and state constitutional revision in isolation, and misread each.
The aim of this project is to integrate accounts of federal and state constitutional
development.
This dissertation proposes a new determinant of American constitutional change –
constitutional decentralization. State constitutional reform addresses national
constitutional controversies, averting federal amendment. Specifically, presidents,
members of Congress, and federal judges can defer divisive and complicated
constitutional issues to the states. Reformers thwarted by Article V might also take their
cause to the state legislatures. These wedge issues may split state legislative parties, or
state legislators may capitulate to reformers, proposing constitutional revisions that clear
the states’ relatively low bar to reform. Even if they are unsatisfied with this revision,
reformers may find their cause trapped at the state level, where constitutional reform can
be slow, piecemeal, or unsuccessful. Controversy is often resolved or quarantined at the
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state level, quieting calls for national constitutional reform and preventing national
amendment.
The state constitutions vent pressure for national constitutional reform, and thus
can guide the timing, nature, and scope of American constitutional and political
development. There are three implications to this. National coalitions defer controversies
not only to the courts, but also to the states. Armed with unique police powers, the states
affect state and national policy in ways courts cannot. Second, in postponing or resolving
national disputes, the states may quietly temper conflict between the national branches.
Neglecting the states risks misunderstanding national constitutional development. Third,
the states guide national constitutional realignments. States do not always lag behind
national realignments, but sometimes lead them. Additionally, constitutional devolution
can postpone change, explaining the periodicity of American constitutional realignments.
Since state constitutional revision stabilizes the federal Constitution, ignoring the state
constitutions, as most scholars do, misunderstands the federal Constitution.
Finally, state constitutional instability solves an old normative dilemma in
American constitutionalism. The federal Constitution claims popular authorization, but
forbids almost all Americans from directly engaging in the amendment process. Only the
people’s representatives assembled in Congress, the state legislatures, and in
constitutional conventions can vote on proposed amendments, and Article V’s
supermajority requirements have blocked almost all reformers from calling these bodies
to a vote. The Constitution lacks popular legitimacy. Yet ordinary Americans have
revised their state constitutions through initiatives, referenda, legislative amendments,

6

legislative conventions, popular conventions, and extralegal popular tactics. State
constitutional revision makes American constitutionalism more legitimate.
The state constitutions are a quiet but main engine of American constitutional and
political development. This dissertation expounds this claim in two parts. Part I ventures
a theory of American constitutional development. This first chapter recounts common,
independent explanations of national constitutional stability and state constitutional
instability. The second chapter challenges these, asserting that state constitutional
instability and reform quiets national controversies, securing national constitutional
stability and guiding American constitutional development. The third chapter gives a
brief overview of all attempted state and federal constitutional revision. Part II tests this
claim against American constitutional development. The fourth chapter recounts how
Revolutionary-era state constitutional framers resolved questions over legislative
sovereignty and design, frontier regulation, and slavery, preempting these debates at the
federal Convention. In the antebellum era, state constitutional reform prevented and
resolved national constitutional controversies over slavery, banking, and suffrage reform,
as explained in the fifth chapter. The final chapter shows how crises over territorial
slavery, fugitive slaves’ rights, black citizenship, and state sovereignty escalated into the
Civil War, and how postwar state constitutional revision settled national debates and
shaped Reconstruction constitutional order. State constitutional reforms quiet some
national constitutional controversies and reforms while entirely preempting others. Thus
one cannot fully understand national constitutional and political development in America
without studying the states.

7

II. Federal Constitutional Stability
Scholars give several explanations for the federal Constitution’s stability. First,
the document is notoriously difficult to amend. Article V requires a proposed federal
amendment receive a two-thirds majority in both congressional houses or in two-thirds of
the state legislatures, and then pass three-fourths of the state legislatures or ratifying
conventions. All legal efforts to reform Article V have failed, and themselves would have
to clear these difficult supermajority requirements.11 Further, Congress has set strict
deadlines for a proposal to clear these hurdles, killing some proposals that waited for
ratification.12 As in the past, partisan polarization in Congress and the state legislatures
currently precludes consensus and thus amendment.
Generations of scholars have attributed the Constitution’s stability to Article V’s
supermajority requirements. In 1902, the reform-minded political scientist John William
Burgess lamented that the Constitution’s great “error lies in the artificially excessive
majorities required in the production of constitutional changes,” which block the
innovative, experimental “impulse in democratic societies.”13 His progressive colleague
Herman Ames agreed that Article V raises “insurmountable constitutional obstacles”
before necessary constitutional reforms, concluding that the “majorities required are too
large.”14 Writing in 1929, Michael Musmanno reiterated Ames’ conclusion, as did Lester

11

Janice C. May, “Constitutional Amendment and Revision Revisited,” Publius: The Journal of
Federalism 17, no. 1 (January 1, 1987): 154–55.
12
Such was the fate of the Equal Rights Amendment and the District of Columbia Voting Rights
Amendment. In 1921, the Supreme Court in Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368, 376 (1921) upheld the sevenyear ratification window set by Congress.
13
John William Burgess, Political Science and Comparative Constitutional Law: Sovereignty and Liberty,
vol. I (Boston: Ginn and Company, 1902), 151.
14
Herman Vandenburg Ames, The Proposed Amendments to the Constitution of the United States during
the First Century of Its History (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1897), 301–4. John R. Vile
summarizes the progressives’ special dislike for the Article V process. See John R. Vile, The Constitutional
Amending Process in American Political Thought (New York: Praeger, 1992), 137–56.
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B. Orfield in 1942, Charles Leedham in 1964, Clement Vose in 1972, and Alan Grimes in
1978.15 Recently Michael Kammen, Bruce Ackerman, and Robert Dahl have reaffirmed
this story.16 As Michael J. Lynch noted “more than 10,000 proposals have led to a mere
twenty-seven amendments. The obvious limiting factor is the special majority required in
Congress.”17 Even after passing Congress, a proposal requires ratification by both houses
of three-fourths of the states. Since the 1791 ratification of the Bill of Rights, the states
rejected six of twenty-three amendments subject to a ratification vote. Sanford Levinson
concludes: “Article V constitutes what may be the most important bars of our
constitutional iron cage… [it] has made it next to impossible to achieve such adaptation
where amendment is thought to be necessary.”18
But Article V alone cannot explain the Constitution’s endurance. Surveying all
national constitutions ratified since 1789, Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton find that
inflexible constitutions cannot adjust to survive unexpected crises. They also find the
United States Constitution to be the least flexible of all national constitutions, suggesting

15

See Michael Angelo Musmanno, Proposed Amendments to the Constitution: A Monograph on the
Resolutions Introduced in Congress Proposing Amendments to the Constitution of the United States of
America. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1929); Lester B. Orfield, The Amending of the
Federal Constitution (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1942); Charles Leedham, Our Changing
Constitution (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1964); Clement E. Vose, Constitutional Change: Amendment
Politics and Supreme Court Litigation Since 1900 (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1972); Alan
Pendleton Grimes, Democracy and the Amendments to the Constitution (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books,
1978). For a review of these and other scholarly works on Article V, see David E. Kyvig, Explicit and
Authentic Acts: Amending the U.S. Constitution, 1776-1995 (University Press of Kansas, 1996), ix–xviii.
16
Kammen, A Machine That Would Go of Itself; Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Foundations, vol. I
(Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1993); Robert Alan Dahl, How Democratic Is the American
Constitution? (New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press, 2001), 144–45; Kramer, The People Themselves,
251.
17
Per Lynch, only seven amendments have failed ratification by the states after being proposed by
Congress, suggesting that the barrier to amendment is not the states but Congress. Michael J. Lynch, “Other
Amendments: The Constitutional Amendments That Failed,” Law Library Journal 93 (2001): 309.
18
Sanford Levinson, Our Undemocratic Constitution: Where the Constitution Goes Wrong (And How We
the People Can Correct It) (Oxford University Press, 2006), 159–66.
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that Article V would threaten the Constitution’s endurance.19 How, then, has the
Constitution survived?
In lieu of amendment, the Constitution’s brevity and according ambiguity allow
federal judges leeway to reinterpret the document. In reinterpreting or negating a core
value, judges can fundamentally change the Constitution.20 But federal judges rarely do
so. Per Robert Dahl, presidents and Congress appoint likeminded federal judges to affirm
existing statutes and constitutional interpretations.21 Moreover, since the president leads
national coalitions, presidents often determine whether to defer constitutional issues to
the courts, keeping some issues off the federal docket.22 Presidents leading new, unified
congressional coalitions can seize constitutional interpretation from the courts.23
19

Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton, The Endurance of National Constitutions, 81–83, 99–101, 140–41.
According to Jacobsohn, detailed “militant” documents or provisions specify how institutions can
interpret and implement these aspirations. For example, the 1868 Fourteenth Amendment specifically
deputized Congress to implement the principle of equal protection over the objections of ex-Confederates
in the states. Conversely, short, vague “acquiescent” constitutions defer these textual controversies to
political institutions to determine in accord with existing norms. See Gary Jacobsohn, Constitutional
Identity (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2010), 226–38. Many provisions in the American
Constitution are the latter sort. For more on constitutional identity and fundamental reinterpretation, see
Gary Jacobsohn, “Constitutional Identity,” The Review of Politics 68, no. 03 (June 2006): 361–397,
doi:10.1017/S0034670506000192; Gary Jacobsohn, “Rights and American Constitutional Identity,” Polity
43, no. 4 (October 2011): 409–31, doi:10.1057/pol.2011.10; Jacobsohn, Constitutional Identity, 2010.
21
Dahl, “Decision-Making in a Democracy.” Dahl notes the Supreme Court overturned only eighty-six
congressional statutes between 1790 and 1957, only fifteen of which were major policies overruled within
four years of passage, and almost all of these were reversed by congressional legislation. Dahl explains the
president and Congress restrain the Court through frequent appointment and foreknowledge of nominees’
preferences, excluding hostile nominees. Dahl’s study downplays the Court’s independence by excluding
the activist New Deal and Warren Courts, so the real question is not whether federal judges uphold existing
constitutional readings, but when. See Jonathan D. Casper, “The Supreme Court and National Policy
Making,” The American Political Science Review 70, no. 1 (March 1, 1976): 50–63, doi:10.2307/1960323.
As Lasser notes, the Court does not always quiet controversies. Lasser notes three cases in which
reactionaries on the Court issued a decision that exacerbated national polarization and the need for
realignment. William Lasser, “The Supreme Court in Periods of Critical Realignment,” The Journal of
Politics 47, no. 04 (November 1985): 1174–1187, doi:10.2307/2130812. Dredd Scott is one such example.
22
Stephen Skowronek, The Politics Presidents Make: Leadership from John Adams to George Bush
(Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press, 1993); Keith E. Whittington, Political Foundations of Judicial
Supremacy: The Presidency, the Supreme Court, and Constitutional Leadership in U.S. History (Princeton
University Press, 2009).
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Democracy”; Richard Funston, “The Supreme Court and Critical Elections,” The American Political
Science Review 69, no. 3 (September 1, 1975): 795–811, doi:10.2307/1958390. Adamany agrees the Court
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Alternately, when a contentious, crosscutting issue threatens to split a waning coalition,
the president can defer the issue to the courts, which will dismiss or slow appeals and
quiet constitutional controversies, helping preempt amendment.24 In either case, the
courts will likely avoid radical constitutional reinterpretation. And the few activist judges
that defy the president and Congress, lacking the power of the sword and purse, cannot
unilaterally enact constitutional reform.25
One might trust ordinary citizens to circumvent federal officials and reinterpret,
protest, or block repugnant constitutional provisions, reforming the Constitution.26 For
example, Revolutionary mobs captured Stamp Act officials in order to abrogate the Act,
and antebellum abolitionists hid fugitive slaves to vacate the Constitution’s Fugitive
Slave Clause.27 But Americans are constitutionally pious, accepting the dominant, shared,
popular constitutional dogma. The risk of American mobs is not so much their violence
as their conformity. Public circumvention of ordinary politics is thus rare, reserved for
crises and moments of exception.28 And even in these moments, popular mobs and

may initially oppose realignment coalitions, stripping new presidents and congresses of constitutional
legitimacy. David Adamany, “Legitimacy, Realigning Elections, and the Supreme Court,” Wisconsin Law
Review 1973 (1973): 820–25. This may be why realignment presidents like Jackson, Lincoln, and Franklin
Roosevelt claimed sole authority to interpret the constitution, to the exclusion of the Court.
24
Graber, “The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty.”
25
Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope.
26
This school of “popular constitutionalism” rests on Aristotle’s insight that a people and its constitution
are distinct – a people can outlast a constitution, and vice versa – but are interdependent. See Aristotle’s
Politics III.3, 5-8, 1277b, IV.11 1295a, VIII, which describes the politea, or constitutional regime, as a
city’s formal rules distributing property and public office and informal way of life. A single polity can
shuffle between various types of regime. Similarly, Hanna Pitkin takes “constitution” as a verb describing
an adversarial, discursive process pitting competing values against each other. A constitution is “the
unintended, collective by-product of our myriad private activities…constituting is not just doing what one
pleases.” Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, “Idea of a Constitution, The,” Journal of Legal Education 37 (1987): 168.
27
Kramer, The People Themselves; Jason A. Frank, Constituent Moments: Enacting the People in
Postrevolutionary America (Duke University Press, 2010); Elizabeth Beaumont, The Civic Constitution:
Civic Visions and Struggles in the Path Toward Constitutional Democracy (Oxford University Press,
2013). See Article IV, Section 2, Clause 3.
28
For example, Larry Kramer traces American popular constitutionalism to the Glorious Revolution, when
Englishmen and colonists protested, rioted, and fundamentally revised their constitutional customs. This
moment is exceptional, perhaps only matched in Anglo-American law by the American Revolution.
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activists eschew the formal process of amendment, explaining the resilience of the
written Constitution.
Similarly, Bruce Ackerman describes America as a “dualist democracy,” with
entrenched representatives passing ordinary statutes and the people infrequently electing
radicals to amend or reinterpret the Constitution to legally bind these entrenched
representatives. For example, the Reconstruction Republicans, like later New Deal
Democrats, “provoked a fundamental reworking of constitutional identity,” through the
Reconstruction Amendments and Social Security Act.29 These parties won landslide
election during times of unusual crisis, gaining the landslide legislative majority needed
to revise the Constitution. But these coalitions too are exceptional.
This stability further increases veneration. James Madison hoped the people
would interpret the Constitution rarely, only on “certain great and extraordinary
occasions… [for] frequent appeals would in great measure deprive the government of that
veneration which time bestows on every thing, and without which perhaps the wisest and
freest governments would not possess the requisite stability.”30 The Constitution, thanks
to Article V and judicial review,31 ages largely unamended and earns public veneration,

Additionally, since American popular constitutionalism grew from English practice, it relies on ideas of
shared constitutional custom, tradition, and gradualism. Kramer credits the English constitution with the
“capacity to improve without changing,” adding “Details, applications, even institutions might change, but
the fundamental law itself remained constant and retained its essential substance.” Kramer, The People
Themselves, 14–15.
29
Unlike Jacobsohn, Ackerman does not assert revising core commitments changes constitutional identity.
This leaves Ackerman’s idea of identity murky. See Ackerman, We the People, II:8; John E. Finn,
“Transformation or Transmogrification? Ackerman, Hobbes (as in Calvin and Hobbes), and the Puzzle of
Changing Constitutional Identity,” Constitutional Political Economy 10, no. 4 (November 1, 1999): 355–
65, doi:10.1023/A:1009023000354; Jacobsohn, “Constitutional Identity,” June 2006; Jacobsohn,
Constitutional Identity, 2010; Jacobsohn, “Rights and American Constitutional Identity.”.
30
Hamilton, Madison, and Jay, The Federalist, 245–46, 309.
31
In Federalist 78, Alexander Hamilton stripped colonial legislatures and popular conventions of the power
of constitutional review, granting it to the unelected federal judiciary, hoping the people would defer to
judges. Hamilton claimed “the will of the legislature declared in its statutes stands in opposition to that of
the people declared in the constitution, [and] judges ought to be governed by the latter, not the former.”
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requires from public officials an oath of fealty, and forbids mandatory religious oaths to
other idols.32 Veneration cools popular passions for amendment,33 which increases
stability, in turn increasing veneration. Madison designed the federal Constitution to
ossify as it aged.34

Legislators follow passing majoritarian passions, against the aim of the permanent Constitution and thus
against popular will. Life tenure insulates the judiciary from these majoritarian passions, allowing impartial
judicial review in accord with true constitutional aims and the true, enduring popular will. The judiciary
thus tempers and modifies popular agitation for constitutional reform. To Hamilton, judges understand the
popular will better than the people themselves, or their elected representatives. Popular constitutional
revision is not only misguided, but also defies true popular will. Similarly, Rousseau asserts the
majoritarian “will of all” is not the true, unanimous general will, but rather an impermanent and inaccurate
representation of the general will. In this sense Rousseau, like Madison and Hamilton, constrains popular,
majoritarian politics. See Ibid., 377–83. On the Social Contract II.3-4, IV.2.
32
See Article II, Section 1, Clause 8, and Article VI, Section 3.
33
As a tangential point, this undermines reading Madison as a liberal pluralist. In Federalist 10, Madison
uses federalism to moderate factions, claiming it is impossible and undesirable to control citizens’
preferences. This Madison adopts the classical liberal argument for value neutrality, against interference in
private belief, and adopts the pluralist argument that legal procedure channels competing interest groups
toward the public good. Charles Beard and Robert Dahl popularized Federalist 10 as the main thesis of The
Federalist. However, The Federalist is a polemical and thus inconsistent pamphlet. In Federalist 37, 49,
and 78, Madison and Hamilton suggest popular constitutional veneration will stabilize the constitution,
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hearts and minds: “The passions ought to be controuled and regulated by the government.” Hamilton,
Madison, and Jay, The Federalist, 248; Jack Rakove, “Constitutional Problematics, circa 1787,” in
Constitutional Culture and Democratic Rule, ed. John Ferejohn, Jack N. Rakove, and Jonathan Riley
(Cambridge University Press, 2001), 42–46.
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Madison got his wish, for Americans have long worshipped their Constitution. For example, on July 4,
1788, Philadelphians celebrated the Constitution’s recent ratification with a grand “Federal Procession.”
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standing atop an ornate coach, followed by workingmen’s trade councils bearing signs and banners. Three
weeks later, New Yorkers of all trades held their own parade to salute the Constitution. See Sean Wilentz,
Chants Democratic: New York City & the Rise of the American Working Class, 1788-1850 (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1984), 87; Kammen, A Machine That Would Go of Itself, 14–15, 45. After the
tumult of the Civil War, Congress’ Reconstruction Acts forced state constitutional framers to acknowledge
the primacy of the federal Constitution and forced state officeholders to “support the Constitution and laws
of the United States.” In 1887, the Constitutional Centennial Commission reaffirmed this. John Fiske’s
widely read 1891 schoolbook, Civil Government in the United States, called the federal Convention “one of
the most remarkable deliberative bodies in history.” John Fiske, Civil Government in the United States:
Considered with Some Reference to Its Origins (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1891), 209.
Progressive historians, lawyers, and political scientists advocated a flexible constitution, and observed and
warned against this resurgence in constitutional veneration. Hermann Von von Holst, The Constitutional
and Political History of the United States, trans. Ira Hutchinson Brainerd, vol. I (Washington: Callaghan,
1877); A. Lawrence Lowell, “The Responsibilities of American Lawyers,” Harvard Law Review 1, no. 5
(1887): 232–40, doi:10.2307/1321338; James Mitchell Ashley, “Constitution Worship,” in Public Opinion:
A Comprehensive Summary of the Press throughout the World on All Important Current Topics, vol. XIX
(New York: Public Opinion Company, 1895); Edward S. Corwin, “Worship of the Constitution,”
Constitutional Review 4 (1920): 3–10. But as Franklin Roosevelt centralized constitutional authority under
the New Deal, the 1937 Sesquicentennial Commission again reminded Americans of the authority of their
national Constitution. Half a century later, the Bicentennial Commission printed and distributed reams of
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This is not to say Americans agree in interpreting constitutional commitments.
Rather, political opponents legitimize their claims by upholding the same Constitution,
and often the same clause. In the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause’s loose
guarantee of “life, liberty, and property” antebellum slaveholders saw a right to their
property in slaves, and these slaves saw a right to their freedom.35 American
constitutional discourse and development is fraught and adversarial, but rarely escapes
the bounds of the Constitution.
The federal Constitution’s inflexibility, brevity, and age and public veneration
encourage judges and citizens to reinterpret their Constitution, rather than amend or
replace it. But popular and judicial reinterpretation tend to affirm existing constitutional
commitments or aspirations. Since national popular constitutionalism and judicial review
often work within existing constitutional commitments, they rarely fundamentally realign
the federal Constitution, helping explain the Constitution’s stability.
III. State Constitutional Instability
Most scholars ignore the state constitutions. Early American political scientists
chronicled state constitutional development until turning to political behavior in the midtwentieth century. 36 Despite the recent return to historical institutionalism and American

pocket Constitutions. In modern America’s fairly pluralist, secular society, the Constitution remains one of
the few objects of common worship. Thomas C. Grey, “The Constitution as Scripture,” Stanford Law
Review 37, no. 1 (1984): 1–25, doi:10.2307/1228651; Kammen, A Machine That Would Go of Itself; May,
“Constitutional Amendment and Revision Revisited,” 168; Levinson, Our Undemocratic Constitution;
Sanford Levinson, Framed: America’s 51 Constitutions and the Crisis of Governance (Oxford University
Press, 2012).
35
Similarly, the Constitution’s companion, the Declaration of Independence, is an aspirational document,
promising an equality unrealized at its framing and still incomplete. But it is an exceptionally vague and
acquiescent document. And so, eighty-seven years after its ratification, Abraham Lincoln found in the
Declaration a promise of equality compatible with abolition, and Jefferson Davis found a right to
proslavery succession.
36
For this history see Donald S. Lutz, “The Purposes of American State Constitutions,” Publius 12, no. 1
(January 1, 1982): 27–31, doi:10.2307/3329671. For Progressive-era accounts of the state constitutions, see
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political development, no comprehensive causal account of state constitutional duration
has been written.37 Similarly, many legal scholars overlook the states, genuflecting to the
federal Constitution, which exceeds the state documents in power, gravitas, and stability.
The state constitutions, with their thousands of obscure provisions and ten thousand
proposed amendments are dauntingly long and unwieldy. Thus most literature on
American constitutionalism disregards the state documents for the federal one.38
This is a problem. Almost all constitutional revision in America happens at the
state level. Further, the federal and state constitutions evolve interdependently, so to

for example John Alexander Jameson, A Treatise on Constitutional Conventions: Their History, Powers,
and Modes of Proceeding (Chicago: Callaghan and Company, 1887); James Bryce, The American
Commonwealth, vol. I (London: Macmillan, 1888), 427–62; Francis Newton Thorpe, “Recent ConstitutionMaking in the United States,” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 2, no.
2 (November 1, 1891): 1–57, doi:10.1177/000271629100200201; Amasa M. Eaton, “Recent State
Constitutions,” Harvard Law Review 6, no. 2 (1892): 53–72, doi:10.2307/1321703; Walter Fairleigh Dodd,
“Judicial Control over the Amendment of State Constitutions,” Columbia Law Review 10, no. 7 (November
1, 1910): 618–38, doi:10.2307/1110983; Christopher B. Coleman, “The Development of State
Constitutions,” Indiana Magazine of History, June 1, 1911; Walter Fairleigh Dodd, “The Function of a
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1–6; Robert F. Williams, The Law of American State Constitutions (Oxford University Press, Incorporated,
2009), 1–11; Peter S. Onuf, “State Politics and Republican Virtue: Religion, Education, and Morality in
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ignore the states is to misunderstand the federal Constitution. The dominant
understanding of national constitutional development is incomplete.
Much of national constitutional politics begins with the states. Popular, grassroots
organizing usually grows from state politics and constitutions,39 as do citizens’ identities
and cultures,40 municipal regulations, and some public ideologies. Against previous
readings, state constitutions are not parochial, but spark national trends, not
particularistic, but reflect reasoned convention debate, not ill-designed and contradictory,
but often functional.41 Finally, the flexibility of state constitutions allows policy
experimentation. This variation helps explain why some constitutions endure while others
fail. With the contemporary Congress polarized and gridlocked, the states, often
operating under single-party governments, have recently resolved constitutional issues
over gun regulation and same-sex marriage that the federal branches alone could not.
Especially now, the state constitutions matter for national politics. Myopic focus on the
federal Constitution, designed for inflexibility and permanence, exaggerates the stability
of American constitutionalism as a whole.
The state constitutions literature is sparse. Most accounts are narrow and
descriptive, shying from explaining constitutional development and endurance.42
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See Sheldon Wolin, The Presence of the Past: Essays on the State and the Constitution (Johns Hopkins
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Historians and lawyers chronicle particular eras, like the Revolution,43 particular states,
regions, and cultures, like the South,44 particular ideas, like republicanism,45 or particular
policy issues, like positive rights.46 In isolating eras, regions, ideas, and policies, these
scholars may miss how the interaction of these orders drives American political
development. Others trace the interaction of these ideas, policies, regions, and levels of
government over state constitutional history.47 For example, Julie Novkov and Emily
Zackin argue that state constitutionalism shapes national debates over family and
marriage regulation and over positive rights.48 But these accounts focus on a single issue
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area in which states have affected federal policy, and they may miss cases when state
revision preempts federal change, systematically understating the state constitutions’
effect on the federal one.
Three characteristics of state constitutions make them unstable. First, the states
have more and easier paths to reform than does the federal Constitution. Consider state
amendments. All state legislatures have fewer members than Congress and so can more
easily coordinate to propose amendments.49 In most state legislatures this is a two-thirds
supermajority, but fifteen states require only a simple majority to propose an amendment.
Legislators can also deputize an expert constitutional commission to amend the
constitution, or can submit a constitutional referendum to voters. Failing that, in eighteen
states voters can circumvent the legislature and amend the constitution through an
initiative.50 One can propose an initiative with as little as three percent of the number of
votes cast in the last election,51 and in all but one state, ratification requires only a simple
majority of voters. In contrast, ratification of a federal amendment requires three-quarters
of the states. Failing a state amendment, one can call a convention to replace the
constitution. This takes only a simple majority in fifteen states and to a two-thirds
majority in others, affirmed in all states by a simple majority popular vote. Fourteen
states require such votes at least once every twenty years. In all but three states, voters
49

See May, “Constitutional Amendment and Revision Revisited,” 168; Rosalind Dixon and Richard
Holden, “Constitutional Amendment Rules: The Denominator Problem,” in Comparative Constitutional
Design, ed. Tom Ginsburg (Cambridge University Press, 2012). Save Delaware, all states require voters
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50
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Article XLVIII.
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ratify convention votes by only a simple majority. Finally, six states do not fully specify
the procedure for calling a convention.52 Historically, even fewer states specified the
means of constitutional change,53 allowing frequent, extralegal popular conventions and
amendments. Of the ninety-six nineteenth-century constitutions, twenty-seven were made
without legal authority.
This flexibility permits frequent state constitutional reform, partly explaining state
constitutional instability.54 Specifically, the ease of constitutional revision tethers state
constitutions to swings in popular politics,55 such that when state legislative control
changes, state constitutions change.56 Dragged into tumultuous ordinary politics, these
documents have short lives relative to their federal counterpart.57 And in general, states
with lower barriers to amendment or replacement face more frequent revision. For
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62; Council of State Governments, “State Constitutions,” in The Book of the States 2014, vol. 46 (Council
of State Government, 2014).
53
Donald S. Lutz, “Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment,” The American Political Science
Review 88, no. 2 (June 1, 1994): 356, doi:10.2307/2944709; Tarr, Understanding State Constitutions, 35.
54
For more on this point see May, “Constitutional Amendment and Revision Revisited,” 155–64; Lutz,
“Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment”; Michael Besso, “Constitutional Amendment Procedures
and the Informal Political Construction of Constitutions,” Journal of Politics 67, no. 1 (2005): 71–75,
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example, the fourteen states that require periodic votes calling for a constitutional
convention undergo especially frequent change.58
Further, this flexibility lets state legislators stock their constitutions with partisan
pork-barrel provisions.59 When new parties enter the state legislature, they can easily
repeal these provisions, or quickly supersede them with new, additional clauses.
Consequently, all state constitutions are longer than the federal one, and on average are
quadruple the federal length. Alabama’s Constitution, at 376,000 words, is the world’s
longest,60 and is fifty times longer than the federal Constitution, which, just under 7,600
words, is the world’s shortest.
This textual specificity may further decrease the average state constitution’s
duration.61 These detailed, overtly-partisan provisions are vulnerable to replacement or
supersession after eventual switches in state legislative control. Consequently, longer
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state constitutions are replaced or amended more frequently.62 And while the brief federal
Constitution allows judges interpretive leeway, the state constitutions’ incredible
specificity limits the power of state judges.63 Further, these state judges are constrained
by legislators’ constitutional amendments,64 and by federal statutory and constitutional
law. With this state judicial review partly blocked, reformers have even more reason to
attempt state constitutional amendment. Finally, Madison accused the state constitutions
of a prolixity and “luxuriancy of legislation” that failed “to mark with precision the
duties” of citizens.65 With state citizens ignorant of the legal checks on their elected
representatives and their parties, government might frequently change hands between
self-interested representatives or factions, bringing new constitutional clauses.
Second, because Americans do not venerate their state constitutions, they likely
have fewer reservations with state constitutional revision. Only fifty-two percent of
respondents to a 1991 survey knew the states have constitutions, thirty-seven percent
were unsure, and eleven percent believed the states did not.66 Respondents to a 2014
survey, when informed they had a state constitution, approved of it, but this approval
reflected respondents’ pride in their state more than their political knowledge. Approval
62
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had little association with the constitution’s content, suggesting public knowledge of the
state constitutions is fairly superficial.67 And this approval did not reach levels of
approval for the federal Constitution.68 While the handful of New England constitutions
resemble the national document in endurance and popular admiration, most state
constitutions are closer to the Southern model – overtly partisan, neglected by their
citizens, and short-lived.69 To the extent that American states have a constitutional
culture,70 it is one of revision – Louisiana, with a French civil law tradition, has had
eleven lengthy documents, enough for a Louisiana lawyer to quip that “Constitutional
revision in Louisiana, whether in conventions or by amendment, has been sufficiently
continuous to justify including it with Mardi Gras, football, and corruption as one of the
premier components of state culture.”71 The other nine states first organized under
French, Spanish, and Mexican civil law customs also have unusually high amendment
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and replacement rates relative to other states,72 further distinguishing the states from the
gradualist common law tradition of federal constitutional reform.
Finally, constitutions backed by widespread consent should endure.73 Recent
rational choice theorists have revived this contractarian account of constitutional
endurance, asserting that common enforcement,74 checks on government,75and broad
72

These states are Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, New
Mexico, and Texas. Only Louisiana still practices civil law Berkowitz and Clay, “American Civil Law
Origins.”.
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Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law,” The American Political Science Review 91, no. 2 (June 1,
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distribution of benefits increase constitutional duration.76 Evidence suggests inclusive
national constitutions endure. Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton propose that broad
participation in drafting and ratification publicizes the terms of coordination of
enforcement, and widespread distribution of goods garners broad support, boosting
stability. Additionally, inclusive electoral participation keeps citizens culturally invested
in a constitution.77
State constitutions are the center of disputes over citizenship and civic exclusion.
In drafting the Tenth Amendment, Congress allowed the states unique and sometimes
exclusive constitutional power to regulate and limit state citizenship, the franchise,
office-holding, legislative district apportionment, and police powers including morality
and religion, temperance, education, labor rights, environmental rights, gender and
sexuality rights, disability rights, and racial classifications. State constitutions were the

fears of violation, “constitutions are necessarily delicate.” This is opposed to Hobbes’ claim that the
sovereign uses fear to compel obedience and secure the regime. It is closer to Locke’s assertion that a
regime that respects rights will likely not be overthrown. Constitutions are self-enforcing, and thus stable,
when many subjects favor enforcement.
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constitutional contract spurs a matching civic and constitutional culture. Weingast, “The Political
Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law,” 253–54. Yet Weingast reduces constitutional cultures
and norms to an epiphenomenal result of the original contract. His model does not admit values shape and
mediate actors’ preferences. Further, Weingast describes liberal constitutions that pit the citizen against the
sovereign. He cannot describe the many constitutions or cultures in which the people are the sovereign, as
in Aristotle’s Athens, or in classical or Rousseauean republicanism. In America, republican constitutional
design and culture may even eclipse the liberal model. Most notably see Wood, who shows that even
during the Revolution, state framers were as much concerned with empowering the sovereign people
through frequent elections as with restraining the executive. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic,
1776-1787.
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See Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton, The Endurance of National Constitutions, 78–81, 97–99. There are
caveats to this contractarian account. Framers of Jim Crow state constitutions so successfully
disempowered Southern blacks through disenfranchisement and physical intimidation that these exclusive
constitutions endured. Some state constitutions might survive by further excluding already disempowered
groups. Additionally, modern state constitutions are not social contracts formed and maintained for
common security and survival. Since the stakes for state constitutional revision are lower in the modern era,
there may be greater incentive for revision. And contrary to the contractarian expectation that citizens form
constitutions in order to weather crises, Americans tend to repeal their state constitutions in moments of
crisis, further suggesting the contractarian theory of national constitutions may not apply to subnational
constitutions.
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battleground on which, for example, the franchise was won by white males, then
suffragettes, then lost by Jim Crow blacks, to be regained by black civil rights litigants.
These citizenship struggles and exclusions likely destabilize state constitutions.78
State constitutional duration reflects local coalition politics. Elites may grant
constitutional rights either to compromise with progressive allies or to legally entrench
their waning power.79 According to this entrenchment theory, constitutions are
conservative documents which elites use to bind progressive legislatures or courts. Yet at
the state level this is likely not the case.80 State constitutions’ open conventions, staffed
by novices and outsiders, states’ referenda, easy amendment, and elected judiciaries
invite popular reforms. That is, state constitutions’ popular revision process is actually a
source of instability. Further, exclusive state citizenship provisions prompt contention,
repeal, and further revision.81 For example, in 1790, ten of thirteen states used property
qualifications to exclude adult white males from the franchise. These men rallied,
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proposing at least forty-six state constitutional reforms, so that by 1855, only three of
thirty-one states maintained such qualifications.82
In conclusion, the federal Constitution’s inflexibility and widespread veneration
discourage amendment and popular and judicial reinterpretation. The state constitutions,
with their flexibility, cultures of revision, and civic controversies, face frequent
amendment. But these explanations alone are incomplete, for the national and state
constitutions develop together. The federal government has broad authority over state
constitutions – Congress and the president can defer enabling acts that recognize state
constitutions, while federal courts and constitutional amendments invalidate or reinforce
provisions of state constitutions and steer state judicial review.83 Further, innovations in
federal governance can obviate state constitutions. The federal government strategically
enforces and relaxes these constraints, relegating thorny issues to the states and
controlling the scope of conflict.84 For example, the federal framers, unable to agree on
regulation of virtue, crime, citizenship, and education, delegated morality legislation to
the states, requiring only “a republican form of [state] government.”85 Thwarted at the
national level, reformers target the state constitutions, which are flexible and have many
special policy prerogatives. Nineteenth-century temperance and morality crusaders first
reformed the state constitutions, building the national coalition that eventually scored the
Eighteenth and Nineteenth Amendments. These national coalitions carry policies and
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ideas across state borders, so that reforms diffuse across states.86 Pennsylvania’s populist
1776 Constitution, for example, inspired constitutional provisions in Vermont, Maryland,
and Georgia.87 Federal deference to the states may destabilize state constitutions. This
interaction is the subject of the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 2: HOW STATE CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION STABILIZES THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may,
if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic
experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”
Louis Brandeis, 193288
I. Model

The federal Constitution creates national and state governments, enumerating
specific powers of the national government and denying many of these to the states. The
Tenth Amendment reserves non-enumerated powers to the states and their constitutions,
to the exclusion of the national government. But since the federal Constitution is short
and ambiguous, many powers delegated to the national government are not expressly
denied to the states, allowing broad concurrent authority. This lets the federal government
defer some constitutional controversies to the states, the subject of this chapter.
A petitioner seeking to reform concurrent powers picks the venue, national or state, that
offers the greatest chance of success. A smarter petitioner bends the rules to repeatedly
guide his or her cause to a friendly venue. Since the rules for arbitration are themselves
contested or unclear,89 the authority and operation of the national and state constitutions,
courts, and legislatures is often disputed, with petitioners strategically constructing and

88

New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932).
The federal framers, deeply divided over the scope of national and state powers, largely avoided defining
each. On May 31, 1787, James Madison proposed Congress veto state legislation to clarify national and
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moving between each. Put very simply, reformers can attempt federal or state
constitutional revision, which can stabilize or destabilize the federal Constitution.
Consider Table 1.
Venue to address constitutional dispute
Decentralized/states Centralized/national
Federal
Stability/resolved
1. Slavery 1800-50 2. Power over post office, post-1787
Outcome Instability/unresolved 3. Slavery 1850-65 4. Coinage/monetary policy 1870-90
Table 1: Paths and Examples of American Constitutional Development.

Analysis of American constitutionalism often ignores cells one and three above,
focusing on the federal Constitution in cells two and four. Scholars have thoroughly
documented how the national courts, Congress, and executive have exacerbated or
resolved national constitutional debates. These national conflicts are important, if overstudied. This dissertation studies all four cells, showing how disputants strategically
choose their venue, national or state, and how this encourages national constitutional
stability or instability.
Specifically, this dissertation argues that when Americans leave disputes to the
states, the states usually resolve these issues, preserving the national Constitution. State
constitutionalism has quieted and stabilized national constitutional politics.90 In studying
the states, this dissertation does not deny the importance of national actors, or claim that
all cases of national constitutional change involve the states. Rather, this study explains
how state constitutional revision often preempts or resolves national conflicts, shaping
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Tocqueville for example affirmed Americans’ enthusiasm for quarantining some constitutional issues to
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the choices of national actors. Paradoxically, to understand national constitutional
politics, one cannot study solely the national Constitution. This chapter outlines how
federal and state constitutional reform interact, concluding by exploring the implications
of this interaction.
The following model demonstrates how constitutional decentralization can abate
pressure for national constitutional reform. National controversies emerge, allowing state
constitutional revision to resolve the controversy, usually preventing national partisan
and constitutional change.
1.National
2. State
1a.
1b.
1c.
2a.
2b.
Change in
Contention
Deference Constitutional Constitutional
population, over
to states
and partisan
revision
technology, Constitution
contention
economics
Figure 1: The States’ Role in American Constitutional Reform.

3a.
Constitutional
and partisan
accord

3. National
3b.
Constitutional
stability

This model applies only to American constitutionalism, and only imperfectly. In a
particular context, this process may occur partially or completely, once or repeatedly, for
one issue or for many.91 Given America’s diverse, incomparable regimes and eras, this
model is not a universal or complete account of American constitutional politics, but can
explain constitutional change on particular issues in a given context.92
Consider each step in the model. American constitutional conflict grows from a
broader dilemma in modern liberal constitutionalism. Constitutions have usually two
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realignment at the third stage. Other issues begin at the second stage, emerging in the states to preempt or
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main purposes. One is to entrench stable rules for the common good.93 Another is to
create a polity and an according common space to enact democratic citizenship.94 These
functions are opposed. The former restrains the polity and the latter empowers it to
reconstitute itself, posing the old normative dilemma between common stability and
democratic autonomy. It also helps explain constitutional change – polities slowly
outgrow and break their inflexible constitutional restraints.
This tension is particularly clear in American constitutionalism, as the
Constitution’s preamble and the Declaration of Independence encourage democratic
constitutional reform while Article V supermajority requirements entrench the national
Constitution against popular revision. As noted in Figure 1, demographic, economic, and
technological trends, especially, slowly delegitimize the entrenched constitutional order
(1a). New populations grow and petition for legal inclusion, trying to translate their
constituent authority into a constitutional amendment.95 But constitutions by nature and
design entrench law against reform, legally and inflexibly bounding the polity. This
93
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designed, necessary unresponsiveness to changes in civic membership exacerbates the
boundary problem,96 legally excluding some members of the polity, who, to gain legal
inclusion, must be citizens. If threatened by outsiders’ push for inclusion, national parties
can appoint conservative judges to uphold the constitutional status quo, ossifying the
Constitution and exacerbating the problem. Inflexible national constitutions cannot adjust
to survive unexpected crises,97 and thanks to Article V, the United States Constitution is
the world’s least flexible constitution.98 Blocked from achieving a national amendment,
reformers may turn to the courts for reinterpretation. But legislators and executives
confirm judges who uphold the constitutional status quo,99 and activist judges cannot
unilaterally enforce their decisions.100 Popular majorities can instead elect radical
legislators,101 or abrogate contentious constitutional provisions,102 but Americans so
venerate their Constitution that this is exceptional and rare.
Without constitutional amendment or reinterpretation, reformers’ petitions can
become grievances and constitutional controversies (1b). Those lacking full citizenship
rights can expansively interpret egalitarian provisions like the Equal Protection Clause or
can propose new amendments.103 The gap between evolving civic aspiration and
inflexible legal reality plagues all laws, but none more than constitutions, which express
civic aspirations and face special public attention and scrutiny. Reformers can chase the
96
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inclusive textual ideal through cyclical constitutional rewriting, but can never achieve full
civic inclusion, such that each revision is imperfect, planting the seed for its successor.
Alternately, a single constitutional commitment or aspiration can yield dueling
interpretations.104 Organizers turn to the same shared, authoritative constitutional values
to turn out their base and build coalitions, but interpret these values in incompatible ways.
Finally, separate and opposed constitutional commitments and clauses may clash.105
Article V puts all proposed amendments before Congress, and the executive and
federal courts also field constitutional controversies. These national actors have several
reasons to avoid contentious issues and to defer them to the states. First, the states’ broad,
traditional police powers to regulate health, safety, morals, and welfare encourage
national actors to defer these to the states. National actors that read their powers narrowly
have more incentive to recognize state authority. Second, constitutional controversies can
split the national parties. Reformers can strategically phrase their constitutional appeals
and grievances to internally divide parties, to seize new factions for their cause and form
dissident coalitions and third parties.106 Civic identities are especially powerful divisive
tools.107 Alternately, members of Congress may be overburdened and may avoid thorny
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legal debates over federalism. Finally, Congress may avoid proposing an amendment that
the states are unlikely to ratify.
Congress, the president, and the federal courts have many constitutional tools to
defer issues to the states (1c). Several clauses in the federal Constitution encourage this.
The Tenth Amendment grants the states expansive authority over any constitutional
power not prohibited to them or expressly delegated to the federal government.108 The
Elections Clause lets states regulate the time, place, and manner of elections.109 Under the
Guarantee Clause’s vague requirement of “republican government” in the states, the
Congress, executive, and federal courts have upheld deference to the states and
occasionally found grounds to threaten to force state constitutional revision.110 The Full
Faith and Credit Clause also allows Congress to intervene in conflicts between states,
forcing states to address particular constitutional issues.111 And citing the Territories
Clause, Congress used enabling acts to force territorial legislatures to address divisive
national constitutional issues until the early twentieth century.112 The broader the

twentieth century that shunned radicalism and communism. Writing in a more contentious time, Walter
Dean Burnham, Samuel Huntington, and Bruce Ackerman claim excluded groups periodically vie for and
achieve civic inclusion via intense organizing and realignment within the major parties, culminating in a
critical election and new, stable, egalitarian constitutional vision. Rogers Smith also debunks Hartz and
Huntington’s liberal thesis, asserting civic exclusion often drives instability and political and constitutional
change. See Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America: An Interpretation of American Political
Thought since the Revolution (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 1955); Walter Dean Burnham, Critical
Elections: And the Mainsprings of American Politics (W. W. Norton & Company, 1970); Samuel P.
Huntington, American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony (Harvard University Press, 1981); Smith,
“Beyond Tocqueville, Myrdal, and Hartz”; Smith, Civic Ideals.
108
The short, vague Tenth Amendment does not specify which issues are subject to state police powers
regulation, so the political construction and interpretation of the Tenth Amendment determines which
national issues the states can quiet. For example, current interpretation of the Tenth Amendment allows
states nearly exclusive oversight over divisive issues like lottery, alcohol, and franchise regulation,
stabilizing federal constitutional policy.
109
Article I, Section 4, Clause 1.
110
Article IV, Section 4, Clause 1. On the Guarantee Clause, see Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1 (1849), and
on the Tenth Amendment, see the Court’s regular invocation of the states’ broad police powers.
111
Article IV, Section 1.
112
For example, Democratic and Whig congressional leadership united to silence antislavery radicals in
both parties by devolving slavery regulation to the territories, citing a reading of the Territories Clause
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interpretation of these provisions, the more effective the states can be at seizing and
national controversies. Put differently, national coalitions quiet threatening issues by
forcing them on the states, controlling conflict by limiting its national scope.113 Censoring
ideas and rhetoric preserves some coalitions and disarms others, quietly setting the
rhetorical agendas that shape policymakers’ preferences.114
The states can tackle national controversies by proposing state constitutional
reforms (2a).115 There are several ways states and territories can claim authority over
national issues. Congressional, presidential, and federal judicial deference can shift
controversies to the states, pressuring moderates and letting opportunistic state radicals
push constitutional debates and reforms on previously neglected topics.116 National
reformers, thwarted by barriers to national constitutional amendment and reinterpretation,
may propose state constitutional reforms.117 Sometimes state reformers may push
constitutional reforms that are uncontroversial at the national level, but have the potential
popularized by Lewis Cass and Stephen Douglas. See Article 4, Section 3, Clauses 1 and 2. Congress also
used the Clause and enabling acts to condition territories’ admission on revision of the territorial
constitution.
113
See Elmer Eric Schattschneider, The Semi-Sovereign People: A Realist’s View of Democracy in
America. (Holt, Rhineart, and Winston, 1975); Graber, “The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty.”
114
Still, the process is inexact. Broad public philosophies can shift preferences without any policymakers
intending or perceiving the process. Lieberman, “Ideas, Institutions, and Political Order”; Jal Mehta, “The
Varied Roles of Ideas in Politics: From ‘Whether’ to ‘How,’” in Ideas and Politics in Social Science
Research, ed. Daniel Beland and Robert Henry Cox (Oxford University Press, 2010); Parsons, “Ideas,
Positions, and Supranationality.”. Words and identities are flexible, unreliable instruments that may
backfire, be co-opted, or ossify through path dependence.
115
The states are excluded from some areas under Article I, Sections 8 and 10, the Supremacy Clause of
Article VI, and are subject to congressional oversight on franchise regulation through several amendments.
116
State coalitions do not defer these controversial issues to the courts. There are two explanations for this.
First, as Graber suggests, variation between states is greater than variation within states, so states’ relative
homogeneity and small size unify state coalitions. This blunts wedge issues, so state coalitions rarely need
to defer to the judiciary, and only do on especially divisive issues like abortion. Graber, “The
Nonmajoritarian Difficulty,” 40, 56–59. However, state politics is more contentious than Graber admits, so
it is more likely that entrepreneurial state coalition outsiders strategically use these issues to unseat
moderate coalition leaders.
117
See Dinan, The American State Constitutional Tradition; John Dinan, “State Constitutions and
American Political Development,” in Constitutional Dynamics in Federal Systems: Sub-National
Perspectives, ed. Michael Burgess and G. Alan Tarr (McGill-Queen’s Press - MQUP, 2012); Sean
Beienburg, “Contesting the U.S. Constitution through State Amendments: The 2011 and 2012 Elections,”
Political Science Quarterly 129, no. 1 (2014): 55–85, doi:10.1002/polq.12146.
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to preempt national debates and reforms. Or state officials may unilaterally seize
authority over a constitutional issue, even without federal deference. And some clauses of
the federal Constitution grant the states special or exclusive authority over nationally
contentious issues.118 A fracturing state coalition may refuse constitutional change,
exacerbating the standing controversy and speeding the coalition and constitution’s
demise. A new legislative coalition then may push for state constitutional amendment or
replacement.119
Since state constitutional reform is relatively easy, many proposed reforms pass
(2b). All state constitutions have a lower amendment threshold than the federal
Constitution,120 and in many states one can propose amendments through popular
initiatives and referenda, such that almost two-thirds of proposed state constitutional
amendments have been ratified. Failing amendment, states can propose new constitutions
through a host of easily methods, and almost half of proposed constitutions have cleared
these hurdles.121 Further, state courts can reinterpret their state constitutions.122
Alternately, ordinary Americans do not venerate their state constitutions as they do their
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For example, the Elections Clause allows the states to regulate the franchise, subject to Congressional
override.
119
See also Cayton, “Why Are Some Institutions Replaced While Others Persist?” Note also that a
coalition may use a constitution revision to reapportion or gerrymander legislative seats, tightening its grip
on the state legislature. Party balance in the state legislature spurs constitutional revision, which in turn
changes partisan balance.
120
These range from a simple to a two-thirds legislative majority to propose an amendment.
121
States can propose new constitutions through their legislatures, governors, and constitutional
conventions, committees, and commissions, and councils. Of the states’ proposed 9,500 amendments, at
least 5,900 have passed. See Tarr, Understanding State Constitutions, 24. Of 354 proposed state
constitutions, 146 have been ratified.
122
But state courts likely do not drive state constitutional reform. The sitting governor and legislature can
appoint friendly judges to uphold the constitutional status quo, so state judges often avoid radically
reinterpreting the state constitution. And activist judges can lose judicial jurisdiction though legislative
state constitutional amendments and through congressional statutes and federal court rulings. See for
example Dinan, “Court-Constraining Amendments and the State Constitutional Tradition.”
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national Constitution, and so have fewer reservations with reinterpreting, nullifying, or
abrogating state constitutional provisions.123
This frequent revision increases state constitutional length and decreases public
veneration, encouraging further revision.124 Easy and frequent addition of new clauses
may make a state constitution seem more like an ordinary statute and unworthy of
popular veneration. Accordingly states with higher revision rates have especially low
levels of constitutional veneration.125 Citizens who do not venerate their constitution
likely have fewer qualms with amending or replacing it, further decreasing veneration.126
An easy amendment process also yields a long, particularistic, specific document. This
specificity loads a document with contentious provisions, decreasing veneration and
encouraging further revision, further eroding veneration. Once begun, the revision cycle
is difficult to end. Unless the revision satisfies all parties, losers push for more

123

Eighteenth and nineteenth-century Americans rallied to block or harass state officials, disband or
intimidate state legislatures, or convene extralegal conventions and elections. By the twentieth century,
citizens vented their frustration through constitutional initiatives and referenda. For informal
reinterpretation of the state constitutions, see Besso, “Constitutional Amendment Procedures and the
Informal Political Construction of Constitutions.”
124
See the previous chapter on this.
125
On average, each state has ratified 2.96 constitutions. Of the seventeen states to have ratified four or
more constitutions, in twelve states, respondents’ current average approval for their state constitution was
below the national average. This varies by region as well. Ten of these seventeen states were Southern.
Similarly, of the nineteen states in which the average state constitutional approval rating was below the
national average, all but five had a state constitutional replacement rate that exceeded the national average
of 2.96 ratified constitutions per state. Similarly, respondents in states with lower average constitutional
duration reported lower admiration for their current constitution. See the appendix for Figure 19.
126
Cayton correctly notes that the public is ignorant of state constitutional politics, precluding public
attitudes on state constitutional revision. However, per Elazar and Berkowitz and Clay, elites like
legislators and lawyers in different states have different constitutional cultures and traditions. For example,
the nine former civil law states have retained a higher rate of revision, even after switching to common law,
than the forty states founded on common law, suggesting state legal traditions exist and are durable.
Louisiana, which was founded on and continues to practice civil law, has adopted 11 constitutions, more
than any other state. Elazar, American Federalism; Elazar, “The Principles and Traditions Underlying State
Constitutions”; Berkowitz and Clay, “American Civil Law Origins”; Cayton, “Why Are Some Institutions
Replaced While Others Persist?”
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revision.127 Constantly vulnerable to revision, a state constitution survives only as long as
a coalition can support it.
State reforms resolve national constitutional conflicts in chiefly two ways (3a).128
In cases of preemptive resolution, state legislators and framers first seize and address a
national constitutional issue, preventing the federal branches from later intervening or
proposing amendments in this area. Alternately in cases of joint resolution, the federal
and state governments jointly propose amendments addressing the same constitutional
issues. However, since state amendment is much easier, usually reform only occurs at the
state level. Further, state revisions may appease reformers and quiet calls for both state
and federal constitutional revision.129 Both types of resolution stabilize the federal
Constitution (3b).
Consider four cases that can lead to preemptive and joint resolution. First,
national leaders can defer to the states by citing states’ Tenth Amendment powers or the
effectiveness of the states’ constitutional regulations, preempting new constitutional
conflicts or jointly resolving existing ones.130 And national elites can retrench their
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For example, on citizenship matters, no revision can achieve complete civic inclusion, so there will
always be losers undermining the document.
128
Actually four outcomes are possible: reforms to concurrent powers can be proposed at solely the federal
level, solely the state level, both, or neither. This dissertation focuses on the second and third cases
(proposals for reform are made at solely the state level or at both the state and federal level) partly because
state reform is understudied, requiring further explanation, and partly because it occurs frequently,
accounting for most of American constitutional reform. Thus the emphasis on these two out of the four
possible outcomes.
129
In The Discourses Machiavelli lauded the Roman practice of periodically venting popular tensions
against elites for the sake of political stability. More recently, Tarr, Burgess, and Marshfield argue federal
national constitutions allow constitutional discretion, or “space,” to subnational units for the sake of
stability. G. Alan Tarr, “Explaining Sub-National Constitutional Space,” Penn State Law Review 115 (2011
2010): 1133; Michael Burgess and G. Alan Tarr, “Introduction: Sub-National Constitutionalism and
Constitutional Development,” in Constitutional Dynamics in Federal Systems: Sub-National Perspectives,
ed. Michael Burgess and G. Alan Tarr (McGill-Queen’s Press - MQUP, 2012); Jonathan L. Marshfield,
“Models of Substantial Constitutionalism,” Penn State Law Review 115 (2011 2010): 1151.
130
For example, some twentieth-century congressional Democrats upheld Jim Crow state constitutions and
statutes on states’ rights grounds, quieting national civil rights debate and amendments.
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constitutional platform by imitating state innovations through congressional statute,
preempting amendment. Relatedly, second, the diversity of state constitutional
provisions, especially on morality, creates a patchwork nation that lets Americans pick a
state that suits their lifestyle. Diversity for mobile Americans means more choices and
greater satisfaction, preventing federal amendment. Alternately, third, a local or regional
movement that scored state constitutional reform may not be prepared to capture a
national majority. Movements might fizzle out locally, preempting national debate.131
And similarly, fourth, splitting a national movement across fifty states may fracture and
kill the national movement, producing many disparate state reforms. The states’
seemingly parochial, localist, diverse amendments can actually present a coherent,
locally-tailored, viable solution to a rising or existing national controversy, preempting or
resolving these controversies.132 These parochial provisions allow federal constitutional
stability. Oddly the state constitutions’ parochialism makes them nationally significant. In
sum, with national controversy quieted, there is little incentive to launch a difficult
national campaign to pass a federal amendment, so the federal Constitution remains
stable. The states preemptively and jointly resolve national controversies.133
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For example, arid Western states carefully regulate water use, but there is little incentive for Western
reformers to make this a national cause.
132
For example, Florida’s Constitution regulates the catching of saltwater finfish, a seeming obscure and
unimportant provision, but is part of a broader and nationally-important tradition of local fishery regulation.
See the Florida Constitution of 1968, Article X, Section 16.
133
One might object that national actors strategically guard issues from state interference, so that
constitutional change circumvents the states. National constitutional debates (1b) might realign the national
coalition (3a) and Constitution (3b) without the states. For example, since the New Deal, Congress has used
grants-in-aid to coerce states into constitutional compliance with federal law, potentially preventing state
mediation. And today, the ideal of states nullifying or modifying the federal Constitution may seem a relic
of the nineteenth century. Indeed, for a handful of issues like coinage or national security, the states have
no constitutional authority. But, as noted earlier, these few policy areas from which states are explicitly
excluded are also politically constructed, usually in response to states’ failure to regulate these areas
effectively. Revolutionary-era states could constitutionally coin money, but could not coordinate coinage,
forcing federal constitutional revision in 1787 that stripped this power from the states. Outside of these few
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There are exceptions. Rarely, state revision can exacerbate national controversies,
requiring federal action. Deference to the states can incubate constitutional debates in
some states. Under the Tenth Amendment, states can introduce new policies and laws
that federal courts and the Congress cannot consider.134 This state experimentation could
arm national coalition radicals with new, viable, tested constitutional platforms.135
Alternately state politicians might see their constitution undermined by a neighboring
state, and pursue national constitutional reform to strong-arm their neighbors.136 Or, when
the national constitutional controversy aligns with sectional tensions, deference to the
states can exacerbate these regional divides and further inflame the issue. Acting in their
short-term interest, national party leaders may continue to defer the issue to the states,
even though this promises eventual discord.137 Unresolved conflict can destabilize
national coalitions, allowing partisan realignment and reinterpretation or amendment of
the federal Constitution,138 and widespread political change.139 But since national actors

issues, the states structure national authority even when they do not directly intervene in a conflict, as the
next section shows.
134
These are the police powers over health, safety, morals, and welfare. Additionally, states have special
legal prerogative over elections and citizenship law. For example, Novkov shows state constitutional and
statutory citizenship regulation affected the development of national citizenship regulations. Novkov,
“Bringing the States Back In.”
135
If, as Graber claims, state coalitions “spend little energy constructing policies that might satisfy
constitutional standards,” then they would not offer viable solutions to federal policy debates. However
Zackin rebuts Graber, showing state coalitions draft and implement successful solutions to federal
constitutional problems, especially on positive rights. For more on state constitutional experimentation and
consequent effect on the federal Constitution see Graber, “The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty,” 58; Burgess
and Tarr, “Introduction: Sub-National Constitutionalism and Constitutional Development,” 18–21; Zackin,
Looking for Rights in All the Wrong Places.
136
For example, between 1777 and 1786 the legislatures and courts of Massachusetts, Vermont, and New
Hampshire extended due process protections to resident slaves, potentially including fugitives. Southerners
passed the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, forcing federal and local agents to return runaways, reforming the
laws of free states. Free states like Wisconsin and Vermont abrogated the Act, worsening the controversy.
Devolution of slavery regulation aggravated sectionalism, forcing the 1850 Act, which further split the
Democratic and Whig parties, forcing the Civil War and constitutional realignment.
137
Congressional devolution of fugitive slave laws and territorial slave policy in 1850 is one such example.
138
Is it possible for a new national coalition to fail to realign the federal Constitution, and instead maintain
the constitutional status quo? That is, can a mass partisan realignment occur without a constitutional
realignment? It is possible, but unlikely. A national realignment coalition holds an exceptional majority of
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use deference to quiet controversies, this should be rare. And even in rare cases when
state revision fails to preempt federal amendment, this state revision can quiet debates
around the amendment, easing its passage.
II. Implications for American Constitutional Development
This model upsets the conventional approach to American constitutional
development which focuses on the federal Constitution. First, scholars ignoring the states
miss almost all American constitutional revision, which happens at the state level.140
More importantly, state constitutionalism mediates how national actors affect the federal
Constitution. Constitutional reformers are opportunistic, simultaneously working at the
national and state level. Often these paths intersect, so to study one path in isolation is to
misinterpret it.
To clarify: imagine American constitutionalism simplified to only courts and
states. Figure 2 illustrates such a system.

Congress – a realignment coalition is defined in part by its unusually large legislative majority – and thus
likely meets the two-thirds supermajority of a national convention or of both congressional houses required
to propose a federal amendment. These national majorities are often backed by reformist state majorities
(2a), which may meet the three-fourths supermajority required for state legislatures or conventions to ratify
the proposed amendment. But these are exceptionally high thresholds that may thwart realignment
coalitions. Coalitions have other options, like passing quasi-constitutional statutes like the Social Security
Act, designed to last generations, or packing the judiciary and revising the federal Constitution through
judicial review. Given the difficulty of revising the Constitution, it is unlikely a surviving but waning
coalition (3a), falling short of a realignment coalition’s supermajority, could realign the Constitution.
139
National constitutional realignment destabilizes national politics generally. Constitutions undergird
ordinary politics, statutory legislation, enforcement of laws, civic culture, and political legitimacy, so
constitutional instability affects citizens’ very beliefs and safety. National realignment also affects the
states, as the federal Supremacy Clause, congressional enabling acts, and judicial review force lagging
states to match these federal reforms. Deference to the states initially quiets national conflict but may
eventually backfire, provoking national conflict. Similarly, Graber shows legislative deference to the
judiciary works in the short run but may eventually backfire. Graber, “The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty,”
65–68.
140
As stated, Americans have proposed only a single federal constitution with only twenty-seven
amendments, but have proposed at least 354 state constitutions, ratified 146, proposed at least 9,500 state
constitutional amendments, and ratified at least 5,900.
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National constitutional
controversy

Judicial review

National constitutional
(in)stability

State constitutional revision

Figure 2: The Courts and States in National Constitutional Reform

In ignoring the states, scholars sometimes attribute outcomes to the judiciary which may
actually be caused by state constitutional revision. The many accounts of judicial review
that ignore the states cannot explain all that they claim to explain. That is, most accounts
of national judicial and constitutional development are fundamentally flawed.
For example, Robert Dahl, Mark Graber, and Keith Whittington assert judges
usually preserve existing readings of the Constitution, while William Lasser and David
Adamany disagree. 141 Both camps miss that national actors defer controversies to the
states. If judges are the impartial, apolitical arbiters they claim to be, then judges too may
defer some political questions to political bodies like state legislatures and
conventions.142 If judges are instead partial and political, then they likely strategically
devolve some issues to the states to avoid inter-branch confrontation.143 Judges can defer
political questions to the states by refusing to grant a writ of certiorari to hear a case.
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Dahl, Graber, and Whittington assert that Congress and the executive defer controversies to federal
judges to postpone political and constitutional reform. Lasser and Adamany reply that strong courts can
defy weak executives and congresses Dahl, “Decision-Making in a Democracy”; Adamany, “Legitimacy,
Realigning Elections, and the Supreme Court”; Casper, “The Supreme Court and National Policy Making”;
Lasser, “The Supreme Court in Periods of Critical Realignment”; Graber, “The Nonmajoritarian
Difficulty”; Whittington, Political Foundations of Judicial Supremacy.
142
For this principle, see Luther v. Borden (1849). More recently, Justices Marshall, Holmes, Rehnquist,
and O’Connor frequently and gladly devolved controversies to the states. Note also that Supreme Court
justices defer to state amicus briefs. See Stefanie A. Lindquist and Pamela C. Corley, “National Policy
Preferences and Judicial Review of State Statutes at the United States Supreme Court,” Publius: The
Journal of Federalism 43, no. 2 (April 1, 2013): 151–78, doi:10.1093/publius/pjs044.
143
Marshall is an instructive case – an arch-Federalist, he stripped states’ economic regulatory power in
Fletcher v. Peck (1810), McCulloch v. Maryland (1819), and Gibbons v. Ogden (1824), until the 1828
election of the states-rights Democrats and Andrew Jackson forced Marshall to defer to states’ commerce
regulations in Willson v. Black-Bird Creek Marsh Co. (1829) and Barron v. Baltimore (1833). See Fletcher
v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87 (1810), McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819), Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1
(1824), Willson v. Black-Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829), and Barron v. Baltimore, 32
U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).

42

Studying only cases that go before the courts, courts scholars systematically miss the
many cases the courts refuse and quietly defer to the states. Selecting issues over which
the courts have power, these studies may consistently exclude cases of federal deference
to the states, missing an important part of judges’ reasoning and of national constitutional
development.
When we integrate the states, many cases of national constitutional action or
inaction attributed to the courts could instead or additionally be explained by state
revision.144 Courts scholars are correct that judicial review can prompt national
constitutional stability or instability. But they often miss that deference by Congress, the
president, and the courts to the states spurs state constitutional and statutory revision.145
American state legislatures, voters, and conventions have amendment power the courts
lack. These amendments are written with political aims, have plenary legal power,
structure executives and legislatures to enforce these policy aims, and can constrain state
judiciaries.146 Relatedly, federal deference to the state constitutions likely explains the
lively positive rights tradition observed by Brennan, Hershkoff, and Zackin.147 Further,
144

For example, in 1850, Stephen Douglas led Congress to defer regulation of slavery to territorial
constitutional conventions, causing the slavery crisis that Adamany and Lasser blame on Prigg v.
Pennsylvania (1842) and Dred Scott v. Sandford (1857). Graber also shows Congress deferred to the
judiciary on slavery, yielding Dred Scott, on monopoly regulation via the 1890 Sherman Act and E.C.
Knight, and on abortion in Roe. see Graber, “The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty,” 45–61. Yet Congress also
deferred to the states on each of these issues: on slavery, as stated, on Progressive monopoly and labor
rights, and on modern abortion and same-sex marriage. See Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539 (1842) or
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857), United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895), and Roe
v. Wade 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
145
Graber suggests this in passing. Ibid., 40.
146
Dinan and Burgess and Tarr note state constitutions’ easy revision procedure and special legal
prerogatives attract reformers thwarted at the national level. Dinan, The American State Constitutional
Tradition; Dinan, “State Constitutions and American Political Development”; Burgess and Tarr,
“Introduction: Sub-National Constitutionalism and Constitutional Development,” 17–18. Yet constitutional
deference to the states reflects national coalitions’ political tactics and intentions, as much as these legal
incentives.
147
William J. Brennan Jr., “State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights,” Harvard Law
Review 90, no. 3 (January 1, 1977): 489–504, doi:10.2307/1340334; Hershkoff, “Positive Rights and State
Constitutions”; Hershkoff, “Positive Rights and the Evolution of State Constitutions”; Hershkoff and
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the courts, lacking the power of the purse and the sword, can rarely force unilateral policy
change.148 The states, not the courts, may drive national constitutional change or stability.
Put differently, national constitutionalism is often stable after judicial review, but not
solely because of judicial review. The judiciary’s effect on national constitutional
development is significantly conditioned on the states.
Describing popular constitutionalism without the states would be equally
misguided. According to Bruce Ackerman, citizens assemble and elect representatives to
revise the federal Constitution, while Larry Kramer emphasizes how popular mobs block
the implementation of federal constitutional provisions.149 Scholars like Elizabeth
Beaumont, Douglas Reed, and Jason Frank study informal practices and moments of
constituent power, catching popular constitutionalism at both national and local levels. 150
This dissertation builds on these accounts, explaining the interaction of state and national
popular constitutionalism.
The model has three implications for American constitutional and political
development. First, as stated, the judiciary’s effect on constitutional stability is
Loffredo, “State Courts and Constitutional Socio-Economic Rights”; Zackin, Looking for Rights in All the
Wrong Places.
148
For example, Rosenberg demonstrates that after Southern states ignored Brown until Congressional
budgeting forced compliance. See Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope. Coalitions defer to Courts not only to
legitimize, resolve, or postpone issues, as Dahl suggests, but also to kill them, as Graber claims. Hirschl
asserts dominant and waning coalitions use courts to entrench their power and silence or preempt outsider
claims, just as Rosenberg’s “flypaper” Supreme Court attracts, traps, and kills minority rights claims. See
Hirschl, Towards Juristocracy. Dahl, Graber, and Whittington show the federal government at T 1 defers to
the courts. Sidelined by their weak enforcement powers, the courts merely legitimize the national
constitutional status quo at T3. See Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
149
Beaumont, The Civic Constitution, 3–5.
150
See Douglas S. Reed, “Popular Constitutionalism: Towards a Theory of State Constitutional Meanings,”
Rutgers Law Journal 30 (1999 1998): 871; Frank, Constituent Moments; Beaumont, The Civic
Constitution. Other historians, lawyers, and political scientists have long noted the state constitutional
conventions’ localist, republican and Jeffersonian character. Fritz, “Alternative Visions of American
Constitutionalism”; Daniel T. Rodgers, Contested Truths: Keywords in American Politics Since
Independence (Harvard University Press, 1998); Scalia, America’s Jeffersonian Experiment; Dinan, The
American State Constitutional Tradition; Amy Bridges, “Managing the Periphery in the Gilded Age:
Writing Constitutions for the Western States,” Studies in American Political Development 22, no. 01
(March 2008): 32–58, doi:10.1017/S0898588X08000035.
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significantly conditioned on the states. Relatedly, the federal and state judiciaries are
perhaps less influential than they seem, undermining the literature damning unelected
judges for impeding popular majorities.151
Second, the federal branches sometimes defer to the states to postpone or prevent
inter-branch conflict.152 Studying only the federal branches risks missing how state
constitutional revision quietly mediates and directs federal inter-branch conflict, and
national constitutional development generally. Further, describing only the unbending
federal Constitution, some scholars of American political development place political
agency in actors and coalitions’ behavior, and little in constitutional law.153 This
dissertation suggests the inverse. The national constitution’s inflexibility, particularly to
citizenship reform, strains national coalitions and constrains presidential leadership,
while the state constitutions’ flexibility invites political reform. Constitutional law and
structures have some agency in determining the timing and nature of inter-branch conflict
and political realignment.
As a corollary, the states retain a role in interpreting the national constitution. The
federal framers wrote an “incomplete text” that intentionally deferred many controversies
over citizenship, the franchise, slavery, and other issues to the states.154 Consequently
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Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics (Yale
University Press, 1986); Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts (Princeton
University Press, 2000); Kramer, The People Themselves.
152
For example, the federal judiciary may defer controversial issues to the states to avoid confronting a
hostile, powerful realignment president. Recall the Federalist Marshall Court devolved commerce debates
to the states rather than challenge the Jackson. The contemporary US Supreme Court until recently
repeatedly deferred the constitutional status of same-sex marriage not only to federal and state courts, but
also to state constitutions.
153
Skowronek and Whittington for example repeatedly describe the presidency as a battering ram against
the old, inflexible federal Constitutional order, exemplified by reconstructive presidents like Jackson,
Lincoln, and Franklin Roosevelt.
154
Donald S. Lutz, “The United States Constitution as an Incomplete Text,” Annals of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science 496 (March 1, 1988): 23–32. This is akin to Dinan, Burgess and
Tarr, and Marshfield’s claims on subnational constitutional “space.”
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through the Tenth Amendment the states elaborate non-enumerated provisions of the
Constitution and through Article V they amend enumerated provisions. Antebellum states
even nullified and interposed provisions of the national constitution. The states’ role is
also political, arming national coalitions with solutions to federal constitutional
controversies. Whittington for example describes the historical contest between
departmentalist and judicial modes of interpretation, but largely misses this third mode of
state interpretation, which mediates and directs the interaction of the other two.
Finally, states mediate national realignments. V.O. Key’s midcentury studies
claimed the states lagged behind federal reforms, especially in the South, and especially
on race.155 Subsequent scholars ignored the states, tracing national realignments to
national institutions like the presidency,156 national parties,157 or to national ideologies
like liberalism.158 No current model integrates the states.159 This project suggests some
states precede and incite federal coalition and policy realignment, while other states
follow. Conservative state coalitions can constitutionally entrench the local status quo,
postponing the state realignments that spark national change. Even after national coalition
and policy realignments, these states can block policy implementation.160
Realignment theorists like Burnham, Sundquist, and Huntington posit realignments are
periodic, but as Mayhew notes, they struggle to explain why, relying “on suggestions and
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V. O. Key, “A Theory of Critical Elections,” The Journal of Politics 17, no. 01 (February 1955): 3–18,
doi:10.2307/2126401; V. O. Key, American State Politics: An Introduction, 1st ed. (New York: Knopf,
1956); V. O. Key, Southern Politics in State and Nation (New York: Vintage Books, 1963).
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Skowronek, The Politics Presidents Make.
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Burnham, Critical Elections; Sundquist, Dynamics of the Party System; John Herbert Aldrich, Why
Parties?: A Second Look (University of Chicago Press, 2011).
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metaphors rather than on sustained argument.”161 One metaphor describes “pressure
buildup” against old, inflexible institutions, as popular majorities revise political systems
based on the “dead issues of the past.”162 Constitutions explain the periodicity of
realignments. Article V frustrates all but the most committed movements, which
gradually build at the state level until they clear this national threshold, scoring national
constitutional and policy realignment.163 The following chapter explains these trends in
more detail.
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David R. Mayhew, Electoral Realignments: A Critique of an American Genre (Yale University Press,
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Key, “Secular Realignment and the Party System,” The Journal of Politics 21, no. 02 (May 1959): 198–
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CHAPTER 3: TRENDS IN FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION
“[T]he State constitutions furnish invaluable materials for history. Their interest is all the
greater because the succession of constitutions and amendments to constitutions from
1776 till to-day enables the annals of legislation and political sentiment to be read in
these documents more easily and succinctly than in any similar series of laws in any other
country. They are a mine of instruction for the natural history of democratic
communities.”
Lord Bryce, 1888164

Previous chapters proposed that the state and national constitutions develop in
tandem. The first section of this chapter explains how to observe proposals for federal
and state constitutional reform. The second section applies this method to demonstrate a
positive and statistically significant association between attempts at federal and state
constitutional reform. The third section disaggregates federal revision by issue area and
state revision by revision procedure, era, and region. This gives an overview of American
constitutional federalism, tentative evidence for the dissertation’s theory, and a guide to
subsequent chapters.
I. Observing Constitutional Change

This dissertation argues that broad demographic, economic, and technological
changes spur groups to organize and contest for constitutional reform. National political
actors may defer these controversies to the states, or clever reformers may circumvent
national venues and seek state and local legal reform. State constitutional revision often
resolves these national controversies, averting national constitutional reform. Table 2 lists
the steps in this process and the means used to observe each step.
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Concept

Measure

1. National
1a.
Change in
population,
technology,
economics
Demographic,
census
measures,
etc.

1b.
Constitutional
contention

1c.
Deference
to states

2. State
2a.
Constitutional
contention

2b.
Constitutional
revision

3. National
3a.
Coalition
(in)stability

Congressional Records of Legislative 1) 1) Ratified
Congressional
1) proposals
federal
proposals for
constitutional 1) proposals
for federal
branches
constitutional
amendments,
for national
constitutional
amendments,
replacements, constitutional
amendments
replacements, 2) statutes,
amendments,
2) records
2) turnover
court cases
2) turnover
Table 2: Observing National and State Constitutional Contention and Change.

3b.
Constitutional
(in)stability
1) Ratified
constitutional
amendments,
2) landmark
judicial
decisions

To observe broad demographic, economic, and technological change (1a), this
dissertation uses secondary sources on American political history and development. To
observe agitation for federal constitutional reform (1b), this dissertation studies all federal
amendments proposed in Congress. Why Congress? Under Article V, all proposed
revisions to the federal Constitution must be submitted to Congress, either by members of
Congress or by the states. As Michael Kammen noted, knowledge of these proposals, “of
their stimuli, and of the controversies they generated, is woefully limited.”165 In
aggregating primary and secondary sources on the proposed federal amendments, this
dissertation fills that gap. Two sources together list nearly all proposed federal
amendments.166 In 2015, John R. Vile compiled an encyclopedia listing by year the
number of proposed amendments and most common amendment topics.167 A 2016
dataset by the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) lists proposed
amendments by date, sponsor, congressional committee and chamber, and resolution
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number.168 The NARA data covers more years than Vile’s, with more information on
each year, including descriptions of each proposal in each year. The Vile data strongly
confirm the accuracy of the NARA data.169 For only eight of the years 225 observed in
both the NARA and Vile data, the NARA data differ significantly from the Vile data.170
For these eight years, when possible the dissertation uses the original congressional
record to correct inaccuracies in the NARA data, and subsequently relies on the corrected
NARA data.171
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The NARA data covers 1788 to 2014. See “Amending America: Proposed Amendments to the United
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(Washington: Congressional Research Service, 1992). For 1990-2012, Vile uses his own compendium, and
for 1990-2014, the NARA dataset relies on the online congressional record. Vile also relies on a 1929
catalog by Michael Musmanno. See Musmanno, Proposed Amendments to the Constitution: A Monograph
on the Resolutions Introduced in Congress Proposing Amendments to the Constitution of the United States
of America. For a guide to these sources, see Lynch, “Other Amendments.”
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difference of zero.
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The Vile and NARA yearly counts differ significantly for 1861, 1945, 1991, 1992, 1995, 1996, 2007,
and 2009. For 1861, Vile lists 121 proposals, Ames’ congressional record, 122, and the original NARA
data, 167; however, since these additional NARA observations are confirmed by additional information, the
dissertation does not delete them, and keeps the uncorrected 167. For 1945, Vile lists 116 observations, the
congressional record, 72, and the NARA data 73, so the dissertation does not correct the NARA data.
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data.
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But the number of proposals per year alone cannot indicate significant
constitutional revision. A single amendment can change a constitution’s identity,
effectively creating a new constitution, even if the old one legally endures.172 Conversely,
a slew of amendments may be insignificant.173 Put differently, a constitution’s identity
exists through its normative commitments.174 Significant constitutional change – a
change in constitutional identity – occurs only when these provisions are revised.
Normative provisions give America’s federal Constitution its identity.175 This
poses five challenges for observing significant constitutional change. First, not all textual
provisions are normative commitments that define constitutional identity, so some
amendments are only minor revisions, like the Twentieth Amendment, setting January
20th as Inauguration Day. A comprehensive survey of all proposed or ratified
amendments will be skewed by the mass of insignificant proposals. Some individual
172

Take for example the controversial but unratified 1861 Corwin Amendment to preempt abolition or the
1875 Blaine Amendment to forbid public funding for religious schools.
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As the English jurist Matthew Hale argued, the flood of minor amendments to the English Constitution
affirmed the Constitution’s fundamental principles, maintain the Constitution’s identity. Hale explained:
“particular variations and accessions have happened in the laws, yet they being only partial, and successive,
we may with just reason say, they are the same English laws now, that they were six hundred year since, in
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proposals have been submitted repeatedly, inflating proposal rates; for example, there
have been over a thousand proposals for an equal rights amendment.176 The political
scientist William S. Livingston rightly observed that a simple count of proposed
amendments
“is of little significance. Many of the proposals were identical, or at least were
concerned with the same questions; many were trivial; many were ridiculous; and
many were unnecessary. But the most significant explanation of the large number
of proposals is the unlimited right of American Congressmen to introduce as
many resolutions as they like.”
Since congressmen often pander to their narrow base by proposing amendments, many
proposals “command no public support whatsoever” with the broader nation.177 A simple,
aggregate count of amendment proposals alone cannot indicate national pressure for
constitutional reform.
One might answer this issue by identifying the federal Constitution’s core,
nationally-shared commitments, giving more weight to, say, Bill of Rights provisions,
and to proposed or ratified amendments to these provisions. But, second, the
constitution’s commitments are themselves a subject of dispute and thus are unclear.178
Relatedly, third, commitments are contested, such that a single clause can have
contradictory meanings.179 Fourth, given America’s common law tradition, constitutional
commitments exist in in diverse places, in the formal constitutional text but also in
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statutes,180 as well as legal and informal practices.181 Finally, commitments do not inhere
in single clauses, but shade into each other. As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. stated
“great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and divide fields of black and
white. Even the more specific of them are found to terminate in a penumbra shading
gradually from one extreme to the other.”182 In sum, simple revision counts cannot affirm
or refute this dissertation’s theory, which aims to observe not only aggregate change, but
also normatively and politically significant change.
Normative commitments exist in constitutions, statutes, precedents, and practices,
so to identify major constitutional changes one must also look to all these sources.183
Therefore this dissertation uses the NARA data to find proposals, after which it uses case
studies to trace these through the congressional record and secondary literature to assess
their importance.184 It supplements this with judicial records, executive speeches, and the
writings of constitutional framers, as well as the broader public, which claimed and
reinterpreted the written constitution. Similarly, to observe the national branches’
deference to the states (1c), the dissertation looks to the congressional record, as well as
to judicial decisions and presidential speeches, letters, and decrees.
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Ames, The Proposed Amendments.
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State constitutional amendment and replacement is largely the legal prerogative of
the state legislatures.185 Hence, contention for state constitutional revision within a state
(2a) should be concentrated in the legislature.186 Political contention within a state can be
observed as the change in a party’s share of the legislature, as recorded by Michael
Dubin.187 To identify cases of contention specifically over constitutional issues, this
dissertation observes the number and nature of proposals for new state constitutions.188
The dissertation assembles a dataset of state constitutional proposals, merging five
incomplete lists of proposals for new state constitutions,189 checking each against the
others.190 To catch any observations not included in these five lists, and to verify and
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entirely new constitution; this dissertation does not include these commissions as attempts to propose a new
constitution. If it is unclear whether the assembly listed in Browne (1973) is limited, the dissertation
includes the commission. The dissertation also refers to a supplement updating Browne’s list to 1976. See
Bonnie Canning, ed., State Constitutional Conventions, Revisions, and Amendments, 1959-1976: A
Bibliography (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1977). Second, Sturm (1970) lists constitutional proposals
between 1938 and 1968, including a thorough list of constitutional commissions. But Sturm (1970) does
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convention, but not propose a replacement constitution. See Sturm, Thirty Years of State ConstitutionMaking, 1938-1968, 138–53. This dissertation does not include these limited commissions as attempts to
propose a new constitution. Given Sturm’s list spans only 1938 to 1968, one might worry this dissertation
systematically undercounts commissions outside this era. But Sturm, Dinan, and Tarr assert commissions
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expand information on each observation, this dissertation surveys and codes every
reference to a state constitutional proposal in every volume of the Oxford Commentaries
on the State Constitutions of the United States, a series on the constitutional history every
state.191 To resolve any remaining ambiguities, the dissertation refers to The
Constitutionalism of the American States, an edited volume on the constitutional history
of every state, and also refers to additional secondary sources, and to primary source
documents, including convention and legislative minutes, newspaper articles, and private
correspondence, sometimes obtained through archival research. Given this, the
dissertation should include nearly all proposed and ratified American state
constitutions.192 Studying failed proposals avoids selection bias toward successful

occurred mainly in the mid-twentieth century. See Sturm, Thirty Years of State Constitution-Making, 19381968; Sturm, “The Development of American State Constitutions”; Tarr, Understanding State
Constitutions; Dinan, The American State Constitutional Tradition. This suggests that Sturm’s study from
1938 to 1968 captures most commissions. And to catch any observations outside of Sturm’s range, the
dissertation refers to the Reference Guides to the State Constitutions of the United States, which surveys the
constitutional development of every state from its founding to the present. Third, Sturm (1982) lists all
proposed constitutions between 1776 and 1981, but not those after 1981. Fourth, Dinan lists all
constitutional conventions between 1776 and 2006. Ibid., 8–28. But this excludes proposals not made by
convention. Fifth, the Rise of Modern Constitutionalism database includes texts of proposed state
constitutions up to 1849, but excludes proposals after 1850.
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The dataset includes state assemblies which the authority to propose an entirely new constitution. Thus
it excludes five kinds of proposals for new state constitutions. First are the constitutions of overseas federal
territories and the District of Columbia’s 1982 and 2016 constitutional conventions and constitutions for
the state of New Columbia. See May, “Constitutional Amendment and Revision Revisited,” 157. Second
are the few state constitutions drafted under a sovereign foreign government, including the 1812 East
Florida Constitution drafted under Spanish control. Third are the periodic state-sponsored votes on whether
to call a constitutional convention, as these votes consider whether to propose a constitution, but
themselves are not proposals for a new constitution. Fourth are the 41 “limited” conventions, commissions,
and committees assembled exclusively and explicitly to amend but not replace a constitution, to collect
information, and/or to prepare for a constitutional convention without proposing a draft constitution. To
identify these cases, the dissertation refers to a list of limited commissions and conventions compiled by
Albert Sturm. See Sturm, Thirty Years of State Constitution-Making, 1938-1968, 35–36, 65–66, 110, 113,
132–55. All but four of these assembled between 1944 and 1973. For a list of these 41 excluded proposals,
see Error! Reference source not found. in the appendix. Last are the few private constitutional assemblies
ormed without legal authority, as sanctioned by the state legislature, and/or without local territorial control.
To identify or exclude these observations, this dissertation uses the Reference Guides to the State
Constitutions of the United States.
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constitutional proposals.193 To the author’s knowledge, this is the most complete list of
proposed American state constitutions.194 A list of all 354 proposals is included in the
appendix.
This dissertation observes state constitutional revision (2b) as the number of
constitutions ratified and enforced within a state. Not all proposals result in the
ratification of an entirely new document, as some proposals are split into amendments
and only partially ratified, and even fully ratified proposals may not be the sole
constitution enforced in a state.195 When coding proposals for a new constitution, this
dissertation considers a proposal successfully passed only if it is completely ratified and
effectively enforced as a state’s sole constitution. The dissertation also observes all state
constitutional amendments proposed and ratified since 1776.196
But as stated, a simple count of attempted and successful constitutional
replacements or amendments cannot reveal which revisions matter. Some states propose
many constitutions but ratify few,197 and even states that regularly replace their
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constitutions might only rarely change their core normative constitutional commitments.
Framers can revise or add many provisions without changing meaning, either as empty
elite concessions to riled citizens, or from inexperience or lack of imagination in drafting,
or from inability to find alternatives to old, successful, path dependent, or sticky
constitutional rules.
State framers and judges have long affirmed that state constitutional identity
inheres in core normative provisions.198 The New Jersey Supreme Court declared “Not all
constitutional provisions are of equal majesty… The task of interpreting most if not all of
[the New Jersey Constitution’s] ‘great ordinances’ is an evolving and on-going
process.”199 State constitutional commitments are drafted, revised, and interpreted by
state convention delegates, special commissions, judges, legislators, governors, voters
casting ballots in referenda and initiatives, and by extralegal mobs, meetings, and
committees. The methods vary by era,200 so the significance of the same reform can vary
by era. Identifying significant state constitutional change requires studying the complex
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In 1780 Massachusetts’ framers forbade legislators from making laws that were “repugnant or contrary
to this constitution,” suggesting that some core provisions of the Constitution ought to be impervious to
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Section I, Article IV. For a similar provision, see the New Hampshire Constitution of 1784, Form of
Government, Section 2.
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See Vreeland v. Byrne, 72 N.J. 292, 370 A.2d 825 (1977) and Robert Forrest Williams, The New Jersey
State Constitution (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 42. See also the North Carolina Supreme
Court in Corum v. University of N.C., 413 S.E.2d 276, 289 (N.C. 1992). However, in Omaha National
Bank v. Spire 223 Neb. 209, 389 N.W. 2d 269 (1986), the Supreme Court of Nebraska considered whether
an amendment to the Nebraska Constitution violated a core principle of the state’s Constitution, and hence
whether the amendment was unconstitutional. The Court implied the Nebraska Constitution had no core
provisions, that all provisions of the Nebraska Constitution were equally important in adjudicating a case,
and accordingly the amendment was valid. While all provisions may be equally important in adjudicating a
constitution, they are not equally important in identifying a state constitution. If the Nebraska Constitution
were revised to include a bicameral legislature for the first time in nearly a century, it would become a
fundamentally different document. For a general comment on state constitutional identity, see James Gray
Pope, “An Approach to State Constitutional Interpretation,” Rutgers Law Journal 24 (1993 1992): 985;
Robert A. Schapiro, “Identity and Interpretation in State Constitutional Law,” Virginia Law Review 84, no.
3 (April 1, 1998): 389–457, doi:10.2307/1073668.
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interactions of all of these bodies over time. This dissertation follows this ongoing
process through records kept by state constitutional convention delegates, legislators,
judges, governors, and newspapers, backed by secondary sources and some archival
research.
Finally, observing stability in national constitutional politics (3a) and the federal
Constitution (3b) is possible, but difficult. One might observe constitutional stability as
the proportion of federal amendment proposals ratified, with fewer ratifications
indicating relative stability in a given era. But only 0.002% or twenty-seven of the 11,797
proposed amendments have cleared Article V and been ratified, so this proportion is so
low as to be meaningless. Rather, this dissertation observes the significance of ratified
amendments as they are interpreted in congressional and federal court records.
II. Comparing National and State Constitutional Change since 1787

As stated in the previous chapter, there are at least two ways that state
constitutional reform can preclude federal reform. In cases of preemptive resolution,
states can seize and address a national constitutional issue, preventing the federal
branches from intervening in this area. Alternately, in cases of joint resolution, the
federal and state governments together address the same constitutional issue, while the
states alone revise their constitutions.
This section examines the joint resolution claim. This claim has two testable
propositions. First, attempts at federal constitutional revision, measured as the number of
proposed federal constitutional amendments, should be positively associated with
attempts at state constitutional revision, measured as the number of proposed state
constitutions and state amendments. Second, a high proportion of these state
58

constitutional proposals should be ratified, while few federal amendments proposals
should be ratified.
As expected, the aggregate numbers of federal and state proposals are closely
associated. To further examine this association, this dissertation regresses separately four
measures of attempted state constitutional reform – the total number of proposed state
constitutions, of partly or fully unratified state constitutions, of fully ratified state
constitutions, and of ratified state constitutional amendments – as independent variables
on the number of attempted federal amendments as a dependent variable.201 The data was
sorted into one-year bins and five-year bins,202 yielding the following eight bivariate
linear regressions.
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Since this section only claims there is a positive and significant association between two variables, the
dissertation uses a simple bivariate linear regression to test this association. This is not a causal prediction,
so the regression does not include control variables. Subsequent case studies trace this causal process.
Pearson correlation tests also affirm the regression results, revealing a moderate to strong positive
correlation between federal amendment proposals and total proposed state constitutions (0.43), unratified
state constitutions (0.64), and ratified state amendments (0.76), for five year bins. See Table 18 in the
appendix.
202
There are several arguments against using one-year bins alone. Members of Congress propose more
federal constitutional amendments in the first year than the second year of a given Congress, inflating
variation between individual years. See Figure 9 in the appendix demonstrating this. Similarly, many state
legislative sessions last more than a year. Finally, proposal and ratification of a federal amendment or state
constitution takes several years, and so we should expect a lag between the variables. The dissertation
compensates for these issues by smoothing the data by sorting it into five-year bins.
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State
Total Const.
Proposals
Unratified
Const.
Proposals
Ratified Const.
Proposals
Ratified
Amendments
Constant

1: Fed.
Pro. 1yr
12.13*
(2.704)

2: Fed.
Pro. 1yr

3: Fed.
Pro. 1yr

4: Fed.
Pro. 1yr

5: Fed.
Pro. 5yr
18.65*
(5.792)

27.19*
(3.654)

6: Fed.
Pro. 5yr

7: Fed.
Pro. 5yr

8: Fed.
Pro. 5yr

39.07*
(6.926)
-2.921
(5.093)

-4.639
(11.91)

0.577*
0.0005
(0.108)
(0.0004)
34.20*
27.46*
53.67*
30.613*
105.2
74.68
250.8*
0.280
(6.635)
(5.967)
(6.246)
(7.699)
(57.69)
(45.10)
(56.61)
(0.145)
Observations
228
228
228
196
50
50
50
42
Table 3: Association between Federal Amendment Proposals and State Constitutional Proposals, 17912014.
Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.01

There is not a statistically significant relationship between the number of federal
proposals and ratified state constitutions, shown in columns 3 and 7. However, columns
1-2 and 4-6 show that there is a positive and statistically significant relationship for the
total number of state constitutions proposed, for the number of partly or fully unratified
state constitutions, and for the number of ratified state amendments.203 That is, it is highly
unlikely that there is no association between these measures of federal and state
constitutional reform. This supports the prediction of a positive, significant association
between attempted federal and state constitutional reform.
Figure 3 demonstrates this association over time, focusing on the number of
proposed federal amendments and proposed state constitutions. This shows that federal
and state proposals are positively associated, increasing together after the 1787
Constitutional Convention, during and after the Civil War, and through the civil rights
movement of the 1960s. These three moments were the high points for attempted state

203

The theory makes an assertion about the statistical significance and direction of the association between
state and federal proposals, and as such, the magnitude of the coefficients for each regression is less
important. Note also there is not a statistically significant relationship between federal and state
amendments (column 8).
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constitutional revision.204 Relatedly, after some national partisan realignments,205 state
constitutional replacement jumps.206
State
30

Total State Proposals
Federal Amendment Proposals

Federal

25
20
15
10
5
0

1750
1500
1250
1000
750
500
250
0

1771 1786 1801 1816 1831 1846 1861 1876 1891 1906 1921 1936 1951 1966 1981 1996 2011
Figure 3: Proposed Federal Amendments and State Constitutions by Five-Year Bins, 1791-2014.

Figure 4 shows the rolling correlation between the number of federal and state
proposals for 1787 to 1995.207 The correlation between the number of state and federal
proposals shows distinct and sustained plateaus around the Civil War and the civil rights

204

For some five-year intervals, the number of proposed state constitutions exceeds the overall mean for
five-year intervals (7.08), and several sequential intervals exceed the mean by at least a standard deviation
(6.83). These sequential intervals occur during the founding, Civil War, and civil rights movement. For
example, between the Civil War’s start in 1861 and Reconstruction’s end in 1877, the states proposed 74
constitutions, almost a fifth of the total proposed in American history, with fifteen in 1861 alone. Equally
important is the number of proposals weighted by the number of existing states. For example, between
1787 and 1791, the fourteen states proposed six constitutions, while between 1912 and 1916, also a fiveyear span, the United States saw also six proposals, but these were diluted across forty-eight states. This
pattern of periodic peaks holds, even when weighted by the increasing number of states over the course of
American history, suggesting that national expansion does not drive this pattern in state constitutional
revision. See the appendix for time series plots and tables showing periods of increased state constitutional
revision.
205
Scholars like V.O. Key and Walter Dean Burnham suggest that parties periodically splinter over divisive
issues and reorganize as new parties, culminating in a critical election. See Key, “A Theory of Critical
Elections”; Burnham, Critical Elections; William N. Chambers and Walter Dean Burnham, eds., American
Party Systems: Stages of Political Development (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975); Sundquist,
Dynamics of the Party System. For a critique of this field, see Key, “Secular Realignment and the Party
System”; Carmines and Stimson, Issue Evolution; Mayhew, Electoral Realignments.
206
During the Revolution, Civil War, and civil rights movement state revision exceeded expected levels.
These three realignments took 49 years total, only a fifth of American constitutional history. Yet nearly half
of all state constitutions were proposed and ratified in these three moments. A quarter of American state
constitutions were proposed or ratified during the Civil War crisis alone.
207
Correlation is measured by rolling twenty-year intervals, sorted by start year. Each twenty-year span has
relatively few observations. As such, this is only an approximate measure of association.
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movement.208 During these two periods, attempts at federal and state revision
simultaneously spiked, explaining the increased association. Correlation also increased
during the 1980s and 1990s, as the number of federal and state proposals declined
together.209 Similarly, the number of federal amendments is associated over time with the
number of unratified and ratified state constitutions, and with ratified state amendments,
as shown by Figure 10 and Figure 11 in the appendix.
Correlation
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
-0.2
-0.4
1787 1802 1817 1832 1847 1862 1877 1892 1907 1922 1937 1952 1967 1982
Figure 4: Correlation between Proposed Federal Amendment Proposals and State Constitutions by Rolling
Twenty-Year Intervals, 1787-1995.

As mentioned, of the 11,797 proposed federal amendments, only twenty-seven
(0.002%) have been ratified. But the states have passed 146 of the 354 proposed state
constitutions (41%). Perhaps unsurprisingly, the number of state constitutions proposed is
closely positively associated with the number of state constitutions ratified, with a
gradual decline after the progressive era when states introduced unelected expert
constitutional commissions that could propose but not ratify new documents.210

208

Jacob Cohen defines weak correlations between social science variables as those around 0.1, moderate
around 0.3, and strong around 0.5 Jacob Cohen, Statistical Power Analysis for the Behavioral Sciences
(Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1988), 79–81.
209
They also diverge periodically, though for shorter periods. This occurred in the 1890s when Congress
incorporated many Western states with new constitutions, but proposed relatively few federal amendments,
and during the Great Depression and after the civil rights movement, the two nadirs of state constitutional
revision.
210
Correlation between the number of proposed and ratified state constitutions is high (0.76), and tracks
very closely both before Reconstruction (0.90 for 1776 to 1876) and after (0.62 for 1876 to 2016). The
proportion of constitutions ratified decreases during the 1960s with the widespread adoption of
commissions. After the 1990s the proportion flat-lines, as states recently have neither proposed nor ratified
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In sum, the number of federal amendment proposals is positively and significantly
associated with the number of proposed state constitutions, unratified state constitutions,
and state constitutional amendments. That is, when Congress proposes more federal
amendments, the states often propose more state constitutions and amendments. Many of
these state proposals pass, while very few federal amendment proposals do. This
tentatively supports the dissertation’s claim of joint resolution, in which the states and
Congress together propose constitutional reform, and that usually the states alone achieve
reform.
There are a few shortcomings of this test. This does not confirm or deny the claim
of preemptive resolution in which the states quiet calls for federal amendment. This is
best observed through case-by-case process tracing. Additionally, during the founding,
Civil War, and civil rights periods, the states did not avert federal amendment,211 but
rather addressed and helped resolve the same controversies facing the national
government. For example, between 1788 and 1800, most proposals for federal
amendments and for state constitutions addressed rights provisions and the structure of
government.212 Between 1860 and 1870, most federal proposals concerned slavery and
suffrage,213 as did many proposed state constitutions, especially in the South.214 And

new constitutions. See Figure 10 in the appendix for the number of state constitutions proposed and
ratified.
211
Multiple federal amendments were ratified during the Founding (10), Civil War (3), and civil rights era
(4).
212
See Edward Dumbauld, “State Precedents for the Bill of Rights,” Journal of Public Law 7 (1958): 323;
Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787; Lutz, Popular Consent and Popular Control;
Donald S. Lutz, “The State Constitutional Pedigree of the U.S. Bill of Rights,” Publius: The Journal of
Federalism 22, no. 2 (March 20, 1992): 19–45; Kruman, Between Authority and Liberty; Adams, The First
American Constitutions; John R. Vile, Encyclopedia of Constitutional Amendments, Proposed
Amendments, and Amending Issues, 1789-2002, Second (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2003), 540–41.
213
Vile, Encyclopedia of Constitutional Amendments, Proposed Amendments, and Amending Issues, 17892002, 544–45.
214
Ralph A. Wooster, The Secession Conventions of the South (Princeton University Press, 1962); Michael
Perman, The Road to Redemption: Southern Politics, 1869-1879 (Chapel Hill: University of North
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between 1960 and 1970, many proposed federal amendments and state constitutions
addressed electoral district apportionment, voting rights, and equal rights provisions.215
Even when the states do not avert federal reform, they can aid in resolving national
constitutional crises. Finally, note that this association supports the dissertation’s causal
story, but alone cannot affirm it. And as explained, these proposal measures alone cannot
identify significant state or federal constitutional change, and can only offer provisional
evidence for the dissertation’s theory. This requires case studies, elaborated in the
following chapters.
So far this section has compared the number of proposals for state constitutions
and federal amendments. How do state proposal rates relate to congressional or Supreme
Court politics? This dissertation suggests that Congress and the Supreme Court often
defer national constitutional controversies to the states. When congressional interparty
polarization is high, we might expect members of Congress will be unable to compromise
to resolve national controversies, and will instead defer conflict to the states. Polarization
should be positively associated with attempts at state revision. The evidence for this is
limited. The correlation between interparty polarization and the number of state
constitutional proposals, though moderate, is negative for the House (-0.37), and weaker
for the Senate (-0.21).216

Carolina, 1984); Richard M. Valelly, The Two Reconstructions: The Struggle for Black Enfranchisement
(University of Chicago Press, 2004).
215
Tarr, Understanding State Constitutions, 153–57; Vile, Encyclopedia of Constitutional Amendments,
Proposed Amendments, and Amending Issues, 1789-2002, 552–53.
216
Polarization for each chamber is measured as the interparty difference in means on the first dimension of
Poole and Rosenthal’s DW-NOMINATE scores. For these correlations, state proposal data is sorted into
two-year bins to match the two-year length of each meeting of Congress, as observed in Poole and
Rosenthal’s data. Data is for 1879 to 2013. See Figure 12 in the appendix for a time series plot comparing
polarization and state proposals.
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We might expect when the Supreme Court is burdened with more cases, it will
push some of these issues on the states, such that caseload and attempts at state
replacement should be correlated. Evidence suggests this is not so. The correlation
between the Supreme Court caseload and the total number of state proposals is weak
(0.08).217 This disjunction is particularly pronounced in the late twentieth century. When
Earl Warren became Chief Justice in 1953, the Court docket caseload was 1,463 cases.
When he retired in 1969, it was 4,202. In 2013, it was 8,580.218 Since the end of the
Warren Court, the states have proposed only twenty-one new constitutions and ratified
eight, a relative decline, and have instead favored piecemeal amendment.219 This is not to
suggest that the modern Supreme Court has displaced the states as the main site for
resolving national constitutional disputes. Rather, piecemeal state amendments and state
court decisions act as a parallel track to the federal judiciary for resolving national
disputes. Sometimes the states move prior to the federal courts, cuing the federal courts’
rulings. Again, recall that in legalizing same-sex marriage in Obergefell v. Hodges
(2015),220 the Supreme Court deferred to prior changes in public opinion and state
constitutional reform.
III. Trends in Federal and State Revision

This section concludes this chapter, disaggregating trends in attempted federal
amendment by topic and then trends in state constitutional revision first by procedure,

217

Correlation is for 1879-2013.
The Supreme Court disposes the majority of these cases (7,547 of 8,808 cases in 2013). The majority of
the remaining cases are in forma pauperis direct appeals to the Supreme Court by prison inmates, to which
the Supreme Court will not grant cert.
219
See Figure 13 in the appendix for a time series plot comparing the Supreme Court caseload and attempts
at state constitutional replacement.
220
See Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. ___ (2015).
218
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then by region, and finally by era, previewing subsequent chapters. Proposals for federal
amendments cluster around specific issue areas. To code proposed federal amendments
by issue area, this dissertation derives a list of twenty-four common amendment topics
from a similar list by John R. Vile,221 combined with and checked against a list of the
most frequent terms appearing across all amendment descriptions in the NARA
dataset.222 Search terms were generated for each topic,223 and amendments with
descriptions including these terms are coded as matching the topic, for up to two topics
per amendment.224 Of the 11,797 proposed amendments, 10,324 (88%) match at least one
topic.225
The following time series plots disaggregate proposed amendments by topic. Note
that some issues like congressional powers are perennial, steady topics for reform, while
other topics, like prohibition, peak and decline. The latter pattern is particularly common
for topics in the 1960s and 1970s, as members of Congress proposed federal amendments
221

Vile’s list catches a few topics, like banking, that appear relatively infrequently in the NARA dataset,
but are nevertheless important to American constitutional development. In developing his Encyclopedia,
Vile listed topics with as much “completeness as possible, but with no pretense to absolute accuracy.” Vile,
Encyclopedia of Constitutional Amendments, Appendix D.
222
The National Archives and Records Administration amendment catalog includes for each proposed
amendment a brief description taken often exactly from the aforementioned congressional catalogs of
proposed amendments. For many amendments this official description, though perhaps not the full
amendment text, may be the best summary available. This dissertation identifies the most common words
to appear across all descriptions, excluding words like “of” and “the” not related to policy issues, duplicates
of words like “right” and “rights”, and words appearing less than fifty times across all 11,861 proposals,
yielding a list of the most common policy-related words.
223
See Table 10 in the appendix for a list of topics, search terms, and their frequency. Skimming
amendment matches for a search term confirms that search terms are narrow enough to usually exclude
false positive matches for a topic.
224
Only two topics are coded per amendment, such that if amendments consistently matched for more than
two terms, these additional matches could possibly be excluded, resulting in a systematic undercounting of
amendments matching these additional topics. But because of the brevity of NARA’s amendment
descriptions, almost no amendments matched for more than two search terms. This dissertation confirmed
this by comparing the number of amendment descriptions including a given term to the number of
amendments coded for that same term. For all topics, these were exactly or almost exactly equal, showing
that this coding method does not systematically exclude any topics it aims to code.
225
Further, 4,287 proposals match for two. Of the 1,471 amendment proposals not matching for any topic,
the dissertation searched for most frequently-occurring words. No word appearing more than fifty times
had policy significance (i.e. many words were propositions like “of”), suggesting the search does not
systematically fail to code these remaining amendment proposals.
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to override Warren and Burger Court decisions on school prayer, state legislative
apportionment, abortion, and school busing. Note also that fifteen of twenty five topic
areas including 5,646 amendment matches are coded as topics that are expressly
concurrent constitutional powers.226 That is, about half of proposed federal amendments
relate to issues that could also be regulated by state constitutional reform. These plots,
demonstrating the main issues for attempted federal amendment in each era, preview and
guide the case selection for national constitutional issues and controversies to study in
subsequent chapters.

226

Note that this count of fifteen is conservative, as the remaining ten topics could be interpreted to concen
concurrent powers. Note also that an amendment can match for up to two topics, such that this cunt of
amendment matches is likely greater than the absolute number of amendments.
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Figure 5: Proposed Federal Amendments by Topic Area, 1788-2014

Turning now to attempted state revision, the state constitutions, unlike the federal
Constitution, allow multiple procedures for constitutional replacement or amendment. All
American state constitutions have been proposed or ratified by three types of bodies:
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constitutional commissions, legislatures, and constitutional conventions.227 State revision
rates vary by procedure, as seen in Table 4.228
Total
Count
146
49
97

Pct.
100
100
100

208
47
39
33
89

100
100
100
100
100

Total
250
71
76
21
28
8
354
Table 4: Methods and Outcomes of American State Constitutional Change, 1776-2017.

100

Ratified
Without popular vote
With popular vote
Unratified
Voters reject part, approve part
Voters reject whole
Whole rejected without vote
No data

Convention
Count Pct.
135
92
46
94
89
92
115
38
32
7
38

55
81
82
21
43

Commission
Count Pct.
4
3
0
0
4
4
72
9
5
20
38

35
19
13
61
43

Legislature
Count Pct.
7
5
3
6
4
4
21
0
2
6
13

10
0
5
18
15

The preferred method of revision has changed over time. During the Revolution
and founding, temporary mobs, committees of safety and correspondence, and
insurrectionary provincial congresses called for or reassembled as state constitutional
conventions.229 But during the Jacksonian era, professional parties organized within the
state legislatures and called overtly partisan legislative committees and conventions to
draft constitutions. Progressives later tried to replace these with piecemeal amendments
227

There are three minor caveats to this classification. First, in October 1776, the Connecticut legislature
passed a statute making the state’s 1662 colonial charter the state constitution. Rhode Island’s legislature
resolved in May 1776 to declare independence from Great Britain while maintaining its colonial charter.
See Adams, The First American Constitutions, 64–66. These documents were drafted by a colonial
government but ratified by an American state legislature, and are exceptions to this tripartite classification.
Second, Pennsylvania’s 1776 Constitution, replaced in 1790, potentially allowed constitutional replacement
by a special Council of Censors. Vermont’s 1777 Constitution, modeled on the 1776 Pennsylvania
Constitution, did the same, as did subsequent Vermont constitutions until the mid-nineteenth century.
However, in practice, these bodies passed piecemeal revisions rather than wholesale constitutional
replacements. Finally, in some cases all three kinds of constitution-making bodies (legislatures,
conventions, and commissions) have had to submit their proposals to the state’s governor, legislature, or
voters.
228
Additionally, older states tend to propose and ratify more constitutions – perhaps unsurprisingly, state
age correlates closely with the number of constitutions proposed (0.55) and ratified (0.59). State age is
measured as the number of years in the Union. See the appendix for Figure 18 on state age and rates of
attempted and successful constitutional revision. Ratified constitutions vary considerably in age. The
average state constitution lasts 64 years without replacement. But many exceed this. Vermont’s
Constitution dates to 1793, New Hampshire’s to 1784, and Massachusetts’ – the world’s oldest standing
written constitution – to 1780. Conversely, South Carolina’s 1776 Constitution survived only two years,
and the 1778 South Carolina Constitution yielded to five more constitutions.
229
Unlike legislatures, which represented parochial, temporary interests, these special conventions could
claim to represent the common will and could frame constitutions to bind the whole polity.
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passed by constitutional initiatives, referenda, and apolitical, appointed expert
commissions. These unelected commissions, drawn by governors and legislatures,
studied existing constitutions and sometimes proposed new ones, but lacking popular
authorization, could not ratify these proposals, deferring the ratification to future
conventions and legislatures. Legislatures could accept or reject a commission’s
proposals piecemeal, and consequently almost all commissions resulted in partial
amendment rather than wholesale constitutional replacement.230 When Baker v. Carr
(1962) called for apolitical reapportionment of legislative districts,231 legislators again
selected commissioners, preferring appointed commissions to conventions of popularly
elected, autonomous delegates. Accordingly, commissions eclipsed conventions in the
mid-twentieth century. The rise in commissions, as well as the natural aging of
constitutions, led to an increase in the number of ratified amendments in the twentieth
century.232 Figure 6 summarizes these trends.

230

Florida is the sole state that allows a commission to submit a proposed constitution directly to voters.
The state used this method to pass its 1968 Constitution. Three other ratified constitutions were drafted
almost entirely by commission. These are Georgia’s 1945 Constitution, Georgia’s 1976 Constitution, which
essentially reorganized the 1945 Constitution, and Virginia’s 1970 Constitution. Note that some
“preparatory” commissions can set the organization and agenda for subsequent constitutional conventions.
Even if these commissions do not directly result in a proposed constitution, they are influential in the state
constitution-making process. For more on the history and authority of constitutional commissions, see
Sturm, Thirty Years of State Constitution-Making, 1938-1968, 33–49; Sturm, “The Development of
American State Constitutions,” 84–86.
231
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
232
See Figure 11 in the appendix for a time series plot of the number of ratified state constitutional
amendments.
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Figure 6: Modes of State Constitutional Proposal, 1776-2017.
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Constitutional revision and design also vary regionally.233 State framers have
generally disfavored the federal model, instead referring to compendia of previous state
constitutions.234 Between 1781 and 1894, over seventy editions of state constitutional
compilations were printed, and these were used in nearly every nineteenth century
convention.235 Most often, framers borrowed from recently-drafted documents and
neighboring states, so constitutions tend to resemble their neighbors in design and
duration, 236 resulting in five distinct regional constitutional cultures. Each region has a
distinct tradition of constitutional design and revision.237

233

Nineteen states have had a single constitution, while Louisiana has had eleven. The average number of
constitutions ratified by each state is three. But not every proposal is successful, and some states have seen
many more unsuccessful proposals than others. For maps indicating the number of constitutions proposed
and ratified by each state, see Figure 16 in the appendix.
234
Dinan, “Court-Constraining Amendments and the State Constitutional Tradition,” 14–16; Tarr,
Understanding State Constitutions, 98–99.
235
Christian G. Fritz, “The American Constitutional Tradition Revisited: Preliminary Observations on State
Constitution-Making in the Nineteenth-Century West,” Rutgers Law Journal 25 (1994): 975–78.
236
Tarr, Understanding State Constitutions, 98–99.
237
For yearly rates of state constitutional proposals and ratification in each region, see Figure 15 in the
appendix.

71

Region
New England

Constitutions
Proposals Pct.
56
16

Ratified
13

Pct.
9

States
CT MA ME NH RI VT

Mid-Atlantic

73

21

33

23

DE IL IN MD NJ NY OH PA WI MI

South

123

35

72

49

AL AR FL GA KY LA MS NC SC TN TX VA WV

Great Plains

39

11

17

12

IA KS MN MO ND NE OK SD

West

63

18

11

8

AK AZ CA CO HI ID MT NM NV OR UT WA WY

Total
354
146
Table 5: American States and Rates of Constitutional Proposal and Ratification by Region, 1776-2017.

New England constitutions, like the federal document, are brief, old, and widely
venerated. John Adams drafted Massachusetts’ 1780 document, the world’s oldest written
constitution, which became a model for subsequent New England constitutions.238 These
documents include broad provisions on morality,239 due process, and equality.240 In
contrast, early Mid-Atlantic conventions drafted longer documents, like Pennsylvania’s
1776 and 1790 Constitutions, which avoided morality legislation, allowing cultural
pluralism and pursuit of private economic ends.241 Virginian and Pennsylvanian farmers

238

The Massachusetts Constitution’s tripartite government inspired delegates to New Hampshire’s 1784
Convention. See Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787, 339–43. The Massachusetts
document, with Connecticut’s 1818 Constitution, inspired Maine framers in 1819. See Marshall J. Tinkle,
The Maine State Constitution: A Reference Guide (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 1–6; Tarr,
Understanding State Constitutions, 98. The short constitutions of Vermont, Rhode Island, and Connecticut
too resemble the Massachusetts document. See Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, Article III.
239
Like many New England states, Massachusetts’ Constitution established a commonwealth with shared
“piety, religion, and morality,” backed by temperance and lottery legislation. See the 1780 Massachusetts
Declaration of Rights, Article III.
240
For example, in 1783 Massachusetts’ Supreme Judicial Court used the state due process clause to
abolish slavery, as did later New England courts and legislatures. Vermont’s 1777 Declaration of Rights,
Chapter I, Section 1 was the nation’s first state law banning slavery. Massachusetts’ 1783 Jennison case
abolishing slavery was reported in 1867 as Commonwealth v. Jennison, Rec. I783, fol. 85. See William
O’Brien, “Did the Jennison Case Outlaw Slavery in Massachusetts?,” The William and Mary Quarterly,
Third Series, 17, no. 2 (April 1, 1960): 220, doi:10.2307/1943353. Initially lacking constitutional equality
and due process protections, Connecticut and Rhode Island provided for gradual emancipation by statute in
1784. Two years later, New Hampshire’s legislature interpreted the state due process clause to ban slavery.
Maine entered the Union as a free state in 1819. See Arthur Zilversmit, The First Emancipation: The
Abolition of Slavery in the North (University of Chicago Press, 1967), 105–8, 116–17; David Menschel,
“Abolition without Deliverance: The Law of Connecticut Slavery 1784-1848,” The Yale Law Journal 111,
no. 1 (October 1, 2001): 164 n3, doi:10.2307/797518; Gregory Ablavsky, “Making Indians ‘White’: The
Judicial Abolition of Native Slavery in Revolutionary Virginia and Its Racial Legacy,” University of
Pennsylvania Law Review 159, no. 5 (April 1, 2011): 1501–2.
241
Like Pennsylvania’s 1776 and 1790 delegates, many Mid-Atlantic framers brokered compromises
between Englishmen and Scots-Irish and Germans immigrants, between Protestants and Catholics, and
between urban and rural settlers, creating longer documents.
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settled Ohio, comprising seventeen of the thirty-five delegates to the first Ohio
convention in 1802, drawing heavily on the Pennsylvania 1790 Constitution.242 From
Ohio, Jacksonian frontiersmen spread the Mid-Atlantic model through the Great Lakes
region to Indiana in 1816, Illinois in 1818, Michigan in 1835, and Wisconsin in 1848.243
Southern framers drafted distinctively long, quasi-statutory constitutions to
reconcile white planters and small farmers while systematically excluding blacks.
Virginia’s 1776 Constitution was the first regional model, and George Nicholas, who
drafted the document, presided over the 1792 Kentucky Convention.244 From Virginia
and Kentucky the model diffused through the antebellum South.245 The Civil War,
Reconstruction, and Jim Crow yielded a slew of constitutions in the mid-nineteenth and
twentieth centuries.246 Of the eighteen states to ratify four or more constitutions, twelve
are Southern, and Southern states account for half of the states with an average
242

It also reflected the as well as the 1796 Tennessee Constitution and 1799 Kentucky Constitution. See
Steven H. Steinglass and Gino J. Scarselli, The Ohio State Constitution: A Reference Guide (Greenwood
Press, 2004), 2–4, 7–8, 10, 15–16.
243
Ohio and Kentucky offered models for delegates to Indiana’s 1816 Convention. Illinois framers, like
Ohio’s and Indiana’s, drew elements of its 1818 Constitution from the Northwest Ordinance, including
Article VI, abolishing slavery, though Illinois allowed de facto slavery until 1845. Michigan framers too
borrowed from the Ordinance, but also New York and Connecticut’s constitutions. Similarly, Wisconsin
settlers too came from New York and New England. See Paul Finkelman, “Evading the Ordinance: The
Persistence of Bondage in Indiana and Illinois,” Journal of the Early Republic 9, no. 1 (1989): 21–51,
doi:10.2307/3123523; Susan P. Fino, The Michigan State Constitution: A Reference Guide, annotated
edition edition (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1996), 4–8; Jack Stark, The Wisconsin State Constitution:
A Reference Guide (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1997), 4–8; Paul Finkelman, Slavery and the
Founders: Race and Liberty in the Age of Jefferson (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2001), 58–80.
244
Seventy-five of the 107 sections of the Kentucky Constitution of 1792 were derived, sometimes
verbatim, from the Pennsylvania 1790 Constitution. See Robert F. Ireland, The Kentucky State
Constitution: A Reference Guide (Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press, 1999), 2.
245
Delegates to Louisiana’s 1812 Convention merged the French civil code with elements of Kentucky’s
1799 Constitution. Virginia’s 1776 Constitution was also a model for the 1776 North Carolina Constitution.
Tennessee, carved from North Carolina’s Appalachian claims, in turn drew on the North Carolina
document in 1796. And from the Tennessee and Kentucky Constitutions came the Mississippi Constitution
of 1817, which inspired framers in Alabama in 1819 and Arkansas in 1836. See Lewis L. Laska, The
Tennessee State Constitution: A Reference Guide (New York: Greenwood Press, 1990), 2–7; Lee Hargrave,
The Louisiana State Constitution: A Reference Guide (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), 2–3; John W.
Winkle, The Mississippi State Constitution: A Reference Guide (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1993), 2–
5; Tarr, Understanding State Constitutions, 129.
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Only with the Jim Crow constitutions of the 1880s and 1890s did Southerners find relative constitutional
stability. See Figure 15 in the appendix for an account of Southern constitutional revision.
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constitutional duration below the national average.247 This regular turnover likely dulled
Southerners’ sense of constitutional veneration.248
Great Plains constitutions, framed in the Populist and Progressive eras,249 allow
piecemeal popular initiatives and referenda, which has almost entirely preempted
wholesale constitutional replacement.250 Similarly, Western constitutions have endured
through partial amendment. California’s 1849 Convention was the first in the West, and a
model for Oregon in 1857 and Nevada in 1864.251 And Wyoming framers in 1889 looked
to the work of nearby Coloradans, Idahoans, Montanans, and North Dakotans.252 Many
Western and Rocky Mountain state constitutions dealt with the same resource concerns
over soil aridity, mineral extraction, and water allocation, and with political concerns
over labor, railroads and corporations, Mormonism, and federal authority.253
Finally, consider revision in each era in greater detail. At the behest of the
Continental Congress, the states ratified twelve constitutions between 1776 and 1778.
Many of these were quickly drafted as expressly temporary instruments to declare
independence from Great Britain and structure government, legal rights, and national
247

In twenty-six states, the average constitutional duration was below the national average. Thirteen of
these states are Southern.
248
According to a 2014 survey, of the thirteen Southern states, in ten, the average of respondents’
admiration for their constitution was below the national average. Texas, Florida, and West Virginia were
the exception. See Stephanopoulos and Versteeg, “The Contours of Constitutional Approval,” 21–25.
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All but three of the seventeen constitutions of the states in the Great Plains region were ratified between
1846 and 1907. Note also Minnesota’s first framers in 1857 drew on the Northwest Ordinance, but the state
entered the Union with the Great Plains states, and thus is categorized with them, rather than the original
and older Old Northwest states. See Mary Jane Morrison, The Minnesota State Constitution: A Reference
Guide (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2002), 3–5.
250
Regional constitutional stability is fairly high, with only two states revising their constitutions more than
once.
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California delegates drew on conventions in Michigan in 1835, New York in 1846, and Iowa.
Oregonians looked also to conventions in Ohio (1849), Maine, Indiana, and Iowa. Idahoans used
California’s 1849 and 1878 Constitutions. See David Schuman, “The Creation of the Oregon Constitution,”
Oregon Law Review 74 (1995): 611; Fritz, “American Constitutional Tradition Revisited,” 975–84.
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sovereignty during the Revolution.254 During the 1790s, many states, including
Pennsylvania, Vermont, and Georgia, replaced these temporary constitutions, conforming
to the federal model. The era produced twenty-five constitutions of average duration,255
roughly a sixth of those ratified in American history.
The federal Constitution deferred suffrage regulation to the states, so Jeffersonian
state legislatures and conventions revised their constitutions to extend near-universal
suffrage to white males. This state-level revision tripled the electorate,256 facilitating
Jackson’s landslide 1828 victory, the collapse of the reigning Democratic-Republicans,
and the rise of the Democratic and Whig parties. Between 1828 and 1861, states proposed
sixty-six new constitutions and ratified twenty-eight.257 Twenty-one of these were
Southern or Mid-Atlantic states that were grappling with slavery, postponing the slavery
crisis and helping preserving the Jacksonian party system.
Eventually, state constitutional revision exacerbated sectionalism.258 Southern
states seceded by redrafting their constitutions in 1861. These gave way to new,
egalitarian Reconstruction state constitutions in 1864 and another set three years later,259
254

In 1776, Pennsylvanians drafted a unicameral system with a weak executive and broad rights and
participation. Vermont and Georgia imitated this design the following year. At John Adams’ behest, the
Virginia Constitutional Convention of 1776 drafted a more conservative model, pitting a governor against
an upper and lower house, as in Britain, and against an independent judiciary. Adams replicated this design
in Massachusetts in 1780, which became the model for the New Hampshire Constitution of 1784, and the
national Constitution of 1787.
255
On average, a constitution framed in this era lasted sixty years. Ten constitutions from the Revolution
and the founding era lasted less than twenty-five years. All but three of these were the initial, experimental
state constitutions framed between 1776 and 1778.
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Richard P. McCormick, “New Perspectives on Jacksonian Politics,” The American Historical Review
65, no. 2 (January 1, 1960): 288–301, doi:10.2307/1842870.
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State constitutions framed in this era were not especially durable, lasting an average of fifty-three years.
Most constitutions framed in this era lasted less than fifty years, nine lasted twenty-five years or less, while
only five lasted more than a century.
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Northerners and Westerners passed antislavery state constitutions and elected Republicans, unbalancing
the House and Electoral College and exacerbating Southern anxieties that a dominant North would abolish
slavery in the territories or states.
259
The twenty-two Reconstruction constitutions were exceptionally inclusive documents, framed by
majority or plurality black conventions, enfranchising black voters at yet-unseen levels that would not be
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which quieted debates around the framing and ratification of the federal Reconstruction
Amendments. As the era ended, Midwestern populists in Nebraska in 1870, Illinois
in1870, and Missouri in 1875 revised and replaced their constitutions to constrain
corporations. Midwestern Populist and Western Progressive territories faced strict federal
oversight in drafting constitutions for admission to the Union, much like their exConfederate counterparts. Though only a quarter century, this period yielded fifty-two
constitutions, a third of the total ratified in American history.260
In the 1880s and 1890s, Populist, Progressive, and Western states protected
economic and positive rights, well before the Progressive federal amendments of 19131920. Southern Redeemers also constitutionalized Jim Crow in this era. Most of these
Jim Crow constitutions were passed in the late 1880 and early 1890s, as Southern
Democrats organized locally before sweeping Congress in 1892 and scoring Plessy v.
Ferguson (1896).261 Virginia’s 1902 Constitution, for example, repudiated the biracial
partisan order built under the state’s 1869 Constitution.
This led to a national lull in state constitutional replacement in the interwar years.
Between 1924 and 1945, only two states replaced their constitutions.262 There are three
reasons for this. First, by 1912 all of the territories within the continental United States

matched for another century. For example, Virginia’s 1869 Reconstruction Constitution, was backed a
racially inclusive order, including the Readjuster coalition between blacks and poor whites. Conversely,
many Reconstruction constitutions disenfranchised and alienated local ex-Confederates who caucused with
Northern moderates to repeal these constitutions and retrench the old constitutional order. The
Reconstruction constitutions lasted an average of thirty years, and only fourteen years when discounting the
outlying constitutions of North Carolina (1868), Tennessee (1870), and Arkansas (1874).
260
On average, a constitution framed in this era lasted fifty-three years. Twenty-eight of these constitutions
lasted less than twenty-five years. Of these, eighteen were Southern Reconstruction constitutions.
261
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
262
These were Louisiana (1921), Missouri (1945), and Georgia (1945).
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had achieved statehood.263 Second, Progressive innovations like the referendum,
initiative, and expert constitutional commission superseded wholesale replacement by
convention. Third, Southern constitutions ossified in the interwar years. The handful of
Southern states had accounted for over half of the constitutional replacement in
antebellum, Civil War, and Reconstruction America.264 But with the end of
Reconstruction, Redeemers and ex-Confederates entrenched their power through durable
state constitutions and statutes that disenfranchised Republican, black, and biracial state
coalitions.265 This new, white, solidly-Democratic electorate locked Southern states under
Democratic control for generations. Southern legislatures, insulated from interparty
competition, called no new conventions and Southern state constitutional replacement
flat-lined.266 The South, once the hotbed of constitutional replacement,267 was now quiet,
and aggregate American state constitutional replacement declined. Additionally, with the
Great Depression, Democrats swept Congress and the White House, regulating state
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Progressive and eugenicist congressmen were wary of granting statehood to the handful of territories
outside the continental United States, particularly to those seized during the Spanish-American War,
arguing their populations were unsuited to American liberal constitutionalism. Similarly, in the Insular
Cases (1901), the Supreme Court selectively extended rights under the national Constitution to these
populations
264
Southern states accounted for a major part of nineteenth-century revision. Between 1826 and 1906, the
thirteen Southern states framed 48 of America’s 87 state constitutions (55%), and drafted 67 of the total
137 proposed constitutions (39%).
265
Virginia’s 1902 Constitution, which disenfranchised the biracial populist Readjustors, exemplifies this
trend.
266
Between Virginia’s 1902 Constitution and the Civil Rights movement of the 1960s, only two Southern
states replaced their constitutions. These were Louisiana in 1913 and 1921 and Georgia in 1945. Florida
broke this lull by replacing its constitution in 1968. Jim Crow constitutions became firmly entrenched for
generations. Though there was intraparty legislative competition and extralegal rioting in the South, these
conflicts did not lead to extralegal, popular state constitutional conventions, as they had in the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth century. Perhaps this was because by the late nineteenth century, Southern
states had developed powerful police forces and mobs to punish extralegal mobbing.
267
For example, Alabama’s 1901 Constitution is still in force. It has at least 892 amendments. National
Democratic leaders like capitulated to Jim Crow constitutionalism, for fear of splitting the party. Wilson
advanced the Jim Crow program in the federal government and Franklin Roosevelt left the Redeemer state
constitutions untouched.
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commerce and welfare programs, sometimes to the exclusion of the states.268 But in other
cases, the states retained constitutional authority over welfare programs.269
Finally, in the 1960s all three federal branches aggressively intervened in state
regulation of education, criminal justice, and voting and apportionment law.270 Between
1960 and 1977, states attempted to replace their constitutions at levels unseen since
Reconstruction. Ten states ratified new constitutions, though only five of these were
states were Southern, suggesting perhaps that Civil Rights-era concerns plagued Northern
and Western constitutions. And during the 1960s and 1970s, every region in the United
States saw a spike in proposals for a new state constitution.271 Relatedly, Baker v. Carr
(1962) forced widespread state legislative redistricting. Across the Sunbelt, conservatives
organized municipalities and states around constitutional amendments, laying the
268

The New Deal Congress first passed the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) and Agricultural
Adjustment Act (AAA) of 1933. Four of the Supreme Court’s reactionary Republican appointees – Pierce
Butler, James McReynolds, George Sutherland, and Willis Van Devanter – led the court to strike down the
NIRA as an overextension of federal commerce powers in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,
295 U.S. 495 (1935), and the AAA as an invasion of traditional state powers in United States v. Butler, 297
U.S. 1 (1936). But after Roosevelt threated to pack the Court with sympathetic justices, the Court
capitulated, recognizing federal commerce power to regulate intrastate economic production in National
Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation, 301 U.S. 1 (1937), and in Wickard v.
Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). The importance of Roosevelt’s threat is a matter of debate. West Coast Hotel
Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) is often read as the Court’s capitulation to Roosevelt’s court packing
threat, the famous “switch in time that saved nine.” However, it is not clear that Roosevelt’s plan
influenced the justices’ meetings on this case, nor is it clear the threat influenced subsequent cases on New
Deal programs. In the NLRB case, Butler, McReynolds, Sutherland, and Van Devanter still opposed federal
authority to establish the NLRB, and none of the four allowed expansion of federal commerce power in
Wickard, as all four had retired.
269
In Steward Machine Company v. Davis (1937), the Court upheld the Social Security Act of 1935,
arguing the Act recognized and enabled states’ preexisting welfare statutes and positive constitutional
rights, balancing national authority and devolution. And in Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell
(1934), the Court deferred to a Minnesota statute granting beleaguered lessees a two-year moratorium
extension on home loan payments, one of many such state laws and constitutional provisions. See Steward
Machine Company v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937) and Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell, 290
U.S. 398 (1934).
270
On federal intervention in state education policy and desegregation, see Brown v. Board of Education of
Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958), the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act of 1965, and Green v. County School Board of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430 (1968). On
criminal justice, see Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). On redistricting, see for example Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186
(1962), Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), and the 1965 Voting Rights Act.
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See Figure 15 in the appendix.
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groundwork for Reagan’s 1980 election. These culture wars still affect state
constitutional revision, making study of the state constitutions as timely as ever.
The gradual backlash to Civil Rights-era reforms also began with the states. Local
grassroots organizing for Goldwater and Nixon in the Sunbelt states eventually realigned
national partisan politics and vaulted Reagan into the White House.272 The contemporary
national parties, now trapped by legislative gridlock, defer to the states on contentious
issues like regulation of abortion, capital punishment, gun control, drug control, and
voting and elections. Facing many disparate and narrow issues, the states have turned to
specialized amendments, rather than wholesale constitutional replacement – Rhode Island
was the last state to replace its constitution, in 1986. These many state amendments and
cases still influence national constitutional politics. For example, thirty-six states had
legalized same-sex marriage by amendment or federal or state ruling before the Supreme
Court followed suit in Obergefell v. Hodges (2015).273 Subsequent chapters further
explain these patterns by era, beginning with the American Revolution.
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Part II: Constitutional Development

80

CHAPTER 4: THE FOUNDING ERA, 1760-1799
“It has been frequently remarked that it seems to have been reserved to the people of this
country, by their conduct and example, to decide the important question, whether
societies of men are really capable or not of establishing good government from
reflection and choice, or whether they are forever destined to depend for their political
constitutions on accident and force.”
Alexander Hamilton, 1787274

In the mid-eighteenth century, American colonists contested British slave law,
frontier regulation, and understandings of legislative sovereignty. Their petitions for
constitutional reform unanswered, colonists revolted, proposing thirty-four new state
constitutions between 1776 and 1799 and ratifying twenty-four, a fifth of the total ratified
in American history. The national constitutional order was equally unstable, as
Americans ratified the Articles of Confederation in 1781 and the federal Constitution in
1788. Congress saw 310 federal amendments proposed in its first two-year session, far
exceeding the antebellum average of twenty-three per session,275 and ratified ten
proposals as the Bill of Rights in 1791, adding the Eleventh Amendment in 1795,
accounting for nearly half of all federal amendments to date.
What explains this state and federal constitutional instability? The Revolution was
a moment of crisis. Colonists scrambled to declare independence and form war
governments by ratifying fifteen constitutions between 1776 and 1780. The collapse of
the Articles and the ratification of the 1787 Constitution pushed the states to propose
another fourteen new constitutions to match the federal model by 1799. Opening The
Federalist, Alexander Hamilton recognized the risk that Americans would “depend, for
their political constitutions, on accident and force.”
274
275

Hamilton, Madison, and Jay, The Federalist, 1.
Between 1787 and 1860, Congress saw on average 11.74 federal amendment proposals per year.
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But Americans were not victims of circumstance. In May 1776, the Continental
Congress deferred constitutional framing to the state conventions, which rejected British
oversight and constitutional custom.276 In the four years after Congress’ May resolutions,
fourteen states had called as many conventions, in what Gordon Wood calls “the most
creative and significant period of constitutionalism in modern Western history.”277 State
framers designed constitutions deliberately, using a growing pamphlet literature on
English Whig mixed constitutions, ancient Saxon democracy, Roman republicanism, and
Greek confederations. In May 1776, Carter Braxton reminded the delegates to Virginia’s
Constitutional Convention that “Various are the opinions of men on this subject,”
allowing “all the candor and deliberation due to its importance.”278 State conventions
proceeded thoughtfully and purposefully. Massachusetts, for example, took four years to
design and ratify its first constitution.
In resolving controversies over slavery, the frontier, and legislative sovereignty
and design, state framers preempted these debates at the federal Convention. As James
Wilson noted and later Hamilton put it, federal framers could now go about “establishing
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good government from reflection and choice.”279 John Dickinson and George Mason
similarly instructed federal delegates to rely on prior state constitutions’ legislative
design and rights provisions.280 In sum, state constitutional design quieted national
constitutional controversies, tempering the instability of the emerging national
constitutional order. In sum, while Revolution led to significant state and national
constitutional revision, state framing helped stabilize national constitutionalism.
This chapter proceeds chronologically in three parts, first introducing colonial
debates in the 1760s over Parliamentary sovereignty, slavery, and frontier regulation,
which escalated into rebellion. Second, the chapter shows how the Continental Congress
in 1776 deferred these questions to the state constitutional conventions, which limited
state legislative sovereignty through bicameralism and gubernatorial and judicial
oversight, reapportioned legislatures to appease frontiersmen, and settled on diverse
slavery regulation. Finally, delegates to the 1787 Philadelphia Convention imitated these
state legislative designs and avoided the difficult slavery question by deferring to existing
state regulations.
I. The Colonial Era and Revolution, 1760-1776
On the eve of the American Revolution, Edmund Burke reflected on the collapse
of Britain’s colonial administration. Addressing the House of Commons, he called
Americans
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a people who are still, as it were, but in the gristle, and not yet hardened into the
bone of manhood. When I contemplate these things; when I know that the
Colonies in general owe little or nothing to any care of ours, and that they are not
squeezed into this happy form by the constraints of watchful and suspicious
government, but that, through a wise and salutary neglect, a generous nature has
been suffered to take her own way to perfection.281
Salutary neglect was the rule of British administration.282 Far removed from the Crown
and Parliament, Americans grew accustomed to liberty.283
Colonists’ resistance to active British administration provoked constitutional
conflict, which colonists addressed three ways. First, they sometimes used judicial
arbitration. But ordinary colonists knew that biased local elites controlled colonial courts.
So when they felt they did not get a fair shake, colonists rioted. When rioting escalated
into the Revolutionary War in 1775, colonists found a third, untested means of
constitutional reform, framing new constitutions and governments for their colonies.284
Colonists thus relied on diverse and conflicting sources of constitutional authority and
change. This in turn prevented colonists from resolving controversies over slavery, the
frontier, and legislative sovereignty and taxation. This section first outlines these three
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independence from Great Britain. In July 1776, the Second Continental Congress too declared formal
separation, ending the colonial era.
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controversies, and then explains how these escalated into war, forcing the beleaguered
Continental Congress to push these issues on the new states.
A. Colonial Constitutional Controversies
In 1606, King James I chartered the Virginia Company to settle the Chesapeake,
establish plantations, and spread Christianity. Colonists landed at Jamestown the
following year, then settling across the eastern seaboard.285 After wresting control of the
Delaware from the Dutch in 1667, England held the North American coast from
Massachusetts to Florida,286 and the Crown quickly issued charters splitting the fifteen
hundred miles of coastline into manageable colonies.287 Proprietary charters established
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Food shortages, disease, and the first few hard winters killed all but sixty of the three hundred settlers,
but after 1610, the hardy survivors ventured from their fort at Jamestown, building villages with homes,
schools, churches, farms, and plantations. The first Africans arrived aboard a Dutch warship in 1619, bound
as slaves or servants. Native Americans of the Powhatan Confederacy overran the nearby village at
Henricus in 1622, killing a quarter of the colony’s settlers, but with immigration, the colony rebounded.
Two years later, Charles I assumed the throne, married a Catholic, and reformed the Church of England on
Catholic principles. This alienated Puritans, who fled to by the thousands to found Massachusetts. Whole
families and villages uprooted to New England, taking with them the English common law tradition of
profuse legal writing. They drafted compacts to govern their villages, and recorded births, marriages,
deaths, and with each, the transfer of property. As in England, property gave status as a freeman and the
right to participate in local government. Charles asserted his royal prerogative over the Massachusetts Bay
and Plymouth colonies with charters in 1629. The colonists grew in number, attacking the Pequots in 1637,
the Narragansetts in 1643, and the Wampanoags in the devastating King Philip’s War of 1675-6, crippling
New England’s Indian population.
286
The English spread until they abutted Dutch settlements along the Hudson River. The embattled Dutch
also clashed with Swedes to the south, claiming the Swedish Fort Christina at the mouth of the Delaware in
1655. Their success was brief. Dutch holdings separated New England from Maryland, chartered in 1632,
and Virginia. English marines overran the tiny wooden Dutch fort in 1664, and the Netherlands ceded its
North American claims three years later, connecting the northern and southern English colonies.
287
Connecticut was chartered in 1662, Rhode Island and the Carolinas in 1663, New Jersey in 1664, and
New York was carved from Dutch holdings the same year. Pennsylvania’s proprietary charter followed in
1681, granting William Penn and his heirs “full and absolute power, licence and authoritie” over the
colony’s land, “to time hereafter forever.” Penn assumed the governorship and strong-armed the colony’s
legislators, who stripped some of his power with a new charter the following year. By 1701, Pennsylvania
settled on a final, stable charter, detaching three southern counties which chartered the Delaware Colony. A
compromise between the Penn dynasty and wealthy legislators, the 1701 Charter served both groups by
disenfranchising the colony’s poor and landless. Thirty-one years later, James Oglethorpe petitioned the
Privy Council to charter the final colony, Georgia. Under the Charter, Georgia would be run by a dozen
trustees, who “shall and may have perpetual succession.” See the 1681 Charter for the Province of
Pennsylvania and the 1732 Charter of Georgia. New England colonies hewed to their old charters and local
councils – in Massachusetts, town meetings and an assembly counteracted the elite-run courts. By 1750,
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new governments exclusively for a few of the Crown’s allies.288 Some colonial
proprietors, governors, or trustees held power indefinitely,289 voting was often reserved
for freemen, disenfranchising those who were dependent on others or had little property
and material stake in their community.290 Colonists clashed with their governing elites
and with the Crown, particularly when James II revoked several colonial charters in
1686.291 William and Mary ended these revolts by issuing restoring standing charters and

only Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, and Maryland had written charters, while
the other colonies relied on customary constitutions.
288
For example, the 1606 Virginia Charter, imitating the corporate charters of contemporary London firms,
gave the Company a monopoly over trade and the use of force. Note however the Massachusetts Bay and
Plymouth Charters of 1629 formally recognized an existing network of democratic town meetings
289
Maryland’s 1632 Charter granted the colony’s lands to the “Baron of Baltimore, his Heirs and Assigns,
forever.” Similarly, the 1669 Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina granted to the colony’s proprietors
“the sacred and unalterable form and rule of government of Carolina forever.” This constitution, drafted by
Locke and the Third Earl of Shaftesbury, was only partially implemented.
290
Colonial laws disenfranchised lacking property – the poor and landless, servants, women, slaves, and
transients – but also Jews, Catholics, blacks, and Indians, who might serve an authority besides the
Protestant Crown. The Carolina Charter of 1669, for example, rejected “numerous democracy.” Though
note that even Pennsylvania’s 1681 Charter, which granted Penn primary authority, admitted “Any
government is free to the people under it (whatever be the frame) where the laws rule, and the people are a
party to those laws.” And in Virginia after 1736, men with multiple landholdings could vote once for each
estate. Keyssar, The Right to Vote, 5–6.
291
To Stuart-era lawyers, Ireland and the American colonies were outside the English realm, and their
charters were subject to royal revocation or revision with little Parliamentary oversight. Therefore, in 1678
the English Lords of Trade acted within their constitutional right in calling to reform Massachusetts’
noncompliant charter government “from the very Root.” Charles II revoked the colony’s governor and
charter in 1684, removed Pennsylvania’s governor the following year, and moved to do the same in
Maryland. After Charles’ death, James II reassembled the Lords as a new Board of Trade to enforce the
Navigation Acts and shepherd American trade to English ports. James also united the Jerseys, New York,
and the increasingly autonomous New England colonies as the Dominion of New England under Edmund
Andros. Andros centralized power, suspended charter liberties, and enforced the unpopular Acts with new
customs officers. Within two years, James had proceeded against every charter of every American
settlement, including the governments of Bermuda and Jamaica. When Parliament ousted James II,
ordinary colonists arrested Andros and his council in the 1689 Boston Revolt, New York farmers deposed
Lieutenant Governor Francis Nicholson in Leisler’s Rebellion, and Puritan Marylanders overthrew their
Catholic royal governor in Coode’s Rebellion. Philip S. Haffenden, “The Crown and the Colonial Charters,
1675-1688: Part I,” The William and Mary Quarterly, Third Series, 15, no. 3 (July 1, 1958): 299–308,
doi:10.2307/1915619; Philip S. Haffenden, “The Crown and the Colonial Charters, 1675-1688: Part II,”
The William and Mary Quarterly, Third Series, 15, no. 4 (October 1, 1958): 456–66, doi:10.2307/2936901;
Jack P. Greene, Negotiated Authorities: Essays in Colonial Political and Constitutional History (University
Press of Virginia, 1994), 29–34, 47–51.
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issuing a new one to Massachusetts Bay in 1691.292 Only after 1721, when Robert
Walpole became Prime Minister, did the colonies return to salutary neglect.
In the mid-eighteenth century, demographic changes forced new controversies
over the status of slaves, the regulation of the frontier, and the extent of legislative
sovereignty. Abolition was a thorny issue. As plantations spread up the fertile
Chesapeake, around 1640 the assemblies of Virginia and Maryland legally distinguished
slaves from indentured servants, protecting the latter with finite contracts and payment in
clothes and provisions.293 After white servants revolted in Bacon’s Rebellion in 1676,294
planters turned to black and Indian slaves, abandoning Indian slavery in the 1700s.295 On
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But in 1697 the Crown appointed the Earl of Bellomont the governor of New York, New Hampshire,
and Massachusetts, provoking colonial resistance.
293
These laws were written to attract poor white Englishmen, and many bachelors from the Thames Valley
immigrated to work as servants for a few years in shops or fields. They flocked to the tobacco plantations
of the Carolinas and the Chesapeake, over half to Maryland alone. Disease, starvation, and labor killed
most. Few lived to twenty, and fewer to forty. This quick turnover increased demand for English servants,
and many of these newcomers, vulnerable to colonial diseases, also died. Rocketing demand exhausted the
supply of English immigrant laborers, which by the century’s end dwindled three percent each year 293.
Unrest also discouraged indentured labor in the Chesapeake. Frontier farmers in Virginia and the Carolinas
might own their land and labor, but they clashed with resident Indians. Winthrop D. Jordan, “Enslavement
of Negroes in America to 1700,” in Colonial America: Essays in Politics and Social Development, ed.
Stanley Nider Katz (Little, Brown, 1976), 230–33.
294
In 1676, Susquehannock tribesmen attacked settlements in Maryland and Virginia. Nathaniel Bacon
rallied a militia of several hundred indentured servants and farmers, and at least eighty black slaves who he
promised freedom. After Virginia’s Governor Berkeley’s refused to commission a formal militia to fight
the Indians, Bacon’s mob marched on the capital at Jamestown, protesting the policy and the Governor’s
nepotism. At gunpoint, Berkeley again refused, before the assembly capitulated. Triumphant, the mob
torched the capital and slaughtered a group of Pamunkey Indians. Wary of poor whites, Virginia plantation
owners abandoned white indentured labor. Smith, Civic Ideals, 61, 66.
295
Europe demanded more tidewater tobacco, and by the 1680s, rice grown in the coastal swamps of South
Carolina and modern Georgia. The tobacco trade enriched Virginia’s planters, public officials, and even its
fledgling college. In 1661 Virginia formally established black chattel slavery, and Maryland did the same
the following year. Charleston supplied the Carolinas with African slaves, and starting in the 1670s, with
Native American slaves captured in war, or forced into servitude by the courts or their families. In this
period, South Carolina’s Indian slave population grew to 50,000, eclipsing the number of black slaves.
After 1682, Virginia’s House of Burgesses classed Indians not as indentured servants, but as slaves, akin to
blacks. But Indians could escape and seek shelter with surrounding tribes. After costly wars against the
Tuscarora and Yamasee tribes between 1715-18, white Carolinians shifted primarily to purchasing blacks,
who could be bought in bulk, at will. Indian slavery declined, though it persisted in all of the colonies.
Meanwhile, African slave ships fed ports across the fertile, flat Southeastern coast, and the slave population
boomed. Four years after Bacon’s Rebellion, less than eight percent of the total Chesapeake population was
enslaved. By 1710, the percentage tripled. Bernard Bailyn, The Peopling of British North America: An
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the eve of the Revolution, only five percent of Northern colonists were enslaved, but
slavery was central to the Northern economy.296 Most colonial legislatures denied full
citizenship to persons with African appearance or physiology, disempowering free and
enslaved blacks across generations.297
In contrast, Britons did not rely solely on chattel slavery, and turned slowly
against the system in the mid-eighteenth century.298 The abolitionists Thomas Clarkson
and William Wilberforce brought antislavery petitions to Parliament, and Granville Sharp
advised the 1772 Somerset decision limiting slavery in Britain.299 The Somerset ruling
condemned colonial slavery as an affront to natural law, worrying Southern slaveholders
Introduction (New York: Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, 1986), 100–102; Smith, Civic Ideals, 59,
521 n53; Ablavsky, “Making Indians ‘White,’” 1466–71.
296
Agricultural slaves were concentrated east of Manhattan, on Connecticut’s tobacco plantations, and in
Rhode Island’s Narragansett region. Most Northern slaves were domestics. In the mid-eighteenth century, a
fifth of Boston households owned at least one slave. In New York City, the proportion was about half, with
a fifth of the total population and a quarter of the city’s working-age males enslaved. And refineries in
these Northern port cities processed sugar from Caribbean slaves into rum and molasses for European
markets. Merchants reaped the profits, using them to build public institutions, including America’s first
universities. Edward Countryman, The American Revolution (Macmillan, 1985), 51; Nash, The Unknown
American Revolution, 32–33; Craig Steven Wilder, Ebony and Ivy: Race, Slavery, and the Troubled
History of America’s Universities (Bloomsbury Publishing USA, 2013).
297
Note New York’s 1702 Act for Regulating Slaves was comparable to Virginia’s 1702 and South
Carolina’s 1740 laws, and Pennsylvania’s 1726 Act for Better Regulating Negroes in the Province was
similarly harsh to free blacks. Countryman, The American Revolution, 34–37; Smith, Civic Ideals, 63–67;
Howard Gillman and Mark A. Graber, The Complete American Constitutionalism, Volume One:
Introduction and the Colonial Era (Oxford University Press, 2015), 409–26.
298
British Quakers protested that slavery humans violated humans’ inherent divinity, while Scottish moral
sense philosophers attributed to civilized man a tendency to sympathy and an abhorrence to slavery.
Inspired by both schools, the English abolitionist Thomas Clarkson leafleted and preached on slaves’
ordeals, stirring his listeners’ compassion and disgust. These moral suasionists were remarkably successful.
By 1792, as many as 400,000 Britons had signed 519 antislavery petitions. John R. Oldfield, Popular
Politics and British Anti-Slavery: The Mobilisation of Public Opinion Against the Slave Trade, 1787-1807
(Manchester University Press, 1995), 5–7; Michael E. Woods, “A Theory of Moral Outrage: Indignation
and Eighteenth-Century British Abolitionism,” Slavery & Abolition 0, no. 0 (September 26, 2014): 5–7,
doi:10.1080/0144039X.2014.963393.
299
In Somerset, Lord Mansfield ruled slavery might be allowed under flawed positive laws, but not under
the higher natural law. Where positive slavery law was unclear or contradictory, Mansfield ruled judges
ought to decide in favor of higher law and liberty. Given Britain’s conflicting laws regulating slavery,
Mansfield ruled that slaves could not be removed from Great Britain without the liberty of habeas corpus
review. British precedent since Smith v. Brown and Cooper (1702) allowed colonial slavery, and each of
the American colonies clearly and consistently legalized slavery, preventing Mansfield from abolishing or
modifying colonial slave laws. Somerset v Stewart (1772) 98 ER 499 and Smith v. Brown and Cooper, 90
Eng. Rep. 1172 (1702). On Somerset’s relation to Smith, see Gillman and Graber, The Complete American
Constitutionalism, Volume One, 406–9.
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and emboldening some slaves.300 Further, Northern slave law was relatively ambiguous
and contradictory, inviting British and Northern judges to rule in favor of liberty and
habeas corpus, preventing the return of runaways from the South and perhaps allowing
the abolition throughout the colonies.
Abolitionism found an audience in America. Many of Philadelphia’s Quaker
merchants were invested in the slave trade, but a few joined Clarkson in establishing a
local antislavery chapter. Granville Sharp printed his pamphlets in Boston and
Philadelphia, and corresponded with Anthony Benezet, a firebrand Quaker abolitionist,
and Benjamin Rush, a professor at the College of Philadelphia. Rush in turn petitioned
the Crown to disband the slaveholding Royal African Company in 1773.301 Across the
colonies liberal pamphleteers attacked monarchy by arguing men were naturally free and
equal. And republican writers revived Roman, Florentine, and English arguments for
liberty from domination, levelling them against both monarchy and chattel slavery. 302 As
war loomed in 1775, Virginia’s loyalist Governor Dunmore promised liberty to rebelowned slaves and indentured servants and indentured servants in exchange for service in
the Royal Army, and three years later Rhode Island offered freedom to slaves joining the
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Shortly after Somerset decision, several Virginia slaves made for England rather than try their luck in
the colony’s courts. Nash, The Unknown American Revolution, 21–23.
301
James Wilson, Rush’s colleague at the College and a fellow Edinburg alumnus, taught the moral sense
theory of Francis Hutcheson, David Hume, and Adam Smith, and in 1768, students at the College held a
public debate on the morality and legality of slavery. William M. Wiecek, “Somerset: Lord Mansfield and
the Legitimacy of Slavery in the Anglo-American World,” The University of Chicago Law Review 42, no. 1
(October 1, 1974): 114–15; Nash, The Unknown American Revolution, 63.
302
Jefferson’s draft Declaration intertwined liberal and republican strands, complaining the Crown had
seized Africans as slaves and vetoed colonists’ antislavery petitions, violating both groups’ liberty, and
worse, incited slaves to revolt.
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Continental Army.303 This worried Southern planters who had spent decades suppressing
armed slave revolts and developing detailed codes to control free and enslaved blacks.
Frontier expansion also split colonists from the Crown and their legislatures. As
in feudal England, social life in a Mid-Atlantic proprietary colony or Southern plantation
colony was hierarchical, dominated by a few dynasties which preserved their seats
through charter privileges, primogeniture, entail, and intermarriage.304 In the smaller New
England colonies, arable land was scarce and grand estates few, but so were the chances
to own land and gain accompanying political and suffrage rights.305 For free white male
colonists in the mid-eighteenth century, land and freedom lay west across the
Appalachians,306 so families streamed west.307
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Rhode Island could afford the bargain – slaves were roughly a tenth of its population at midcentury.
Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution, 51.
304
With at least fifty acres of farmland, a free Pennsylvanian male twenty-one or older could vote. But
since the 1681 Charter, much of Pennsylvania’s land belonged to the Penns and a few others, who leased it
to disenfranchised tenant farmers. In New York, dynasties like the Livingstons, Van Renssalaers, and
Beekmans controlled tenant estates of hundreds of thousands of acres. In Maryland, Virginia, and the
Carolinas, slaves and indentured servants worked tobacco fields for wealthy planters.
305
Families in New England and along the Atlantic seaboard split farms as they were bequeathed, with a
double portion to the first son. Over generations, this left smaller divisions and less land. With less land,
farmers could not afford to leave land fallow to recuperate after harvesting, the soil failed, and so did
farmers. After 1750, many Massachusetts farmers would leave at least one son landless. In the town of
Chebacco, Massachusetts, nearly half of all sons failed to inherit land. Countryman, The American
Revolution, 9–14; Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution, 42–48; Nash, The Unknown
American Revolution, 72–73.
306
Land did not grant freedom to all. Indentured servants farmed without immediate reward, and black and
Indian slaves had no prospect of freedom and property in the land they worked. Under the English practice
of coverture, daughters were legally subjects of their fathers, and wives of their husbands, unable to own
property, sue, or draft wills or contracts. A tenth of women owned property by divorce or widowing, and in
some colonies, could vote, but rarely did. And some immigration was involuntary. England sent fifty
thousand felons, and additional prisoners of war, condemned to unfree labor in Maryland and Virginia.
307
From Connecticut, Yankees pushed to the Wyoming Valley in northeastern Pennsylvania, skirmishing
with local whites, while Pennsylvanians followed Virginians to North Carolina, doubling the colony’s
population, and North Carolinians crossed the mountains to modern Kentucky, seceding from the colonial
government. Europeans came too. Enticed by shipping company advertisements promising land and social
mobility, groups of German families paid bulk rates to travel from the Palatinate up the Rhine to
Rotterdam, then to England, spreading between the foothills west of Philadelphia. After the Irish droughts
of the 1710s, Irishmen fled to the Appalachians, intermarrying in the 1740s with Scotsmen escaping the
collapse of the clan system. This immigration of 120,000 Scots-Irish and 90,000 Germans dwarfed the
original migration of some 20,000 Puritans to Massachusetts. Bailyn, The Peopling of British North
America, 13–36, 121; Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution, 49; Smith, Civic Ideals, 67–69.
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Settlers crossing the Appalachians found the land claimed by Indians and the
French.308 To Protestant colonists, roving Indians failed to enclose and tame the earth as
God intended, losing their right to it.309 Frontiersmen sought to organize militias to
displace Native Americans, but old, inflexible colonial laws reserved to governors or
assemblies the power to appoint and salary militia officers. And in colonies like
Pennsylvania, North Carolina, and South Carolina, these laws concentrated legislative
districts and the franchise in wealthy eastern counties.310 Without county status, western
territories struggled to organize militias and forts, and without legislative representation,
they could not fund new defense and infrastructure projects. So frontiersmen rioted. They
publicly protested the colonial charters’ voting and apportionment schemes –
disenfranchised Pennsylvanians mobbed polling places at least five times between 1739
and 1755, and marched on the colonial Assembly twice.311 In 1763, the Crown granted
the newly-captured Ohio River Valley to French Catholics and outlawed trans-
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The Iroquois, or Haudenosaunee, peoples spread from the Hudson west to the Catskills and
Adirondacks. A confederation of five tribes – the Cayuga, Mohawk, Oneida, Onondaga, and Seneca – the
Iroquois shared a language and government, conquering tribes to the south, from the Susquehanna in the
east to the steep western Alleghenies. The Alleghenies ran south into the Blue Ridge and the Cherokees, on
the edge of Virginia and the Carolinas. These tribes worked and roamed the Appalachians and Ohio River
valley, alongside French trappers, traders, and troops.
309
Expansion promised freedom and harmonized with many settlers’ Christian and English Whig beliefs.
Writing in 1682, Locke doubted that in “uncultivated waste of America, left to nature, without any
improvement, tillage or husbandry, a thousand acres” could match “ten acres of equally fertile land do in
Devonshire, where they are well cultivated.” Never mind that Native Americans better cultivated the land
than the first colonists. Smith, Civic Ideals, 61; John Locke, Two Treatises of Government and A Letter
Concerning Toleration, ed. Ian Shapiro (Yale University Press, 2003).
310
Eastern elite families in the colonial assemblies refused to dilute their power by parceling the western
periphery into new counties and legislative seats. Between 1725 and the American Revolution, over 70
percent of New Jersey legislators were related to previous legislators. Wood, The Radicalism of the
American Revolution, 48.
311
These rallies predate the conventional story of popular constitutionalism, which normally begins with
the Stamp Act protests of 1765.
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Appalachian migration,312 frustrating Protestant settlers and overriding land claims by
Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Virginia.313
Then came the last and worst crisis for British rule. Under salutary neglect,
Parliament’s Navigation Act tariffs lay dormant until the French and Indian War
burdened Britain with costly new frontier garrisons and warships.314 To raise funds,
Prime Minister George Grenville levied the 1765 Stamp Act on purchases as big as a
plantation or as small as a pair of dice, thus taxing colonists of all classes, and required
payment in pounds sterling, which few colonists carried.315 Americans rich and poor
rioted, pilloried tax and customs officials, boycotted British goods, and refused to pay the
tax.316
The crisis hinged on a question of legislative sovereignty in constitutional matters.
Many Americans believed a tax law was legitimate only if it was passed by the
representatives of the people taxed.317 Colonists lacked specific delegates to the House of
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Parliament passed the Quebec Act of 1774. Extending the new Province of Quebec south along the Ohio
and west to the Mississippi, the British created a heaven for oppressed Catholics, alienating Protestant
colonists. Since the early eighteenth century, every British colony had suppressed Catholicism, including
Maryland, once a Catholic haven, and Rhode Island and Pennsylvania, traditional places of religious
freedom.
313
Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (Belknap Press of Harvard
University Press, 1967), 118; Smith, Civic Ideals, 57.
314
A century before, Parliament had passed the Navigation Acts, coaxing the colonies’ growing trade to
British ports through naval escorts while discouraging foreign trade through taxes. But Britain had
neglected the Acts since the Glorious Revolution and Robert Walpole’s 1721 appointment as Prime
Minister. The few officials enforcing the Acts in America could be bribed to ignore the taxes, and
American juries refused to convict the few smugglers who were caught. Countryman, The American
Revolution, 10–11.
315
The Stamp Act taxed colonists who needed their documents or sales notarized, and charged the judges
of the vice-admiralty courts to convict smugglers and the Royal Navy to search ships. Similarly, the 1764
Sugar Act taxed on the colonial molasses trade.
316
Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution, 99–104.
317
In 1688, England’s Parliament ousted James II, affirming Whig theories that sovereignty lay in
Parliament. Englishmen and colonists were represented in the House of Commons, but the people
themselves did not hold sovereign power. Colonists largely accepted Parliament’s authority, save for the
power to levy taxes, which were gifts from the people, written into law by their representatives in the
House of Commons. On colonists’ initial capitulation to parliamentary sovereignty, see Jack P. Greene,
The Constitutional Origins of the American Revolution (Cambridge University Press, 2011), 75–79.
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Commons, invalidating the Stamp Act, but Grenville’s deputy Thomas Whately
concocted the idea of virtual representation, claiming all Members of Parliament
represented all of Britain and its colonies.318 This gave Parliament broad sovereignty over
legislative and constitutional affairs. American pamphleteers did not buy it.319 Colonists
did elect representatives to the colonial assemblies, which passed legitimate taxes, but
Parliament overruled these laws. Two months after the Stamp Act, Patrick Henry
proposed seven resolutions to Virginia’s House of Burgesses abrogating the Acts. 320
Several months later the Virginia legislature affirmed that laws of “internal Polity and
Taxation” required colonists’ consent. Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New
York, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and South Carolina issued similar declarations. In
October, nine colonies dispatched delegates to the Stamp Act Congress in New York,
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Grenville’s speech to Parliament proposing the 1764 Sugar Act admitted enforcement of the Acts had
little precedent, threatening colonial unrest. Still, he received universal applause from his audience.
Countryman, The American Revolution, 41–52; Smith, Civic Ideals, 70–86.
319
In an October 1765 pamphlet, the Marylander Daniel Dulany declared Whately’s scheme “a cob-web
spread to catch the unwary, and intangle the weak.” A few years later, Pennsylvania’s John Dickinson
wrote that without American delegates, the Commons could not represent the American people’s taxation
powers. Daniel Dulany, “Considerations on the Propriety of Imposing Taxes in the British Colonies, For
the Purpose of Raising a Revenue, by Act of Parliament,” in Tracts of the American Revolution, 17631776, ed. Merrill Jensen (Bobbs-Merrill, 1967); John Dickinson, “Letters from a Farmer in Pennsylvania to
the Inhabitants of the British Colonies,” in Tracts of the American Revolution, 1763-1776, ed. Merrill
Jensen (Bobbs-Merrill, 1967); Merrill Jensen, “Introduction: The Pamphlet Writers and Their Times,” in
Tracts of the American Revolution, 1763-1776 (Bobbs-Merrill, 1967), xl–xli, xxix–xxxii; Countryman, The
American Revolution, 65–69.
320
Henry asserted Virginia’s “two royal charters, granted by King James I” had regulated taxation “without
interruption” for a century, “constantly recognized by the kings and people of Great Britain.” Through the
charters and decades of custom, colonists delegated taxation authority to their colonial representatives, who
knew “what taxes the people are able to bear.” Henry merely wanted to maintain colonists’ customary
British freedom under the charters. If unchallenged, Grenville’s law would assume constitutional precedent,
overturning a century of popular sovereignty over colonial taxes. Henry’s last resolution added a radical
stipulation. He claimed colonists had been governed by laws of “internal policy and taxation, as are derived
from their own consent.” Parliament’s laws over the colonies’ “internal policy” also required consent and
representation. John Henry, “Virginia Stamp Act Resolutions,” in Journals of the House of Burgesses of
Virginia, 1770-1772, ed. John Pendleton Kennedy (Richmond, Va.: The Colonial Press, E. Waddey Co.,
1906).
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which affirmed Virginia’s resolutions, extending colonists’ legislative power past
taxation, to all matters of domestic legislation.321
Grenville resigned four months later, and Parliament repealed the Acts.322 But in
1773 Parliament heavily taxed colonial tea merchants while exempting the failing East
India Company. Colonists again rioted. This time, Parliament did not retreat. The 1774
Coercive Acts enforced the Tea Act by blockading Boston’s port, shuttering the
Massachusetts government, stationing British troops in unoccupied buildings, and
extraditing the Acts’ violators to Britain for trial. As Parliament intended, the Acts forced
a crisis.323 Dulany, Dickinson, and Henry claimed their right to resist the Acts by citing
English common law, the colonial charters, and their own British ancestry.324 And by
1774, many of the members of the First Continental Congress appealed not only to
English rights, but also to a natural or republican right to revolt.325 War loomed.
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Countryman, The American Revolution, 50–52, 63–64; Greene, The Constitutional Origins of the
American Revolution, 67–88.
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The following year, Parliament’s Declaratory Act claimed authority over America “in all cases
whatsoever,” from tax law to regular legislation. Chancellor of the Exchequer Charles Townshend
exercised this power with a tax on paint, glass, lead, paper, and tea entering colonial harbors. But newly
appointed customs agents failed to collect the taxes, and Parliament repealed the Townshend Acts in 1770.
323
Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution, 118–19, 128; Countryman, The American
Revolution, 52–56.
324
The planter Landon Carter was more explicit, claiming colonists ought to be “solely governed and taxed
by Laws made with the Consent of the Majority of their own Representatives, according to an
Englishman’s inherent Birthright.” But American Indians, women, blacks, and the poor were denied many
liberties promised by the charters, and had few legal grounds for protesting the taxes. And if English blood
granted English rights, even fewer colonists could protest. Implicitly, Englishmen alone could rebel and
reconstitute the body politic, limiting citizenship. Smith, Civic Ideals, 72–77; Greene, The Constitutional
Origins of the American Revolution, 82.
325
New Hampshire’s John Sullivan wrote Massachusetts’ written charter was “only a confirmation of those
Liberties which the God of nature had given.” Dispirited by the Stamp Act, Richard Bland argued “we can
receive no Light from the Laws of the Kingdom, or from ancient History.” Only natural law remained
legitimate, granting a natural right to rebel. Citing Locke, Bland asserted subjects “have a natural Right to
quit the Society of which they are Members, and to retire into another country…if they unite, and by
common Consent take Possession of a new Country, and form themselves into a political Society, they
become a sovereign State.” Claims to republican self-governance relied on a small polity capable of local
meeting and deliberation, necessarily excluding some. Richard Bland, “An Inquiry into the Rights of the
British Colonies,” in Tracts of the American Revolution, 1763-1776, ed. Merrill Jensen (Bobbs-Merrill,
1967), 112, 116; Smith, Civic Ideals, 77–86; Neil L. York, “The First Continental Congress and the
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B. Escalation and Rebellion
Entering the Revolution, Americans debated abolition, the regulation of the
frontier, and the nature of taxation and legislative sovereignty. Each was a constitutional
question.326 Americans tackled these issues through three methods: popular resistance,
judicial review, and constitutional framing, in each of the states simultaneously.
Ultimately, these diverse, clashing methods exacerbated the era’s constitutional disputes.
The first method, popular constitutional reform, or “popular constitutionalism,”
had roots in seventeenth century colonial politics,327 particularly in rebellions against the
repeal of the colonial charters by James II in 1686.328 After 1720, Prime Minister Robert

Problem of American Rights,” The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography 122, no. 4 (October
1, 1998): 366; Greene, The Constitutional Origins of the American Revolution, 88–90.
326
Common to all three issues was the question of rights and citizenship. Rights gave citizenship. If a law
violated one’s natural, individual, republican, or customary rights, one could invalidate the law.
Invalidating a law changed the body of English law, and thus the English constitution. And in this new era
of popular sovereignty, revising the English constitution, the colonial charter, or the state constitution was
an exercise of citizenship. Tracing rights to Saxon ancestry or English common law limited rights and
citizenship to British males. Vague, uncodified liberal and republican rights could belong to humanity
universally, expanding the right to revolt, and enlarging the bounds of constitutional citizenship. Further,
when a right was denied, natural justice allowed the people to assemble in common protest, constituting
itself. During the Revolution, rights claims opened a new path to citizenship in the state and American
polities.
327
Since English conquest in 1664, New Yorkers had resisted English rule, and in 1673, an English colonist
named Samuel Hopkins engineered the Dutch Navy’s briefly successful seizure of New York. Two years
later, Nathaniel Bacon rallied poor Virginia farmers and slaves, promising the former legal recognition to
call a militia, and the latter freedom. Bacon’s posse contested Governor William Berkeley’s harsh frontier
and slavery regulations, aiming to broaden Virginian citizenship and reconstitute the polity.
328
James II revoked the charters of the New England colonies, merging them under the governorship of
Edmund Andros, and proceeded against the powerful, unruly proprietary governments of William Penn in
Pennsylvania and Lord Baltimore in Maryland. At James’ behest, Andros seized administration over all
land in his new Dominion of New England, dissolved the colonial assemblies, and conformed Puritan
marriage practices to Anglican law. Perhaps most offensive to Massachusetts Puritans, on May 1, 1687,
Andros’ government planted a maypole in Charlestown, inciting the townspeople to dance. New
Englanders rebelled. Connecticut colonists challenged James’ writ revoking their charter, before submitting
in 1687. In early 1689, word reached the colonies that Parliament had ousted James II for William and
Mary. On April 18, Bostonians seized a royal heavy frigate, then Andros’ officials, and then Andros
himself, finally dispatching emissaries to request that William and Mary restore their 1630 Charter and
accompanying liberties. British troops were few and remote, posted west of the big coastal cities to deter
French and Spanish invasion from the Mississippi, or on the vulnerable Caribbean islands, and could not
contain the rebellion. Later the following month, in Leisler’s Rebellion New York farmers seized and
torched New York City’s fort, looted Manhattan, dispossessed officeholders and the wealthy, and
overthrew Andros’ deputy Francis Nicholson. When Maryland’s Catholic governor requested the colony’s
militia turn in their guns, John Coode led fellow Protestants to rebel for fear of persecution by Catholics
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Walpole dispatched new, conciliatory governors, returning some colonies to salutary
neglect.329 Still, farmers, frontiersmen, and urban mechanics rioted against their colonial
charters and local governments.330 Suffrage exclusion was a perennial point of
contention, particularly for disenfranchised white males.331 In New York, Hudson River
Valley tenant farmers rioted when their wealthy landlords changed lease terms in 1765.332
and Indians. Coode and the colony’s Protestant elite assembled a new legislature, and with the Crown’s
blessings, appointed a new governor. Haffenden, “The Crown and the Colonial Charters, 1675-1688,”
October 1, 1958, 456–59; Jack M. Sosin, English America and the Revolution of Sixteen Eighty-Eight:
Royal Administration and the Structure of Provincial Government (University of Nebraska Press, 1985),
76–80, 153–56; Jack P. Greene, Peripheries and Center: Constitutional Development in the Extended
Polities of the British Empire and the United States, 1607-1788, 1990, 44; Brendan McConville, The
King’s Three Faces: The Rise & Fall of Royal America, 1688-1776 (University of North Carolina Press,
2007), 29–39.
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For example, William Gooch, appointed in 1727, presided over two decades of relative stability in
Virginia. Other colonies still chafed under British rule. In 1722 and 1729, Parliament passed the White
Pines Acts, claiming these tall trees to hew masts for the growing Royal Navy, depleting New England’s
lumber supply. In 1734, thirty citizens of Exeter, New Hampshire blocked royal deputies from claiming cut
lumber. Colonists in Connecticut and Massachusetts seized royal lumber and attacked royal forest
surveyors, claiming the Acts had vacated provisions in their charter without their consent. Pauline Maier,
“Popular Uprisings and Civil Authority in Eighteenth-Century America,” in Colonial America: Essays in
Politics and Social Development, ed. Stanley Nider Katz (Little, Brown, 1976), 428–29.
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In September 1745, roughly 150 New Jersey farmers freed Samuel Baldwin, who had been imprisoned
for harvesting the colonial governor’s lumber. When the governor ordered the mob’s organizers arrested, a
second mob, twice as large, guarded the leaders. Two years later another agrarian mob broke its leaders
from jail. The legislature responded by banning mobbing, to little effect. By 1748, New Jersey farmers had
established their own elected militia, jail and courts, and tax system, seizing sovereignty and executive
authority over the colony’s backwoods. Across the Delaware, elites in Pennsylvania’s legislature used a
provision of the 1701 Charter to disenfranchise poor Philadelphians, who mobbed polling places half a
dozen times between 1739 and 1755. In 1763, frontier farmers organized as the “Paxton Boys” and
marched on Philadelphia, demanding legislative reapportionment and militias to dispossess frontier Indians.
The legislature responded with a Riot Act the following year, prohibiting mobbing, and refused for over a
decade to grant the westerners’ demands. Connecticut had passed a similar mobbing act in 1722, and
Massachusetts in 1751, suggesting colonial legislatures were wary of these groups seizing the executive
prerogative. Ibid., 428–48; Nash, The Unknown American Revolution, 2–8.
331
For example, in the City of Philadelphia in 1775, only a tenth of male taxpayers could raise the fifty
pounds required to vote. In Pennsylvania’s rural Cumberland County, many freemen held the fifty acres of
land needed for suffrage, but the county held half as many seats as urban Philadelphia. Philadelphians
protested franchise laws, while a hundred miles west, farmers marched against malapportionment. By
McKinley’s count, the Philadelphia franchise extended to only 335 of the city’s 3,452 male taxpayers.
Albert Edward McKinley, The Suffrage Franchise in the Thirteen English Colonies in America
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1905), 284–92.
332
A few dynasties like the Livingstons and Van Rensselaers owned and leased the Valley’s land to small
farmers at arbitrarily increasing rates. These families also controlled New York’s courts and county
governments, leaving the farmers little legal recourse. When, in 1765, the manager of Philipse Manor cut
tenants’ longstanding leases to one to three-year terms, William Prendergast led a tenants’ revolt. The
governor called for Prendergast’s arrest, making him a folk hero. Three hundred farmers joined him,
capturing the King’s Bridge north of Manhattan, where they were dispersed by the city militia and regular
troops. Prendergast was captured. Justice Robert R. Livingston, scion of the wealthy Livingston and
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Southern colonies too faced free and slave agrarian revolts.333 And Northern abolitionists
printed, leafleted, and rallied to change the laws of their colonies.334
The 1764 Sugar Act and 1765 Stamp Act spurred riots against the Crown and
Parliament.335 Colonists abrogated the Acts with mobs and grand juries freeing those
arrested under the Acts. Failing this, a mob might publicly humiliate an official who
enforced the Acts, or might block collection of taxes, as Bostonians famously did by
destroying a tea shipment taxed under the Tea Act.336 As riots gave way to war, patriots
overthrew their local governments.337
These colonial mobs engaged in constitutional politics in a few senses. They
revised legal practices and thus revised the English customary constitution, which existed
through practice and action as much as through written law. Additionally, in checking
governors, legislatures, kings, and Parliament, these mobs helped balance government, an

Beekman families, ordered Prendergast’s execution, but no citizens volunteered to aid the city sheriff, and
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essential part of Whig constitutionalism. Finally, colonial mobs momentarily assumed
executive prerogative to enforce or abrogate charters and statutes. In an era of plural
governors, proprietors, and trustees, and later, of rotating executive councils, it was
normal for the executive power to belong to a plural, ad hoc group.338
Judicial reform offered a second method to address controversies over slavery,
frontier regulation, and taxation and representation.339 Slaves and abolitionists, desperate
for success where they could find it, looked to the judiciary. Northern and Southern
judges diverged. Several slaves freedom won suits in eastern Massachusetts, where the
1691 Charter promised all colonists “all liberties and Immunities of free and natural
subjects.”340 In contrast, Southern legislatures curtailed the grounds for blacks to make
freedom suits.341 And within months of Somerset, a Virginia court freed twelve Indian
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Similarly, under the era’s contractarian theories, natural individuals could only hold overawing,
executive power when they combined their private powers as a group. Under Lockean teachings,
individuals, so long as they did not violate the group’s rules, could leave at will. So for colonists, a plural,
shifting, popular executive was a part of English constitutional custom and a properly-functioning
government. Further, these large mobs, necessarily plural and diverse, could claim to represent the
common good, and thus assume executive prerogative, a power usually granted only in service to the
common good of the people.
339
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unconstitutional and abrogate it. Larry Kramer explains “no one, at any time, seems ever to have
considered bringing these constitutional disputes before a judge to have them settled… underscor[ing] the
absence of anything resembling modern judicial review before the Declaration of Independence.” Kramer,
The People Themselves, 38.
340
In 1766, Jenny Slew sued for her freedom in Salem, as did an enslaved sailor named Boston in the
Nantucket Court of Common Pleas. And nine years later in Newbury, a local jury awarded Caesar
Hendrick freedom and eighteen pounds in reparations from his owner. The courts also passed loyalist
slaveholders’ confiscated property to slaves. In 1781, Anthony Vassall of Cambridge successfully
petitioned the legislature for reparations from his loyalist master’s seized property. Several years later, an
elderly Medford slave named Belinda followed his example, drafting a legislative petition. Like many
colonial legislatures, Massachusetts’ assembly, called the Great and General Court, adjudicated private
judicial disputes, much as Parliament had in England. Since state courts had no special prerogative for
constitutional review, slaves looked to the legislature for freedom. Stories of Belinda’s childhood seizure
from Africa, her successful case, and her repeated petitions, circulated as far south as New Jersey, perhaps
because they were sensational and exceptional. Between 1765 and the end of the Revolution,
Massachusetts heard only eighteen freedom suits from its slave population of over five thousand. George
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98

slaves, arguing their matrilineal Indian ancestry made them legally white, narrowing the
grounds on which blacks could sue for freedom.342 Since each colony elaborated its legal
relationship to Great Britain differently,343 Somerset’s colonial judges interpreted the
brief, ambiguous dictum in diverse and conflicting ways.344 Northern judges cited
Somerset to protect runaways’ habeas corpus rights and to argue Northern abolition and
privileges and immunities provisions freed resident runaways, preventing their return
south. Conversely, Mansfield’s ruling admitted that Somerset, when he resided in
Virginia, was a slave under the colony’s positive law. Clashing readings of Somerset
threatened sectional tension over fugitive slaves.
Colonial courts also grappled with the rights and land claims of frontiersmen,
tenant farmers, and Indians. Legal apprenticeship was expensive, so judges often came
from and ruled for a circle of wealthy families, breeding resentment among colonists.345
With few sheriffs and justices of the peace to enforce rulings, patrician judges’ used their
stature, social authority, and knowledge of local traditions to eke out compliance.346
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As the Navigation Act taxes prompted smuggling and consequent searches by law
officers, colonists took their search warrant disputes to court. When the Massachusetts
Superior Court issued general search warrants to customs officer Charles Paxton, sixtythree Boston merchants challenged the Court’s overly-broad writs in Paxton’s Case
(1761).347 Representing the merchants, the young firebrand attorneys James Otis and
Oxenbridge Thatcher argued that these writs violated the merchants’ common law
privacy rights, and that consequently a 1662 Parliamentary statute authorizing these
general warrants was unconstitutional.348 As customs officials ransacked merchants’
homes and stores, rebellious colonists seized Otis and Thatcher’s arguments for privacy
rights and against Parliament’s authority to enforce the Navigation Acts. Samuel Adams,
watching Otis’ rousing speech at Boston’s State House, recalled “Then and there the
child independence was there born.”349
Rather than resolving disputes, colonial courts became sites of new controversies.
In ruling against Otis and Thatcher and for the Crown, Massachusetts’ Chief Justice drew
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charges of nepotism.350 George III bolstered these accusations by withdrawing colonial
judges’ life tenure,351 appointing judges at will. And when colonial juries refused to
condemn violators of the Navigation Acts, the Crown forced these trials into the English
Vice-Admiralty Courts where the court’s single Crown-appointed judge could punish
defendants, leaving no clear right of appeal.352
Frustrated with the judiciary, colonists rallied to thwart searches by sheriffs and
customs officials. On August 14, 1765, Bostonian ransacked and torched the houses of
Chief Justice Thomas Hutchinson and the Stamp Collector Andrew Oliver, forcing
Oliver’s resignation.353 Rhode Islanders circumvented the courts’ seizure by burning the
Liberty in 1769, shelled the customs ship St. John, and in 1772, burned the Royal Navy’s
schooner Gaspee.354 As Massachusetts spiraled into war, patriots assembled in
Cambridge to write a new state constitution, requiring “a special designation of the
persons or objects of search, arrest, or seizure” and assembling a new judiciary.355
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Colonists in every major city protested the Stamp Act, often tarring and feathering or
drowning customs agents, and patriots in every colony redrafted or abandoned their
colonial charters.356
Constitutional framing was the third and final means colonists used to address
these controversies. In March 1774, Parliament passed the Coercive Acts, dissolving
Massachusetts’ unruly legislature and closing Boston’s port. The colony’s legislature
reassembled as an independent Provincial Congress, and rural townspeople called for
independence and reinstatement of the 1629 Massachusetts Charter. With the news of
Massachusetts’ rebellion, the other colonies’ legislatures and revolutionary committees
dispatched delegates to Philadelphia to meet as the First Continental Congress on
September 6, 1774. Through 1775, colonists ousted their royal governors,357 shuttered
their legislatures and courts,358 and abrogated their royal charters and customary
constitutions. By 1776, only the insurrectionary Johnathan Trumbull of Connecticut
356
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retained his post as governor. Temporary provincial congresses, conventions, and
committees of safety and correspondence assumed control of many colonies, but lacked
the skill and the legal authority to govern and to fend off British troops.
Virginia, New Hampshire, and South Carolina, all lacking governors, looked to
the beleaguered Continental Congress for advice.359 On May 16, 1775, Massachusetts’
Provincial Congress requested from the Second Continental Congress instructions on
replacing the colony’s royal governor and assembly.360 As Massachusetts militiamen
reinforced the heights at Bunker Hill on June 9th, Congress answered Massachusetts’ plea
with instructions to modify and reinstate the abrogated Massachusetts Charter of 1691.361
In November, Congress allowed New Hampshire and South Carolina to draft
constitutions, and in December, granted Virginia the same liberty.362 With Congress’
blessing, New Jersey’s constitutional convention assembled on May 26, 1776, drafting a
constitution over the next month. From Philadelphia, the Continental Congress watched
as New Jersey, Maryland, and North Carolina called independent legislatures and courts.
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By April 1776, Georgia assembled an independent legislature and executive, and North
Carolina formally declared separation from Great Britain.363
These first state conventions met under duress, declaring independence and
forming wartime governments,364 framing constitutions long on revolutionary bluster and
short on detail.365 New Hampshire and South Carolina’s expressly temporary
constitutions rebranded their colonial legislature as the state legislature, but failed to
clarify its lawmaking authority to Parliament or to the people of the state. These
documents declared independence, but on the instructions of the Continental Congress,
concluded by appealing to Great Britain for reconciliation.366 Despite their brevity, these
first state constitutions were novel for expressly listing and limiting the powers of
government.367
In early 1776 little was clear. After almost two centuries of largely uninterrupted
salutary neglect, the colonies had rejected British rule in the courts, the streets, and in
constitutional convention. The constitutions of New Hampshire, South Carolina,
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Virginia, and New Jersey expressly repudiated British rule. But these were revolutionary
documents – novel, explicitly temporary, and written to repudiate authority, not to
permanently establish it. The sovereignty of these new governments would be tested on
the fields at Trenton, Saratoga, and Yorktown and defined at the coming state and
national constitutional conventions. So too would be standing controversies over slavery,
the frontier, and legislative sovereignty and taxation powers.
C. Congressional Deference to the State Constitutional Conventions
The beleaguered Continental Congress initially failed to address these
controversies. While the Southern and New England colonies facing invasion had
declared independence, the Congress split over the question of independence. John
Adams, frustrated with the Boston crisis, sought a congressional declaration of
independence as early as 1774. But blocked by other congressmen,368 Adams soon
realized that “the delegates here, and other persons from various parts are unanimously
very sanguine that if Boston and the Massachusetts can possibly steer a middle
course…the exertions of the colonies will procure a total change of measures and full
redress for us.”369 Congress was initially less prepared for independence, Adams saw,
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than were his Massachusetts neighbors under British occupation.370 John Dickinson of
Pennsylvania and James Duane of New York emerged as leaders of Congress’
conciliatory majority faction.371 Like many of the faction’s moderate delegates, they
represented the middle colonies, which were still relatively insulated from the war.372 The
Second Congress, hamstrung by unanimity requirements and overwhelmed with
immediate wartime problems, repeatedly shying from declaring independence.373
Increasingly preoccupied Bostonians’ hardship under British blockade,374 Adams
hatched a plan to circumvent Congress’ Dickinson-Duane faction and push America to
independence. Late one evening in January 1776, Adams met with George Wythe, an
elder Virginia congressman and jurist, to discuss the coming state constitutional
conventions. Nearly forty years later, Adams recalled the meeting in exact detail. Wythe,
370

John Adams’ second cousin and fellow Bay Stater Samuel Adams agreed that Congress saw
Massachusetts as too “intemperate and rash.” Maier, American Scripture, 6.
371
John Rutledge interrupted the Committee of the Whole on May 16 th to propose separation from Great
Britain, but found little support. On June 26th, Jefferson and John Dickinson, both outspoken critics of
Parliament, began compiling colonists’ grievances into the Declaration on Taking Up Arms. 371 Dickinson
redacted some of Jefferson’s insurrectionary language and the measure passed on July 6 th. Two days later,
Dickinson sent the conciliatory Olive Branch Petition to Lord Dartmouth, the King’s Secretary for the
American Colonies. Awaiting the Crown’s reply, Congress issued at least three more proclamations against
Great Britain that summer, each shying from independence. Ibid., 17–25.
372
Thomas Jefferson, “Notes of Proceedings in the Continental Congress, 7 June to 1 August 1776,” in The
Papers of Thomas Jefferson: 1760-1776, ed. Julian P. Boyd, vol. I (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1776), 309; Adams, The First American Constitutions, 57.
373
As rogue patriot militiamen clashed with royal troops at Lexington and Concord, Ticonderoga, and
Bunker Hill in May and June of 1775, the Congress scrambled to organize American troops into the
Continental Army. In the following months, Congress’ five dozen delegates met in ad hoc committees, six
days a week, from early morning until dinner, borrowing and printing money, regulating the mail, and
bargaining with Indians and loyalists. Congress, like the New England state assemblies, also worked as a
court of last resort, arbitrating disputes over wartime property seizures, and as an executive, overseeing the
treasury and Army and even mundane administrative issues like the salary of the congressional doorkeeper.
Resolutions passed only with unanimous consent from the diverse state delegations, requiring days of
backroom canvassing. Maier, American Scripture, 8–17.
374
He had come to Congress in May 1775 worried with the “poor People of Boston, imprisoned within the
Walls of their City by a British Army.” Confiding to his journal, he wrote the delegates to Congress “knew
not to what Plunder or Massacres or Cruelties [Bostonians] might be exposed.” He decided that Congress
ought to resolve the crisis by recommending “to the People of all the States to institute Governments for
themselves… then to inform Great Britain We were willing to enter into Negotiations with them for the
redress of all Grievances, and a restoration of Harmony between the two Countries.” John Adams, “Diary,”
in The Works of John Adams, Second President of the United States: With A Life of the Author, Notes and
Illustrations, ed. Charles Francis Adams, vol. II (Boston: Little, Brown, 1775), 406–7.

106

he wrote, agreed “upon the necessity of independence…observing that the greatest
obstacle in the way of a declaration of it was the difficulty of agreeing upon a
government for our future regulation.” The states, and their congressional delegates, each
had different plans for government, deadlocking the Continental Congress. But the state
committees and legislatures were smaller and more harmonious. Here, Adams saw a
chance at progress. The colonies might individually draft constitutions declaring
independence, circumventing the conciliatory, deadlocked Congress. “I replied,” Adams
remembered, “that each colony should form a government for itself, as a free and
independent State.” An impressed Wythe asked “what plan would you institute or advise
for any of the States?” Unsure, Adams deferred the question, later penning a plan in a
letter to Wythe. From this he redrafted his plans for the state constitutions into a
pamphlet, the Thoughts on Government, which he forwarded to Wythe. Wythe offered it
to another Virginian, Richard Henry Lee, who had it printed in Philadelphia in April and
circulated to fellow members on the fourth day of Virginia’s Convention. Within days of
this, Adams sent a similar plan to his fellow congressman Jonathan Dickinson Sergeant
for Sergeant’s use in New Jersey’s Constitutional Convention.375
But in early May 1776, only New Hampshire, South Carolina, Virginia, and New
Jersey had called conventions. On May 4th, Rhode Island cut ties with the Crown, but
avoided drafting a constitution to replace its colonial charter.376 Adams felt he needed to
coax the other states to independence.377 He pressed for a congressional resolution
375
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requesting the remaining colonies call constitutional conventions, but on March 13th
Congress’ conciliatory majority defeated the measure.378 In the following weeks, Adams
set to bargaining with other members. Seconded by Lee, on May 10th Adams introduced
to the Committee of the Whole a new resolution, only a single sentence long, calling on
the colonies’ revolutionary committees and assemblies to declare independence by
drafting new governments.379 The resolution passed. Assembling a private subcommittee
with Edward Rutledge and Richard Henry Lee, Adams added a strategically vague and
brief preamble to the resolution declaring that “the exercise of every kind of authority
under the crown should be totally suppressed.” After two days of heated debate, the
resolutions narrowly passed on the morning of May 15th, with six to seven colonies
voting in support, four against, including Duane’s New York delegation, and one to two
abstaining.380 Adams felt America had declared independence.
Lee had cleverly isolated the issue of state constitutional design to his June 1775
subcommittee, as had Adams in May 1776. By drafting their resolutions in private
subcommittees, they initially avoided debating the Dickinson-Duane faction in the
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Committee of the Whole, which Adams had called the “greatest obstacle in the way of a
declaration.”381 A defeated Duane attacked Adams, calling his resolution “a Machine for
the fabrication of independence,” to which Adams happily agreed.382 The rising fervor for
independence no doubt helped Adams’ May 10th and 15th, 1776 resolutions’ gain a
majority of Congress, as did the resolutions’ brevity, which kept them short, vague, and
agreeable.
Adams kept the resolutions short to push them through Congress, but this brevity
had the unexpected consequence of empowering the states. The May resolutions deferred
to the states on the design of government, and the regulation of slavery, the frontier, and
every other constitutional matter. This was an exceptional devolution of authority – thus
far, every colony to draft a new constitution had first asked Congress’ permission. Adams
had allowed all remaining colonial conventions to draft their new governments, and solve
America’s gravest crisis on their own, without congressional oversight.383 New Jersey
first answered the call with a convention on May 26th, drafting a constitution and
declaration of independence. Pennsylvania’s Provincial Conference, meeting from June
18th to 25th, also declared separation from Great Britain, calling a constitutional
convention.
Trailing the states, the Continental Congress gradually turned toward
independence. George III had snubbed Congress’ Olive Branch Petition in September
1775, Lord Dunmore had freed Virginia’s loyalist slaves the following month, and
Paine’s Common Sense, published in January 1776, had pushed delegates toward
381
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separation.384 On June 7th, 1776, Richard Henry Lee, backed by Adams and Wythe, asked
Congress to follow Virginia in formally declaring independence.385 Four days later,
Congress delegated the Declaration’s drafting to Thomas Jefferson, John Adams,
Benjamin Franklin, Roger Sherman, and Robert R. Livingston, dubbed “the Committee
of Five.”386
Prior state constitutional framing aided the drafting of the Declaration. In exactly
imitating previous state declarations of independence, the Committee made a national
Declaration that was more palatable to moderate congressmen. Adams, Jefferson, and
Franklin, the document’s primary authors, relied on their prior experience drafting local
constitutions and declarations of independence.387 Charged with composing the first draft
of the Declaration,388 Jefferson drew heavily on his proposed Virginia Constitution,389 as
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he later admitted.390 The Committee of Five and the state convention delegates mailed
each other, read the same pamphlets, and faced the same hardships under British rule.391
Consequently, the national Declaration of Independence closely resembled those printed
in the first four state constitutions. Thirty-two of the Declaration’s thirty-eight provisions
appeared previously in some form in a state constitution.392 Four provisions were
common to at least five of the six documents, including objections to the Crown’s
dissolution of the colonial legislatures, deploying standing armies, blocking colonial
trade, and making war against colonists.393 After Congress’ Declaration, seven state

and third section reappeared in the opening of the Declaration, as did other sections. In total, twenty-seven
of the thirty independence provisions in the Virginia Constitution of 1776 reappeared in the Declaration.
Julian P. Boyd, “Editorial Note: The Declaration of Independence,” in The Papers of Thomas Jefferson:
1760-1776, ed. Julian P. Boyd, vol. I (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950), 413–17; Julian P.
Boyd, “Editorial Note: The Virginia Constitution,” in The Papers of Thomas Jefferson: 1760-1776, ed.
Julian P. Boyd, vol. I (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950), 239–37.
390
Jefferson wrote: “The fact is, that the [Virginia Constitution’s] preamble was prior in composition to the
Declaration; and both having the same object, of justifying our separation from Great Britain, they used
necessarily the same materials, and hence their similitude.” Thomas Jefferson, “Letter to Augustus B.
Woodward, August 25, 1825,” in The Works of Thomas Jefferson Volume 2, ed. Paul Leicester Ford (New
York, NY: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1825), 160. Pauline Maier argues the preamble to the Virginia Constitution
of 1776 in turn came from the English Declaration of Rights. Maier, American Scripture, 126. For an
extended discussion of Jefferson’s drafting of the Declaration of Independence, see Ibid., 97–153.
391
Jefferson later recalled the tenor of the Committee of Five, and of the era: “All American whigs thought
alike on these subjects… This was the object of the Declaration of Independence…. Neither aiming at
originality of principle or sentiment, nor yet copied from any particular and previous writing, it was
intended to be an expression of the American mind, and to give to that expression the proper tone and spirit
called for by the occasion. All its authority rests then on the harmonizing sentiments of the day, whether
expressed in conversation, in letters, printed essays, or in the elementary books of public right, as Aristotle,
Cicero, Locke, Sidney, &c.” Thomas Jefferson, “Letter to Henry Lee, May 8, 1825,” in The Works of
Thomas Jefferson, ed. Paul Leicester Ford, vol. 12 (New York, NY: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1825), 408.
392
See Table 14 in the appendix on these provisions.
393
New Hampshire’s conciliatory 1776 Convention delegates listed only ten grievances, objecting mainly
to the seizure of property and impediment to trade under the Navigation Acts, and to George III’s
suspension of the colony’s governor, legislature, and courts, asking for a restoration of English rights and
peace with Britain. New Jersey’s Convention also listed only ten grounds for independence, and like New
Hampshire’s, closed by appealing to conciliation. South Carolina’s 1776 Constitution catalogued
grievances against George III with the same vitriol as the Declaration, and fifteen of South Carolina’s
complaints reappeared in the Declaration. Both Virginia and South Carolina’s constitutions anticipated the
Declaration’s complaint George III instigated revolt among “the merciless Indian savages.”

111

constitutional conventions followed, imitating the national Declaration.394 State and
national framers collaborated and together met the challenge of declaring independence.
The Declaration’s meaning changes when read through the state constitutions.
Consider the Declaration’s infamous silence on slavery. Jefferson’s first draft of the
Declaration condemned George III, who had “prostituted his Negative for Suppressing
every legislative Attempt to prohibit or to restrain an execrable Commerce” in slaves.395
When the Committee of the Whole debated Jefferson’s draft on July 2nd and 3rd,
Georgians and South Carolinians and Northerners representing slave merchants rejected
the clause,396 and the Committee of Five cut the provision. Generations of scholars have
mourned this deletion.397
But Jefferson’s redacted clause, drawn from the Virginia Constitution of 1776, 398
defended the state legislatures’ constitutional right to control the slave trade. These
nonimportation laws let white plantation hold owners a monopoly on slave labor and

394

These state declarations drew on Congress’ Declaration. New York copied the Congressional
Declaration verbatim. The following states listed grounds for independence and dissolution of government
in their constitutions: Pennsylvania (1776), Maryland (1776), North Carolina (1776), Georgia (1777), New
York (1777), Vermont (1777), and Massachusetts (1780). For a discussion of the state and local
declarations see Maier, American Scripture, 47–96.
395
The clause added the royal slave trade violated the “most sacred Rights of Life and Liberty in the
Persons of a distant People who never offended him.” For the full clause see Thomas Jefferson, The Papers
of Thomas Jefferson: 1760-1776, ed. Julian P. Boyd, vol. I (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950),
420 n10.
396
Jefferson, “Notes of Proceedings in the Continental Congress, 7 June to 1 August 1776,” 314–15; Carl
Lotus Becker, The Declaration of Independence: A Study in the History of Political Ideas (New York:
Harcourt, Brace, 1922), 171–72; Maier, American Scripture, 146–47.
397
For example, Gary Nash calls it “the most important deletion of Jefferson’s draft.” For similar accounts,
see Boyd, “Editorial Note: The Virginia Constitution,” 414; Michael Rogin, “The Two Declarations of
American Independence,” Representations 55 (July 1, 1996): 14–15, doi:10.2307/3043733; Don Edward
Fehrenbacher, The Slaveholding Republic: An Account of the United States Governments Relations to
Slavery, ed. Ward M. McAfee (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 17; Nash, The Unknown
American Revolution, 208–9; Beaumont, The Civic Constitution, 61.
398
Jefferson’s provision, as passed in the Virginia Constitution of 1776, argued George III had lost
authority over the colony “By prompting our negroes to rise in arms against us, those very negroes whom,
by an inhuman use of his negative, he hath refused us permission to exclude by law.” Jefferson originally
drafted this complaint in his Summery View of the Rights of British America. See Maier, American
Scripture, 112–13.

112

limit and control the growth of rebellious slave populations.399 The newly-independent
Virginia legislature passed a 1778 nonimportation act and a 1793 act prohibiting
immigration by free blacks.400 Similarly, Delaware’s 1776 Constitutional Convention
simultaneously declared the state’s independence from the Crown and right to abolish the
royal slave trade, but maintained slavery in Delaware.401 Jefferson’s redacted clause, like
its author, was ambivalent about liberty. It loftily proclaimed freedom for black slaves,
but tacitly protected states’ rights to keep slaves.402 Accordingly, the Declaration cannot
be understood only through the Committee of Five’s notes or scrapped provisions, but
must be read as a response to state and local constitutional experimentation.
II. Local Responses, 1776-1787
Prompted by Adams’ May resolutions, the state framers drafted new constitutions
regulating legislative sovereignty, the frontier, and slavery. Separation from Great Britain
prevented tyranny by Parliament, but not by the colonial and state legislatures, which too
might overextend their constitutional authority. Framers responded by forbidding state
legislators from making or amending constitutions. By the constitutional conventions of
399
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the 1770s and 1780s, concerns over taxation and Parliamentary supremacy transformed
into broader questions of designing checks on the legislature. Pennsylvanians proposed a
unicameral legislature constrained by frequent popular elections, while in Virginia and
Massachusetts framers checked the lower house with an upper house, a gubernatorial
veto, and independent courts. By the 1790s, framers universally accepted the latter
model, resolving national debate over legislative design. On frontier matters, revolution
abrogated the 1763 Proclamation forbidding western migration, and in scrapping their
elitist colonial legislatures, state framers reapportioned districts to better represent
westerners. However, framers in all states maintained old, contentious property
qualifications on the franchise. Finally, Northern courts and legislatures accepted gradual
emancipation, while Southerners legally reinforced slavery. This section of the chapter
explores first how state framers limited legislatures’ constitutional authority, second, how
they reapportioned and checked the legislature, and third, how they regulated slavery.
A. Separating Legislative and Constitutional Authority
Across the states, constitutional framers forbade legislators from engaging in
constitutional reform. Accordingly, between 1776 and 1784, all but two states adopted
their constitution through a special session or constitutional convention, on the
assumption that constitutional sovereignty lay not in the legislature, but in the united
people, represented by their delegates in convention.403 There was some truth to this
populist claim. After the Continental Congress declared independence and assumed
management of the War, local revolutionary committees shifted their focus from wartime
403
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governance to calling popular elections for convention delegates. These conventions
proceeded slowly and deliberately, submitting draft constitutions to public revision and
approval. In seizing the power to make and amend constitutions and submitting these to
popular review, these conventions assuaged colonists’ anxieties over legislative tyranny
or detachment.
After the Declaration, at least seven states rejected legislative sovereignty in
constitutional matters, instead calling special, popular elections to pick delegates for their
constitutional conventions. As provincial conferences abolished colonial suffrage
requirements, many Americans went to the polls for the first time. Pennsylvanians moved
first. On May 7, 1776, Philadelphians heard reports a British warship was bearing royal
marines to the city. Within hours of Adams’ May 15th resolution, Philadelphia patriots
began organizing a preliminary meeting to call a constitutional convention to declare
independence, much to the dismay of loyalists like John Dickinson and James Wilson.404
Five days later, a crowd of four thousand ordinary Philadelphians, pressed together in the
rain, heard a reading of the resolution and erupted in cheers, tossing their hats.
Pennsylvania’s aristocratic legislature would rule no more. The next day, Philadelphia’s
Committee of Observation announced a Provincial Conference would assemble to call a
convention. Nearly every day a new rally or pamphlet or article declared Philadelphians’
authority to draft a new constitution. The following morning, May 22nd, William
Bradford, a Philadelphia militiaman and printer of the Pennsylvania Journal, republished
the May 15th resolution and this dialogue:
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Q. Who ought to form a new Constitution?
A. The people.
Q. Should the officers of the old constitution be entrusted with the power of the
making of a new one when it becomes necessary?
A. No. Bodies of men have the same selfish attachments as individuals, and they
will be claiming powers and prerogatives inconsistent with the liberties of the
people.
The dialogue appeared in at least one other Philadelphia paper, and an anonymous fourpage pamphlet, The Alarm argued the state legislature could not draft a constitution. The
state would have to call a special election for delegates.405
Pennsylvanians were the first to strip the legislature of constitutional sovereignty.
The colony’s loyalist legislators initially refused to draft a new, separatist constitution.
But even after the Assembly grudgingly allowed a vote for independence on June 8th,
Philadelphians refused a constitutional convention called by the legislature.
Rediscovering populist English Whig pamphlet literature, Revolutionary Pennsylvanians
felt that after their state declared independence, authority reverted to the people of
Pennsylvania, who passed it to their representatives in the constitutional conventions.406
Thus the Pennsylvania Journal called for delegates of the middling sort, who would
“regard not the person of the rich, nor despise the state of the poor,” and at “moment the
constitution is framed, [would] descend into the common paths of life” and abdicate their
authority. Pennsylvania’s populists met again at Carpenter’s Hall in Philadelphia for the
405

The dialogue and quotes appeared in the May 16, 1776 edition of the Pennsylvania Evening Post and the
May 22nd Pennsylvania Journal. For the quotes and details on the printing of the Post, Journal, and “The
Alarm; or, an Address to the People of Pennsylvania on the Late Resolve of Congress”, see Williams,
“State Constitutions of the Founding Decade,” 552; Kruman, Between Authority and Liberty, 25; Adams,
The First American Constitutions, 61; John W. Carter, “Religion and State Constitution Making” (Catholic
University of America, 2009), 133; John P. Kaminski et al., eds., The Documentary History of the
Ratification of the Constitution, vol. IV (Charlottesville, Va: University of Virginia Press, 2009), 274.
406
For example, Locke’s Second Treatise, reprinted in Boston in 1773, which argued that revolution broke
the social contract, returning constitutional authority to its original authors, the people. Prior to this, Locke
had been read only rarely in the colonies, usually for his “Letter Concerning Toleration” and “Essay
Concerning Human Understanding.” His republished Treatises could not nearly match the influence of
Paine’s Common Sense. John Dunn, Political Obligation in Its Historical Context: Essays in Political
Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 53.

116

Provincial Conference on June 18th, resolving the following day “That it is necessary that
a provincial convention be called by this conference, for the express purpose of forming a
new government in this province, on the authority of the people only.”407 Since the
convention represented the people’s united will,408 it could only engage in the general act
of constitution-making, and not in particular legislation.409
This populism was not merely rhetorical. Conference delegates decided that free
males over twenty-one and with a year of residency could vote for delegates to the
coming Constitutional Convention, and reapportionment of Convention delegates would
give a voice to long-neglected western frontier counties. The proportion of freemen
eligible to vote increased from fifty to ninety percent, and the elections vaulted
Appalachian farmers and urban tradesmen into the Convention. On August 2nd, the
Convention printed and distributed a draft constitution. For four weeks, Pennsylvanians
debated the constitutions in town meetings, newspapers, and pamphlets, sending edits to
the Convention, which incorporated the revisions into the final draft approved on
September 27th. On dissolving, the Convention transferred authority over constitutional
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revision not to the legislature but to a newly-designed Council of Censors, chosen from
the people’s representatives.410
Pennsylvania’s populist process proliferated. With elite legislators excluded from
the state conventions by loyalty oaths or prohibitions on dual office holding, many state
framers were small farmers, backcountry lawyers, printers, merchants, and
shopkeepers.411 Imitating Pennsylvania, other states distinguished constitution-making
from lawmaking by calling special elections for convention delegates.412 On July 27,
1776 Delaware’s legislature refused to engage in constitution-making, instead scheduling
special elections to select delegates to the state constitutional convention.413 Provincial
congresses in New York, New Jersey, Maryland, and North Carolina also expressly
instructed convention delegates to represent the common will by avoiding legislating, a
necessarily narrow and self-interested activity. To secure popular sovereignty, many state
constitutions allowed the people to check legislators with frequent elections, open
legislative sessions, and publication and public review of proposed bills. And Maryland
and North Carolina delegates printed and distributed their proposed constitution for a
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two-week period of pubic consideration.414 State constitutional convention delegates
appeased frontiersmen by extending them the vote and lawmaking authority for the first
time, and by ousting or weakening elitist eastern legislators.415
Massachusetts citizens were exceptionally clear in limiting legislative
sovereignty. On September 17, 1776, the Massachusetts legislature issued a circular letter
to the state’s town meetings, requesting authority to draft a constitution. Twenty-three of
the ninety-seven towns objected to some element of the plan.416 Instead, the legislature
held special elections for delegates a new legislative session, which drafted a constitution.
The state called all men over twenty-one to vote on the proposed constitution, the first
such election in America. In March 1778, Massachusetts voters resoundingly rejected the
legislature’s constitutional plan 9,972 to 2,083. Finally, the legislature capitulated in June
1779, calling a constitutional convention “with the sole purpose of framing a
constitution.” The Convention drafted a new proposal that voters accepted two years
later. In 1784, New Hampshire replaced its emergency constitution, imitating
Massachusetts’ plan for popular elections.417
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Framers also forbade the legislature from amending the constitution. The first
framers expected constitutional change to occur through extralegal popular revolution,
rather than through legislative revision. Eleven state conventions invoked their right to
rebel and draft a new constitution, and four formally recognized this popular authority in
their bills of rights.418 Accordingly, initially only three states specified a formal, legal
process for amendment by convention.419 Framers felt legislators represented narrow,
parochial interests, and thus could not amend or reinterpret a constitution, which
embodied the common good. Georgia, Delaware, and New Jersey framers expressly
stripped the power of the state legislature to amend or contradict the ratified
constitution.420 Pennsylvania also prohibited legislative amendment, which it passed to
Georgia and Vermont.421 Maryland allowed the legislature to amend the 1776
Constitution only if the amendment represented a united popular will, indicated by a twothirds majority in both houses over two years.422 And when South Carolina’s legislature
attempted to frame a new constitution, Governor John Rutledge resigned in protest and
his replacement refused to take office.423 Massachusetts’ 1780 Constitution prohibited all
political branches from revising the constitution through “orders, laws, statutes, and
ordinances, directions and instructions,” providing instead for an eventual popular
referendum for constitutional replacement, a provision New Hampshire borrowed in
418
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1784.424 Elsewhere, framers proposed a gubernatorial veto or an independent revision
council as a counterweight to the legislature.425 For example, Pennsylvania’s Council of
Censors met septennially to affirm that no legislative statutes had violated the people’s
will as represented at the 1776 Convention.426
The state conventions clarified questions of legislative sovereignty and suffrage
that had dogged the colonies under British rule. Colonists united in Farmers rejected
legislative sovereignty and distinguished it from constitutional authority. All of the
provincial congresses and constitutional conventions expressly refused to serve as a
standing government, and after drafting a constitution, each of the initial state
conventions dissolved.427 Underlying this self-imposed brevity was the assumption that
only a rare, momentary emergency could unite the people to a common interest, making
it possible to legally represent the whole people, the aim of constitution-making.428 In
contrast, ordinary legislation, serving narrower private interests, was done by standing
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Massachusetts’ 1780 Constitution called for a referendum in 1795, while New Hampshire’s 1784
Constitution required one every seven years. See the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, Frame of
Government, Chapter I, Section I, Article IV and Chapter VI, Article X and the New Hampshire
Constitution of 1784, Form of Government, Section 2.
425
Adams, The First American Constitutions, 267–69.
426
Similarly, Virginia’s 1776 Constitution, drafted in part by Jefferson, called for “frequent recurrence to
fundamental principles,” though this phrase did not appear in Jefferson’s original draft. After the
Pennsylvania Council reauthorized the Constitution in 1783, legislators rallied for abolition of the Council
and Constitution, arguing that ongoing legislative amendment would more closely track the shifting
popular will. In 1790, Pennsylvania’s anti-Constitutionalists scored a convention that revised amendment
procedures. See the Virginia Constitution of 1776, Bill of Rights, Section 15. Kruman, Between Authority
and Liberty, 57–59.
427
Note however in Virginia, after Governor Dunmore dissolved the House of Burgesses, legislators
reassembled as the standing Provincial Convention, which in turn, called the state’s 1776 Constitutional
Convention. In Pennsylvania the loyalist legislature dissolved in June 1776, leaving government to the state
Constitutional Convention assembled that summer. A similar situation occurred in Delaware.
428
Since authority only reverted to the people during rare breaches of the social contract, popular
assemblies were necessarily short and infrequent, though not opposed to making durable constitutions.
Paradoxically, because constitutions were designed to durably constrain ordinary politics, and could not be
made through ordinary legislative politics, they could only be framed in fleeting emergencies. Constitutionmaking was necessarily brief, while constitutions were necessarily durable. Here was born the great
dilemma in constitutionalism, for constitutions claimed to represent the popular will, but the people were
almost always restrained from revising their constitutions.
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bodies. Additionally, as states called conventions, many ordinary American freemen
turned to the polls and to deliberative meetings for the first time. In selecting delegates
and in writing constitutions, the people could claim authority over all law, refuting
Parliamentary claims that popular authority extended only to tax law.
B. Legislative Design
Still, the states did not ban their standing legislatures outright. It now fell to state
constitutional drafters to check and equitably reapportion the legislature. In mid-1776,
state framers split between two legislative designs. Pennsylvania framed a unicameral
legislature checked by frequent popular elections, while Virginia and Massachusetts
reverted to the English Whig plan to check the lower house with an aristocratic upper
house and a gubernatorial veto. By the late 1780s the state framers settled on the latter
model, which promised stronger, gubernatorial and judicial constraints. This model
assuaged framers’ worries of legislative detachment, resolving the national question over
legislative sovereignty and design.
Pennsylvania pioneered the unicameral model. For centuries, Pennsylvania’s
colonial legislature, the Assembly, had maintained statutory and charter provisions
disempowering the urban poor and western settlers.429 In 1775 under charter rule, only
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Under the 1681 Charter, William Penn governed the colony, appointing judges and a lieutenant
governor, all of whom were subject to English law and a veto by the English monarch and Privy Council.
Landing in the colony the following year, Penn drafted a new charter promising Pennsylvanians an elected
bicameral legislature, claiming “Any government is free to the people under it (whatever be the frame)
where the laws rule, and the people are a party to those laws, and more than this is tyranny, oligarchy, or
confusion.” But Penn exercised disproportionate authority as the colony’s governor and proprietor,
alienating voters who elected legislators to block his agenda. He ceded some authority with a 1683 Charter,
and when New York’s Governor Benjamin Fletcher assumed military control of the colony between 1692
and 1694, the legislature’s lower house, called the General Assembly, seized more power under a new 1696
Charter. Asserting its authority to pass a new constitution on behalf of Pennsylvanians, the General
Assembly forced a final compromise, the 1701 Charter of Privileges, which would govern Pennsylvania
until independence. This Charter downsized the Council and granted the Governor’s power of appointment
to the Assembly, which effectively became the colony’s government. The Charter also limited the vote to
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147 of Philadelphia County’s 6,941 taxable males were wealthy enough to vote.430 As
Philadelphia’s poor population boomed in the 1750s and 1760s,431 these citizens mobbed,
interrupting Philadelphia elections, casting multiple illegal ballots, and harassing wealthy
voters with clubs and stones. Rowdy Pennsylvanians mobbed polling places in
Philadelphia in 1705 and 1742, Chester County in 1739, Lancaster County in 1749, York
County in 1750, and Bucks County in 1752. The following year the Assembly dispatched
constables with lists of taxpayers to elections to expel ineligible voters, stifling the
protests.432 Moreover, while western frontier counties rapidly grew in the mid-eighteenth
century, 433 the colonial legislature largely refused to revise the 1701 Charter to grant
westerners new seats.434 The malapportionment issue came to a head during the French

any Protestant male over twenty-one with two years residency and fifty acres of land or fifty pounds of
property. This provision dated to the 1696 Frame of Government of Pennsylvania.See the Preface to the
1682 Frame of Government of Pennsylvania. J. Paul Selsam, The Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776: A
Study in Revolutionary Democracy (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1936), 8–9; Theodore
Thayer, Pennsylvania Politics and the Growth of Democracy: 1740 - 1776 (Pennsylvania Historical and
Museum Commission, 1953), 3–5.
430
A “taxable” male payed an estate and poll tax. Note these provisions were lax relative to other colonies,
and the landholding requirement allowed many small farmers to vote. See Thayer, Pennsylvania Politics
and the Growth of Democracy, 6. In Philadelphia County in 1776, 743 of the 1455 taxable males could vote
under the landholding provision. McKinley, The Suffrage Franchise in the Thirteen English Colonies in
America, 287–88; Selsam, The Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, 33.
431
Between 1750 and 1773, the proportion of Philadelphia’s workforce bound to slavery or servitude
decreased from fifty to thirteen percent. In this same period, the percentage of the poor in the City of
Philadelphia multiplied eightfold, packing the city’s poorhouses. Nearly nine of ten Philadelphia merchants
were former artisans living hand to mouth, and a third of them might face bankruptcy 431. In 1775, only 335
of the 3,452 male taxpayers in the City of Philadelphia had enough property to vote, a much lower
proportion than in a similar city like New York. And unlike the city governments of New York or Boston,
the leaders of the Corporation of the City of Philadelphia did not face public meetings or elections.
432
McKinley, The Suffrage Franchise in the Thirteen English Colonies in America, 284–85, 290–92;
Countryman, The American Revolution, 117.
433
The colony, once limited to Philadelphia and adjacent Chester and Bucks counties in the southeast,
expanded in the mid-eighteenth century. Three groups emerged. Under the 1701 Charter’s property
requirements, only Philadelphia’s Quaker elite participated in elections and the Assembly. Moravian,
Schwenkfelder, Mennonite, and Dunker Germans seeking religious freedom, settled Lancaster, Berks, and
Northampton counties to the immediate west. And after Ireland faced a series of droughts between 1715
and 1720 and after the Scottish clan system collapsed in the 1740s, a wave of Irish and Scottish
Presbyterians immigrated to Lancaster and the western agrarian frontier. Rosalind L. Branning,
Pennsylvania Constitutional Development (University of Pittsburgh Press, 2004), 9–16; Selsam, The
Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, 4–8.
434
The 1701 Charter specified the three easternmost counties elect four legislators each, but not how to
apportion representation to new counties. The Quaker-dominated Assembly grudgingly granted German
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and Indian War, when westerners unsuccessfully petitioned the legislature to form
militias and build forts,435 eventually rioting and marching on the legislature in 1763
before being dispersed by royal troops.436 The Assembly responded with only token
reapportionment.437
The Stamp Act and Coercive Acts spurred westerners and progressive
Philadelphians to form the Committee of Correspondence of Philadelphia, challenging
the loyalist Assembly.438 At the behest of the Committee, revolutionary delegates from
nearly all Pennsylvania counties converged on Philadelphia for a brief, initial
insurrectionary Provincial Convention in late January of 1775.439 On May 22, 1776, a

settlers Lancaster County in 1729 and York County in 1747. Peripheral Berks, Northampton, and
Cumberland Counties received a total of five seats, but easterners refused to incorporate more western
counties, and the three eastern counties kept a twenty-six to ten legislative majority. Selsam, The
Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, 31–35.
435
A provision from the 1681 Charter reserved to the governor and his deputies the authority to “to levy,
muster and traine all sorts of men” against “the incursions as well of the Savages.” And Eastern Quaker
legislators, insulated from and morally opposed to war, refused western petitions to fund militias and forts.
Ibid., 18–36.
436
In November 1755, an unarmed mob of 300 to 700 German frontiersmen, led by a tavern keeper named
John Hambright, descended on Philadelphia to petition the Assembly. Several days later, the Assembly
passed a supply bill funding western troops. Ten months after the War’s end in 1763, in December 1763,
Scots-Irish frontiersmen from Paxton Township organized a militia, dubbing themselves the “Paxton
Boys,” and began slaughtering Indians. They marched on Philadelphia, intending to overrun a Conestoga
Indian safe house and declare their grievances against the Assembly. Stopping at Germantown on
Philadelphia’s outskirts they announced their frustration with the Assembly’s government under the 1701
Charter, until they were dispersed by royal troops. Several months later, two Paxton leaders submitted a
formal petition, the Remonstrance, requesting redesign of the Governorship and Assembly. Within a week,
the colony’s governor dismissed them. Philadelphia pamphleteers rightly traced the Paxton Boys’ rebellion
to Presbyterian and Scots-Irish resistance to the Crown during the English Civil War – the march enacted
popular elements of the English constitutional tradition. Ibid., 39–42; James H. Hutson, Pennsylvania
Politics 1746-1770: The Movement for Royal Government and Its Consequences (Princeton University
Press, 1972), 24–28, 96–98, 103–5.
437
The Assembly incorporated three new frontier counties in 1771, adding five western legislators, and the
following year it relaxed taxes on westerners and funded to western canals and turnpikes. But the Assembly
had passed a law two years before requiring representatives reside in their district, keeping frontier
representatives away from Philadelphia, maintaining eastern dominance. Selsam, The Pennsylvania
Constitution of 1776, 35; Thayer, Pennsylvania Politics and the Growth of Democracy, 127–39.
438
The Assembly also submitted a resolution against the Stamp Act on September 21, 1765, but this likely
reflected wealthy merchants’ opposition to royal taxes, rather than a push for popular self-government.
439
With fifty-seven Philadelphia delegates and fifty from the outlying counties, the Convention rolls
roughly reflected the colony’s population distribution. Delegates hailed from every county, save for distant
Bedford and Westmoreland and loyalist Bucks County. The Provisional Convention’s opening resolutions
affirmed the Continental Congress’ call for resistance by organizing new committees and boycotts and
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Philadelphia meeting affirmed the Continental Congress’ May 10th and 15th resolutions
requesting new state constitutions. Then on June 18th, dozens of western delegates
attended the statewide Provincial Conference of Committees to dictate the process for
electing delegates to a convention to draft a new constitution.440 Consequently, the
Constitutional Convention fielded a relatively egalitarian distribution of delegates,441
many of whom were also ideologically committed to direct democracy and the
unicameral legislative design.442

distributing goods. But “the real objective was to familiarize the people with the necessity of subverting the
old charter and establishing a new constitution.” Selsam, The Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, 71.
440
While eastern counties controlled nearly-three quarters of the state legislature, they comprised only half
of the 108 delegates to the Conference. By the author’s count from the original Conference minutes, the
rolls by county are as follows. The four oldest Pennsylvania counties fielded 54 delegates: City of
Philadelphia, 25, Philadelphia County, 11, Bucks, 11, Chester, 13, Lancaster, 9. The seven newer counties
also sent 54 delegates: Berks, 10, Northampton, 6, York, 9, Cumberland, 10, Bedford, 3, Northumberland,
5, Westmoreland, 2. The delegates were men of humble background, nearly all captains, majors, or
colonels in the Continental Army, joined by a few country lawyers, and several scholars, including
Benjamin Franklin and Benjamin Rush. The Conference’s first motion was to unanimously uphold the
Continental Congress’ May 15th resolution, and declare the colony’s royal government illegitimate. Two
days later, the Conference allowed all taxpaying free males over twenty-one and with a year of residency to
elect delegates to the Constitutional Convention. With property and apportionment restrictions lifted, the
proportion of freemen eligible to vote increased from fifty to ninety percent, guaranteeing a more populist
constitutional convention. Further, the Conference excluded from the election those who would not
forswear allegiance to the crown, targeting wealthy eastern loyalists, as well as Quaker elites, who refused
oaths. A unanimous resolution also required a similar oath for convention delegates. The pledge required
delegates to “profess faith in God the Father, & in Jesus Christ his eternal son, the true God, & in the Holy
Spirit,” excluding faithful Unitarian Christians as well as non-Christians. Kruman, Between Authority and
Liberty, 26; Maier, American Scripture, 66.
441
A June 21 resolution by the Conference required at the Convention “equal representation for each
County.” Thus each county, plus the City of Philadelphia, dispatched four delegates to the state’s
Constitutional Convention. Western delegates outnumbered those from the City of Philadelphia and the
three eastern counties thirty-two to sixteen, and many of the Philadelphia delegates were radicals opposed
to the Assembly. Theodore Thayer writes: “When one considers the composition of the Constitutional
Convention, it becomes apparent that almost any procedure adopted in choosing a drafting committee
would have given it a radical majority…the opposition could do little more than register its protest.” And
Rosalind Branning affirms that the imbalance of delegates at the Convention “marks the transfer of power
from the people whose ancestors were the original settlers under William Penn to the newer elements in the
recently settled regions, together with their political allies.” Thayer, Pennsylvania Politics and the Growth
of Democracy, 184, 191; Branning, Pennsylvania Constitutional Development, 9–16.
442
As Gary Nash asserts, Pennsylvania’s new “constitution drafters rejected three of the most honored
elements of English republican thought” – bicameralism, executive independence, and property-based
suffrage. Pennsylvania’s framers instead imitated the ancient Saxons and Romans. The Saxons governed
England through the local “tithing,” the egalitarian, deliberative village meeting in which all men of age
held stake. Tithings annually elected a common, unicameral legislature, and retained the right to revoke
their delegates. An anonymous 1776 pamphlet printed in Philadelphia, The Genuine Principles of the
Ancient Saxon, or English Constitution introduced many Pennsylvanians to unicameralism, popular checks
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Two coalitions emerged in the Constitutional Convention. John Dickinson’s
populist faction joined the Convention, abandoning the Assembly, which collapsed in the
summer of 1776, unable to reach quorum.443 Against them, conservative Convention
delegates sought to preserve the Assembly’s aristocratic tradition and maintain mixed,
multi-branch government.444 Thanks to Philadelphia’s revolutionary tenor, the radical
party prevailed, designing a directly-elected, powerful unicameral legislature, with
equitable apportionment for westerners.445 The people, the true seat of sovereignty, would
regularly check the legislature with yearly elections and term limits.446 Legislators would
debate publicly, submit their minutes and laws for public review and amendment, pledge

on the legislature, and manhood suffrage. Paine’s Common Sense, printed in January 1776, also inclined
delegates toward unicameralism and regular election. Additionally, echoing the Roman model,
Pennsylvanian framers proposed a Council of Censors to monitor the legislature and executive. Some
delegates adopted a radical strain of republicanism, emphasizing the Lockean right to popular revolt. These
reformers merged republican “Whig sentiments similar to those expressed in the Declaration of
Independence and…guarantees of personal liberty and of Anglo-Saxon judicial procedures.” Selsam, The
Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, 71, 118; Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787,
226–32; Branning, Pennsylvania Constitutional Development, 14; Nash, The Unknown American
Revolution, 273–74.
443
The popular, or radical, party was led by wealthy Presbyterian Philadelphia radicals, including George
Bryan, James Cameron, James Cannon, and Franklin, the Convention’s president. Despite their wealth, as
Thayer puts it, their minds were unfettered by “traditional concepts concerning the proper form of civil
government,” including mixed government. Instead they had a “tendency to approve the democratic
aspirations of the common man.” Consequently, they allied with the west’s “motley throng of backwoods
farmers and country politicians,” and a handful of populist German delegates from the middle counties. A
few wayward Philadelphia Quakers like Timothy Matlack joined the radicals. Matlack was a westerner in
spirit, prone to horse racing, cock fighting, and the occasional stint in jail, which cost him membership in
the Quaker Society of Friends. Paul Leicester Ford, “The Adoption of the Pennsylvania Constitution of
1776,” Political Science Quarterly 10, no. 3 (September 1, 1895): 432–34, doi:10.2307/2139954; Thayer,
Pennsylvania Politics and the Growth of Democracy, 182–86.
444
Most conservative leaders like George Ross, George Clymer, and James Smith came from wealthy
Philadelphia families. A Quaker leader in the Assembly, Ross was presiding officer in the Convention.
Clymer admired Montesquieu’s separation of powers and the moderate Whig theory of mixed government.
And per Thayer, Smith “feared an unrestrained democracy…The end product of [the Convention], he
concluded, was forcing upon Pennsylvania a thoroughgoing democratic ‘Agrarian constitution.” Thayer,
Pennsylvania Politics and the Growth of Democracy, 187–90.
445
Ben Franklin, George Bryan, and James Cameron proposed the unicameral legislature as the
Constitution’s centerpiece, and the locus of institutional power in the state. The description of the
legislature took the first third of the 1776 printing of the document for public consideration. See the
Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, Section 1, 5-17.
446
Legislators sat for one-year terms, serving no more than four terms in seven years, and no more than
four years consecutively. See the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, Section 8.
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loyalty to the people of Pennsylvania.447 They could not amend the Constitution, which
the Preamble established as the written popular will. “Demophilius,” the pseudonymous
author of a popular pamphlet on Saxon democracy, praised this measure for separating
the legislature’s statutory authority from constitutional authority, which lay in “the hands
of THE PEOPLE.”448 “Here we see a regular process,” Thomas Paine added, “a
Government issuing out of a Constitution, formed by the people in their original
character, and that Constitution serving not only as an authority, but as a law of control to
the Government.”449 Sovereignty lay in the people’s will and Constitution, rather than the
legislature, which would be closely checked.450
The people closely controlled the legislature, which controlled the other, weaker
branches. The legislature selected an executive council of nine, with a president and vice
president, to meet at the same time and place as the legislature.451 The Executive Council
appointed a judiciary, which served at the legislature’s pleasure for seven-year nonrenewable terms.452 Legislators could impeach judges and executive councilmen, who
lacked veto power.453
447

See the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, Section 10, 13-15.
Quoted in Selsam, The Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, 435.
449
Thomas Paine, Common Sense, The Rights of Man and Other Essential Writings of Thomas Paine (New
York: Signet Classics, 2003), 297.
450
Selsam suggests the Pennsylvania legislature, “through the enlarged franchise, was the people’s – and
the people were supreme.” Selsam, The Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, 187.
451
In the first draft, legislators selected all members of the council. Delegates’ most radical provisions
stripped the executive of its traditional enforcement powers. The President commanded Pennsylvania’s
armed forces, but only with the regular approval of the assembled Council, which through revision was
enlarged to twelve members elected from the state’s eleven counties and Philadelphia. Each member served
a three-year term, rotating so that only four members would be elected at the same time, preventing
factions. Scattered across the counties, the Executive Council could meet only rarely to authorize military
actions, preventing the overbearing executive that emerged under the early colonial charters. Other states,
recalling Whig anti-monarchism and their own authoritarian and inept colonial governors, also limited their
executives, but Pennsylvania’s was the weakest, largely an honorary office. See the Pennsylvania
Constitution of 1776, Section 20. Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution, 72–79.
452
Without the power of judicial review, the branch could only arbitrate contracts and disputes. Judges, like
legislators, were salaried, so that independently-wealthy aristocrats would not be the only ones attracted to
office. See the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, Section 17 on salaries for legislators and Section 26 for
448

127

Further, the delegates framed a Council of Censors to interpret and guard the
Constitution, the written will of the people, from the ambitions of the legislature.454 If
elected officials failed in “their duties as guardians of the people,” the Council could
impeach them, and repeal the laws inconsistent with the Constitution and the people’s
will. And, for “the rights and happiness of the people,” the Council could call a new
convention to abolish the legislature or executive entirely, and form a new popular
government.455
Finally, the Constitution allowed broad political participation and equitable
legislative apportionment, benefiting poor urban and frontier voters. Suffrage extended to
every free male taxpayer, twenty-one or older, with at least a year of residence.456
According to Gary Nash, this “created the most liberal franchise known in the Western
world to that date.”457 The document also served Pennsylvania’s poor with a host of
redistributive social welfare provisions.458 And appeasing frontiersmen, the Constitution

judges. After public review, delegates removed a provision from the proposed Section 25 allowing the
legislature to create courts at will.
453
See the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, Section 22.
454
Derived from Roman example, this Council of twenty-four was directly elected by each county, plus
Philadelphia, every seven years.
455
See the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, Section 47. Note the people of Pennsylvania could not call a
convention, which Shaeffer suggests framers intended to check populism John N. Shaeffer, “Public
Consideration of the 1776 Pennsylvania Constitution,” The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and
Biography 98, no. 4 (October 1, 1974): 437.
456
See the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, Section 17.
457
No longer disenfranchised by property qualifications, the urban poor exercised electoral power
proportionate to their population. Foreigners could own property, after a year, could assume the rights of a
freeman, and after two years, could vote. Nash, The Unknown American Revolution, 268–77; Wood, The
Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787, 169.
458
The Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 established and subsidized public schools in each county, limited
tuition, and established a university, the modern Dickinson College. Delegates exempted debtors from
imprisonment if they attempted to repay loans, and required reasonable bail for those who could not.
Criminal prisoners were also exempted from excessive bail. Note, though, that non-capital crimes were
punishable by work in labor houses. There was no property qualification to run for office. Finally, lands,
commons, and game were provided for the public to hunt, affirming Pennsylvania’s claim to be a
commonwealth. A provision of the Bill of Rights, later retracted, sought land redistribution to the poor. No
other state passed a similar provision, and perhaps none have since. The clause held: “an enormous
proportion of property vested in a few individuals is dangerous to the rights, and destructive of the common
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promised to arm and train freemen, and allowed them to elect their own officers to
organize militias.459
Pennsylvania was the first state to require public revision of a proposed
constitution,460 and after public meetings, petitions, pamphlets, and newspaper
commentary, Pennsylvania’s framers redrafted two-thirds of the original provisions.461
Delegates also added a concession, Section 15, that the legislature could not pass a
proposed law until the next session, letting the public review the proposal. The
Convention deferred to the public to apportion legislative districts. Laymen reviewing the
constitution proposed districts proportional to the taxable population, reapportioned every
seven years in accord with census returns, assuring parity in representation between
urban elites and growing Appalachian counties.462 The public also seized from the
legislature the power of electing executive councilmen.463 After review, delegates

happiness, of mankind; and therefore every free state hath a right by its laws to discourage the possession
of such property.” See the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, Section 28-9, 43. Selsam, The Pennsylvania
Constitution of 1776, 192, 202–4; Thayer, Pennsylvania Politics and the Growth of Democracy, 192–96.
459
See the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, Section 5.
460
On September 5, 1776, the Convention submitted the Constitution for public review, printing 400 copies
of the document for distribution. By September 18, the proposed Constitution appeared in three
newspapers. Relatedly, “Demophilius” had proposed this measure only two months earlier. Oddly, a
September 25 newspaper commentary also under the name “Demophilius” argued Pennsylvania’s new
electorate of rural, uneducated farmers would select inept representatives. Against the unicameral Saxon
model, the commentary argued for a council of educated legislators to check the lower house. Shaeffer,
“Public Consideration of the 1776 Pennsylvania Constitution,” 416, 432.
461
Delegates initially required voters take a loyalty oath, excluding Quaker elites, but dropped the
provision after public review. The final draft of Section 6: “Every freemen of the full age of twenty-one
Years, having resided in this state for the space of one whole Year next before the day of election for
representatives, and paid public taxes during that time, shall enjoy the right of an elector: Provided always,
that sons of freeholders of the age of twenty-one years shall be intitled to vote although they have not paid
taxes.” This clause allowed Pennsylvania officials to exclude potential voters who were not freemen. Note
the original added a provision, proposed by the convention, which granted “the rights of an elector on
taking an oath or affirmation of fidelity to the Common-Wealth, if required.” However, an original
provision requiring legislators pledge loyalty (§10) survived public review. For the original proposal, see
“The proposed plan or frame of government for the commonwealth or state of Pennsylvania : printed for
consideration,” Rare Book and Manuscript Library – Rare Book Collection, Van Pelt Library, University of
Pennsylvania.
462
The proposed Constitution required only voting by district (see the original Section 17). The rest was
framed in response to public review. See Section 17 of the final draft.
463
Compare the original Section 18 to the final draft’s Section 19.
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prefaced the Constitution with a preamble and bill of rights.464 On September 28th, the
Convention ratified the 1776 Constitution.
Five states imitated Pennsylvania’s institutional, apportionment, and rights
provisions.465 Timothy Matlack, Thomas Young, and James Cannon, all radicals in the
Pennsylvanian Convention, evidently sent their plan to the conventions of Vermont and
Georgia.466 In an open letter, Young cited Congress’ May 15th resolution, he called on
them to exercise their “supreme constituent power” – evidently the first use of this phrase
– and draft a new constitution, modeled on Pennsylvania’s.467 On July 8, 1777, the
Vermont Convention ratified a constitution almost identical to Pennsylvania’s, including
a unicameral legislature, limited executive, yearly public review of legislation, and

464

The preamble opened by claiming George III violated Pennsylvanians’ natural rights to safety and selfgovernment, forcing the colonists to rebel and found a new government on popular consent. The
Convention first drafted a bill of rights on July 25, but did not include it in the publicly-circulated proposal.
After public review, the final draft included a Declaration of Rights which protected life, liberty, property,
happiness, and safety, religious free exercise and non-establishment, popular control of the police and
government and a legal right to rebellion, and a right to vote. Other provisions prohibited taking property or
forcing militia service without consent, trial without charge or council, warrantless search and seizure, and
criminal and civil trial without jury. The conclusion recognized a right to free speech, to bear arms, to
virtuous representatives, to move between counties and states, and to assembly. See the 1776 Declaration
of Rights of the Inhabitants of the Commonwealth or State of Pennsylvania, Articles I--XVI. Fifteen years
later, the federal framers adopted parts of nine of the Pennsylvania’s Declaration’s sixteen articles into the
federal Bill of Rights.
465
The influence of Pennsylvania’s 1776 Constitution was not limited to the United States. Thomas Paine,
an Englishman in Philadelphia, commended the Constitution in The Rights of Man. Franklin traveled
France distributing copies of the Constitution, including to French intellectuals like Anne-Robert-Jacques
Turgot, the Duke de la Rochefoucauld, and Condorcet. As the French Revolution loomed, the Girondist
leader Jacques Pierre Brissot circulated a French printing of the Constitution with accompanying essays,
which was later translated into Italian. And a German edition, “Die Regierungsverfassung der Republik
Pennsylvanien,” was published in 1776. Not far behind Franklin was John Adams, an opponent of
Pennsylvania’s majoritarian democracy, who tried to turn Europeans, and later, Americans, against the
1776 Constitution. J. Paul Selsam and Joseph G. Rayback, “French Comment on the Pennsylvania
Constitution of 1776,” The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography 76, no. 3 (July 1, 1952): 311–
25; Williams, “State Constitutions of the Founding Decade,” 563.
466
John Adams, “Autobiography,” in The Works of John Adams, Second President of the United States:
With A Life of the Author, Notes and Illustrations, ed. Charles Francis Adams, vol. II (Boston: Little,
Brown, 1775), 508.
467
Thomas Young, “To the Inhabitants of Vermont, a Free and Independent Stae, Bounding on the River
Connecticut and Lake Champlain, April 11, 1777,” in Publications of the Colonial Society of
Massachusetts: Transations, 1906-1907, vol. IX (Boston: The Colonial Society of Massachusetts, 1777),
44–46; Adams, The First American Constitutions, 63.
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regular public review of the Constitution.468 The Georgia Convention, meeting by night
in a tavern, followed Pennsylvania establishing a unicameral legislature and secret
balloting, and elected nearly all civil officers annually.469 Maryland established a mixed
government, including an upper house, but elected both houses annually.470 Under an
early draft constitution, modeled on those of Pennsylvania and Vermont, legislation faced
public, not gubernatorial, review. Following the Georgian model, citizens regularly
elected all public officials.471 North Carolina’s Convention also seems to have borrowed
elements of Pennsylvania’s bill of rights. Finally, Pennsylvanians like the Philadelphia
radical Thomas McKean influenced the Delaware Convention, which adopted elements
of the Pennsylvania and Maryland bills of rights.472
Philadelphia’s rising spirit of democratic unicameralism unnerved John Adams.
Thomas Paine printed Common Sense in January 1776, which Adams condemned “as
flowing from simple ignorance, and a mere desire to please the democratic party, in
Philadelphia, at whose head were Mr. Matlack, Mr. Cannon, and Dr. Young,” the framers
of Pennsylvania’s Constitution. He added: “I dreaded the effect so popular [a] pamphlet

468

Beginning with a sweeping bill of rights, the Vermont Constitution granted universal manhood suffrage,
abolished slavery, and even redistributed land to small farmers. See the Vermont Constitution of 1777, e.g.
Declaration of Rights, Article I, and Frame of Government, Section II, XIII-IV, XVI-XIX. Nash, The
Unknown American Revolution, 280–84.
469
See the Georgia Constitution of 1777, Article II. In April 1776, Georgia’s Provincial Council drafted
“Rules and Regulations of the Colony of Georgia.” These rules maintained laws made under the colonial
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might have among the people, and determined to do all in my power to counteract the
effect of it.”473
The following April Adams penned his Thoughts on Government, arguing
Americans should maintain their tradition of Whig balanced government.474 He proposed
bicameralism, limiting popular participation to annual elections, and constraining the
people’s lower house with an upper house and a gubernatorial veto.475 Over the summer
of 1776, Adams aggressively promoted his pamphlet among state framers.476 He started
with Virginia,477 where local aristocrats sought an upper house to check a popular
majority.478 The distribution of power in Virginia, and in other states, hung in the
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balance.479 Drawing on the writings of Adams, Lee, Jefferson, and the English Whigs,
Virginia delegates adopted a conservative tripartite scheme, establishing an upper house
to represent the state’s gentry and check the lower house.480 The bicameral legislature
would in turn select a Governor and Privy Council, imitating Parliament.481 Judges,
though appointed by the legislature, held life tenure, conditional on good behavior,
making Virginia the first state to introduce and independent judiciary. A prohibition on
plural office holding helped ensure separation of powers. Framers maintained the colonial
requirement that voters hold fifty acres of land, on the English Whig assumption that
landed property gave its owner an enduring, perhaps inherited, material interest in the
common welfare of the state, and the material independence to vote without coercion.482
Malapportionment kept power in eastern counties, leaving unresolved questions of
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frontiersmen’s rights.483 As Alan Nevins concludes, Virginia’s “Constitution tended to
perpetuate the old oligarchy of rich Tidewater planters.”484
Building on the era’s moderate Whig sentiment,485 Adams’ separation of powers
model spread to at least four other conventions, each of which imitated parts of his
plan.486 Many other state framers checked the lower house by ensconcing their aristocrats
in an upper house. South Carolina’s William Henry Drayton, for example, proposed state
senators be not elected, but appointed for life from the state’s wealthiest families.487 The
fever for mixed government peaked in Massachusetts in September 1779. John Adams
proposed a tripartite scheme with a bicameral legislature, including a Senate to represent
the state’s propertied classes, a powerful, veto-equipped governor elected by the people,
an independent, tenured judiciary, and a bill of rights.488 In a state recently freed from the
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overbearing Governor Gage, Adams’ plan for a gubernatorial veto was contentious. No
convention had so empowered a governor. But Adams defended governor as a
dispassionate check on a tyrannical legislature, and the Convention passed his plan, with
the stipulation that a two-thirds legislative majority override the veto.489 Four years later,
New Hampshire called a convention, replacing its temporary 1776 Constitution with one
modeled on Massachusetts’.
Eventually Pennsylvania pamphleteers turned memories of Parliamentary tyranny
against their powerful state legislature. A polemicist called “Associator” in 1777 derided
the Pennsylvania Constitution as a plan “full of whimsies – a government with only one
legislative branch, which has never yet failed to end in tyranny.” Conservatives called for
a new constitution with a strong executive and bicameral legislature, one that they felt
better represented the natural, tripartite division of society. As the theory of mixed, Whig
government eclipsed that of direct, Saxon democracy, Pennsylvania’s ideology drifted
toward that of the other, more moderate states, and in 1790 Pennsylvanians scrapped their
old constitution for a tripartite scheme.490
Harnessing arguments for judicial independence and that constitutions trumped
ordinary legislation, state judges began interpreting constitutions to overrule legislative

489

See the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, Frame of Government, Chapter I, Section I, Article II.
Nevins, The American States, 178–81; Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787, 218,
558–59, 576–77; Kruman, Between Authority and Liberty, 125–26; Adams, The First American
Constitutions, 88–90.
490
British troops threatened Philadelphia’s storehouses and armories, but Pennsylvania’s weak Executive
Council, scattered around the state, was unable to meet to move the provisions. The Republican Party, long
opponents of the 1776 Constitution, printed a host of pamphlets decrying the new government. Drawing on
Whig arguments, they asserted that the dominance of a single branch of government was tyranny. For the
quote by “Associator” – likely James Wilson or Benjamin Rush – see Wood, The Creation of the American
Republic, 1776-1787, 233–37; Eric Nelson, The Royalist Revolution: Monarchy and the American
Founding (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2014), 164, 313n72. See also Selsam, The Pennsylvania
Constitution of 1776, 205–46; Robert Levere Brunhouse, The Counter-Revolution in Pennsylvania, 17761790 (Harrisburg : Pennsylvania Historical Commission, 1942), 27–38; Nash, The Unknown American
Revolution, 277–80.

135

statutes, checking the legislatures. For example, in Commonwealth v. Caton (1782), three
prisoners appealed to the state courts to void their sentencing under a state statute which
they claimed violated the Virginia Constitution. State legislators tried to steer the case
into a special joint legislative-judicial committee, and then a legislative council of
revision. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals convened, assumed the authority to “declare
an Act of the Legislature void because it was repugnant to the Act for the Constitution of
Government,” and ultimately upheld the 1776 statute.491 Edmund Randolph lauded the
courts for shielding the Virginia Constitution from narrowly-interested legislators.492
Similarly, in Rutgers v. Waddington (1784), judges on the Mayor’s Court of New York
City held the New York Trespass Act of 1783, prohibiting military appropriations of
property, violated the 1777 state Constitution, which incorporated a common law
principle allowing military appropriation of abandoned property. In response, the New
York Packet attacked the act of constitutional review by judges “who are independent of
the people.” In Trevett v. Weeden (1786), attorney James Varnum convinced Rhode
Island Supreme Court judges to overturn a statute that stripped the constitutional rights of
trial by jury and appeal from merchants who refused to accept paper money as legal
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tender.493 After the decision, the legislature interrogated and reprimanded the judges,
replacing all but one with paper money advocates the following term.494 North Carolina’s
James Iredell, representing the plaintiff in Bayard v. Singleton (1787) argued that the
American Revolution repudiated the British theory of parliamentary sovereignty,495
persuading the Court of Conference of North Carolina to uphold the state Constitution’s
promise of trial by jury, and vacate a legislative statute stripping this right. But Richard
Dobbs Spaight, a champion of legislative supremacy, replied these judges could not
represent the people’s will.496 By the late 1780s, judiciaries in only five states had
asserted a right to judicial review with mixed success.
The state framers also accepted the Whig argument, propounded by Adams and
others,497 that property allowed the material and intellectual independence needed to vote
freely. Consequently, all states imposed property requirements on the franchise. Some
framers required voters have some minimum wealth. This was the case at Maryland’s
1776 Convention, where wealthy planters, wary of growing agitation by local farmers,
493
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defeated a proposed inclusive franchise measure, instead restricting the franchise to the
wealthiest half of property owners and reducing the frequency of elections.498 Agitation
at New York’s 1777 Convention cut freehold qualifications in half – in New York City,
nearly all freemen could vote – but in Duchess and Westchester counties, the seats of the
state’s landholding Hudson river dynasties, the restrictions were tighter, and in some rural
New York counties, only a third of freemen could vote. By Jefferson’s count, less than
half of Virginians could vote under the 1776 Constitution. In the Carolinas and Georgia,
the proportion varied from half to three-quarters 499. Other states’ requirements were less
stringent.500 Overall, property qualifications disenfranchised a quarter to half of free
American males.501
By the mid-1780s, Americans had rejected Pennsylvania’s populist legislative
design for mixed government, legislative reapportionment, and property qualifications on
the vote. Adams’ May 1776 resolutions allowed the state conventions to design
governments, and gradually a consensus emerged around institutional checks on the
legislature, resolving longstanding concerns over legislative detachment. The
decentralized states had resolved the United States’ first and perhaps greatest
constitutional controversy.
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C. Slavery and the First State Constitutions
Adams’ May 1776 resolutions deferred all major constitutional questions,
including regulation of slavery, to the states. Colonial framers largely dodged the slavery
question. Several state declarations of independence called for liberation from slavish
subjection under the Crown,502 and accordingly framers in eight states constitutionally
protected life, liberty, property, and happiness, 503 and in seven recognized the natural
equality of men.504 But Vermont was alone in explicitly abolishing slavery.505 All other
state conventions deferred the slavery question to the political branches.
Southern and Northern state courts and legislatures continued on their divergent
paths. The Northern states all moved toward abolition. Between 1777 and 1804, every
state north of the Mason-Dixon Line began abolishing slavery,506 often citing the state
constitution’s due process clause. New Englanders did so quickly. Vermont’s courts
upheld at least two freedom suits made under the 1777 Constitution’s due process
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clause.507 In 1779, at least nineteen New Hampshire slaves petitioned for their freedom
before the state legislature, which in 1786 declared the state due process clause to clearly
abolish slavery,508 and by 1800, the state recorded only eight slaves.509 Importantly, by
explicitly extending due process liberty to all persons, including slaves, Massachusetts,
Vermont, and New Hampshire became legal refuges for fugitive slaves, and would
remain so until the Civil War.510 Connecticut and Rhode Island retained their colonial
charters, which lacked equality and due process clauses, and abolition here came
slowly.511
Between 1765 and 1783 Massachusetts courts heard at least eighteen freedom
suits by slaves,512 culminating in Commonwealth v. Jennison (1783), the first judicial
abolition of slavery in America. The case was the last of three freedom suits surrounding
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a young Massachusetts slave, Quock Walker. In the spring of 1781, Walker fled his
master, Nathaniel Jennison, but Jennison soon recaptured Walker and beat him with a
cane. Walker sued in the Inferior Court of Common Pleas, winning fifty pounds in
damages, but had to appeal to the Supreme Judicial Court to compel Jennison to pay. It is
not clear if Jennison did pay, for in January 1782, he appealed to the Massachusetts
legislature, where the issue stalled. Jennison then successfully sued John and Seth
Caldwell, who had harbored Walker.513 The Supreme Judicial Court overturned the
Caldwells’ conviction, hinting that 1780 Constitution’s Article I, protecting men’s “lives
and liberties,” required abolition.514 Then, in September, Massachusetts indicted Jennison
for beating Walker. Chief Justice William Cushing charged the jury to affirm that “the
idea of slavery is inconsistent with our own conduct and Constitution.” The jury accepted
Cushing’s claim, abolishing slavery in Massachusetts. By 1790, the national census found
no slaves in Massachusetts.515 Following Jennison, legislators abolished slavery by citing
the state constitution’s due process provision.516
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Mid-Atlantic states, split between abolitionists and slaveholders, settled on
gradual legislative emancipation. In 1780, Pennsylvania’s was the first legislature to
abolish slavery,517 albeit through very gradual abolition.518 New Jersey imitated parts of
the Pennsylvania law in 1785.519 After rejecting an antislavery clause, New York’s
constitutional framers expressly deferred abolition to their legislature,520 which passed
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author’s archival research suggests John Dickinson had drafted a similar bill for gradual emancipation in
Pennsylvania in 1776, stating every “Negro or Mulatto shall be and is hereby declared to be free and to all
intents and purposes”, given the slave had reached the age of eighteen or twenty-one. See R. R. Logan
collection of John Dickinson papers: Series 1. b. Political, 1774-1808, Box 3, Folder 19, at the Historical
Society of Pennsylvania. For the act as it passed, see Pennsylvania’s Act for the Gradual Abolition of
Slavery.
518
But the bill offered no protection for fugitive slaves or those traveling with masters from slave states,
and did not extend equality clause protections to slaves, though a 1788 amendment to the bill protected
fugitives. Pennsylvanian slaveholders refused to register their slaves for emancipation, and conservative
representatives, sweeping the legislature in October 1780, unsuccessfully attempted to repeal the bill’s
promise of abolition. Emancipation came slowly. The state’s population dropped from around ten thousand
at the bill’s passage in 1780, to 795 in 1810, though total emancipation did not occur until 1847. Horton,
“From Class to Race in Early America,” 639; Nash, The Unknown American Revolution, 323–27.
519
In 1780, the New Jersey Gazette reprinted the Pennsylvania Act, and the New Jersey legislature heard
three antislavery petitions. But the state constitution lacked equality and due process clauses, and the
legislature’s proslavery faction killed the proposals. The state passed 1785 nonimportation bill with some
grounds for manumission, but overall, the state was hostile to abolition, Zilversmit, The First
Emancipation, 141–46, 152–53.
520
Gouveneur Morris, leading the antislavery majority at New York’s 1777 Constitutional Convention,
proposed a resolution that “the rights of human nature and the principles of our holy religion, loudly call
upon us to dispense the blessings of freedom to all mankind.” Given widespread opposition, Morris struck
this antislavery language and the resolution passed thirty-one to five two days later. The revised resolution
deferred to “future Legislatures of the State of New-York, to take the most effective measures, consistent
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manumission and gradual abolition statutes in 1781, 1788, and 1799, though as in
Pennsylvania, full abolition would not come until the 1840s.521
Southern states maintained slavery through the 1780s and 1790s. Maryland and
Delaware constitutionally impeded abolition,522 and the Carolinas’ constitutions reserved
due process protections to freemen, preempting slaves’ freedom suits or legislative
freedom petitions on due process grounds.523 In 1782, South Carolina’s legislature
promised “one grown negro,” confiscated from loyalist estates, to every militiaman who
would serve ten months against the British, and “three large and one small negro” to
every officer recruited.524

with the public safety, and the private property of individuals, for abolishing domestic slavery with the
same, so that in future ages, every human being who breathes the air of the state shall enjoy the privileges
of a freeman.” In recognizing slaveholders’ property rights, the resolution required gradual compensated
emancipation or manumission. Ibid., 139–40. For the vote rolls, see “Journal of the Provincial
Convention,” in Journals of the Provincial Congress, Provincial Convention, Committee of Safety and
Council of Safety of the State of New-York 1775-1776-1777., vol. I (Albany: Thurlow Weed, 1842), 887–
89. Note also the similarity of this language to contemporary interpretations of Somerset.
521
In 1781 the legislature manumitted slaves who served in the armed forces, and in 1785, Aaron Burr
proposed immediate and unconditional statewide abolition. The Assembly rejected his bill thirty-three to
thirteen, but a plan to emancipate at birth all children of slaves passed thirty-six to eleven. However,
opposed Assemblymen attached riders prohibiting blacks from court testimony, intermarriage with whites,
office-holding, and voting. The state Senate struck down all provisions but the last. The state Council of
Revision, which oversaw legislative and constitutional revisions, still rejected the bill, claiming the
disenfranchisement rider violated the 1777 Constitution’s equality clause, even though emancipation suited
the “spirit and letter of the Constitution.” The Council included three state Supreme Court justices, the
Governor, and the state Chancellor, Robert Livingston, who penned the argument against the 1785 bill. For
Livingston’s full opinion, see John P. Kaminski, A Necessary Evil?: Slavery and the Debate Over the
Constitution (Rowman & Littlefield, 1995), 31–32. A 1788 statute relaxed limits on manumission, and
following agitation by John Jay and the state Manumission Society, in 1799 the legislature freed all male
children of slaves after twenty-eight years of indenture, and females after twenty-five. Few were freed
under the gradualist act, and the state slave population remained steady around fifteen thousand, as
slaveholders chose to sell away newly-acquired slaves rather than eventually manumit them. Full abolition
would not occur until 1841. McManus, A History of Negro Slavery in New York, 161–79; Kaminski, A
Necessary Evil?, 31; Horton, “From Class to Race in Early America,” 639.
522
Delaware’s 1776 Constitution prohibited slave importation and freed any imported slaves on their
arrival, granting the state’s slave-owners a monopoly on the local slave trade. Maryland allowed broader
manumission, but the 1776 Constitution denied slaves the due process right to life, liberty, and property.
See the Delaware Constitution of 1776, Article 26 and the Maryland Constitution of 1776, Article XXI.
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See the North Carolina Constitution of 1776, Article XII, and the South Carolina Constitution of 1778,
Article XLI.
524
For slaves in the Carolinas and Georgia, defection to the British promised a more comfortable servitude,
and slaves largely avoided petitions to the new state governments. Countryman, The American Revolution,
165, 239–40; Nash, The Unknown American Revolution, 327–29.
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Virginians too embraced slavery. Virginia newspapers circulated Mansfield’s
antislavery Somerset decision, black slaves earned their freedom as loyalist and patriot
soldiers, and though slaves lacked due process rights,525 the state’s courts took several
Indian and black freedom suits.526 However the legislature passed statutes in 1778, 1789,
1795, and 1806 narrowing slaves’ rights to sue for their freedom.527 And in Hudgins v.
Wrights (1806), Virginia jurist George Wythe extended due process protections to
Indians, but not to blacks.528 Further, Mansfield’s decision upheld Virginia’s positive
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Jefferson’s draft Declaration of Rights recognized “That all men are by nature equally free and
independent,” holding a right to life and liberty. But at the Convention, Edmund Pendleton added that these
rights came not from nature, but from entering “into a state of society.” Since Virginia slaves were not full
citizens, not fully entered into Virginia society, they were not guaranteed a right to life and liberty,
precluding freedom suits. Gutzman, Virginia’s American Revolution, 27.
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In Robin v. Hardaway, twelve Virginia petitioners won their freedom by establishing that they were
descended from Indian women who were free under a 1705 statute. The petitioners were incorrect about the
date – St. George Tucker later found a 1691 copy of the law. The precedent was largely forgotten, but in at
least three cases between 1787 and 1793, the state Supreme Court of Appeals again used this statute to free
Indian petitioners who established matrilineal Indian descent. See Robin v. Hardaway, 1 Jeff. 109 (Va.
Gen. Ct. 1772), Hannah v. Davis (1787), Jenkins v. Tom (1792), and Coleman v. Dick & Pat (1793).
Ablavsky, “Making Indians ‘White,’” 1490–91.
527
A 1662 law held descendants of a free woman were also free, but few black Virginian slaves could
prove a free matrilineal ancestor. However, there were a few loopholes. Slaves imported from another state
with lax slave laws might establish free maternal ancestry – in 1800, a Norfolk jury freed Phene Phillips on
these grounds. After the legislature banned the importation of slaves for resale in 1778, illegally-imported
slaves could sue for their freedom, though a 1793 statute closed this exception to slaves imported from
Africa and the West Indies. The 1778 act required any person importing slaves to swear not to resell the
slaves within ten days of entering the state. Since slave-owners might miss this deadline, a 1789 act
extended the window to sixty days, narrowing the grounds for slaves’ freedom suits. At least five AfricanAmerican slaves used the loophole in 1797. In 1795, the legislature forbid the state’s abolitionist groups
from representing slaves outside their local court district, and in 1806, it outlawed freedom suits by
illegally-imported slaves who had resided in Virginia for a year. Some slaves could also sue owners who
had reneged on promises of freedom by manumission, which was made easier under a 1782 law, but this
was still difficult. See McColley, Slavery and Jeffersonian Virginia, 164–67; Nicholls, “‘The Squint of
Freedom,’” 50–57.
528
In 1806, Indian slaves set to be transported from Virginia sued for their freedom in Hudgins v. Wrights,
claiming that as Indians, they were legally “persons perfectly white,” and hence free. See Hudgins v.
Wrights, 11 Va. (1 Hen. 8c M.) 134, 139 (1806). George Wythe, sitting on Richmond’s Court of Chancery
granted their freedom on constitutional grounds, citing the first article of the Virginia Bill of Rights’
protection of “life and Liberty.” But on appeal, St. George Tucker of the state Supreme Court stripped this
constitutional protection. Indian freedom, and according citizenship, was a statutory right, not a
constitutional one. Similarly, contemporary Native Americans hold national citizenship not through the
Fourteenth Amendment, but through the 1924 Indian Citizenship Act. Tucker also granted the Indians
freedom on physiological grounds, asserting that petitioners with Indian characteristics like straight, black
hair should be assumed to have matrilineal Indian descent, and thus be free. Tucker’s precedent excluded
black slaves and Indians from a constitutional right to liberty and citizenship, and helped legally bind
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proslavery laws, and the state courts cited a growing body of statutes prohibiting freedom
suits by African-Americans. In 1786 the legislature eased manumission rules and allowed
slave-holders to free young and mentally-able slaves, but twenty years later, amended the
act, requiring free slaves leave the state, lest they mix with the local white population.529
Constitutional decentralization on the slavery issue yielded two distinct, stable
regional approaches to slavery.530 Like their colonial predecessors, state judges
interpreted Mansfield’s short, vague, and flexible Somerset decision in irreconcilable
ways. Northern judges cited Mansfield’s claims that slavery violated natural law and that
positive law, including Northern manumission and antislavery statutes and constitutional
rights provisions, granted fugitive slaves a habeas corpus right against seizure.531
Conversely, Southern judges cited Mansfield’s affirmation of Virginia’s positive
proslavery law, and eventually, reinterpreted Somerset to argue abolition only held where
explicitly required by positive law, suggesting slavery might be legal in incoming
territories.532 While the North and South diverged over slave law, interstate disputes over
slavery mobility were few.533
slavery to African physiology. Wiecek, “Somerset,” 123–24; Adams, The First American Constitutions,
183; Ablavsky, “Making Indians ‘White,’” 1487–94.
529
The Assembly passed a 1778 nonimportation law, allowing some imported slaves grounds for freedom
suits and appeasing abolitionists, but the law also gave slaveholders a monopoly over the colony’s black
slave population. Virginia’s domestic slave population was growing without importation, so much so that
the law tempered the booming population, allowing whites to maintain control of the state with less fear of
revolt. A 1793 statute prohibited immigration by free African-Americans. McColley, Slavery and
Jeffersonian Virginia, 163–67; Nicholls, “‘The Squint of Freedom,’” 55; Adams, The First American
Constitutions, 183–84; Finkelman, Slavery and the Founders, 31–32; Ablavsky, “Making Indians ‘White,’”
1501–5.
530
This split also applied to black citizenship to some degree. Since slaves depended on others for their
wellbeing, state framers did not trust slaves to act as independent voters or citizens. Consequently, slaves
did not have franchise or citizenship rights. Conversely, propertied freemen, including blacks, could vote in
every state at the founding. But Southern states like Virginia reduced their free black population, their
black electorate dwindled. Kruman, Between Authority and Liberty, 106–7.
531
As late as 1848, Free Soilers adopted the Jennison argument to claim Southern state constitutions had
outlawed slavery. Wiecek, “Somerset,” 125.
532
For example, in 1797 Maryland’s Luther Martin dismissed Mansfield’s enthusiasm for liberty. See
Mahoney v. Ashton, 4 H. & Mc H. 295, 1799 WL 397 (Md. Gen. Ct. 1799). However, at the 1787
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III. National Responses: The Confederation Era and Convention, 1787-1799
This final section explains how prior state constitutional revision quieted two
pivotal debates at the federal Convention. Since the states had settled on a bicameral
tripartite system, federal delegates, many of them former state framers, adopted this plan
immediately and with little debate. Further, federal framers deferred to the states’
divergent slave policies rather than impose a uniform federal slave law.
Framers in at least seven states declared their governments sovereign and
independent not only from Parliament, but also from the Continental Congress.534
Delaware’s 1776 Convention, the first assembled after the Declaration of Independence,
stated “the people of this State have the sole exclusive and inherent Right of governing
and regulating the internal Police of the same.” Similarly, Massachusetts’ framers
declared authority over all police powers, to the exclusion of Congress, save for the few
powers “expressly delegated” to the Continental Congress.535
These sovereignty claims defanged the Continental Congress. The Articles of
Confederation, ratified in 1781, charged Congress with the common defense, 536 but
recognized the states’ sovereignty over nearly every other subject, including all affairs

Constitutional Convention, Martin argued for a national ban on the slave trade, deeming slavery
“inconsistent with the principles of the revolution and dishonorable to the American character to have such
a feature in the Constitution.” Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, 1911, II:364;
Wiecek, “Somerset,” 128.
533
At least relative to the 1840s and 1850s.
534
These governments were sovereign to the extent they worked within the state constitutions, which
embodied the popular will, the ultimate seat of sovereignty.
535
Pennsylvania and Maryland adopted Delaware’s wording, and North Carolina imitated Delaware’s
claim the people were sovereign over the state’s “internal government and police,” which Georgia in turn
copied the following year. New York also drafted a similar clause. See the 1776 Delaware Declaration of
Rights, Section 4, the 1776 North Carolina Declaration of Rights, Section II, and the Massachusetts
Constitution of 1780, Part I, Article IV. Adams, The First American Constitutions, 133–34.
536
Congress was responsible for the “common defense, the security of their liberties, and their mutual and
general welfare,” and formally recognized Congress’ existing foreign policy, trade, and war powers,
including treaty-making with Indians. The Articles also established a system of weights, currency, and a
post office.
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under the broad, nebulous label of regulating the “internal police.”537 Congress could not
compel states’ financial contributions or regulate their commerce.538 Congressional
apportionment was similarly contentious.539 Further, questions over frontier regulation
reemerged,540 as states made conflicting western land claims,541 and unrecognized
frontier republics unsuccessfully petitioned for congressional recognition.542 Finally,
amendments to the Articles required unanimous approval so that no sovereign state
would be bound to a constitutional provision it had not approved,543 preventing revision
of the flawed system. The document was therefore no more than a “firm league of
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Adams, The First American Constitutions, 276–81, 286–87.
States cooperated only when it served their interest. Since Congress was saddled with Dutch and French
wartime debt, this was a serious problem. See Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787,
354–63; Peter S. Onuf, The Origins of the Federal Republic: Jurisdictional Controversies in the United
States, 1775-1787 (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983); Jack N. Rakove, “The First Phases of
American Federalism,” in Comparative Constitutional Federalism: Europe and America, ed. Mark V.
Tushnet (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1990); Keith L. Dougherty, Collective Action under the Articles
of Confederation (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Richard Beeman, The Penguin Guide to
the United States Constitution: A Fully Annotated Declaration of Independence, U.S. Constitution and
Amendments, and Selections from The Federalist Papers (New York: Penguin, 2010), 133–43.
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National representation was contentious. Each state delegation held a single, equal congressional vote,
to the frustration of delegations from populous states like Massachusetts and Pennsylvania, and ones with
the potential for western expansion, like Virginia. Slaveholding states did not count their slave population
when contributing to the national army and treasury.
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Adams, The First American Constitutions, 281–85. Related to this was the difficult question of Indian
regulation. Gregory Ablavsky, “The Savage Constitution,” Duke Law Journal 63 (2014): 999.
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Under Article IX, Congress could resolve territorial disputes between existing states, which it did in
1782 to resolve a conflict between Pennsylvania and Connecticut over the Wyoming Valley of northeastern
Pennsylvania.
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On June 30, 1777, the Continental Congress rejected Vermont’s petition to send delegates to Congress,
resolving that the states never specifically granted Congress the authority to recognize Vermont. Unwilling
to alienate the Virginia delegation, members of the Continental Congress also rebuffed appeals from the
Appalachian territories of Westsylvania and Kentucky. Virginia eventually ceded its claims, and on
October 10, 1780, Congress claimed authority over all western lands and the right to organize “distinct
republican states, which shall become members of the federal union, and have the same rights of
sovereignty, freedom and independence, as the other states,” leading to the Northwest Ordinance of 1787,
dividing the Ohio River Valley and Great Lakes regions into territories. Worthington Chauncey Ford,
Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774-1789, vol. VIII (Washington: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1907), 508–11; Worthington Chauncey Ford, ed., Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774-1789,
vol. XVIII (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1910), 915–16.
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friendship” between the states.544 The Articles’ constitutional legitimacy was also
suspect, as the Continental Congress, a standing legislature, lacked constitution-making
authority, and moreover, had never been expressly authorized to draft the Articles.545 In
limiting legislators’ constitutional prerogative, state framers had also undermined the
Congress.
In response, delegates eventually assembled in Philadelphia for the national
Constitutional Convention on May 14, 1787.546 All thirteen original states, save for
Rhode Island, were represented, and up to half of the fifty-five delegates were former
state framers.547 By relying on prior state constitutional design, the federal framers
preempted debate on institutional design and slavery, two of the era’s most contentious
topics.
Delegates immediately and with little debate adopted the states’ tripartite
institutional design. Waiting for a quorum in mid-May, James Madison, author of
Virginia’s tripartite 1776 Constitution, began quietly conferring with Gouverneur Morris
544

The Articles thus explicitly affirmed constitutional sovereignty lay with the states. In a provision nearly
identical to Massachusetts’ sovereignty clause, the Articles acknowledged “Each state retains its
sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this
Confederation expressly delegated to the United States, in Congress assembled.” See the Articles of
Confederation, Article II. Note the original draft of the Articles that John Dickinson reported to the
Continental Congress on July 12, 1776, read “Each Colony shall retain and enjoy as much of its present
Laws, Rights and Customs, as it may think fit, and reserves to itself the sole and exclusive Regulation and
Government of its internal police, in all matters that shall not interfere with the Articles of this
Confederation,” potentially allowing national intervention in state police powers. See Worthington
Chauncey Ford, ed., Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774-1789, vol. V (U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1906), 547. Congress dropped this language. For Dickinson’s early drafts and notes on the Articles,
see the R. R. Logan collection of John Dickinson papers: Series 1. b. Political, 1774-1808, Box 3, Folders
20-1 and Box 4, Folder 22, at the Historical Society of Pennsylvania.
545
Most Americans deferred constitution-making to temporary conventions.
546
After a smattering of frontier rebellions and years of campaigning by nationalists like Alexander
Hamilton, five state delegations convened for four days in Annapolis in 1786, listing the failings of the
Articles and calling for another, larger meeting. Beeman, The Penguin Guide to the United States
Constitution, 145–50.
547
Williams, citing at least five other scholars, estimates a third to a half of the federal delegates had
already framed state constitutions. See Robert F. Williams, “Experience Must Be Our Only Guide: The
State Constitutional Experience of the Framers of the Federal Constitution,” Hastings Constitutional Law
Quarterly 15 (1988 1987): 403; Williams, “State Constitutions of the Founding Decade,” 542–43.
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and James Wilson of Pennsylvania, opponents of the Pennsylvania Constitution.548 When
a quorum assembled, delegates to the Philadelphia Convention met again on May 25th
and 28th, turning first, as the state conventions had, to the question of institutional design.
On May 29th, Madison and Edmund Randolph proposed a tripartite national government,
modeled on the Virginia Constitution they had drafted together eleven years earlier.
Wilson and Morris backed Madison’s plan, as did the Pennsylvanian John Dickinson,
another opponent of the Pennsylvania model. Reflecting on the federal Convention,
Dickinson argued that “government must never be lodged in a single body,” but rather in
“a number of great departments… three or four of these are competent in number.”549 On
May 30th, only the fourth day of meeting, the Committee of the Whole resolved in favor
of the widely-accepted tripartite design.550 Prior state framing helped delegates quickly
settle this essential question.
Framers also rejected unicameralism. After several weeks of debate over
proportional representation,551 on June 15th, delegates from small and enclosed states
rallied around the New Jersey plan penned by William Paterson, which promised equal
representation per state in a unicameral legislature. But recalling the deadlocked
unicameral Pennsylvania legislature and Continental Congress, delegates settled instead
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Note also Wilson had long advocated mixed government, later penning a defense of the system in his
“Lectures on Law.” George Clymer, another opponent of the Pennsylvania model, served with Wilson at
the federal Convention.
549
John Dickinson, “Letter IV, April 19, 1788,” in Pamphlets on the Constitution of the United States:
Published During Its Discussion by the People, 1787-1788, ed. Paul Leicester Ford (Brooklyn, NY, 1788),
181–82; Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787, 604.
550
The resolution held: “that it is the opinion of this Committee that a national government ought to be
established consisting of a supreme Legislative, Judiciary, and Executive.” Max Farrand, ed., The Records
of the Federal Convention of 1787, vol. I (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1911), 30–31.
551
Proportional representation benefitted larger states, growing states, and those states with unbounded
western borders and the prospect of expansion. Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and North Carolina
alone accounted for half the national population, and the latter two states expected their slave and
immigrant populations to keep growing. David Brian Robertson, The Constitution and America’s Destiny
(Cambridge University Press, 2005), 40–45.
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on the Connecticut Compromise of July 16th, incorporating the New Jersey plan’s
chamber as the upper house in a bicameral scheme.552 This closed debate on
unicameralism. As Robert Williams states, “One of the earliest—and most resolute—
decisions of the Convention was in favor of bicameralism…There was no real
controversy over this point.”553
Morris and Wilson engineered a strong national executive. By June 4th, delegates
agreed the president would be unitary, and like Massachusetts’ executive, could veto
legislation.554 As Willi Paul Adams concludes, “The presidential system at the federal
level can be ascribed much more to the beliefs of the authors of the first state
constitutions” than to any other source.555
Judicial review, still being debated at the state level, did not take hold in the
federal Convention. Several federal delegates had promoted judicial review in the state
courts. William Davie did so in North Carolina’s Bayard v. Singleton in 1787, as had
delegates John Francis Mercer, John Blair, and George Wythe in Virginia’s
Commonwealth v. Caton in 1782. Edmund Randolph served in the latter case as
Virginia’s Attorney General, sending his arguments for judicial review to James
Madison.556 But only five states had attempted judicial review, and it was new and
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For example, see James Wilson’s objection to the New Jersey plan: “The government is implemented
[?] in an improper manner – legislative Authority single – executive divided…It provides not effectively
for the true Ends of Government. The legislature and executive Power are too feeble and dependent – They
and the judicial Power are too confined.” See James Wilson Papers (#0721), Box 1, Volumes 2-4, Folder 2,
pp.58-9 at the Historical Society of Pennsylvania.
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Williams, “State Constitutions of the Founding Decade,” 577.
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Delegates rejected other state designs, like an executive council or direct gubernatorial elections.
Instead, the unitary president would be elected by delegations representing the states. Robertson, The
Constitution and America’s Destiny, 152–57; Beeman, The Penguin Guide to the United States
Constitution, 157–58.
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Adams, The First American Constitutions, 289.
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Similarly, Alexander Hamilton in Federalist 78 defended the proposed Constitution’s independent
judiciary as the protector of the people’s will as enumerated in the Constitution. James Wilson made the
same argument in his “Lectures on Law.” John Marshall, who had observed Randolph’s arguments in
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contentious in all of them. New Yorkers and North Carolinians, including Richard Dobbs
Spaight, now a North Carolina delegate to the Convention, had chastised their judges for
overruling the popularly-elected legislature, and Rhode Island legislators fired four
justices who had attempted judicial review. Judicial review was attractive to some
delegates, but still an untested and divisive idea.
Since Northern and Southern framers had happily diverged over slavery, few
delegates would likely consent to a uniform national slave law. As Madison wrote, “the
great division of interests in the U. States… did not lie between large & small States: it
lay between the Northern & Southern.”557 On May 30th, the Convention debated the
Virginia Plan for legislative apportionment by “free inhabitants.” Fearing an early debate
over apportionment of free and slave votes would split the nascent Convention, Madison
cut the language, hoping to postpone the slavery debate.558 The framers subsequently
avoided explicitly mentioning slaves or implying that the federal Constitution allowed
slavery,559 largely deferring to existing state regulation.
Convention debates over slavery yielded only three major clauses. State framers,
imitating the British model, had used an upper house to represent their state’s aristocracy
and property, including property in slaves. On June 11th, Rutledge and Pierce Butler
proposed national legislative representation also remained proportionate to property in
slaves. Charles Pinckney split with his South Carolina delegation, instead proposing
slaves receive partial representation as population, counting as three-fifths of a vote.
Commonwealth v. Caton, would expand these arguments in Marbury over twenty years later. Wood, The
Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787, 462–63; William Michael Treanor, “Judicial Review
before ‘Marbury,’” Stanford Law Review 58, no. 2 (November 1, 2005): 496–97, 554–57.
557
Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, 1911, I:486.
558
Finkelman, Slavery and the Founders, 11.
559
Slavery troubled some delegates on moral grounds. On August 25 th, Madison declared he “thought it
wrong to admit in the Constitution the idea that there could be property in men…slaves are not like
merchandise, consumed &c.” Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, 1911, II:417.
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James Wilson backed this more moderate proposal, which the Convention applied to
House representation on July 12th, adopting the same three-fifths proportion for
determining each state’s tax burden on August 21st.560
The day after the Convention adopted the three-fifths compromise, the
Continental Congress passed the Northwest Ordinance, prohibiting slavery in states
formed from the Northwest Territory. On August 29th and 30th, delegates settled on the
process for admission of a new state into the union, requiring only that the proposed
constitution be republican in nature. The Convention did not specify whether other
territories would draft free or proslavery constitutions, leaving this controversy to future
congresses, courts, and presidents.
Further controversy lay with the domestic mobility of slaves. Northern judges
could cite Somerset to claim that their state’s positive law abolition provisions, privileges
and immunities clauses, and personal liberty laws freed a runaway, preventing his
return,561 while Southern judges could cite Somerset’s deference to the positive
proslavery laws of Virginia. The same day they scrapped Rutledge’s tariff plan, delegates
passed the Fugitive Slave Clause, requiring runaways be returned to their home state,
protecting Southern slaveholders’ monopoly on slaves. Still, delegates did not charge
specific federal or state agents with enforcement, maintaining the status quo of
nonintervention. 562
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Countryman, The American Revolution, 189–91; David Brian Robertson, The Original Compromise:
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205.
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For example, in 1788, the Pennsylvania legislature amended its 1780 gradual emancipation act to
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Slaveholders, backed by federalist delegates wary of the Articles’ failures, secured broad national
powers. On July 17th, Roger Sherman proposed a clause explicitly prohibiting the national government
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The slave trade proved less contentious. Neither Northerners nor Southerners
relied on the trade to maintain local slavery,563 such that eleven states heavily taxed or
outright abolished the trade,564 yielding bisectional agreement on nonimportation. But
rogue South Carolinians and Georgians in the Continental Congress had used the
Congress’ unanimity requirement to block a national nonimportation provision in
1776.565 The 1787 Philadelphia Convention gave Northern and Southern delegates the
chance to finally establish a uniform federal nonimportation policy. On August 22nd,
George Mason warned the federal Convention that the nation’s growing slave population
threatened revolt, and accordingly, it was “essential in every point of view that the
government should have to power to prevent the increase of slavery.”566 But John
Rutledge represented South Carolina’s robust slave importation business, and proposed
any international commercial treaty pass a two-thirds vote in both houses. This would

from interfering “with the Government of the individual states in any matters of internal police which
respect the Govt. of such states only, and wherein the General welfare of the U. States is not concerned.”
Southern delegates, favoring broad national powers to protect slavery, defeated the provision and a similar
one on September 15th, guaranteeing “no State shall without its consent be affected in its internal police.”
To some Southerners, Sherman’s explicit protections of state police powers seemed merely weak
“parchment barriers.” Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, 1911, II:25, 629–30; Mark
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state Constitution, and Virginia passed nonimportation statutes in 1778 and 1793. McColley, Slavery and
Jeffersonian Virginia, 164–67; Maier, American Scripture, 265 n33; Nicholls, “‘The Squint of Freedom,’”
51, 54–55; Finkelman, Slavery and the Founders, 22–32.
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June to 1 August 1776,” 314–15; Becker, The Declaration of Independence, 171–72; Maier, American
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thwart tariffs on slaves, boosting the South Carolinian slave trade, but also blocked tariffs
on manufactured goods, gutting the protectionist policies New England industrialists
wanted. On August 25th, New Englanders capitulated, allowing slave importation until
1808 under the terms of the Importation Clause,567 and the Convention rejected the rest of
Rutledge’s tariff plan four days later.568
As before, the states called conventions to ratify the proposed Constitution.
Imitating the state constitutional conventions, the ratification conventions were temporary
representations of popular authority, distinct from the states’ standing legislatures.569
New Hampshire’s convention cast the ninth vote to approve the Constitution on June 21,
1788, allowing nationwide ratification of the new Constitution. Following the
Convention, Georgia, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Delaware, and Vermont replaced
their constitutions to match the federal model. Though the Constitution’s Guarantee
Clause only requires of states “a republican form of government,” since 1787, states have
almost invariably chosen bicameral tripartite governments.
State framers resolved questions on institutional design and slavery, preempting
these debates at the Philadelphia Convention. Most scholars rely on Convention records
to recount how delegates bargained,570 for example, focusing on the bicameral
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Connecticut Compromise.571 But this misses how prior state framing made bicameralism
a near certainty, foreclosing the option of unicameralism long before federal delegates
even met. Similarly, most scholars assert federal delegates like James Wilson centralized
power and introduced a strong executive as a reaction to the Articles’ failure. But this
centralization, particularly in Wilson’s case, was also a rejection of weak, decentralized
executive design at the state level. In studying federal Convention records but ignoring
state conventions, scholars may miss how previous state framers’ choices silently
preempted certain Convention debates.572 To ignore state constitutionalism, is to
misunderstand decisions at the federal Convention.
The era’s final constitutional debate concerned formalizing rights. By 1787, eight
states already had bills of rights,573 leading George Mason, framer of Virginia’s bill, to
propose combining them into a federal bill late in the Convention.574 Weary delegates
unanimously refused, and during ratification federalists argued the state bills made a
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national one redundant,575 deferring the issue to Congress. Between 1788 and 1799,
Congress heard 345 proposals for federal amendments, 311 of these in the first two-year
session. Most of these initial proposals were rights provisions drawn exactly from the
state constitutions and bills.576 These proposed federal amendments protected free speech
and press, free exercise, keeping arms, trial rights, prohibited quartering of troops and
certain searches, and reserved non-delegated powers to the states, and were eventually
combined and ratified as the federal Bill of Rights.
In conclusion, during the Revolution and founding, every state reauthorized or
replaced its colonial charter, resulting in two dozen new state constitutions. These helped
resolve longstanding debates over legislative sovereignty and design, slavery, and frontier
regulation, preempting these debates during the framing and ratification of the
Constitution and Bill of Rights. Even in this tumultuous period, state constitutional
revision quieted national controversies. Yet some, like slavery and consolidation of the
frontier, would later reemerge in the antebellum era, as the next chapter explains.
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CHAPTER 5: THE ANTEBELLUM ERA, 1800-1849
“The Constitution had not destroyed the individuality of the states, and all bodies, of
whatsoever sort, have a secret instinct leading them toward independence. That instinct is
especially pronounced in such a country as America, where every village is a sort of
republic accustomed to rule itself.”
Alexis de Tocqueville, 1835577

Antebellum Americans debated expanding suffrage and reforming elections,
abolishing slavery, and establishing a national bank. Congressmen proposed hundreds of
federal amendments on these topics, some proposed by presidents, and federal courts
intervened to expand and contract federal authority. Despite these attempts to revise the
federal Constitution, only a single federal amendment passed. In contrast, the states
proposed dozens of new state constitutions and hundreds of state constitutional
amendments. Thus the question for this chapter – why, in the tumultuous antebellum era,
was the national Constitution so stable while the state constitutions were so unstable?
This chapter argues state constitutional reform resolved national controversies over
elections, slavery, and banking, preempting national constitutional reform. Antebellum
state constitutional revision stabilized the federal Constitution.
I. Trends in State and Federal Constitutionalism, 1800-49
In the antebellum era, state constitutional reform far outpaced federal amendment.
Between 1800 and 1849, the states proposed fifty-three new constitutions, ratifying
twenty-seven.578 While Revolutionary state framers had avoided amendment,579
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Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 386.
On average, a state constitution ratified between 1800 and 1849 lasted only 52.6 years. While proposals
were spread evenly across the states and territories, ratifications were not. New Englanders rejected all but
three constitutional proposals, instead gradually elaborating their existing constitutions through judicial and
legislative review and amendment. The vast and sparsely colonized Great Plains and Western territories
generally did not call conventions or ratify new constitutions. So most constitutional ratification occurred
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antebellum Americans proposed hundreds of state constitutional amendments,580 ratifying
least 201,581 mainly to older New England and Southern constitutions. 582 These numbers
are all the more impressive given there were relatively few states in this era.583 In
contrast, of the 476 federal amendments proposed before Congress, only the Twelfth
Amendment passed. Why did antebellum Americans frequently amend and replace their
state constitutions while leaving the federal Constitution almost untouched?

Rivers. Of the twenty-seven constitutions ratified, fifteen were initial constitutions that organized new
states, and all but two of these fifteen were drafted by Southern or Old Northwest and Mid-Atlantic states.
For the full list and map of constitutions proposed and ratified between 1800 and 1850, see Figure 17 in the
appendix.
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amendments. This was partly an issue of expediency, as the Revolutionary-era constitutions were framed
quickly, under duress, and haphazardly, sometimes resulting in contentious, experimental designs that
required wholesale replacement by convention. Revision by convention, rather than legislative amendment,
was also an ideological choice. Conventions in New York, New Jersey, Virginia, North Carolina, and
South Carolina refused to specify a process for constitutional amendment on the grounds that the power of
constitutional revision belonged solely to the whole people and their representatives assembled in
convention, rather than partisan, narrowly-interested legislators. For example, the 1776 conventions of
Delaware and New Jersey forbade the legislature from amending rights provisions.
580
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Development of American State Constitutions,” 66.
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State Constitutions Project”; Dippel, “The Rise of Modern Constitutionalism, 1776 - 1849.”
582
Further, six Southern states had a tradition of frequent constitutional revision dating to colonial civil law
systems under French, Spanish, or Mexican government. Ten states were settled by France, Spain, or
Mexico and had developed civil law systems at the time of the Revolution. These are states Alabama,
Arizona, Arkansas, California, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, New Mexico, and Texas. For
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There are a few familiar explanations of the federal Constitution’s stability. First,
Article V’s supermajority requirements may have blocked proposed federal amendments.
But in in the Jeffersonian era there were fewer states – only sixteen in 1800 – and thus
fewer potential vetoes. Further, backlash to the Federalists’ Alien and Sedition Acts and
widespread support for states’ rights swept Jeffersonians into both houses of Congress
and the White House. With Monroe’s 1816 election, the Democratic-Republicans
controlled thirty of forty-two Senate seats, 146 of 185 House seats, clearing the necessary
two-thirds to propose an amendment, and held many state legislatures, paving the way for
ratification.584 Yet puzzlingly, the unchallenged Democratic-Republicans did not
entrench their power through federal amendment or a second constitutional convention.
As David E. Kyvig asserts, growing veneration for the founders and their
Constitution may have discouraged congressmen, state legislators, and ordinary
Americans from reforming the federal document.585 A 1796 schoolbook introduced
children to their Constitution in words “made level to the lowest capacities.” The book,
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small enough to carry in a breast pocket, dissuaded readers from revising the work of the
founders, which it called
“The greatest [constitution] by far that any people ever had; and it can scarcely be
expected that any ever should be greater. It was formed in an age when the
principles of liberty were well understood; [the federal framers] had all the
examples of former ages and governments before them, their beauties and defects;
they sat down in a state of profound peace, and had full leisure to form the most
perfect constitution that the nature of things would admit of.”586
But the antebellum Constitution was not so widely venerated. The secrecy of the
1787 Convention and the extralegal ratification process tarnished the Constitution for
Anti-Federalists,587 and for some later Jeffersonians and Federalists.588 In 1828, the South
Carolina legislature attempted to nullify Congress’ constitutionally-guaranteed tariffmaking power, and in 1845, the abolitionist William Lloyd Garrison burned a copy of the
Constitution at a Framingham rally of the Massachusetts Anti-Slavery Society. By the
late antebellum era, state and federal legislators cited compact and nullification theory in
calling for amendment or replacement of the ailing Constitution.
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Repudiating the Revolutionary generation’s rowdy spirit, the book instructed “no riots, mobs, nor
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Alternately, John Marshall and subsequent justices may have reinterpreted the
Constitution, easing it into new contexts and preempting amendment. But after the 1803
Marbury decision, the Supreme Court would not again use judicial review to overturn a
congressional statute until Dred Scott in 1857. Rather, the Marshall Court overturned
state legislation, helping explain why many antebellum constitutional controversies were
focused at the state level.
There are a few possible explanations for the states’ frequent revision. First, some
state legislatures could easily propose and pass amendments or new constitutions.589 But
in other states, early framers set higher barriers to legislative amendment and
replacement, perhaps thwarting revision.590 Further, given how often elites and reformers
circumvented formal rules for constitutional revision,591 these rules cannot alone explain
the states’ frequent constitutional upheavals. Nor can procedural rules explain why
antebellum reformers sought change in the first place. As Donald Lutz concludes “the
589

For example, Article IV of Maryland’s 1776 Declaration of Rights recognized a popular right to “to
reform the old or establish a new government,” and Article X encouraged frequent legislative amendment:
“That, for redress of grievances, and for amending, strengthening and preserving the laws, the Legislature
ought to be frequently convened.” Most amendments could pass with a simple majority, but under Article
LIX, they had to be approved by two sequential legislative sessions. Thus Maryland was able to pass ten
amendments in 1837.
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amendment. In 1822, New York voters approved a new constitution that failed to provide a mechanism for
calling future conventions. Even newer state constitutions, like Indiana’s 1816 document, did not address
amendment procedure. The Indiana document required that every twelve years citizens vote on whether to
hold a constitutional convention. See the Indiana Constitution of 1816, Article VIII. See also Dealey,
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Reference Guide (Greenwood Press, 1996), 4.
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first state constitutions were not used legalistically the way Americans use constitutions
today… political conflicts were not susceptible to resolutions on the basis of the precise
wording of a constitution.” 592
One might speculate that antebellum Americans had little veneration for their
state constitutions, and thus fewer qualms with state constitutional revision. But in an era
when the distant, fledgling national government commanded little authority, and its
Constitution earned little respect, many Americans revered their state constitutions.
Thomas Paine recalled that the Pennsylvania Constitution was
“the political Bible of the state. Scarcely a family was without it. Every member
of the Government had a copy; and nothing was more common, when any debate
arose on the principle of a bill, or on the extent of any species of authority, than
for the members to take the printed Constitution out of their pocket, and read the
chapter with which such matter in debate was connected.593
The state constitutions regulated the mundane elements of most Americans’ lives,
including their schooling, their religious and moral habits, their commerce and
employment, and their marriage and family life, and so these documents held citizens’
attention and investment.
This chapter instead asserts that state constitutional replacement outpaced federal
reform because of the decentralization of constitutional conflicts. The antebellum
Congress split over the regulation of suffrage, slavery, and banking and finance. These
issues internally divided the Democratic-Republicans, and later the Democrats and the
Whigs. Rather than confront these divisive controversies, congressmen deferred them to
592
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the states. State legislators and constitutional convention delegates revised their
constitutions to extend suffrage to nearly all adult white males, to preserve slavery south
of the Ohio River and abolish it to the north, and to create a system of locally-regulated
banks and infrastructure corporations. This helps explain the era’s high rate of state
constitutional revision.594 Congress accepted these reforms. Between 1800 and 1849,
congressmen did not pass any national amendments regulating suffrage, slavery, or
banking and finance, and following the states’ revisions, congressmen largely avoided
even proposing national amendments to regulate these issues. National controversies
prompted state constitutional revision, preempting national constitutional change.
This chapter proceeds in three steps. First, the chapter explains how presidents,
Congress, and the Supreme Court deferred to the states on national controversies over
suffrage and elections, territorial slavery, and chartering banks. Second, the chapter
argues that prior to 1828 the states preempted and resolved national controversies over
slavery and elections and suffrage. Finally, the chapter argues that after 1828, the states
resolved the banking question while struggling territorial slavery debates.
II. Constitutional Controversies at 1800
Several constitutional controversies gripped the early republic. Between 1800 and
1849, congressmen proposed 476 amendments, clustered around several topics,595
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Territorial expansion and the incorporation of new states accounts for some of these new constitutions.
But this cannot explain why some new states amended their newly-drafted constitutions, or why old states
replaced or amended previous constitutions.
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policy issues. A second list of common terms is created by reading descriptions all 476 proposals in this era
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primarily on the regulation of Congress (142), the presidency (83), the judiciary (25),
finance and taxes (57), and slavery (19).596 Note that the latter two categories concern
concurrent powers subject to regulation by state constitutional reform, and as did some
topics in the former categories, such as the selection of presidential electors (48), of the
president (65), and of congressional representatives by district (34). That is, many of the
issues that threatened to destabilize the federal Constitution were also subject to state
constitutional regulation.597
These counts cannot reveal an amendment’s congressional support or doctrinal
impact and can systematically miss issues excluded from the congressional agenda.
Therefore this section explores three antebellum constitutional controversies in greater
detail. The first concerns the balance of state and national economic authority. The brief
Tenth Amendment did not expressly delineate the states’ legal, economic, and police
powers,598 leaving Justice James Wilson in Chisholm v. Georgia (1793) to reject
Georgia’s claim to legal immunity to a private citizen’s suit.599 Jeffersonian senators were
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touching on selection federal officials were subject to state constitutional regulation.
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In 1791, Congress passed the Tenth Amendment reserving to the states powers not delegated to the
federal government, but this did not explicitly define or protect states’ police powers. The Guarantee
Clause, requiring states draft republican governments, and the Supremacy Clause, proclaiming the
supremacy of federal law over state law, did not clarify this issue either. See Article IV, Section 4, Clause 1
and Article VI.
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In South Carolina, Alexander Chisholm, the executor of clothier Robert Farquhar’s estate, sued Georgia
for undelivered payment for clothes Farquhar supplied to Georgia during the Revolutionary War. Article
III, Section 2 of the Constitution referred suits “between a State and Citizens of another State” to the
federal judiciary. Georgia alleged it was a sovereign government, and that Article III, Section 2 allowed the
state to act as plaintiff in a suit against a private citizen, but did not require it appear as a defendant.
Dismissing Georgia’s sovereignty claims, Justice James Wilson admitted that the states’ citizens may have
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upset that the Federalist Wilson favored Alexander Chisholm, a private merchant, over
Georgia’s state sovereignty rights, and so two days after the ruling proposed an
amendment overriding the decision.600 Months later the Eleventh Amendment passed
after a day’s debate in each chamber, granting states sovereign immunity from private
suits. And three years after the Amendment, the Virginia and Kentucky legislatures
affirmed that the states had compacted to form the Constitution and should remained
arbiters in constitutional disputes.601
While the Amendment and Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions helped clarify the
states’ legal authority, the federal Constitution was ambiguous on the extent of state and
federal economic powers.602 Banking authority soon became a point of contention. To
finance the young nation’s mounting debt, Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton
proposed the First Congress authorize a federal mint, taxation system, and national bank.
Fisher Ames, Theodore Sedgwick, and Johnathan Trumbull rallied congressmen to pass
Hamilton’s mint and taxation plans.603 But the Constitution did not expressly empower

delegated sovereignty to their state constitutions, but added that these citizens also ratified the national
Constitution, granting federal courts authority over interstate disputes. Wilson thus firmly concluded “As to
the purposes of the Union, Georgia is NOT a Sovereign State.” See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 457
(1793).
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Supreme Court (University of Chicago Press, 2004), 22.
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resolutions, drafted by Madison and Jefferson, nullifying the Acts. Jefferson’s Kentucky Resolution
declared the states formed the Constitution, were bound by the “certain definite powers” delegated to the
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But see Article I, Section 8, Clause 1, granting Congress the power to “lay and collect Taxes, Duties,
Imposts and Excises.”
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Congressmen initially frowned on political factions, instead clustering into advocates and opponents of
strong national government, a division familiar from the Constitution’s ratification debates. When bills
concerning national powers reached the First Congress’ Committee of the Whole, Federalists and AntiFederalists clashed, but without party structure or discipline, neither group could rally around a
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Congress to establish a national bank, which might also muscle out fledging state
banks.604 Thus the Virginians Madison, Jefferson, and Edmund Randolph, all opposed to
broad federal powers and constitutional readings, allied with George Clinton and Aaron
Burr of New York, uniting the nation’s Democratic-Republican societies and presses
against Hamilton’s bank plan.605 Despite this, Congress chartered the bank of the United
States in 1791. The bitter presidential election of 1796 internally divided many states,
with established local elites often assuming the Federalist label – by the late 1790s, New
England Federalists like Ames, Sedgwick, and Trumbull caucused with prominent
families in Delaware and South Carolina, becoming a national party.606 Congressmen
split into two intersectional parties, one supporting the Bank and the other opposing it,
each trying to entrench its position, together proposing a dozen federal constitutional
amendments on national banking powers.607
With the Constitution still silent on banking authority, states too claimed this
power. States and localities had long engaged in self-financing. Neglected by Parliament
and sometimes by their own legislatures,608 colonial counties, cities, and rural villages
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funded their own infrastructure and public works projects through lotteries.609 Between
1766 and 1775, Rhode Island alone authorized forty-three lotteries.610 But with
independence, state legislators formalized and expanded their authority to raise revenues
through taxes and banks. By 1791, Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and Baltimore all
hosted state banks, each of which competed with a corresponding local branch of the
national Bank.611 Albany opened a state bank the following year, and in 1793
Pennsylvania opened a second state bank in Philadelphia, hoping to raise state revenue to
through stock sale rather than taxation. When Hamilton threatened to plant a national
Bank branch in Virginia, Jefferson and the state legislature proposed competing banks in
Alexandria and Richmond to better respond to yeoman farmers’ credit needs. Twentythree banks were chartered between 1792 and 1800, and with President Jefferson’s
blessing,612 uncounted more opened in the following decade, such that by 1811, each
state had established at least one bank. Accordingly, each senator represented a state bank
that competed with the national one,613 keeping alive congressional opposition to the
national Bank, such that by the 1810s, congressmen still proposed federal constitutional
amendments to block the institution’s re-chartering.614
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Territorial slavery presented a second issue. The 1787 Northwest Ordinance
abolished territorial slavery north of the Ohio River,615 while the 1789 North Carolina
Cession Act forbade territorial abolition south of the River,616 promising a balanced
Senate. Territorial slaves would count as three-fifths of a person for the purposes of
national taxation and representation,617 inflating the number of congressmen and
Electoral College votes south of the Ohio.618 Some convention delegates expected whites
to quickly settle these fertile new states, further increasing the Southern delegation.619 But
Northerners knew they could use the Senate to check a Southern House and veto a
Southern president.620 And any congressional statute, including slavery regulation, would
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require bisectional support, as would any amendment changing the terms of the
compromise.621
This peace lasted nearly twenty years, with free states formed north of the Ohio
and slave ones south, until Jefferson’s 1804 Louisiana Purchase pushed American
jurisdiction west across the Mississippi, past the Ohio’s dividing line. Federal framers,
dodging the slavery controversy, had not expressly specified whether congressional
authority extended to regulating slavery in new territories.622 Further, the eastern states
had abolished or affirmed slavery without congressional interference, suggesting new
western states might do the same. Congressmen were now unsure of the boundary and the
balance of free and slave states and congressional seats, opening the bisectional compact
to renegotiation by constitutional amendment. Between 1803 and 1808 congressmen
proposed eight amendments banning slave importation,623 and another eight stripping
Southern states’ extra slave votes and tax duties,624 threatening the bisectional balance.
All failed. And congressmen avoided proposing amendments on the divisive question of
territorial slavery,625 leaving this pivotal national issue to territorial legislators.
Finally there was the issue of election and suffrage law. Colonial and early state
legislatures established property and taxpaying qualifications that disenfranchised
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women, slaves, transients, the urban poor, and tenant farmers. In late July 1787, federal
Convention delegates briefly debated national franchise reform before delegating this
question to the overburdened Committee of Detail, which rejected a uniform federal
property requirement. The Convention again rejected reform in August, 626 settling
instead on three clauses that reaffirmed the states’ traditional authority over elections.
The Elections Clause allowed state legislatures to regulate the “Times, Places and
Manner of holding elections for Senators and Representatives,” subject to Congressional
override.627 Second, people qualified to vote for candidates for the state’s lower house
also qualified to vote for candidates for the national House of Representatives.628 And the
Guarantee Clause required, without any elaboration, “a Republican Form of
Government” for each state.629 The Constitution was otherwise silent on suffrage
qualifications, including those for state office, and congressmen refrained from proposing
any amendments on the topic. As Alexander Keyssar concludes, “By making the
franchise in national elections dependent on state suffrage laws, the authors of the
Constitution compromised their substantive disagreements to solve a potentially
explosive political problem.”630 As white, male tenant farmers and urban laborers began
rallying against their disenfranchisement, this problem fell to the state legislatures.
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The Elections Clause, deferring election regulation to the states, resulted in
conflicting state laws for the selection of House members and for presidential electors.
Different states elected House members by district,631 by general ticket,632 and by twostage election,633 much to the frustration of congressmen, who sought a consistent
system. In 1800, John Nicholas proposed a national amendment for election by district,
and similar district proposals came in 1802 and 1813, followed by twenty-two
amendment proposals between 1816 and 1826. Three passed the Senate before failing in
the House.634 Congress’ authority to unilaterally regulate these elections was itself
suspect, and state ratification conventions in 1788 proposed eight amendments to prevent
congressional interference, but these and a few subsequent proposals failed, leaving
authority split.635 Relatedly, congressmen grew frustrated with states’ inconsistent
schemes to pick presidential electors by district vote, by general ticket, or by legislature,
particularly when deadlocked legislatures failed to pick electors. Allegations of House
interference in the 1824 presidential election reignited demands for a selection by popular
vote. Between 1800 and 1849, Congress fielded at least sixty-five amendments on
presidential elections,636 and forty-five for selection of electors by district, at least four of
which passed the Senate with broad support,637 and six for popular election of the

631

Massachusetts, Virginia, New York, Maryland, South Carolina.
New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Georgia.
633
In Connecticut a preliminary election then narrowed the field by a third, from which a second election
selected a representative.
634
In total, between 1800 and 1849, Congress saw at least thirty-four proposals for electing representatives
by district. See Table 11 Table 1in the appendix.
635
Ames, The Proposed Amendments, 28–29, 56–58.
636
A few proposals between 1797 and 1803 concerned the selection of the president and vice president,
resulting in the Twelfth Amendment in 1804.
637
Ames puts the total count at forty-two, with four passing the Senate. Ames, The Proposed Amendments,
80–84, 113.
632

171

president,638 among other methods.639 Like the selection of House members, this issue
threatened to destabilize the national Constitution, but was also being regulated the state
legislatures.
III. Constitutional Conflict and Resolution, 1800-1828
A. Constitutional Decentralization
Presidents, Congress, and the Supreme Court delegated these three matters to the
states. Presidents left suffrage law to the state constitutional conventions. John Adams
focused his suffrage reform efforts on Massachusetts’ 1821 Constitutional Convention, to
which he was a delegate.640 Thomas Jefferson supported expanding the franchise through
state constitutional reform,641 and while Madison sought a national freehold
qualification,642 he admitted in The Federalist “One uniform rule would probably have
been as dissatisfactory to some of the States as it would have been difficult to the
convention,” instead leaving the issue to be “fixed by the State Constitutions.”643
Jeffersonian congressmen too shied from tinkering with state suffrage laws, and early
congressional interventions into territorial suffrage, though expressly constitutional,644
were few. These tended to expand the white male vote. After Ohio’s 1802 Convention
allowed an exemption of taxpaying requirements, Congress scrapped property
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requirements for the neighboring Indiana Territory, and did the same in the southwestern
territories. Similarly, the congressional acts authorizing the Ohio and Indiana
constitutional conventions allowed white male taxpayers with a year of residence to vote
for state convention delegates. Congress abandoned these taxpaying requirements for
convention elections in Illinois in 1818, Michigan in 1835, and Wisconsin in1846.645
Territorial slavery was more divisive. Southern congressmen pushed to open new
western territories to Southern trade and settlers, aiming to win seats in the House and
Electoral College and unbalance the bisectional accord.646 The issue came to a head when
Indiana settlers convened at their territorial capital of Vincennes in 1802,647 and, hoping
to encourage Southern emigration, requested Congress modify Article VI of the
Northwest Ordinance to allow slave importation for ten years.648 A House committee
split between the Virginian John Randolph and a Northern bloc rebuffed the petition, but
a subsequent Southern committee accepted it in 1804, only to be defeated by floor votes
in 1804 and 1806.649 Ignoring Congress and the Northwest Ordinance, Indiana’s
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Territorial Governor William Henry Harrison redrafted a slave code from his home state
of Virginia and forced it through the territorial legislature.650 As slaveholders streamed
into Indiana, Congress refused to repeal or enforce Article VI of the Ordinance, avoiding
the issue. Thus, per John Craig Hammond, “the battle between slavery and freedom in
Indiana shifted from Congress back to Indiana itself.”651
Congress also refused to intervene in southwestern territorial slavery.
Congressmen, unable to coerce distant Appalachian settlers to emancipate their slaves,
capitulated to North Carolina’s proslavery 1789 Cession Act,652 and in March 1798,
Secretary of State Timothy Pickering recommended Congress maintain slavery in the
Mississippi Territory, for fear abolition would push local slaveholders to defect to
Britain. When Maine’s antislavery Federalist representative George Thatcher proposed
abolition in the Territory, condemnation was widespread. South Carolina Federalists
Robert Goodloe Harper and John Rutledge, Jr. rallied their party against Thatcher’s
amendment,653 which failed against bipartisan support,654 garnering only twelve votes in
the House. Both congressional parties upheld the existing patchwork of local slavery
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regulations. As John Nicholas concluded, it “was not for them to make a particular spot
of country more happy than all the rest.”655
Following Jefferson’s 1804 Louisiana Purchase, Congress reaffirmed its policy
nonintervention.656 Questions of implementing the treaty and of territorial slavery fell to
the Senate,657 where Federalist James Hillhouse of Connecticut proposed abolishing the
domestic and international slave trade within the Louisiana Territory and emancipating
male slaves at the latest at age twenty-two and females at nineteen. The moderate
Federalist senators Timothy Pickering and John Quincy Adams rallied with DemocraticRepublican Southerners to defeat the latter provision, but the importation prohibition
stood, provoking an angry, seditious petition from Louisiana slaveholders.658 In response,
Southern congressmen led Congress to quietly let these antislavery provisions expire the
following year.659 And as Federalists lost congressional seats in the 1810s,660 calls for
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territorial abolition subsided. As Donald Fehrenbacher puts it, Congress used “the handsoff strategy later called ‘nonintervention.’ The effect, especially in view of slavery’s
pervious existence there, was a tacit federal sanction of the institution everywhere west of
the Mississippi.”661
Similarly, presidents and Congress refused to enforce the contentious Fugitive
Slave Clause across the states,662 instead deferring to local law enforcement. When
Pennsylvania abolitionists clashed with proslavery Virginians over an escaped fugitive in
May 1788, 663 Pennsylvania Governor Thomas Mifflin appealed to President Washington,
who, on the advice of Attorney General Edmund Randolph, avoided the issue, as would
subsequent presidents.664 Congressmen grappled over the issue for two years, debating
one House bill and three Senate bills before settling on the 1793 Fugitive Laborer Act,665
asking governors to accept each other’s extradition requests, as required by the federal
Fugitive Slave Clause, satisfying Southerners, but did not force federal agents, governors,
or state courts to comply, satisfying Northerners. Later attempts to amend the Act failed
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to gain bisectional support.666 Deference to state governors and judges remained the
status quo.667
While the early Supreme Court rarely debated slavery or franchise regulation,
after seizing the power of judicial review in Marbury v. Madison, the Marshall Court
began overturning state statutes and constitutional provisions that regulated commerce
and contracts.668 In Fletcher v. Peck (1810),669 Marshall asserted the Constitution’s
Contracts Clause forbade newly-elected Georgia legislators from invalidating a contract
their predecessors had drafted with the Yazoo Land Company.670 Nine years later he
directly answered the banking debate in McCulloch v. Maryland, interpreting the
Necessary and Proper Clause to affirm federal power to charter a national bank.671
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Marshall also interpreted the Clause in this case to constrain a state’s economic powers,
repudiating the Maryland legislature’s attempt to levy a crippling fine a local branch of
the Second Bank of the United States,672 and by extension, overturning similar fines
passed by five other states.673 Over the next two years, Jeffersonian congressmen replied
with four proposals for a national amendment to override McCulloch by prohibiting
further congressional national Bank charters, but all failed.674 Marshall further cemented
federal economic authority in Gibbons v. Ogden (1824), holding that a federal statute
overrode a conflicting state law regulating interstate steamship traffic.675 With Fletcher,
McCulloch, and Gibbons, Marshall established three separate and independent routes to
limit state legislatures’ economic regulatory powers.
672
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Columbia. See The Debates and Proceedings in the Congress of the United States: Sixth Congress, First
Session (Washington: Gales and Seaton, 1855), 70; Ames, The Proposed Amendments, 255–57.
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Thomas Gibbons asserted his coasting license to operate steamships between Elizabethtown, New Jersey
and New York City, granted under a 1793 congressional statute, trumped a New York statute allowing
Aaron Ogden a monopoly over regional steamship traffic. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824). The
question for the Marshall Court was whether the state and federal governments could have concurrent
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York’s. While Justice William Johnson’s concurrence granted the federal government exclusive interstate
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The early Marshall Court also extended federal judicial authority to the exclusion
of the states. In Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee (1816), Spencer Roane of the Virginia
Supreme Court forced a confrontation with the Marshall Court, which in response seized
jurisdiction over cases originating in the state courts.676 Five years later, in Cohens v.
Virginia (1821), Marshall again reversed Roane. Roane refused the right of the Cohen
brothers, who had illegally sold lottery tickets in Virginia, to appeal to the U.S. Supreme
Court, claiming Virginia’s police powers granted the state sole jurisdiction over criminal
cases.677 Marshall rejected Roane’s claim, arguing the Cohens’ appeal concerned federal
law, thus extending federal jurisdiction to criminal cases originating in state courts and
chipping at states’ traditional police powers.
But the early Court left other major constitutional disputes to the states. In Calder
v. Bull (1798), the Court was forced to decide, among other questions, whether a
Connecticut statute violated the state’s Constitution. In response, Justice Chase threw out
the case, ruling that the Supreme Court could not decide any cases relating solely to state
law.678 This let state courts decide most disputes over state statutes and constitutions.679
676
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The Marshall Court accordingly deferred electoral and slavery regulation to the states,
and, save for the Cohens decision, largely respected the states’ traditional police powers.
Marshall’s deference may have preempted conflict between the Federalist Court
and Jeffersonian White House and Congress. While Jeffersonians tried to control the
Court, first by impeaching the Federalist Justice Chase, and then by appointing
Jeffersonian justices, Marshall still dominated Court deliberations, relegated to the
minority in only eight of the thousand cases he heard.680 By respecting the states’
traditional authority over slavery, elections, and police powers, the Federalist Marshall
Court avoided direct conflict with hostile Jeffersonian executives and congressmen,
shielding the young Court. The rise of the Marshall Court reflects not only Marshall’s
clever reasoning in cases like Marbury, and not only the waning of executive power
towards the end of the Era of Good Feelings, but also the Court’s relationship with the
states. Deference to the states prevented national inter-branch conflict, helping make the
Supreme Court and independent, equal federal branch. It also pushed many controversial
issues to the states, decreasing pressures for federal constitutional revision.
B. Jeffersonian State Constitutional Revision
This deference and national partisan trends destabilized state constitutionalism.
With the election of 1800, Jeffersonians swept both congressional houses, the White
House, and many of the state legislatures. For example, in South Carolina in 1800, an
alliance of Appalachian frontiersmen and Charleston mechanics and shopkeepers ejected
Federalists in favor of a Democratic-Republican governor and legislature. In turn these
679
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Democratic-Republicans increased the number of local elections, opened the farming
upcountry to banking and the slave trade, and amended the state Constitution in 1808 to
equitably reapportion the legislature, and again in 1810 to repeal taxpaying qualifications
on the franchise.681 This was a common pattern,682 and many of these legislative switches
incited constitutional replacement. Between 1800 and 1849, the states proposed at least
205 constitutional amendments,683 and thirty-one constitutions to replace previous
documents.684 Of the twenty-two constitutional proposals for which this dissertation has
data on legislative party balance, fifteen occurred within three sessions of a switch in
legislative control,685 and the proposals defying this trend were exceptional.686 In the
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observations for nine of these thirty-one cases. See Table 19 in the appendix on state constitutional
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antebellum era, attempts at state constitutional replacement almost always were
associated with shifts in state coalition politics.687 And these new Jeffersonian state
legislators and framers had broad prerogatives to regulate slavery, suffrage and elections,
and banking and finance.
State convention delegates, legislators, and judges, confronted with regulating
slavery, maintained the bisectional consensus. The older, eastern states continued their
previous policies.688 In New England, only Vermont’s Constitution mentioned or
abolished slavery, but the courts and legislatures of Vermont, Massachusetts, and New
Hampshire promised liberty to all persons, including slaves.689 Rhode Island and
Connecticut joined New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and to some degree, Maryland,
on the path to gradual emancipation by statute.690 But courts in Virginia, the Carolinas,
and Georgia still largely refused to extend constitutional rights to slaves and blacks, and
in 1832, the Virginia legislature defeated a proposal for gradual emancipation.691
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septennial proposals for a new state constitution, regardless of partisan balance. After 1790, Vermont was
the only state to enforce this practice. Pennsylvania’s 1776 Constitution and New York’s 1777 Constitution
allowed for meetings by a similar council, but these constitutions were soon replaced.
687
Note, however that this dissertation does not note cases where changes in legislative control were not
followed by an attempt at constitutional replacement.
688
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All nineteen constitutional provisions on slavery passed between 1800 and 1820
were drafted in new frontier states or territories,692 where the federal government
exercised little power and state framers had broad discretion. Framers in Old Northwest
states reaffirmed abolition north of the Ohio under the bisectional consensus. In 1800,
Democratic-Republican candidates in Cincinnati and in Ross County warned Ohio voters
that slavery would bring plantations and a Federalist aristocracy. Swept into office with
Jefferson’s election that year, Democratic-Republicans dominated Ohio’s Constitutional
Convention of 1802, where they held majorities on all eight committees and marginalized
the proslavery Federalist Governor Arthur St. Clair. Delegates adopted the Northwest
Ordinance’s Article VI into the state constitution, but allowed indentured servitude for
black apprentices, and forbade blacks from voting, office-holding, military service, and
legal testimony against whites.693 Indiana’s territorial legislature repealed proslavery
territorial statutes and outlawed black indenture in 1810. The state’s 1816 Convention
passed a constitution, modeled on Ohio’s Constitution and Article VI, with an
unamendable ban on slavery, though the Constitution allowed continued indenture of
existing servants, and forbade blacks from militia service.694 Slavery in Indiana waned.
By 1830 the federal census listed only three slaves in the state,695 and later reforms
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See Table 16 in the appendix.
The Constitution also declared “no alteration of this constitution shall ever take place so as to introduce
slavery or involuntary servitude into this State.” See the Ohio Constitution of 1802, Article VII, Section 5
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forbade free blacks from immigrating.696 Facing pressure from Northern antislavery
congressmen, framers of the 1818 Illinois Constitution almost exactly imitated Ohio’s
abolition clause,697 and six years later Governor Edward Coles led Illinois voters to
soundly reject a constitutional convention to redact the clause.698 But to attract Southern
settlers, Illinois framers tacitly endorsed slavery.699 Over a thousand blacks, mainly
slaves and servants, lived in the state at the 1818 Constitution’s passage, and formal
abolition did not come until the late 1840s.700
This constitutional revision pleased congressmen and legislators in other states.
Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois conventions formally upheld the Ordinance’s abolition
requirement and its promise to return fugitive slaves, curbing conflict with slaveholders
in bordering Kentucky and Virginia. With slavery waning in the Old Northwest,701
antislavery congressmen were appeased – the firebrand James Talmadge was a lonely
congressional voice of opposition to Illinois’ 1818 Constitution. Slavery was, as
Hammond writes, “by default, a local question. Consequently, slavery entered local
696
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politics in western states and territories far more frequently and intensely than it did
national politics prior to 1819.”702
States south of the Ohio allowed slavery, maintaining the consensus. In 1790,
seventeen percent of Kentucky’s population was enslaved, enough that Congress, which
governed the region under the 1790 Southwest Ordinance, left the institution intact.
When a group of seven Protestant ministers proposed abolition at the state’s 1792
Convention, the Convention’s proslavery majority prohibited the legislature from freeing
a slave without compensation or the owner’s consent.703 Tennessee’s 1796 Convention
also followed the 1776 North Carolina Constitution and 1790 Southwest Ordinance in
allowing slavery within the borders of the state, but granted the vote to all freeholders or
residents over twenty-one, including blacks.704 Similarly, Louisiana’s territorial
legislature passed a slave code, and in 1807, forbade manumission and compensated
emancipation.705 The state’s 1812 Convention borrowed many provisions from
Kentucky’s 1799 Constitution, but curiously redacted all explicit references to slavery. 706
Five years later, Mississippians drafted their own constitution, borrowing heavily from
the constitutions of Kentucky and Tennessee, but allowing the legislature to emancipate
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slaves for “distinguished service” to the state, with compensation paid to the owner.707 In
sum, between 1800 and 1828, the state conventions elaborated the bisectional bargain
struck at the Convention. With the question of territorial abolition settled for the time, the
issue presented little national controversy.
The states also took up suffrage and electoral reform. Revolutionary-era state
framers, worried that tenant farmers and the urban poor were not materially invested in
their community or wealthy enough to think and vote independently, conditioned voting
and office-holding on private property ownership and taxpaying.708 All thirteen original
states passed property or taxpaying requirements,709 disenfranchising women, blacks,
Indians, and white male tenant farmers, transients, and urban workers.710
But with the rise of urban manufacturing, mechanics, workingmen, shopkeepers,
and immigrants rallied for labor and suffrage reform. Baltimore mobs pushed the
Maryland legislature to reject property requirements in 1801. In Milwaukee, German and
Irish immigrants organized to claim the franchise. And in Richmond, disenfranchised
protestors presented the 1829 state convention with a formal petition. Small farmers
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across the country faced similar disenfranchisement. A muster of 1,000 Shenandoah
County, Virginia militiamen found that 700 lacked the vote.711 New York had long
excluded tenant farmers,712 particularly those in Westchester and Duchess Counties on
the east Hudson,713 such that by 1821, only seventy-eight percent of adult male New
Yorkers could vote for assemblymen, and only thirty-nine percent for the governor or
senators.714 In 1839, the Hudson Valley’s tenant farmers revolted and formed roving
militias, attacking sheriffs, threatening to burn cities and estates, and skirmishing with the
state militia.715
Antebellum state framers were amenable to franchise reform. From Massachusetts
to Illinois to Virginia and Alabama, convention delegates argued enfranchised militiamen
were more loyal, obedient, and in the South, better able to stop slave revolts. Thanks to
Congress’ liberal enabling acts to admit a territory to the Union, in some territories, male
taxpayers with a year of residence could vote for delegates to a territory’s constitutional
convention. This new generation of convention delegates and state legislators worked as
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village lawyers, farmers, mechanics, and shopkeepers, and felt independent employment
– not property wealth – allowed independent voting,716 arguing for franchise expansion.
Martin Van Buren was one such delegate.717 In 1821, he attended the New York
Constitutional Convention, organizing delegates against a proposal for freehold
qualification of 250 dollars in state elections. Defeating the amendment would double the
state electorate, enfranchising 75,000 new freeholders, mainly “mechanics, professional
men, and small landholders… constituting the bone, pith, and muscle of the population of
the State.”718 The Convention enfranchised all white males who served in the military or
paid taxes, though free black males had to hold a prohibitively high 250 dollars in taxable
property.719 Along the Hudson and around Albany, hotbeds of tenant farmer agitation,
Van Buren found a mass political base, turning sporadic rural unrest into a statewide
machine dubbed the Albany Regency. Van Buren’s men nearly unseated the patrician
Governor DeWitt Clinton in 1820, boosting Van Buren to the Unites States Senate in
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1821. In response Clinton capitulated and sponsored a successful constitutional
amendment removing tax and service requirements on the franchise in 1826.720
In the 1820s and 1830s, these workingmen seized state legislatures and
conventions. Democrats and Whigs competed to expand their base by enfranchising new
groups, repealing property qualifications.721 Delaware eliminated constitutional property
qualifications in 1792,722 Maryland in 1802,723 Massachusetts in 1821, and New York in
1826.724 For new western territories, enfranchisement also promised more settlers and
quicker admission to the Union. Kentucky’s 1792 Convention extended the vote to all
male residents older than twenty-seven, including blacks and Indians.725 Delegates to the
1796 Tennessee Convention put only a token freehold requirement on the white male
franchise.726 Five of the next eight states admitted enfranchised almost all white males.727
White males twenty-one or older could vote under Indiana’s 1816 Constitution after a
year of residence in the state, while Alabama’s 1819 Constitution lowered the
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requirement to three months.728 Hence, while the number of states nearly doubled
between 1790 and 1830, the number of states with property requirements actually
decreased. Most suffrage reform was complete by the 1820s, allowing Andrew Jackson to
campaign and win in 1828 on a workingmen’s platform. Between 1830 and 1855, the few
states maintaining property qualifications repealed these laws.729 Since enfranchisement
might also draw immigrants to a state and boost the state’s tax revenues and land values,
many new western states further relaxed constitutional suffrage restrictions.730
Year

1776

1790

1800

1810

1820

1830

1840

1850

1855

States in Union

13

13

16

17

23

24

26

31

31

States with Property Requirements

13

10

10

9

9

8

7

4

3

Percent of States with Prop. Req.s

100

77

63

53

39

33

27

13

10

Table 6: States with Property Requirements on the Franchise.
Data from Alexander Keyssar, The Right to Vote: The Contested History of Democracy in the United States
(New York: Basic Books, 2000), 336.

States relaxed other restrictions on the franchise and participation. By 1855, only
six states maintained taxpaying qualifications for voters, down from a peak of twelve.
Through the 1830s, Democratic legislators enfranchised resident aliens.731 State
legislators and framers also scrapped municipal franchise restrictions, liberalized office-
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influx of Anglo-American immigrants to Louisiana pushed the legislature, long controlled by French
planters under the conservative 1812 Constitution, to call a convention. The state’s 1845 Convention
scrapped property and taxpaying requirements to extend the vote to all adults over twenty-one with two
years of state residency, reapportioned the legislature, and increased the number of elected offices. See the
Louisiana Constitution of 1845, Title II, Articles 8 and 10. Hargrave, The Louisiana State Constitution, 1–
5.
730
Delegates to Illinois’ 1847 Constitutional Convention proposed loosening the state’s franchise
restrictions to increase immigration and repay the state’s loans
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Delaware, South Carolina, Indiana, and Michigan reduced residency requirements on the franchise.
After Pennsylvania Whigs passed an 1836 Registry Act to temper the Democratic vote, Democrats halved
residency requirements at the state’s 1837 Constitutional Convention, hoping to attract new immigrant
voters. Henretta, “The Rise of ‘Democratic-Republicanism:’ Political Rights in New York and the Several
States, 1800-1915,” 59.
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holding requirements and religious tests, and established judicial elections.732 Of the
seven states admitted between 1800 and 1828, six allowed voters to approve amendments
or conventions by referenda.733 And across the country, state legislators and framers
reapportioned legislative districts to equitably represent these new voters.734
This electoral reform occurred almost entirely through state constitutional
revision. Between 1790 and 1855, at least fifty-nine state-level legal provisions
elaborated or repudiated property and taxpaying qualifications. Of these, forty-six were
constitutional provisions and thirteen were statutory, and even these few statutory
provisions had a quasi-constitutional function in bounding the polity.735 Framers also
entrenched these franchise regulations in the state constitutions to prevent partisan
legislators from disenfranchising their opponents’ base.736 Similarly, to preempt
gerrymandering by legislators, state framers often entrenched apportionment rules in the
constitutional text. Attempts to correct malapportionment usually meant calling a
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Proceedings and Debates of the Convention of 1821 Assembled for the Purpose of Amending the
Constitution of the State of New York, 278.
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convention. 737 In sum, by the Jacksonian era state framers had revised their constitutions
to expand the franchise.738
State constitutional guarantees of white male suffrage appeased riotous farmers,
workingmen, and militiamen. Mass suffrage let parties herd these new voters to the polls
and to party caucuses, parades, rallies, and barbecues. Party identification absorbed and
tempered class identification, perhaps preempting national labor agitation.739 Thanks to
state reforms, many small farmers now vented their discontent at the polls by voting
Democrat. Rowdiness became rote and routinized. In frontier states, the guarantee of
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North Carolina did this by amendment. John V. Orth, The North Carolina State Constitution: With
History and Commentary (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1993), 8–11; Tarr,
Understanding State Constitutions, 103.
738
Van Buren captured the nation’s spirit in his speech to New York’ 1821 Convention. Attacking the
aforementioned proposed amendment limiting the vote to men with 250 dollars in freehold property, Van
Buren declared “in none of [the Southern] Constitutions, nor in those of any state in the Union, except
North Carolina, was such a provision as that proposed by the amendment to be found. In the Constitution of
the Union, too, which has been in operation long enough to test the correctness and soundness of its
principles, there was no excessive freehold representation.” Van Buren, “Mr. Van Buren Against the
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not the sole explanation for America’s lack of partisan organizing by class. For example, Alexander
Keyssar asserts colonial American planters substituted slave labor for peasant labor, and hence never faced
the peasant revolts and class organizing that forced western European nations to pass national suffrage
reform in the nineteenth century. For a broad discussion of this phenomenon and question, see Eric Foner,
“Why Is There No Socialism in the United States?,” History Workshop, no. 17 (April 1, 1984): 57–80;
Wilentz, Chants Democratic, 213; Keyssar, The Right to Vote, 70.
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legal recognition might have preempted settlers from mobilizing in the first place. 740 In
sum, most states broadened the white male franchise and saw relative peace.741
Admittedly, when reform came, it was not always peaceful. Under Rhode Island’s
antiquated constitution,742 the state’s southern rural districts, comprising a third of the
state’s population, elected a majority of the state’s legislators, mainly rural planters, who
exempted themselves from taxes and refused to reapportion districts toward growing
cities. These same planters repeatedly renewed freehold qualifications from 1762 that
disenfranchised a majority of voters, including Providence’s recent Irish immigrant
textile workers.743 In the 1820s, a carpenter named Seth Luther began stumping the state
calling for constitutional reform. After legislators rebuffed five attempts to revise the
Constitution,744 in 1840, voters installed a new cohort of Whig legislators who called a
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Alabama’s founding 1819 Constitution exemplifies the frontier democracy for white males. For the
connection between the frontier and democracy, see Frederick Jackson Turner, The Frontier in American
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Journal of Legal History 22, no. 3 (July 1, 1978): 241, doi:10.2307/845183.
743
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1817 tabled a call for a convention.
744
The legislature offered in February, 1821 to call a convention, but refused to address the suffrage issue,
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sixth constitutional convention in February 1841. Still skeptical of legislative reform, the
populist Rhode Island Suffrage Association, backed by the ousted Democrats, called a
competing, extralegal “People’s Convention” staffed by urban workers and led by the
radical Democrat Thomas Dorr, which reversed franchise exclusions and
malapportionment.745 Voters approved the People’s Constitution over the legislature’s
constitution, and the radical faction elected a separatist legislature and Dorr as their
governor. In early May 1842, Dorr assembled a company of several thousand militiamen
and laborers and marched on Providence, where he and his legislature were inaugurated.
President Tyler rebuffed Governor Samuel King’s request for federal troops to thwart
Dorr,746 and Congress too refused to intervene.747 In the early hours of May 18th, Dorr
rallied four hundred supporters to storm the arsenal at Providence. Church bells across
the city called loyalist militiamen to defend the arsenal, which Dorr, joined by Luther,
prepared to shell. But Dorr’s cannons failed to fire, and his troops retreated to the rural
town of Chepachet. The separatist legislature dissolved, and with a thousand-dollar
bounty on his head, Dorr fled the state. The following year, a new convention extended

Constitutional Struggle in Rhode Island (Providence: Preston & Rounds, 1901), 28–38; Dealey, Growth of
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Borden, 48 U.S. 1 (1849). Mowry, The Dorr War, 268.
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the vote to all males who paid a token tax, including blacks, restoring peace to Rhode
Island.748
Rhode Island shows the danger of withholding the vote from mobilized, armed,
angry white Jacksonian men. Other states saw the same tensions over class, the vote, and
malapportionment,749 and could have faced Rhode Island’s fate.750 There were
exceptions. Virginians peacefully submitted to franchise restrictions,751 Louisiana refused
reform until an 1845 convention, and North Carolina legislators and convention delegates
appeased Appalachian farmers with token reapportionment and franchise expansion.752
Conversely, suffrage expansion did not always guarantee stability. Anglo-Americans in
748
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California, New Mexico, and Texas granted broad suffrage to white males, but still faced
domestic turmoil, forming separatist governments to split from Mexico.753 After 1801,
Maryland refused property and taxpaying qualifications but maintained
malapportionment, leading a reform party to consider armed revolt.754 And in 1838, a
narrow and corrupt Democratic victory in the Pennsylvania gubernatorial election led the
deposed Whig governor to rally militiamen to seize the state armory, despite the state’s
liberal franchise laws.755 But again, these are the exceptions. Between 1800 and 1850
most states reformed their constitutions to repeal taxpaying and property qualifications,756
and most of these states had stable constitutional politics.757
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Stable Constitutional Politics
Strict Qualifications
LA 1812: requires voters own
property, pay taxes in the last six
months, or have purchased federal
land
NC 1823(F), 1833(L), 1835 (F, A):
1835 amendments require 50 acres
to vote for Senate, taxpaying for
Governor and House vote
NY 1801(F), 1804(S): 1801
Convention maintains 1777
requirement for a 20 pound freehold
or rental of a tenement for 40
shillings per yearly ; 1804 statute
changes the tenement requirement to
$25 per year
VA 1804(S), 1816(F), 1829, 1850:
1804 statute maintains 1762
requirement of 25 cleared acres or 50
acres total; 1830 Convention adds
exception enfranchising some leasing
land; 1850 Convention repeals
property requirements

Unstable Constitutional Politics
Strict Qualifications

Lax or No Qualifications
AL 1819: no qualifications
AR 1836: no qualifications
CT 1818, 1845(A): 1818 convention maintains lax 1796 statutory requirement voters own $134 in property
or a freehold worth $7 per year, exempts taxpayers and militiamen from property qualifications; 1845
amendment repeals property and tax qualifications
DE 1831: 1831 Convention maintains 1792 amendment enfranchising anyone who paying taxes within the last
six months, with exceptions
FL 1838: no qualifications
GA 1833(F), 1839(F): maintains 1798 Constitution’s provision enfranchising anyone paying taxes within the
last year
IA 1846(F), 1848: no qualifications
IL 1818, 1848: no qualifications
IN 1816: no qualifications
KY 1850: no qualifications
LA 1845: no qualifications
MA 1821(F, A): 1821 amendment enfranchises anyone paying taxes within last two years unless exempt from
taxes, repeals 1780 property qualification requiring 3 pounds in annual income or 60 pounds in estate for
Senate vote
ME 1819: no qualifications
MI 1835, 1850(F): no qualifications
MO 1820, 1845(F): no qualifications
MS 1817, 1832: in 1817 requires taxpaying or militia service; drops this requirement at 1832 Convention
NH 1847(S), 1850(F): 1792 provision disenfranchises those who opt out of tax payment; 1847 statute
enfranchises them after a year of tax payment
NJ 1807(S), 1844: 1807 statute enfranchises those worth 50 pounds and all taxpayers; 1844 convention
repeals this
NY 1821, 1826(A): in 1821 drops property requirement for whites, keeps $250 requirement for blacks,
institutes taxpaying requirement, with exceptions for militiamen, firemen, and resident highway workers;
subsequent conventions maintain this
OH 1802: enfranchises taxpayers, exempting resident highway workers
OR 1843(F), 1845(F): no qualifications
SC 1810(A): 1810 amendment repeals 1790 tax qualification, maintains 50 acre freehold from 1790
Constitution
TN 1835: repeals freehold 1796 qualification
VT 1814(F), 1822(F), 1828(F), 1836(F), 1843(F), 1850(F): no qualifications
WI 1846(F), 1848: no qualifications
Lax or No Qualifications

RI 1824(F), 1834(F), 1841(F),
CA 1849: no qualifications
1842: failed conventions maintain
MD 1801(S), 1850(F): 1802 amendment repeals 1776 freehold qualification of fifty acres or thirty pounds in
1762 statute requiring a freehold
value; no tax qualifications
worth 40 pounds or 40 shillings per
NM 1848(F), 1849(F), 1850(F): no qualifications
year, with exceptions for freeholders’ NY 1837(F), 1846: maintains 1821 qualifications
sons; 1842 Convention requires
PA 1833(F), 1838: maintains 1970 provision enfranchising those paying taxes in the last two years with minor
$134 in real estate or $7 in yearly
exemptions
rentals, with exceptions
TX 1836(F), 1845: no qualifications
Table 7: State-Level Outcomes of Attempts at Regulation of Property and Tax Qualifications on the
Franchise, 1800-50.
Franchise regulations listed above are passed by constitutional convention, unless noted as a legislative constitutional amendment (A)
or statute (S). Also included are failed conventions (F) and legislative committees (L) that proposed but did not ratify a new
constitution to displace standing franchise regulations. These standing regulations, made by a previous legislature or convention, are
listed after the failed convention or committee. For details on the stability of constitutional politics in each state, see Table 20 in the
appendix.
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This state constitutional revision helped preempt Congress from proposing a
national amendment regulating suffrage. Between 1800 and 1849, members of Congress
proposed at least 476 amendments to the federal Constitution. Not one directly addressed
suffrage qualifications.758 This was not for lack of congressional authority, as Congress
could have overturned local and state constitutional election law through a single federal
amendment, as it later would through the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, Nineteenth, TwentyFourth, and Twenty-Sixth Amendments.759 Rather, antebellum congressmen continued to
respect the states’ traditional authority over franchise law, perhaps in part because the
states so competently and thoroughly addressed the issue. Further, antebellum suffrage
movements, concerned with local questions of labor, apportionment, and
enfranchisement, did not bridge states or regions, preventing the rise of a single national
campaign for an amendment.760
In restricting the franchise to white males, state framers also helped settle and
define the extent of antebellum citizenship.761 With industrialization and land shortages
pushing white men into urban wage labor, state framers abandoned prohibitive property
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and tax qualifications, instead asserting that independent labor allowed the material
independence needed to vote.762 This disenfranchised dependent laborers like women and
slaves, and some free blacks, Indians, and aliens. But other free blacks, Indians, and
resident aliens were wage laborers and potential voters. Framers in some states closed
this loophole by asserting that blacks, Indians, and immigrants, like women and children,
lacked the mental and moral capacities for citizenship and thus the vote.763 For example,
delegates to Maine’s 1819 Convention excluded Indians from the state polity and vote,
but included free blacks in both.764 New York, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Vermont,
Maryland, and Virginia, which had granted the vote to any inhabitant, revised their
constitutions to enfranchise only citizens, excluding aliens, as did every new state
constitution drafted between 1800 and 1840, save Illinois.’765 Free blacks lost the vote in
Connecticut, North Carolina and Tennessee in 1835, and Pennsylvania in 1839,766 and in
New Jersey in 1844, which in 1807 repealed the nation’s only provision to allow female
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agrarian virtue from the industrial revolution and reformist Whigs, and thus Democrats took a binary
approach to civic inclusion. As Watson explains, “For Jacksonians, equality was absolute and indivisible. If
a man was entitled to some privileges of citizenship, he was entitled to all of them, and there could be no
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suffrage.767 By 1860, only the New England states still allowed free blacks to vote
without qualification.768
The states also resolved congressional disputes over selecting presidents,
presidential electors, and selecting members of the federal House by district. Congress
heard at least sixty-five, forty-eight, and thirty-four amendment proposals for these topics
respectively,769 such that election regulation was the most common topic for amendments
proposed in Congress for thirty of the fifty years after 1800.770 As noted, in the 1810s and
1820s Congress heard dozens of amendment proposals for electing federal
representatives by district, three of which passed the Senate. But the states gradually
settled on a single-member district system, to Congress’ satisfaction. After New Jersey
failed elect a general ticket slate of representatives, congressional Whigs pushed to
nationalize the system of election by districts. Since all but six of the twenty-six states
had already adopted single-member districts, the district proposal passed by
congressional statute in 1842.771 Congress largely refrained from intervening in House
elections again until the Reconstruction. As Herman Ames summarizes, “The desire for
local representation gradually led to the general adoption by the States of the district
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system of electing their Congressmen, and caused the introduction of amendments on this
question to cease.”772
The disputed election of 1824 reignited debates over electing the president.
Presidential electors in 1824 split between four candidates, granting a plurality of the
Electoral College vote to Andrew Jackson, the popular vote winner. Since no candidate
garnered a majority, the House intervened, with Speaker Henry Clay rallying
congressmen to John Quincy Adams, allegedly in exchange for appointment as Secretary
of State.773 Backlash was swift. Following Adams’ election, congressmen proposed at
least twenty-two constitutional amendments to guarantee selection of the president by
popular vote, as well as amendments to standardize the selection of electors by general
ticket, by districts, or by legislature, to abolish the Electoral College, and to prevent the
election from devolving on the House.774 The issue quickly overwhelmed Congress’
constitutional agenda. Between 1824 and Jackson’s election in 1828, Congress heard
sixty-four amendment proposals, forty-five of which concerned executive selection.775
While none of these congressional proposals cleared Article V’s supermajority
threshold, the states’ lower barriers to statutory and constitutional reform allowed
experimentation. Most states selected electors by legislature, by district, or by general
ticket, often changing their method when new parties took power. Massachusetts alone
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switched its practice for selecting electors between every election from 1796 and 1820.776
But partisan deadlock over switching methods occasionally kept states from picking
electors. State legislators looked for a consistent practice, converging on the general
ticket method. In 1789 Pennsylvania united its electors onto the same general ticket to
maximize the state’s electoral impact. In 1812, only nine of eighteen states in the Union
allowed direct election of presidential electors. But by the 1820s three of the other five
most populous states imitated Pennsylvania, with small states following, such that by
1824, twelve states used the general ticket system. States also opted to select these tickets
by popular vote, so that by 1832, all but two of the twenty-four states selected electors by
a general ticket and popular vote.777
This state-level reform alleviated congressional fear of an undemocratic
presidential election. Congressmen proposed fewer amendments on the topic – only
twenty-seven of the total sixty-five between 1832 and 1836 – none of which passed. By
the middle of the century, congressmen almost entirely abandoned the issue.778 As
Herman Ames notes, thanks to the states, “after 1832, the method of choosing electors
had become nearly uniform throughout the country without the resort to an amendment to
the Constitution.”779 State reform quieted the most contentious national constitutional
issue of the 1820s, shaping the presidency and preempting Congress from shaping
presidential elections.780 The states established a general ticket system that still endures,
creating swing states and affecting presidential campaigns, and in allowing a popular vote
776
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for in presidential elections, inaugurated Jacksonian democracy and the plebiscitary
presidency.
IV. Constitutional Conflict and Resolution, 1828-1849
A. Constitutional Decentralization
In 1828 Van Buren engineered a mass interstate coalition, increasing presidential
election turnout, 781 to elect Jackson to the White House.782 Crowds of all classes
swarmed to Jackson’s inauguration in March 1829.783 The spirit had not yet died in
December, when Jackson offered his first State of the Union Address, calling for a
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constitutional amendment to guarantee the popular vote in presidential elections.784 In the
1830s, the Whigs copied Van Buren’s model, organizing as an intersectional party and by
1840 the average difference in state-level vote share dropped to eleven percent as both
parties gained footholds in states across the country.785
While state constitutional revision and Jackson’s landslide election largely
quieted debate over enfranchising adult white males, slavery and state sovereignty still
divided the national parties. The admission of Missouri reignited the slavery crisis. The
House in 1800 and 1812 encouraged slaveholders to immigrate to the Missouri
Territory,786 until in April 1818 New Hampshire representative Arthur Livermore
proposed a federal amendment banning slavery in any territory admitted to the Union.787
The House rejected the proposal, but the following March James Tallmadge, Jr. rallied
congressmen around a new proposal excluding additional slaves from Missouri and
freeing at the age of twenty-five all slaves born after the state’s admission.788 A few days
later, John W. Taylor, a fellow New Yorker, proposed banning slavery in the Arkansas
Territory. The stakes were high for antislavery congressmen. Missouri’s admission as a
slave state threatened to bolster slavery in neighboring Illinois and perhaps revive it in
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Indiana.789 Proslavery congressmen feared Talmadge’s proposal would cordon slave
states and congressional seats to the southeast. Further, Tallmadge justified the
amendment by claiming that the Constitution’s Guarantee Clause, requiring each state
have a “republican government,” forbade proslavery state constitutions, potentially
invalidating slavery nationwide.790 Over Missouri, there was little bisectional agreement
– Northerners voted nine to one for Tallmadge’s amendment to the Missouri bill, while
Southerners coalesced against it. The issue cut across both congressional parties,
threatening the constitutional status quo.791
But in December 1819, Northern congressmen admitted Alabama under a
proslavery constitution,792 signaling proslavery state law did not violate the Guarantee
Clause, tacitly accepting Southern and Missouri slavery. Congress then admitted the free
state of Maine alongside the slave state of Missouri, and abolished slavery in states
admitted north of the 36º 30’ latitude line, preserving it in those below, extending the
bisectional line.793 Southerners approved the plan, expecting Northerners would struggle
to settle the barren Great Plains, while Southern migration would quickly create
southwestern slave states and congressmen. Northerners accepted the plan rather than
alienate secessionist Southerners.794 Congress would regulate territorial slavery and
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refuse statehood to any territory violating the Compromise.795 But were a state north of
the line to allow slavery or one south to abolish it, Congress and the executive would
have weak constitutional grounds to reverse the decision.796 The Missouri Compromise
depended on the states’ cooperation.
Leaders in both parties silenced and delayed abolitionists. Starting in 1832, the
Democratic Party required all presidential and vice-presidential candidates claim twothirds of convention delegates to receive the party’s nomination, requiring compromise
with both Southern and Northern delegates. Three years later, Jackson ordered the federal
post to impound abolitionist printing, and refused Texas’ 1836 statehood petition until it
was paired with a free state’s. And in 1835, free-state Democratic congressmen joined
their slave-state counterparts in instituting a gag rule to table antislavery petitions.797
Free-state Democrats voted for the measure sixty-one to fourteen, and voted seventy-five
to five for a separate resolution preventing interference with slavery in the District of
Columbia.798 This effectively kept slavery a local concern.799
As party leaders attempted to quiet abolitionists in the 1830s, they reopened the
bank debate. Between 1800 and 1830, America doubled in territory, adding eight new
states on the frontier, and nearly tripled in population. For example, in 1800, four years
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after its founding, Tennessee held 105,000 residents, increasing to 682,000 in 1830.800
Mills and factories drew rural and foreign immigrants to booming eastern cities.801 State
and national legislators proposed canals, turnpikes, roads, and railways to link these
eastern cities to each other and to raw goods like Appalachian coal and Southern cotton.
Across the frontier legislators scrambled to authorize roads and canals to draw more
settlers west and send raw commodities to eastern mills and to interlink rural villages.
Turnpikes, canals, and railways stretched great distances, and thus were built
slowly, with little prospect of immediate profit. Congress could sell federal land and pass
tariffs to subsidize these private projects, but tariffs were contentious, and none more so
than John Quincy Adams’ Tariff of 1828, which protected Northern industries, to
Southerners’ frustration. When Jackson upheld the Tariff, Virginia, Mississippi, and
North Carolina contested the tariff’s constitutionality, Georgia, Alabama, and South
Carolina proposed a national constitutional convention to amend the Constitution to
prohibit regionally-biased tariffs, and Jackson’s Vice President John C. Calhoun
anonymously penned the South Carolina legislature’s “Exposition” arguing for tariff
nullification.802 On December 10, 1832 Jackson answered with the “Proclamation to the
People of South Carolina.”803 Jackson stated that the constitutional compact irrevocably
bound the states, warning that “if force was applied to oppose the execution of the laws,
that it must be repelled by force.” South Carolina radicals resentfully retreated, but the
balance of state and national economic authority remained unresolved.
800
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Infrastructure companies instead turned to state and local banks loans for capital.
Since 1816, these local banks had followed lending rules set by the Second Bank of the
United States. Frontier farmers and workingmen relied on infrastructure development and
thus on the policies of the distant, elite-run Second Bank headquartered in Philadelphia.
Already unpopular with populist Democratic-Republicans, the Bank issued enough paper
currency to exacerbate inflation, contributing to panic of 1819 and the foreclosure of
many loans on small farms. Democratic-Republicans attacked the Bank’s
constitutionality. Walter Lowrie of Pennsylvania proposed a national amendment to
prohibit chartering of a bank outside the District of Columbia, effectively gutting the
bank. The legislatures of Tennessee, Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois backed the measure, and
other Indianans and Pennsylvanians proposed similar constitutional amendments the
following year.804
Jackson began dismantling the nation’s system of centralized finance. On taking
office in 1829, he vetoed congressional funding bills, which he felt invaded state
authority. And in 1832, when his opponents attempted to renew the Bank’s charter,
Jackson, aided by Attorney General Roger B. Taney, successfully vetoed the Bank’s
renewal on constitutional grounds. The following year the Georgia legislature called for
an amendment to distribute a federal surplus raised under the Tariff of 1833, and two
years later, Calhoun proposed a pair of amendments to pass the surplus to the states.805
Congress answered with an 1836 bill distributing the funds directly to local banks, ending
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congressional debate over the surplus and the Bank.806 Financial devolution quieted
congressional debates on national banking powers.
Marshall was in a bind. Jackson effectively reversed McCulloch with his bank
veto, and he pointedly refused to enforce Marshall’s Worcester v. Georgia (1832)
decision,807 on states’ rights grounds.808 A keen student of inter-branch politics since his
Marbury decision, Marshall likely realized he would not win a direct confrontation with
Jackson and the House’s solid Democratic majority.809
So Marshall strategically deferred economic regulation to the states, where defeat
was less certain. In Willson v. Black-Bird Creek Marsh Co. (1829), Marshall affirmed the
Delaware legislature’s police power to charter a dam company to dry a marsh that
threatened public health, even though closing the marsh impeded interstate commerce.810
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Then, in Barron v. Baltimore (1833), Marshall asserted the Bill of Rights did not bind
Maryland from interfering in the private business of Baltimore resident John Barron.811
On Marshall’s death, Taney became Chief Justice, issuing a triad of decisions
dramatically expanding the states’ banking and incorporation powers. In Charles River
Bridge v. Warren Bridge (1837), Taney ruled that the state legislatures had broad powers
to charter and constrain a corporation, while a corporation could not use its charter to
constrain a state legislature without that legislature’s explicit blessing.812 And in Mayor
of New York v. Miln (1837), the Taney Court upheld a New York’s use of state police
powers to require passenger ships publish passenger lists and pay a tax funding
immigrant processing facilities, even though this state statute may have impeded
interstate commerce.813 Finally, in Briscoe v. Bank of Commonwealth of Kentucky (1837),
Taney affirmed Jackson’s decentralized banking scheme,814 holding states could charter
banks despite the federal Constitution’s stipulation the states not issue credit.815 In
Willson, Miln, Charles River Bridge, and Briscoe, the Court, Congress, and the White
House together upheld the state legislatures’ authority to charter corporations and banks.
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B. Jacksonian State Constitutional Revision
State legislators used their new constitutional authority to charter infrastructure
ventures. Spurred by the mercantilist desire to protect unprofitable public projects, by the
promise of eventual returns on their investments, and by outright corruption, state
legislators established and funded private corporations and banks to build roads,
turnpikes, bridges, canals, and railways. The number of banks in the United States
boomed from four hundred to six hundred between 1833 and 1836 and bank liability
skyrocketed, particularly in the west, where bank note issues increased by 100 percent,
and in the South, were they increased by 120 percent.816
Financial regulations were lax in the early 1830s. For example, Michigan’s 1835
Convention almost entirely failed to regulate corporations.817 Lobbyists swarmed the
Michigan legislature, and railroads and banks were chartered without personal liability
clauses, leaving investors no recourse if these businesses failed. A clause requiring the
state government make costly internal improvements nearly bankrupted the booming
state.818 In neighboring Ohio, legislators allowed banks to be chartered with little hard
currency reserves, subsidized private infrastructure ventures under the 1837 Loan Act,
and granted these companies tax breaks. Increased spending and corporate tax cuts
inflated the state’s annual deficit to nearly twenty million dollars, which legislators
covered with heavy taxes on personal and real property, irritating voters.819
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Then, in March of 1837, a decline in cotton prices brought the failure of Herman
Briggs and Company, a major New Orleans cotton firm. A panic in New Orleans ensued,
leading to the collapse of other local firms, and then ones in New York. British lenders,
worried that American banks had overextended themselves, called in their loans.820 This
sparked a nationwide panic. In Ohio, runs drained the shallow reserves of local banks,
which collapsed. Newly insolvent banks lacked capital to lend to existing infrastructure
ventures, which too folded, leaving taxpayers to cover their losses.821
Voters, ruined by land and infrastructure speculation, called constitutional
conventions to constrain corporations and state legislators in the late 1830s. For example,
Florida’s 1839 Convention devoted a fourteen-section article to bank regulation,
prohibiting election of candidates who had worked for a bank within the previous year,
limiting legislators’ authority to issue debt and charter corporations, and requiring public
oversight of corporations.822 At least nineteen documents regulated the printing and
circulation of currency, and twelve more imposed reserve requirements on banks.823
Delegates to California’s 1849 Convention passed a similar currency provision and
prohibited state legislators from chartering special banks.824 Many state framers followed
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California, particularly in the West.825 And the first Midwestern constitutions, all drafted
after the panic, each included at least five banking and finance regulations, exceeding the
national antebellum mean of two per document.826
Framers aggressively constrained legislators’ borrowing and lending powers.
Delegates to New York’s 1846 Convention limited legislators’ power to issue debt,827
and every other constitution ratified after 1845 included a similar clause.828 New York’s
new, comprehensive document tripled its predecessor in word count, and with more
regulations, constitutions grew longer. Michigan’s 1835 Constitution, drafted on the eve
of the panic, had only one provision on corporate regulation, but was replaced by an 1850
Constitution that dedicated two articles and at least thirty clauses to the topic.829
Indianans scrapped their 1816 Constitution for an 1851 document with at least thirteen
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sections regulating banks, corporations, and debt.830 In a few states, legislators even
passed constitutional amendments to constrain themselves.831
Framers also used elections as a constraint. In New York, nearly all judicial,
administrative, and local offices were now elected, and senators were elected from small
single-member districts every two years, rather than four.832 Other states did the same,833
and voters gained new power, using referenda, frequent elections, conventions, and
amendments to constrain corporations, recall judges, and prohibit legislators from
granting corporations special privileges, risky loans, and immunity to liability,834
suggesting Jacksonian democracy was in part a pragmatic response to the financial crisis.
These state constitutional revisions quieted national controversy over banking.
While banking began as a congressional issue, with congressmen proposing a dozen
federal constitutional amendments around the 1816 Second Bank chartering and 1832 rechartering debates, thanks to Jackson’s devolution and the panic of 1837, state
constitutional bank regulations increased in the 1830s and 1840s.835 Thirty-eight of the
fifty-two state constitutions or organic laws proposed after 1830 regulated debt, banking,
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1830. Another thirty included similar oversight mechanisms, twenty-six of which were drafted after 1830.
At least four others included office-holding limitations. See Table 15 in the appendix.
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or incorporation. Similarly, all but sixteen of the total 157 antebellum corporate
regulations and debtors’ protections were drafted after 1830.836 State regulations crested
roughly ten years after the panic,837 though every constitution ratified between the panic
of 1837 and 1860 constrained banks and lending, save for Kentucky’s 1850 document.838
In contrast, Congress proposed only three constitutional amendments on banking and
corporations between 1837 and 1860.839 In 1840, dissatisfaction over the panic of 1837
swept Whigs into the White House and both houses of Congress. Yet congressional
Whigs neither chartered a third Bank nor proposed a national constitutional amendment
to centralize banking powers.840 This was partly because the states’ voters and convention
delegates had already developed a comprehensive local system of bank regulations.

836

These 157 regulations exclude at least 45 antebellum debtors’ protections. This was the first type of debt
regulation – sixteen of the provisions date to the eighteenth century – and also the most common,
particularly after 1830. For example, in 1846, Wisconsin’s first constitutional convention proposed
preventing the seizure of debtors’ homes and banning banks outright, but voters rejected the document.
Two years later, voters instead approved a constitution forbidding imprisonment for debt but allowing
lenders to seize debtors’ homes, limited by the “privilege of the debtor to enjoy the necessary comforts of
life.” See the Wisconsin Constitution of 1848, Article I, Section 16-7. In 1852, Wisconsin voters approved
a referendum instituting banks within the state, but subject to careful regulation. Stark, The Wisconsin State
Constitution, 4–8. See Table 15 in the appendix.
837
This suggests that state constitutions can adjust to exogenous shocks relatively quickly, especially
compared to the federal Constitution.
838
In total, off the 107 state and territorial constitutions and organic laws drafted between 1776 and 1860,
sixty-eight regulated banking, debt and finance. This population includes all state and territorial
constitutions and organic laws drafted between 1776 and 1860 as listed in the Rise of Modern
Constitutionalism database. This database is a compendium of proposed constitutional documents,
including American state constitutions. See the appendix for Table 15 listing these 107 documents and their
banking and corporate regulations. Note that this population includes some observations, including
constitutions of failed American states, that are not listed in the dissertation’s dataset, and note that the
dissertation dataset includes some constitutional proposals that never resulted in documents and thus are
excluded from the Rise of Modern Constitutionalism database. However, the two datasets are fairly similar.
839
As the panic spread in March 1837, a select congressional committee proposed prohibiting the states
from incorporating a bank to issue paper notes. The amendment failed, as did a similar one proposed by
Representative Rice Garland of Louisiana, and another proposed by an 1840 select committee. Ames, The
Proposed Amendments, 257–58.
840
Ibid., 250.

215

State
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0

State Constitutional Banking/Corporate Regulations
Proposed Federal Amendments on Banks/Corporations

Federal
6
5
4
3
2
1
0

1777 1783 1789 1795 1801 1807 1813 1819 1825 1831 1837 1843 1849 1855
Figure 7: State and Federal Constitutional Banking Regulations, 1776-1860.
For these federal and regulations see respectively Table 12 and Table 15 in the appendix.

On matters of territorial slavery, the states preserved the Missouri Compromise.
South of the Ohio River and Missouri’s 36º 30’ parallel, every newly-admitted state
preserved slavery within its borders,841 while territories north of these lines abolished
slavery, letting Congress pair each new slave state with a free one, keeping the House and
Electoral College balanced. When the Arkansas Territory in 1833 petitioned for a
territorial census as a prelude to statehood, Congress stalled for two years until admitting
Michigan as a free state. Arkansas’ 1836 Constitution subsequently recognized slavery,
forbade emancipation without the owner’s consent, and limited voting and office-holding
in the legislature to white males, and charged the legislature with controlling the slave
trade.842 Florida’s Constitution, framed two years later, also prohibited legislators from
emancipating slaves, allowing them to control the influx of free and enslaved people of
color into the state.843 These state constitutional prohibitions on emancipation promised a
durably proslavery South and a balanced, stable national constitutional regime. Congress
thus recognized Florida’s Constitution in 1844, when Iowa accepted congressional limits
841

By the ratification of Mississippi’s 1831 Constitution, all but three Southern states constitutionally
recognized slavery. The exceptions are Louisiana and the Carolinas.
842
See the Arkansas Constitution of 1836, Article II, Section 21, Article IV, Section 2, 4, 6, 25, Article IX,
Section 1. Goss, The Arkansas State Constitution, 1–3.
843
See the Florida Constitution of 1846, Article XVI, Section 1-3. D’Alemberte, The Florida State
Constitution, 1–5.
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on its boundaries and could be admitted as a free state.844 Wisconsin entered the Union as
a free state four years later.845
In the far West, only Texas constitutionally protected slavery.846 Delegates to
New Mexico’s 1849 Convention, embroiled in a border dispute with Texas, rejected the
Texan model’s proslavery clauses.847 President Zachary Taylor, eager to consolidate
territory newly seized from Mexico, urged Congress to swiftly admit New Mexico as a
free state. But after Taylor’s unexpected death, Millard Fillmore assumed the presidency
and submitted without comment New Mexico’s statehood request, where it died in the
Senate.848 The framers of California’s 1849 Constitution banned slavery with little
debate, fearing recent white immigrants would lose jobs to cheap slave labor, and that
slaves might intermix with local whites.849 Congress admitted California the following
year. To the northwest, Oregon’s Organic Laws of 1843 and 1845 prohibited slavery. The
state legislature affirmed this by statute, but also outlawed free or enslaved blacks from
entering the territory, under punishment of whipping.850 This differed slave state

844

Stark, The Iowa State Constitution, 1–5.
See the proposed Wisconsin Constitution of 1846 Article XVI, Section 2 and the ratified Wisconsin
Constitution of 1848 Article I, Section 2.
846
Texans also forbade legislators emancipate slaves without compensation or block their importation.
However, the 1845 Constitution also prohibited legislators from stripping slaves’ rights to jury trial and
obligated slaveholders to feed and clothe their slaves. See the Texas Constitution of 1845, Article III,
Section 1-3. Similarly, Texas’ 1836 Constitution had prohibited forced emancipation and regulated
immigration of slaves. See the Texas Constitution of 1836, Article VI, General, Section 9.
847
The Constitution made no reference to slavery, though it limited the vote and office-holding to the white
male population, which also determined legislative district apportionment. See the New Mexico
Constitution of 1849, Article II, Sections 3, 4, 6, 8.
848
Smith, The New Mexico State Constitution, 2–4.
849
See the California Constitution of 1849, Article I, Section 18.Grodin, Massey, and Cunningham, The
California State Constitution, 1–9.
850
See the Oregon Organic Law of 1843, Article I, Section 4 and Oregon Organic Law of 1845, Article I,
Section 4. Schuman, “The Creation of the Oregon Constitution,” 611–17.
845
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constitutions, fourteen of which required slaves, as valuable property, be treated
hospitably,851 and eleven of which guaranteed slaves’ jury trial rights.852
Thanks to these state clauses, there was little controversy in the state or national
legislatures over constitutional regulation of slavery in the 1830s and 1840s. States
drafted relatively few clauses on slavery.853 Northern state framers avoided the slavery
issue or addressed it with a single clause, while Southerners framed comprehensive state
constitutional slavery provisions to prevent local emancipation and preserve a proslavery
South. Save for a triad of unsuccessful abolition amendments proposed by John Quincy
Adams in 1839,854 Congress entirely avoided proposing amendments on the topic.
In conclusion, both the state and federal legislatures faced constitutional
controversies over suffrage and electoral regulation, territorial slavery, and banking
powers. Congress proposed relatively few federal amendments expressly constraining
states’ constitutional powers,855 instead proposing amendments on concurrent
constitutional powers,856 which were also subject to state constitutional regulation. State
constitutional revision quieted these issues, preempting federal constitutional reform.
851

Slave state constitutions, often framed by slaveholders, protected slaveholders’ property in slaves by
outlawing uncompensated emancipation and physical harm to slaves. See Table 16 in the appendix.
852
This jury trial right usually extended to only a petit jury. See Table 16 in the appendix.
853
Between 1776 and 1860, state framers drafted only ninety-six slavery regulations. In contrast, the states
constrained legislators and corporations with at least 202 detailed constitutional banking and debt
regulations. This count of slavery and banking regulations does not include amendments. See Table 16 in
the appendix. This data is from the Rise of Modern Constitutionalism database. As explained in Footnote
838 this database differs slightly but not significantly from the one created for this dissertation.
854
Adams’ amendments would have abolished hereditary slavery in 1842, forbade the admission of slave
states after 1845, and prohibited slavery and the slave trade in the District of Columbia. Ames, The
Proposed Amendments, 193.
855
Congressman Hall of North Carolina proposed an 1829 amendment for defining national and state
authority, and South Carolina’s 1832 tariff nullification brought four proposals between 1832 and 1833 for
resolving disputes between the federal and state governments. And as noted, proposed amendments in
1837, 1838, and 1840 would have regulated state banks that issued notes. Amendments proposed in 1839
would have refused admission to proslavery territories and abolished hereditary slavery within the states.
An 1842 proposal would have regulated state legislatures’ nomination powers.
856
As stated, following the disputed election of 1800, congressmen proposed alternate means to select
presidential electors. Jefferson’s contentious 1807 Embargo Act led congressmen to propose amendments
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This pattern played out across all three issues. Jeffersonian congressmen,
executives, and courts deferred to the states’ traditional authority to regulate elections.
State legislators and framers caved to white males’ demands for enfranchisement,
repealing state constitutional property and taxpaying qualifications and beginning mass
democracy in America. Congress deferred to these state regulations, largely avoided the
topic of electoral reform. Similarly, as Congress proposed federal amendments on the
selection of House members and of presidential electors, the states settled on singlemember House districts and general ticket popular selection of electors. By the 1830s,
beleaguered congressmen accepted these systems, abandoning attempts to revise the
federal Constitution. These antebellum state reforms still fundamentally structure the
modern House, binding members to their district and encouraging particularistic
policymaking, and modern presidential campaigns, which are now popular contests in
which candidates compete over the general ticket votes of swing states. That is, state
constitutional reform helped establish the current, stable constitutional design of the
House and presidency.
States also helped resolve banking controversies. In the 1830s, Jackson and
congressional Democrats encouraged state legislators and framers to constitutionally
charter and fund banks and infrastructure corporations. Marshall too deferred to the states
rather than confront Jackson’s coalition, demonstrating how devolution can preempt
inter-branch conflict. But with the panic of 1837, bank runs drained the shallow reserves
of these banks, and corporations collapsed, often passing their losses to small investors.

regulating embargoes, the national Bank, taxes, and funding for internal improvements. When
congressional leadership handed John Quincy Adams the 1824 election, members responded with proposals
for direct election of the president or his electors. The Jacksonian congresses proposed several means to
distribute the national surplus before Jackson settled on his system of decentralized banks.

219

Popular outrage led to a wave of state constitutional provisions constraining legislators,
bankers, and corporate employers. The result was a stable locally-run and locallyregulated system of banks, such that congressmen stopped proposing amendments to the
federal Constitution.
Finally, tensions simmered over territorial slavery. Jeffersonian congressmen
abolished slavery north of the Ohio River and tacitly allowed it below, but could not
enforce these laws in the distant territories. Territorial voters kept the bisectional accord
through state constitutional revision, abolishing slavery in Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, and
allowing it in Kentucky, Tennessee, Louisiana, and Mississippi. With the Compromise of
1820, the states extended the accord line across the Mississippi in cooperation with the
executive and Congress, which almost entirely avoided proposing federal constitutional
reform on the issue. However, in the 1850s the line blurred as it extended west, and
Northerners reevaluated their tolerance for territorial slavery and the Fugitive Slave
Clause. This promised conflict.
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CHAPTER 6: THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION, 1850-77
“What we wanted, and what we now labored to obtain, was a constitution free from the
narrow, selfish, and senseless limitation of the word white.”
Frederick Douglass, on state constitutional framing, 1893857

In the mid-nineteenth century, Americans faced constitutional crises over
territorial slavery, fugitive slaves’ rights, black citizenship, and state sovereignty. By
1850, the populous free states had grown to a majority in the House and Electoral
College. Proslavery congressmen passed the 1850 Compromise and 1854 KansasNebraska Act to let Western states adopt slavery, increasing slave state congressional
seats. But this devolution backfired. Western constitutional framers consistently rejected
plantation slavery, constricting slavery and slave states to the southeast, making
Southerners a permanent national minority. Frustrated with the 1850 Fugitive Slave Act,
Northern states invoked state sovereignty in refusing to return Southern runaway slaves.
Southern firebrands rebelled, ending the antebellum constitutional order.
Union victory brought Reconstruction through state constitutional revision.
Rather than dictating the terms of Reconstruction through a new national constitution or a
host of new amendments, Congress passed only three federal amendments, two of them
quite brief, relying instead on statutes that forced the states to revise their constitutions
and elaborate in detail the postwar constitutional order. Southern blacks and Northern
carpetbaggers drafted state constitutions to outlaw slavery, grant blacks citizenship,
disenfranchise ex-Confederates, and recognize the national government’s sovereignty.
These documents expounded and enforced the brief national Reconstruction
Amendments, formulating a new if still intensely contested and fragile settlement of
857

Frederick Douglass, “Life and Times of Frederick Douglass,” in Autobiographies (Library of America,
1893), 666.

221

slavery, citizenship, and state sovereignty. Even as Congress and the president expanded
their constitutional powers, they relied on the states to resolve many of the era’s
constitutional questions.858
I. Trends in State and Federal Constitutionalism, 1850-77
In most eras of American history, Americans have revised the state constitutions
far more frequently than the federal Constitution. But during the Civil War and
Reconstruction, both the state and federal constitutions saw unprecedented revision. The
number of state constitutions proposed each year skyrocketed, and exceeded the 17911877 yearly mean by at least a standard deviation for much of the Civil War and
Reconstruction.859 In 1861 alone the states proposed fifteen new constitutions. In total,
between 1850 and 1877, the states proposed 104 new constitutions and ratified fifty-two,
more than any other era before or after.860 Even when weighted by the increasing number
of states, attempted state constitutional replacement still increased significantly around
the Civil War, suggesting this instability was not driven solely by westward expansion.861
Similarly, the number of state constitutional amendments spiked during the Civil War
and Reconstruction.862
Attempts to revise the federal Constitution also peaked. During and after the Civil
War, congressmen proposed a slew of amendments, exceeding the 1791-1877 yearly
858

In mentioning the “Constitution,” “Congress,” “White House,” and “Supreme Court,” this chapter refers
to the Union institutions, and not their Confederate counterparts, unless otherwise noted.
859
Specifically in 1850, 1851, 1857, 1861, 1864-5, 1868, and 1875.
860
Of the era’s 104 proposed state constitutions, forty-seven were Southern. Another twenty-one were
Midwestern or Western. See in the appendix for a United States map indicating the number of
constitutions proposed in each state.
861
Between 1791 and 1877, the number of states in the Union nearly tripled from fourteen to thirty-eight,
inflating the rate of antebellum constitutional replacement. But attempted replacement exceeded the 17911877 weighted yearly mean in almost exactly the same years as the unweighted yearly mean – in 1850-3,
1857, 1859, 1861-76, and by at least a standard deviation in 1850-1, 1857, 1859, 1861, 1864-5, 1868, and
1875.
862
See Figure 14 for the number of state constitutional amendments proposed each year for 1789-1877.
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mean by at least a standard deviation during and after the Civil War.863 In total, between
1850 and 1877, Congress saw 834 proposals for federal constitutional amendments.
Three of these passed – the Thirteenth (1865), Fourteenth (1868), and Fifteenth (1870) –
fundamentally revising the federal Constitution in favor of freedom and civic equality for
African Americans, and eventually for other groups.
Federal
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Figure 8: Proposals for State Constitutions and for Federal Constitutional Amendments, 1791-1877.

Reinterpretations of the federal Constitution proliferated alongside calls for
amendment. With Congress deadlocked over slavery, Justice Roger B. Taney in Dred
Scott reversed decades of judicial non-intervention in slavery, firmly establishing
territorial slavery and rejecting black citizenship.864 And when Congress in 1850 forced
Northerners to recapture fugitive slaves, abolitionists like William Lloyd Garrison and
Ralph Waldo Emerson reinterpreted the Constitution as an irredeemably proslavery
document.865 Southerners radicals worried Free-Soil and Republican congressmen would

863

Specifically, proposals exceeded the mean by at least a standard deviation in 1860-1, 1864, 1866, and
1869. Proposal rates exceeded the 1791-1877 yearly mean in 1860-1, 1864-9, 1872-3, and 1876-7.
864
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857). As later explained, the Prigg decision anticipated elements
of Dre Scott.
865
Garrison in 1833 questioned the Constitution’s morality but accepted its legitimacy. But by 1845, he and
his colleague Wendell Phillips rightly derided the Constitution as a covenant with slaveholders, which they
felt was illegitimate. On Emerson, see George Kateb, “Self-Reliance, Politics, and Society,” in A Political
Companion to Ralph Waldo Emerson, ed. Alan M. Levine and Daniel S. Malachuk (The University Press
of Kentucky, 2011); James H. Read, “The Limits of Self-Reliance: Emerson, Slavery, and Abolition,” in A
Political Companion to Ralph Waldo Emerson, ed. Alan M. Levine and Daniel S. Malachuk (The
University Press of Kentucky, 2011).
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ban territorial slavery, reconceived the Constitution as a revocable compact, some
abandoning the Constitution outright in favor of the Declaration’s invocation to rebellion.
Demonstrating that the state and national constitutions faced intense and joint
revision, spurs another question – why? Why did the era’s debates over slavery, states’
rights, and citizenship force revision at both levels of government? This national
constitutional revision is even more unusual compared to the constitutionalism of the
Jacksonian era, when the states resolved controversies over suffrage, slavery, and
financial regulation, preempting federal constitutional reform. What made the Civil War
era different?
There are a few possible explanations for the era’s unprecedented federal and
state constitutional instability. Federal amendment rates are easily explained. Between
1850 and 1859, Democrats, Whigs, and Republicans split Congress, with no party
garnering the two-thirds supermajority needed to affirm a proposed amendment.
Congressmen proposed only twenty-four amendments in these years, all of which failed.
But in 1861, aided by the withdrawal of Southern Democrats, Republicans captured over
two-thirds of both congressional houses and by 1864 controlled twenty of the twenty-five
Union state legislatures,866 clearing the Article V amendment threshold. The Republican
Congress subsequently proposed 421 amendments between 1864 and 1870, passing three
which dramatically transformed federal civil rights.
In contrast, state constitutions’ flexibility, specificity, or unpopularity may partly
explain this unprecedented state constitutional revision. Compared to the federal
Constitution, the state constitutions had fairly low thresholds on amendment or
replacement. But these thresholds were consistently low throughout the nineteenth
866

Dubin, Party Affiliations in the State Legislatures, 10.
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century, and cannot alone explain the sudden uptick in state constitutional revision in the
1860s.867 Alternately, over-specificity may explain state constitutional revision.
Jacksonian state legislators encouraged bank speculation, spurring the panic of 1837 and
subsequent lengthy, technical state constitutional clauses closely constraining banks,
corporations, and state legislators. These specific, particularistic provisions may have
eventually grown outmoded, requiring replacement.868 But again, this cannot explain the
abrupt revision increase in the 1860s. Alternately, this legislative corruption, economic
panic, and regular constitutional reform may have dulled Americans’ respect for or
interest in their states and constitutions, encouraging further state constitutional reform.
But antebellum Americans likely venerated their state governments and constitutions,869
suggesting they would be hesitant to reform the state documents.
More generally, explaining state and federal constitutional revision in isolation is
misguided, for the two were inextricably tied. In the 1850s, Stephen Douglas and Lewis
Cass promoted popular sovereignty, deferring the slavery question to the states and
territories, just as prior congressmen had in 1787 and 1820. But this familiar tactic
backfired in the 1850s as Western state framers rejected slavery, increasing free state
dominance Congress and the Electoral College. State constitutional revision suddenly
failed as a venting mechanism, now exacerbating the slavery crisis. When antislavery
Republicans seized Congress and the White House in 1860, Southerners rebelled by
867

Note that some states failed to specify a revision procedure, and at least twenty-seven nineteenth-century
state constitutions were drafted without explicit legal authority.
868
In general, specific, lengthy state constitutions tend to have more contentious provisions and shorter
lives. May, “Constitutional Amendment and Revision Revisited,” 164–70; Lutz, “Toward a Theory of
Constitutional Amendment,” 357–59.
869
As Tocqueville explained, an individual American state “represents a definite number of familiar things
which are dear to those living there. It is identified with the soil, with the right to property, the family,
memories of the past, activities of the present, dreams for the future. Patriotism, which is most often
nothing but an extension of individual egoism, therefore remains attached to the state.” Tocqueville,
Democracy in America, 367.
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drafting new state constitutions, which granted Republicans an overwhelming majority in
the Union, allowing the Reconstruction Amendments and the Reconstruction Acts which
forced the drafting of new antislavery Southern state constitutions. These postwar state
constitutional framers worked in cooperation with Congress to build the Reconstruction
constitutional order that endures to this day.
This chapter explains the era’s constitutional tumult through the interplay of state
and national constitutional politics. The two move in tandem, suggesting Congress and
the state conventions together addressed the era’s constitutional crises. For example, note
that state revision rates spiked during moments of congressional contention in this era.870
The chapter first recounts the constitutional controversies of the 1850s, explaining how
the federal deference to the states unexpectedly exacerbated these issues. Then the
chapter recounts how Southerners attempted to resolve these issues through secession and
consequent state constitutional reform. The chapter’s last section shows how
Reconstruction state constitutions established abolition, equal protection, and universal
male enfranchisement, often prior to and in more detail than did the federal
Reconstruction amendments. These state constitutional conventions formally resolved the
era’s major questions. The Reconstruction constitutional order was drafted not just by
Congress, but also by the states.

870

See Figure 8. Note also attempted state constitutional replacement exceeded both the 1791-1877 yearly
mean by at least a standard deviation in 1850, 1851, 1857, 1861, 1864-5, 1868, and 1875 – all significant
junctures in congressional and Supreme Court constitutional politics. In 1861, every Confederate State
replaced its constitution in order to reject the federal Constitution. These states revised their constitutions
again between 1864 and 1865 under Lincoln’s and Johnson’s terms for Reconstruction. States exceeded
their yearly mean in 1868, many revising their constitutions under the terms of the 1867 Reconstruction
Act. Finally, state constitutional revision increased again in 1875, as some Southern states repealed their
Reconstruction reforms.
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II. Constitutional Controversies at 1850
Between 1850 and 1877, proposed federal constitutional amendments clustered
around several issues.871 Of the 834 amendment proposals, most dealt with slavery (199),
including proposals abolishing slavery (59), and addressing fugitive slaves (44),
territorial slavery (36), and slavery in the District of Columbia (31). Postwar proposals
focused on congressional design (131), including postwar reapportionment (113), on
suffrage expansions for African Americans and exclusions for ex-Confederates (89), and
on extension of civil rights (37) and citizenship (21). Executive design and powers
remained a perennial topic (71).872 See Table 11 in the appendix for counts of proposals
by topic.873 Note also that many of the era’s proposed amendments concerned concurrent
powers subject to state constitutional reform, including amendments regulating slavery
and suffrage and apportioning congressional districts, which alone account for half of the
era’s proposals. In short, during the mid-nineteenth century the states were poised to
resolve the nation’s main constitutional controversies.
Between 1850 and 1860, Congress used statutes to address controversies over
territorial slavery and blacks’ interstate movement and citizenship. Territorial slavery was
a longstanding issue. Statutory compromises in 1787 and 1820 balanced the House and
871

To generate a list of the most common proposed amendment topics for 1850-77, this dissertation first
identifies policy-related words to appear at least twenty times across descriptions of all 834 proposed
amendments for 1850-77 in the NARA dataset, excluding duplicate words and words like “of” and “the”
not related to policy issues. A second list of common terms is created by skimming descriptions the 834
proposals in this era compiled by Ames. These two are then merged and checked against Vile’s list of most
common topics by year. See Ames, The Proposed Amendments, 324–53; Vile, Encyclopedia of
Constitutional Amendments, Appendix D.
872
Note however that only twenty-two dealt with the selection of the executive, a substantial decrease after
states largely resolved the issue in the antebellum era. See the previous chapter. Note also this figure is a
minimum.
873
Note these are approximate counts. Some individual amendments may match for multiple search terms
and be included in multiple topic counts. Note also these counts are minimums, as they do not include
amendments that do not match the search terms but may still be relevant to the topic. For example, in 1850
David Disney proposed an amendment protecting the local governments’ sovereignty. Although not
explicit, this amendment was intended to protect slavery. Ames, The Proposed Amendments, 353.
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Electoral College between free and slave states, such that Northerners and Southerners
alike accepted the pact. Between 1836 and 1856, each party nominated a president from
one section and a vice president from the other, in hopes of capturing and representing
both regions.874 Thus in an 1833 open letter to the London Patriot, Massachusetts
abolitionist William Lloyd Garrison grudgingly affirmed the Constitution’s legitimacy,
declaring the slavery question was “not a constitutional controversy, but one affecting
conscience.” Even the radical Garrison was willing to “recognise the compact” of the
Constitution.875 And as a South Carolina congressman, John C. Calhoun trusted that these
compromises would maintain Southern control of the presidency and the House,
championing a powerful national Congress and Union in order to preserve slavery.876
Jackson obliged, impounding abolitionist mailings in 1835, and the following year the
House implemented a gag rule tabling antislavery petitions.

874

In 1787, a near-unanimous coalition of Northern and Southern delegates to the Continental Congress
passed the Northwest Ordinance, mandating Congress form free states north of the Ohio River and
implicitly allowing slave states to the south. This promised that congressional seats and subsequent slavery
legislation would be balanced between the two regions. The Missouri Compromise extended the line across
the Mississippi along the 36º 30’ parallel, preserving the bisectional accord in Congress, as each slave state
would enter the Union with a paired free one. Lynd, “The Compromise of 1787,” 225–33, 238–43; Graber,
Dred Scott, 12–13, 91–93, 102–3, 115–26; Aldrich, Why Parties?, 134–38.
875
To Garrison, this shared national shame over slavery required union and a nationwide constitutional
solution to the slavery crisis: “the guilt of slavery is national, its danger is national, and the obligation to
remove it is national.” Thus Garrisonians canvassed and leafletted the North and South on three-month
tours, hoping to persuade or shame Americans into abolition. But in this same letter, Garrison derided the
Constitution, which condoned slavery, as “a compact formed at the sacrifice of the bodies and souls of
millions of our race… and according to the law of God, null and void.” For Garrison, the Constitution was
legitimate as positive law, but not as moral law. William Lloyd Garrison, “Letter to the Editor of the
London Patriot, August 6, 1833,” in The Letters of William Lloyd Garrison: I Will Be Heard, 1822-1835,
ed. Walter McIntosh Merrill, vol. I (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1833), 248–49; Richard S.
Newman, The Transformation of American Abolitionism: Fighting Slavery in the Early Republic (Univ of
North Carolina Press, 2002), 152–59.
876
See Article I, Section 2, Clause 3. However, Calhoun anonymously wrote the South Carolina
legislature’s “Exposition” of 1828, defending nullification of the 1828 Tariff. Graber, Dred Scott, 115–18.
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But antislavery delegates to California’s 1849 Constitutional Convention refused
to split the state into a free northern and proslavery southern half,877 potentially
increasing the Senate free-state majority to six seats, threatening the compromise.
Further, early industrialization and rising immigration had inflated the population of
Northern cities, and canals, turnpikes, roads, and railways funneled settlers into the free
territories of the Old Northwest, which quickly reached the 60,000 inhabitants required to
apply for statehood. By 1850, free states in total controlled 169 of the 290 Electoral
College votes, enough to unilaterally select the president, and held 147 of the 237 House
seats.878 That same year, New Mexico proposed an antislavery state constitution, a wall
against southwestern expansion of slavery threatening to cordon slavery to the
southeastern states and block Southern recapture of the Electoral College and House.879
Congress tilted not only Northern, but also toward a Free Soil platform, which
included prohibitions on slavery in the District of Columbia and the territories, on the
interstate transportation of slaves, and on federal officials from recapturing fugitives.880
After Polk pushed Congress to admit Texas as a slave state, in 1846 Pennsylvania
representative and later Free Soiler David Wilmot proposed using the Territories Clause

877

Grodin, Massey, and Cunningham, The California State Constitution, 3–9; Fehrenbacher, The
Slaveholding Republic, 271–73.
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By 1850, New York had a population of roughly three million and thirty-six Electoral College votes,
and Pennsylvania and Ohio roughly two million each and twenty-six, and twenty-three votes respectively,
while Virginia, the largest slave state, had just over a million inhabitants and only seventeen votes. See
“United States Resident Population by State: 1790 - 1990,” New Jersey Department of Labor and
Workforce Development, n.d.
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Graber, Dred Scott, 126–30; Aldrich, Why Parties?, 132–33.
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Frustrated with Congress’ gag rule, antislavery societies elected Liberty Party candidates to legislatures
in Massachusetts and Maine in 1842, and rallied the New York vote against Henry Clay in the 1844
presidential election, aiding James Polk’s victory. The Liberty Party then caucused with anti-patronage
reformers and “Barnburner” abolitionist New York Democrats to form the Free Soil Party. By 1848,
Congress’ Free Soil cohort had grown to thirteen. Free Soilers stopped short only of abolishing slavery
within an existing state.
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to ban slavery in all territories seized during the Mexican-American War.881 The Wilmot
Proviso passed the Northern-dominated House with no concessions to slaveholding
states, threatening the bisection accord, before failing in the more balanced Senate.882
The territorial slavery controversy pushed some to secessionism. Calhoun
answered the Wilmot Proviso with resolutions requiring territorial slavery, but these
failed against free-state majorities in both houses.883 In a March 1850 Senate speech, he
declared the result of Northern population growth was to give the “Northern section a
predominance in every department of the government.” Hence, “as it now stands, one
section has the exclusive power of controlling the government, which leaves the other
without any adequate means of protecting itself against its encroachment and
oppression.”884 Southerners considered secession, and Southern legislators ordered the
burning, impounding and censoring of antislavery literature.885 In response to this and the
lynching of abolitionists,886 Northern antislavery advocates also radicalized, recognizing
they could not talk Southern citizens or congressmen into abolition. In 1844, Garrison
rejected the Constitution’s legitimacy,887 explaining his change of heart in an 1845 letter
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damning the Constitution as a “covenant with death and an agreement with hell.”888 He
repeated this phrase in a Framingham rally of the Massachusetts Anti-Slavery Society
that same year, brandishing a burning copy of the Constitution.
Democratic Party leaders tried to quiet the territorial slavery issue by pushing it
from Congress back on the territories. In 1848, Lewis Cass, the Democratic presidential
nominee, proposed that the Territories Clause let Congress regulate only the territories’
public lands, requiring Western territorial legislatures and state constitutional conventions
to address slavery without congressional oversight. Cass promised Northern audiences
that the territorial constitutional conventions would ban slavery, and convinced Southern
audiences that the conventions would preserve it, satisfying both crowds. On losing the
1848 election, Cass passed the platform to fellow Democrat Stephen A. Douglas who,
with the aid of Daniel Webster, shepherded through the House and Senate a series of bills
together dubbed the Compromise of 1850. Congress admitted California as a free state
and allowed the legislatures and constitutional conventions of New Mexico and Utah to
regulate slavery as they wished.889
Douglas’ “popular sovereignty” plan for devolution initially satisfied both
sections. In the same bill, Northerners and Southerners saw divergent outcomes in the
territories.890 Proslavery congressmen trusted that southwesterners would adopt
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plantation and mining slavery and would elect proslavery congressmen. North Carolina
representative Thomas Lanier Clingman, recalling newspaper articles and conversations
with Westerners, expected the Colorado River would “produce sugar, cotton, rice, and
tropical fruits &c.” In describing California, he added “Gold mines are known to exist
there… Wherever gold mines exist, especially surface, alluvial, or deposit mines, slave
labor can be employed to greatest advantage.”891 Northerners and some abolitionists
backed popular sovereignty, predicting slavery would not flourish in the dry southwest.
The Democrat John McClernand of Illinois supported the Compromise, claiming “God
and nature have traced an immutable material law in the lofty mountains and arid deserts
of that Territory, forever prohibiting African slavery within its limits… Slavery does not,
nor can it, as I think, exist in Utah or New Mexico.”892 Moreover, antislavery
congressmen trusted that southwesterners would maintain Mexican laws abolishing local
slavery.893 Douglas’ plan passed the House and Senate with bisectional support, partly
because it did not require antislavery or proslavery congressmen to abandon their position
and compromise.
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This devolution temporarily quieted the territorial slavery question, preserving the
Constitution. As Representative Boyd of Kentucky argued, this was the plan’s strength:
“I am earnestly and in good faith seeking to test the sense of the House upon the doctrine
of non-intervention. I want to see that principle carried out – I want to see it carried out in
good faith. I wish to see peace restored to the country. I am for the Union. I am for the
Constitution as it is – I want no amendment to it.”894 Boyd got his wish. Between 1850
and 1859, Congress, divided by section and united for popular sovereignty, proposed
only twenty-four federal constitutional amendments, only two of which would have
directly regulated territorial slavery, none of which passed.895 Devolution solved the
short-term dispute in Congress, but let both sections maintain irreconcilable platforms on
Western slavery, promising eventual conflict.896
The rights of fugitive slaves presented a second controversy. The brief federal
Constitution’s Fugitive Slave Clause allowed the return of fugitive slaves,897 but failed to
charge federal or state actors with enforcement. Moreover, the Clause stated people could
be held in servitude in a state, “under the laws thereof,” but not under a uniform federal
law. Rather than placing the Clause with Article I congressional powers or Article II
894
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executive powers, the federal framers placed it among the state powers and
responsibilities of Article IV, acknowledging the states’ traditional authority over fugitive
law.898
States quickly diverged by section. New England state legislatures, courts, and
constitutional conventions promised life and liberty to all persons within their borders,
free and slave. Similarly, Northern states passed personal liberty laws punishing
slavecatchers who seized free blacks,899 and Northern congressmen defeated an 1801 bill
to limit these personal liberty laws and an 1817 bill compelling Northern governors and
judges to enforce the 1793 Fugitive Slave Act.900 In contrast, Louisiana’s antebellum
territorial governor William C. C. Claiborne had coerced Mexico to agree to return slaves
who fled to Texas.901
This divergence opened national controversies under the Privileges and
Immunities Clause. Beginning in the 1820s, slave state legislatures, fearing slave
insurrection, stripped visiting free-state blacks of the liberties they enjoyed through their
home state’s constitution.902 This created an interstate conflict of laws and likely violated
the federal Privileges and Immunities Clause, which required a state grant a visitor at
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least the basic rights he enjoyed in his home state.903 Conversely, free states that had
allowed whites to travel with slaves under “sojourner laws” began repealing these laws in
the late antebellum era, arguably violating slaveholders’ federal Privileges and
Immunities rights.904 For example, in Commonwealth v. Aves, the Massachusetts’
Supreme Court held visiting slaves could appeal for their freedom under the state’s
Constitution.905 Connecticut quickly followed suit, citing Aves in a decision freeing a
slave brought from Georgia.906 Between the 1836 Aves ruling and 1860, courts in every
state considered the Aves precedent, and all but five Northern states accepted it.907
These state violations of federal Privileges and Immunities rights spurred two
cases in which the Supreme Court partly maintained state authority. In Groves v.
Slaughter (1841), Justice Smith Thompson implicitly limited the Court’s authority over
903
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the interstate movement of slaves,908 and in a concurring opinion Roger B. Taney
explicitly stripped this power from the Court and Congress,909 leaving the matter to the
states. This let proslavery and antislavery state legislators to continue to regulate blacks’
interstate movement as they pleased.910
In Prigg v. Pennsylvania (1842), 911 Justice Joseph Story struck down a
Pennsylvania personal liberty law, ruling that the federal government, not the states,
regulated and enforced the return of fugitives under the 1793 Fugitive Slave Act.
Accordingly, free states could not impede federal enforcement of the Act.912 The case
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was on balance an important doctrinal victory for advocates of slavery and broad national
powers.913
But despite Story’s bold nationalist rhetoric, the collective Prigg opinions
deferred much to the states. Story’s ruling left Congress to enact fugitive slave policy,
and in the absence of congressional action, states were likely to continue their divergent
courses.914 Further, Story ruled free-state citizens and officials could not be compelled to
recapture slaves. He reasoned the Fugitive Slave Clause:
does not point out any state functionaries, or any state action, to carry its
provisions into effect . The States cannot, therefore, be compelled to enforce
them, and it might well be deemed an unconstitutional exercise of the power of
interpretation to insist that the States are bound to provide means to carry into
effect the duties of the National Government, nowhere delegated or entrusted to
them by the Constitution.915
The antislavery Justice McClean argued that slave law was a police power reserved to the
states, recognizing “in the State a power to guard and protect its own jurisdiction and the
peace of its citizens.”916 Even Taney’s proslavery concurrence, clashing with Story,
devolved enforcement to the states, noting that by placing the Fugitive Slave Clause in
Article IV, the federal framers intended it as a state power, rather than an Article I
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congressional power.917 Antislavery and proslavery justices agreed on nonintervention,918 and McClean and Taney’s concurrences paved the way for Northern
states’ rights arguments. This mix of nationalist and states-rights opinions, and
consequent congressional inaction, let the states reinterpret the decision to allow nonenforcement of the Fugitive Slave Clause and the 1793 Fugitive Act and boldly pass new
personal liberty laws.
In response congressional Democrats proposed the 1850 Fugitive Slave Act
forcing federal and state officials and citizens to return runaways.919 A united South
passed the Act over piecemeal Northern resistance,920 gutting Northern personal liberty
laws. Assuming the power granted by Story’s Prigg ruling, Congress then laid the issue
to rest. Between 1850 and 1859, Congress proposed only one federal amendment
touching on slave mobility, recognizing a right to property in slaves.921 The question
remained whether Northern officials and citizens would cooperate.
These disputes over blacks’ movement rights fit in a broader dispute over black
citizenship. While egalitarians like William Lloyd Garrison, Frederick Douglass, and
Martin Delany argued for black citizenship,922 biological racists challenged this claim.
Caving to white students’ demands, Harvard expelled Delany and two other black
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medical students, and hired Louis Agassiz, whose embryology studies concluded that
blacks’ and Native Americans’ fetal development halted too early to allow the mental
capacity for citizenship.923 And in 1839, Agassiz’s Philadelphia colleague Samuel George
Morton first published Crania Americana, asserting that blacks’ and Native Americans’
lower cranial volumes indicated weaker mental faculties. The work, expanded by
coauthor and fellow University of Pennsylvania graduate Josiah T. Nott, received wide
circulation through the country,924 affirming state-level prohibitions on blacks’
citizenship, suffrage, and education rights. These clashed with somewhat more egalitarian
Northern citizenship laws, creating more national Privileges and Immunities conflicts.
In Strader v. Graham (1851), the federal Supreme Court refused to intervene in
this state regulation. Jacob Strader owned a steamboat that transported three of
Christopher Graham’s slaves from Kentucky to Ohio, where they escaped for Canada.
Graham sued to recover the cost of his loss property, and won in the Kentucky judicial
system.925 Though Strader appealed under interstate jurisdiction, the Supreme Court
unanimously declined that it had jurisdiction over the case, deferring to the state
courts.926 Additionally, the defendants had claimed that the slaves had gained their
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freedom on entering Ohio, under Article VI of the Northwest Ordinance. In his majority
opinion, Taney rejected this too, asserting that on granting statehood, Congress
relinquished authority to regulate slavery within a state,927 leaving the states to regulate
blacks’ freedom and citizenship rights.928
Finally, slavery disputes reignited the nullification controversy. When
California’s admission tipped the Senate to a six seat free state majority, Southerners lost
hope of regaining the Senate, and so considered alternate means to block Free Soil
legislation. Calhoun and others revived compact theory, arguing the states were
temporally and legally prior to the Union and could negate national law by nullification,
constitutional convention, and even secession. Similarly, Northern legislatures, courts,
and governors passed and upheld new personal liberty laws to expressly nullify the 1850
Fugitive Slave Act. These alienated congressional moderates like Representative David
Disney of Ohio, who in 1850 proposed a federal amendment allowing states and
territories to pass slave laws, only “when they do not conflict with the Constitution.”929
In sum, in 1850, Congress faced crises over territorial slavery and fugitive slaves.
As it had in 1820 and 1837, Congress deferred the territorial slavery issue to the states
and territories. But now this backfired, so that by the mid-1850s, the states had
established clashing proslavery and antislavery constitutional orders. Rather than
authorizing only one order, Congress and the federal courts read the national
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Constitution’s ambiguous slavery and citizenship clauses to allow both.930 The
Constitution and courts had failed their role as neutral arbiter in interstate disputes.
III. Escalation and the Civil War, 1850-65
A. State Constitutionalism and the Slavery Crisis
Devolution worsened the era’s conflicts. Southwesterners rejected slavery,
inflating the free state majority and exacerbating the territorial slavery controversy.
Utahans did not legalize slavery in their 1849 or 1856 territorial constitutions, and New
Mexicans, burdened with the Mexican-Indian Taos Uprising of 1847 and a border dispute
with Texas, failed to recognize slavery in their 1848 and 1849 territorial constitutions. 931
An 1850 New Mexico Constitution outlawing slavery failed to be adopted.932 Laws aside,
plantation slavery never succeeded in these vast, dry territories.933 In 1860, Utah and New
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Mexico held twenty-nine and zero slaves respectively, blocking slavery’s westward
roll.934
Nor did slavery find a foothold on the west coast. Miners’ advocates from
California’s northern half dominated the territory’s 1849 Convention. Fearing slavery
would undercut miners’ wages and allow racial intermixing, delegates banned the
institution with little debate,935 preempting slave labor in California’s northern mines and
southern farms. Morton McCarver, Oliver M. Wozencraft, and James McHall Jones, all
born or adopted Kentuckians, proposed outlawing the immigration of free and enslaved
blacks, but the Convention dropped the clause, worrying egalitarian congressmen would
block California’s admission to the Union.936 California would be free. The Convention’s
Committee on Boundaries then proposed pushing California’s eastern border across the
Sierra Nevada to the Utah Territory, and the northern border to the Oregon Territory,
excluding slavery from much of the west. Winfield S. Sherwood, an immigrant from New
York, predicted these expansive borders would end the national slavery controversy,
declaring:
“if the Union is to be cut asunder by this one question, we shall regret it for years,
that having it in our power, with no cost to ourselves, we did not settle it forever.
It is this that governs my vote, and not any desire that I have to embrace that
territory within our limits as a State. I want to see [the territorial slavery debate]
forever kept out of the halls of Congress.”937

934

Fehrenbacher, The Slaveholding Republic, 273; Graber, Dred Scott, 43.
The original draft did not mention slavery, but delegate W.E. Shannon imported Section 23 of the 1846
Iowa Constitution, banning slavery. See the California Constitution of 1849, Article I, Section 18.
936
Gordon Lloyd, “The 1849 California Constitution: An Extraordinary Achievement by Dedicated,
Ordinary People,” in The Constitutionalism of American States, ed. George E. Connor and Christopher W.
Hammons (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2008), 717–18; David Alan Johnson, Founding the
Far West: California, Oregon, and Nevada, 1840-1890 (University of California Press, 1992), 127–30.
937
John Ross Browne, Report of the Debates in the Convention of California, on the Formation of the State
Constitution, in September and October, 1849 (Washington: Printed by John T. Towers, 1850), 420.
935

242

The Virginian Charles T. Botts, better attuned to the Southern mind, presciently warned
Sherwood of opposition from “the extreme faction of the South, headed by Mr. Calhoun,”
but also from “the wise and moderate men of the North” who feared so provoking
Southern firebrands.938 Like Sherwood, Botts hoped to frame a state constitution to
resolve national tensions. The Convention settled on Sherwood’s expansive borders, and
on September 9, 1850, Congress brought a free California into the Union under Douglas’
Compromise.939 To the north, Oregon’s 1843 and 1845 Organic Laws banned slavery,
and legislative statutes penned by Morton McCarver threatened whipping for any African
American, free or slave, who attempted to enter the territory.940 The 1850 Compromise’s
deference to local custom had yielded an anti-black, antislavery West, halting the spread
of slavery, worrying Southerners.
Southern hopes that the northern Great Plains were too frigid for white settlement
too were dashed.941 White settlers flooded Iowa, abolishing slavery in their 1846 and
1857 Constitutions by drawing on the Northwest Ordinance’s abolition clause.942 The
1848 Convention in neighboring Wisconsin banned slavery and enfranchised African
Americans, but only given voters’ and legislators’ eventual approval.943 And in the Old
Northwest where slavery had lingered since colonial days, an 1848 constitutional
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convention cemented abolition in Illinois, as did one in Michigan two years later, and one
in Indiana the year after that.944
Still, popular sovereignty was so rhetorically vague and palatable that both
Northern and Southern congressmen supported it again, now through the 1854 KansasNebraska Act. The Act, promoted by Douglas and the Missouri senator David Atchison,
repealed the Missouri Compromise’s prohibition on slavery above 36º 30’ parallel.
Atchison hoped this would draw new settlers from the slaveholding counties of western
Missouri into eastern Kansas, while Congress’ Northern Democrats expected Kansas to
be inhospitable to slavery and to become a free state.945 With the 36º 30’ line repealed,
slavery in the all territories would be decided by territorial voters, legislatures, and
constitutional conventions.
Again, devolution backfired. Northerners rejected the Act. The House Committee
on the Territories received petitions against the Act from all but three of the free states,
and from only two slave states.946 Northern Whigs, persuaded against slavery by the
recent trial of the fugitive Anthony Burns and the publication of Uncle Tom’s Cabin,
abandoned their party’s Southern wing, joining Free Soilers and rebranding themselves as
Republicans. In 1856 they nominated the free state antislavery candidates John C.
Fremont of California and William Dayton of New Jersey, rejecting the tradition of
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bisectional presidential tickets.947 Seventy percent of Northern Democratic congressmen
supporting the Kansas-Nebraska Act lost their seats in 1854, decimating the Party’s
Northern wing.948 Republicans were now largely antislavery Northerners and Democrats
largely proslavery Southerners, deadlocked over the slavery question.949
Kansans, faced with resolving this national question, wrangled over the state’s
constitution and future. The politics were dirty, then violent. Missouri Senator David
Atchison led his constituents across the Mississippi on Kansas’ election day, where their
votes installed a proslavery territorial legislature.950 Excluded from the legislature,
abolitionists Kansas formed a shadow government under the antislavery Topeka
Constitution of 1855.951 Proslavery forces then sacked the abolitionist stronghold of
Lawrence, for which John Brown executed local slaveholders.952 The conflagration
spread to the Unites States Senate where the South Carolinian Preston Brooks caned
Charles Sumner of Massachusetts for a lurid speech implicating Atchison and Brooks’
cousin in the Kansas crisis. The Northern-leaning House answered by accepting the
antislavery Topeka Constitution, but Southern senators blocked the measure. Kansas’
proslavery legislature and voters, backed by President James Buchanan, instead proposed
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the 1857 Lecompton Constitution, legalizing Kansas slavery.953 To appease their riled
constituents, surviving Northern Democrats made a stand, rejecting the Lecompton bill
and a slave code for the territories, splitting with the Party’s Southern majority.954
Quarantining the free soil issue in Kansas had not cured the controversy, but rather
incubated it and then spread it back to Congress.955
Other Westerners and Midwesterners also rejected slavery. In 1855, New England
transplants established Minnesota’s antislavery Republican Party, and two years later, the
state’s first constitutional convention abolished slavery.956 Of the sixty delegates to 1857
Oregon Constitutional Convention, roughly forty-five were Democrats and twenty-seven
hailed from slave states, submitting to voters proposed clauses establishing slavery and
prohibiting black immigration. Voters approved the Constitution and the clause limiting
black immigration, but rejected the proslavery clause 7,727 to 2,645. Oregon would have
no black citizens, free or slave. Over Southern opposition, a free soil Oregon entered the

953

See Kansas’ Lecompton Constitution of 1857, Article VII, Section 2-4 and Article XV, Schedule,
Section 14.
954
Graber, Dred Scott, 40–41, 164.
955
While a paralyzed Congress mulled the 1857 proposal, Kansas voters installed a free-state majority in
their legislature, which called a convention in Leavenworth to revise the original antislavery Constitution.
The nation’s eyes now on Kansas, a divided Congress ignored the contentious Leavenworth proposal.
Kansans made a fourth and final constitution. The 1859 Wyandot Convention adopted the old constitution’s
abolition clause, but tabled divisive provisions integrating public schools and abrogating the Fugitive Slave
Act. Suffrage was reserved to whites, and this relatively moderate document finally cleared a free soil
Senate two years later. The 1859 document, difficult to amend, entrenched Republican power in Kansas.
The Wyandot Convention was split between thirty-five Republicans, all but one from south of the Kansas
River, and seventeen Democrats, all but one from the River’s north. The Republican majority drafted the
state’s boundaries and institutions to exclude Democrats, who boycotted the proposed document. It passed
anyway, handing the state to Republicans for almost a century. See Kansas’ Leavenworth Constitution of
1857, Article I, Section 6 and Kansas’ Wyandot Constitution of 1859, Article I, Section 6 and Article V,
Section 1. Francis Howard Heller, The Kansas State Constitution: A Reference Guide (Westport, CT:
Greenwood Press, 1992), 3–8; Francis Howard Heller and Paul D. Schumaker, “The Kansas Constitution:
Conservative Politics through Republican Dominance,” in The Constitutionalism of American States, ed.
George E. Connor and Christopher W. Hammons (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2008), 490–91,
496–97.
956
See the Minnesota Constitution of 1857, Article I, Section 2.Barbara Allen, “Framing Government for a
Frontier Commonwealth: The Minnesota Constitution(s),” in The Constitutionalism of American States, ed.
George E. Connor and Christopher W. Hammons (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2008), 509–20.

246

Union in 1859.957 And in April 1860, thirty-two settlers of the New Mexico Territory met
in Tucson to draft a constitution for the separatist provisional government of Arizona, but
failed to establish slavery.958
Douglas’ 1850 and 1854 Acts briefly united congressmen around the palatable,
familiar rhetoric of democracy, localism, and bisectional compromise. While this
balancing tactic worked in 1787 and 1820, in the 1850s it backfired. Of the twenty-nine
constitutions proposed between 1850 and 1859, only three endorsing slavery were
ratified,959 increasing the free state majority and Southern anxieties. This happened for
several reasons. Westerners rejected slavery, fearing black immigration and knowing
plantation slavery would fail on arid southwestern land. Additionally, federal land claims
had reached the Pacific, preventing Southerners from retaking Congress by claiming new
proslavery territories.960 Finally, Northern voters and representatives turned against
slavery. Controlling both the House and Senate, after 1854 these free state congressmen
had little reason to broker another costly compromise and risk voter backlash.961
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Immediate electoral worries eclipsed long-term concerns over Union and constitutional
consensus.
State constitutional reform and reinterpretation also worsened the national
fugitive slave controversy. Northern state officials reinterpreted Prigg to allow state
noncompliance with federal fugitive law. New York’s governor and courts took this
reading of Prigg,962 as did Pennsylvania’s legislature.963 Pennsylvania’s courts quickly
affirmed that the state’s personal liberty law did not violate Prigg,964 and allowed the
state to emancipate visiting slaves.965 Vermont immediately answered Prigg with an 1843
law fining and imprisoning any state official who detained a fugitive, Rhode Island in
1842 constitutionally forbade slavery and the following year let expire a 1774 sojourner
law,966 and Connecticut’s legislature in 1848 abolished all slavery and slave sales.967
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After the 1850 Compromise, free state legislatures and courts protected their
personal liberty laws by nullifying the new Fugitive Slave Act. Massachusetts led the
charge with personal liberty law proposals in 1851 and 1852. In 1854 Bostonians mobbed
federal marshals to free the alleged fugitive Anthony Burns, and the following year, the
state legislature passed a comprehensive personal liberty law. Still unsatisfied, Worcester
citizens rallied to a disunion convention in 1857.968 Similarly, within weeks of the
passage of the 1850 Fugitive Slave Act, Vermont’s legislature let state attorneys appeal
for a writ of habeas corpus for alleged fugitives,969 passed two resolutions rejecting
federal authority over slavery, and sent these to Congress and every governor. President
Millard Fillmore reportedly threatened military intervention against Vermont, but
recanted,970 and Vermont passed additional personal liberty laws in 1854 and 1858.971
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A slew of personal liberty laws followed. Illinois’ Supreme Court in 1852 ruled
that in disputed cases fugitives should be presumed free,972 Connecticut passed an 1855
liberty law, and in 1857 freed all slaves entering the state.973 That same year, the New
Hampshire and Maine legislatures freed any slave involuntarily entering the state, the
Michigan and Ohio legislatures adopted personal liberty laws, and Ohio’s Supreme Court
freed any slave entering the state by citing Somerset.974 Finally, Wisconsin’s courts
bullishly abrogated the 1850 Fugitive Act.975 In In re Booth and Rycraft, Wisconsin
Justice Abram Smith repeatedly cited Jefferson to explain that the “respective states and
the people thereof were the source from which the federal government has derived all its
powers, and remain sovereign and independent only in so far as they have delegated or
relinquished powers an attributes incident to complete sovereignty.” Since the state’s
Constitution guaranteed Wisconsinites’ liberty and habeas corpus rights, Smith freed
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Sherman Booth and John Rycraft, who had been imprisoned under the 1850 Act for
aiding a fugitive.976
Southerners threatened secession. Southern state courts rejected Somerset and its
Northern progeny protecting fugitives.977 The secessionist Georgia senator Robert
Toombs saw in the liberty laws a plan to void Southerners’ constitutional property rights
and “to exterminate slavery by abrogating by State laws that portion of the Constitution
which provides for the return of fugitive slaves.”978 James Buchanan appealed to the
Northern “State legislatures [to] repeal their unconstitutional and obnoxious enactments.
Unless this shall be done without unnecessary delay, it is impossible for any human
power to save the Union.”979 Chief Justice Taney overruled the Wisconsin courts in 1859,
and in 1860 Unionist presidential candidates Abraham Lincoln and John Bell pushed for
repeal of the liberty laws, but with little success, as Northern Republican governors held
the line.980
The blame for this dissensus lay with Northerners’ assertive reinterpretation of the
Prigg decision, which disempowered and riled Southern slaveholders. Appeasing
Southerners and bringing stability required a firm, nationalized approach to fugitive law.
But Prigg, backed by Strader, created a patchwork of clashing state statutes and
constitutional provisions, destabilizing national constitutional politics. The 1850 Fugitive
976
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Act came too late, only affirmed Northerners’ commitment to their reactionary liberty
laws, inflaming the controversy.
Across the Union, Northern and Southern legislatures together restricted black
citizenship, resolving this national question. All Southern legislatures, worried free
blacks might foment slave revolt, limited free blacks’ citizenship, often legally treating
them as slaves.981 To thwart integration, Southern legislatures and governors largely
ignored state constitutional promises requiring they fund public education,982 and every
Southern state except Tennessee outlawed the instruction of slaves.983 Northern states
forced blacks into segregated, underfunded charity schools,984 which the Massachusetts
Supreme Court upheld in Roberts v. City of Boston.985 Similarly, almost all Northern
legislatures excluded blacks from voting or holding higher office.986 Frontier legislatures
were no better. Oregonian and Californian legislators stripped black citizenship rights to
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discourage black immigration,987 despite congressional objections.988 Similarly, Illinois’
and Indiana’s Constitutions outlawed black immigration to the state, and Indiana fined
resident blacks, using these funds to resettle blacks elsewhere.989
State courts settled on a patchwork of decisions withdrawing some or all
citizenship rights for blacks. While New England courts extended equality and due
process clause protections to African Americans, Connecticut and Pennsylvania courts
denied that blacks held federal birthright citizenship.990 But North Carolina, one of the
last Southern states to allow black voting, granted free blacks birthright citizenship in
State v. Manuel in 1838. 991 Kentucky, Virginia, and Alabama courts also granted
birthright citizenship to the children of slaves in the process of gaining their freedom, as
987
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did the Louisiana Supreme Court, which added that long-term residence in a free territory
freed a plaintiff not born in a slave state or territory. Free blacks now existed neither as
aliens nor full citizens, but as an intermediate “degraded race” or “third class” in the
state. Tennessee’s Chief Justice John Catron similarly asserted that the state’s
manumission policy affirmed blacks’ partially inferior citizenship status.992 And in
Kentucky, the Court of Appeals justified free black’s partial citizenship by noting that
free black men, removed by statute from the privileges and immunities granted to white
men, could not be full citizens.993
Federal courts repeatedly rebuffed blacks’ challenges to these laws, sequestering
the issue at the state level. The federal Attorneys General usually accepted Attorney
General William Wirt’s 1821 instruction that blacks not receive federal Privileges and
Immunities citizenship. Affirming the states’ policy of intermediate citizenship, Attorney
General Hugh Legare deemed blacks mere “denizens” in 1843.994 In Strader v. Graham
the Supreme Court rejected appeals under the Commerce Clause, signaling it had little
interest in interfering with the states’ traditional prerogative to regulate citizenship. And
since state legislatures often mirrored the citizenship law of neighboring states, crossborder tensions were rare, giving fewer opportunities for suits. In minimizing interstate
disputes and settling on nationwide restrictions on black citizenship, the states kept this
national issue quiet.995
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In May 1856, Democratic Party leaders asked the Supreme Court to silence FreeSoil Republicans by affirming popular sovereignty.996 The Court took the issues of black
citizenship and territorial slavery in Dred Scott.997 Dred Scott, a slave, appealed for his
freedom to the Supreme Court. Taney dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, not by
citing Missouri’s prior rejection of Scott’s citizenship and standing under the widelyaccepted Strader v. Graham ruling, but rather by controversially asserted that no black
person, free or slave, held federal birthright citizenship and according judicial standing.
Taney claimed birthright citizenship came to those granted the civic privileges limited to
whites or to those descended from the nation’s white founders, and that federal
naturalization citizenship could not apply to native-born blacks.998 This preempted free
black litigants from appealing state laws on federal Privileges and Immunities grounds,
affirming the states’ diverse schemes for partial citizenship for free blacks.999 This could

personal liberty laws. That is, the fugitive slave crisis was for Northerners primarily an issue over states’
rights, not blacks’ rights. It seems that many Northerners were content with stripping blacks’ rights, so long
as it was on Northern terms. Thus many Northerners happily accepted a national regime limiting black
citizenship.
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have settled that case, but Taney added that the Territories Clause extended congressional
authority only to territory under federal jurisdiction at the 1787 ratification of the
Constitution, invalidating the later Compromises of 1820 and 1850, reopening all
Western territories to slavery.1000 Further still, he declared congressional abolition would
violate the Fifth Amendment due process rights of slaveholders to claim property in
slaves.1001
In ruling against black federal citizenship, Taney effectively overrode the stable
status quo of diverse state-level laws for partial black citizenship. Specifically, Taney
affirmed slaveholders’ Fifth Amendment right to travel the nation with their slaves,
voiding all Northern personal liberty laws and state constitutional due process and
equality protections for slaves.1002 Free states considered nullifying Taney’s decisions.
New Hampshire replied by freeing visiting slaves and Maine by granting fugitives a
defense attorney.1003 Some newspapers warned the Taney Court would expand
slaveholders’ Fifth Amendment rights to allow slavery in Northern states. Citing the
Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, the New York legislature invoked its right to nullify
such a federal law. Moderate Republicans voided Taney’s ruling on the territories,
suggesting that since Scott lacked citizenship and standing to sue, the Court had no
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jurisdiction over his case, making the decision a nonbinding obiter dictum.1004 Similarly,
Wisconsin courts ignored Taney’s Ableman v. Booth decision to re-imprison the
abolitionist Sherman Booth and Wisconsinites freed Booth and elected his attorney,
Byron Paine, to the state Supreme Court.1005 Few of these Northern states granted blacks
full citizenship, suggesting their objection was not over Taney’s repeal of black
citizenship, but rather his overriding Northern state statutes. That is, the controversy was
more over states’ rights to abolition than blacks’ rights to equality.1006
As Northern states radicalized, in November 1860 Republicans captured thirtyone of fifty Senate seats and 108 of 183 House seats, bringing the antislavery
congressional majority Southerners had long feared. With Democrats divided between
candidates, Lincoln took the White House with only forty percent of the popular vote,
drawing on antislavery voters and Northerners exasperated with the Buchanan
administration’s corruption, proslavery Kansas platform, and mismanagement in the face
of an economic panic.1007 Proslavery Southerners saw they had little chance of regaining
the Congress or presidency. They seceded and readied for war.
B. State Constitutionalism during the Civil War
Congressmen scrambled to save the Union. Congress had long used statutes to
devolve slave law, but in the 1850s the states failed to resolve the nation’s slavery
question, so Congress now sought resolution through federal constitutional amendment.
The number of proposed federal amendments skyrocketed, jumping from twenty-four
total between 1850 and 1859 to seventy-two in 1860, to 167 the following year. This
1004
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included dozens of proposals on abolition, fugitive slaves, territorial slavery, the rights to
own and travel with slaves, and on the slave trade.1008 For the first time, Congress
seriously considered answering the slavery question by amending the federal
Constitution.
Most amendments proposed in the winter of 1860-1 attempted reconciliation with
the South. On November 9,, 1860 President Buchanan considered a second federal
convention, and on the 3rd of the following month he suggested constitutional
amendments overturning Northern personal liberty laws and protecting slavery in the
states and territories. Ten days later, Georgia’s Robert Toombs urged Southern
congressman to back a similar amendment overriding the liberty laws. As Buchanan and
Toombs’ proposals failed, John Crittenden offered amendments allowing popular
sovereignty, compensated emancipation for runaways, and prohibiting Congress from
abolishing slavery. These too were rejected. Of the hundreds of proposals offered in the
coming months, a few others gained traction, but ultimately all failed.1009
On December 20th, South Carolina seceded and withdrew from Congress,
exaggerating Congress’ Northern majority. The other six deep South states followed in
January and February, sending delegates to Montgomery, Alabama to draft a provisional
constitution, which was replaced by a permanent constitution the next month. Following
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the April attack on Fort Sumter, the six border states joined the Confederacy, ratifying the
Confederate Constitution over the summer. Lincoln, now president, rejected peace by
federal amendment, and federal congressmen, burdened with the War and unwilling to
reconcile with rebels, proposed only nine constitutional amendments between 1862 and
1863, a precipitous decline given that congressmen had proposed nearly that many on a
single December day in 1860.1010 Federal troops now shouldered the Union’s fate.1011
The new Confederate Constitution gave the Confederate states broad power to
elaborate their nascent constitutional order.1012 Delegates convened in each state to ratify
the Confederate Constitution, and while waiting on ratification, began legislating and
raising funds, troops, and supplies.1013 Most ratified new state constitutions within a
year,1014 maintaining provisions for slavery and disenfranchising women and nonwhites.
Some framers, no longer obligated by free blacks’ federal Privileges and Immunities
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rights, now constitutionally restricted the immigration of free and enslaved blacks.1015
And state framers for the first time declared their states sovereign nations, with attendant
explicit rights to nullification, interposition, and secession.1016
The documents did not last long. The historian Frank Owsley asserted that this
constitutional decentralization doomed the Confederate war effort and national and state
constitutions.1017 But even a centralized constitutional system might have died in infancy
against overwhelming and fast-advancing Union armies.1018 Given the Confederate
Constitution lasted merely four years, one can only speculate how this decentralization
might have affected its endurance in peacetime.
As Northern armies toppled Confederate governments, Lincoln began
Reconstruction through state constitutional revision. He tested early Reconstruction plans
by moving to readmit any Confederate state that drafted an antislavery constitution
backed by ten percent of the state’s 1860 voting population. Under the plan, Lincoln
pushed Louisiana’s Union Governor Michael Hahn to admit blacks to the state’s 1864
convention. Delegates, all backcountry and working white men, made New Orleans the
capital and thanks to reapportionment, the new seat of power, weakening planter
counties. Public workers won a nine-hour day and a minimum wage, slavery was
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abolished, and progressive taxes supported public schools, though blacks got no vote.1019
Arkansas called a convention under the ten percent plan, and within a day of meeting, a
committee of thirteen passed a new constitution abolishing slavery and protecting blacks’
property rights.1020 Across the Mississippi, Tennessee’s military governor Andrew
Johnson called a loyalist convention to propose amendments outlawing slavery and
property in humans and allowing the legislature to disenfranchise ex-Confederates, which
pro-Union voters ratified in 1865.1021
Congress also initially experimented with Reconstruction through state
constitutional design on the Confederacy’s periphery. When western Virginia farmers
assembled and drafted a proslavery constitution for the new loyalist state of West
Virginia, Senator Charles Sumner conditioned the state’s admission on abolition, and
West Virginians capitulated.1022 Prodded by Union occupation, in 1864 Marylanders
representing western farm counties narrowly ratified a new constitution freeing slaves
1019
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without compensation and enfranchising Union soldiers. Reapportionment shifted
legislative power away from Chesapeake planters, and provisions for debt forgiveness
and tax-funded public education supported poor whites. But blacks remained
disenfranchised in the state, precluding interracial organizing.1023 In 1864 Congress
prepared for Southern reconstruction by forcing the new Nevada Territory to draft a
constitution, including clauses rejecting slavery and Mormonism. But suffrage was
reserved to whites and subject to a poll tax.1024 Soon Congress turned its efforts to the
Confederacy. In late 1864, Union troops advancing across Georgia and Virginia
dismembered the remaining Confederate state governments, closing the Southern
constitutional experiment.
IV. Reconstruction through State Constitutional Revision, 1865-77
Federal armies marched on Atlanta and Richmond, pillaging plantations and
freeing slaves. Weary Confederates accepted abolition, ending debates over fugitive
slaves and territorial slavery. The Union survived, now disburdened of slavery, thanks
not to legislators’ reflection and choice but to accident and force on the fields at
Antietam, Gettysburg, and Vicksburg.1025
Yet other controversies remained. Abolition, once the states’ prerogative, now fell
to separate, untested plans posed by Lincoln and Congress. Congress also debated
whether to readmit ex-Confederate states as equal states in the Union or as conquered
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alien nations to be dissolved into new congressionally-administered territories.1026 Also
unclear was whether to allow ex-Confederates to vote and hold office. And as four
million Southern blacks earned freedom, old questions of black citizenship resurfaced.
Early Reconstruction constitutions prohibited black voting, office-holding, and jury
service, frustrating Lincoln and the radical Republicans from expanding their voting base.
Freemen’s economic and social rights, still undefined, were similarly contentious.1027
With Union troops pressing south and ex-Confederates excluded from Congress,
emboldened Northern congressmen addressed Reconstruction’s controversies with
hundreds of amendment proposals. The federal Constitution entered a period of
unprecedented instability. Congress, which had proposed only twenty-four amendments
in the decade before the War, now proposed 421 amendments between 1864 and 1870.
Congressmen proposed dozens of amendments for emancipation, reapportioning
Congress, payment of rebel debt, and for expanding blacks’ citizenship, suffrage, and
civil rights while limiting ex-Confederates’ rights.1028 Seven proposals passed at least one
house, including the three revolutionary Reconstruction Amendments.1029

1026

On the House floor on June 13, 1864 Ohio Democrat Samuel Cox declared the Union was a compact
which Southern states could exit and reenter without losing sovereignty and attendant rights and police
powers. New York’s Fernando Wood argued the same on May 3 rd. However, the following day George
Boutwell of Massachusetts replied that the Southern states, in exiting the Union, had ceased to exist. The
radical Pennsylvanian Thaddeus Stevens asserted that the ex-Confederates states ought to be treated as
conquered alien territories. The Congressional Globe: Thirty-Eighth Congress, First Session (Washington:
John C. Rives, 1864), 2075, 2078–80, 2102–3, 2917–18.
1027
Foner, A Short History of Reconstruction, 30–34.
1028
See Table 11 in the appendix for a count of these topics by year.
1029
In May 1864 Ohio Democrat George Pendleton summarized the Radical Republican Party as
“revolutionary. It seeks to use [legislative] powers to destroy the Government, to change its form, to change
its spirit. It seeks under the forms of law to make a new Government, a new Union, to ingraft upon it new
principles, new theories…It is in rebellion against the Constitution.” The other four failed amendments
concerned Confederate War debt, congressional representation, suffrage, and selection of presidential
electors. The Congressional Globe, 1864, 2105; Ames, The Proposed Amendments, 23.

263

Abolition came first. In January of 1864 Senator Charles Sumner proposed an
amendment granting slaves freedom and equal protection before the law.1030 The
following month the Senate Judiciary Committee accepted Sumner’s proposal but
redacted the equality provision, leaving blacks’ citizenship unresolved. Debate resumed
on April 5th when Kentucky’s senators offered opposed amendments for compensated
emancipation and prohibiting black citizenship and office-holding.1031 Other amendments
against black citizenship and for gradual compensated emancipation threatened to delay
abolition for generations.1032 On April 8th the Senate passed the Thirteenth Amendment, a
brief two-sentence amendment clarifying little. The first section required abolition
without compensation. The Amendment’s novel and contentious second section let
Congress back the Amendment with legislation protecting black citizenship, potentially
overriding state law.1033 States’ rights Democrats in the House blocked the Amendment,
which failed passage by thirteen votes, and South Carolinian and Alabamian state
legislators soon attacked the proposal. After the House vote, little was clear. In April
1864 Congress had not answered whether emancipation would come immediately, with
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compensation, or through the states, or whether free blacks in the North and South could
expect federal citizenship.1034
As the War closed, an overwhelmed Congress deferred much of Reconstruction to
Southern state constitutional conventions. There were several reasons for this. First, in
early May of 1864 Congress, later backed by the Supreme Court, decided not to dissolve
the ex-Confederate states, but to readmit them to the Union.1035 Consequently, ratification
of the Thirteenth Amendment, requiring three-fourths of the Union’s states, waited on the
readmission of the Southern states through new constitutional conventions.1036
Additionally, through readmission the Southern states regained nearly exclusive Tenth
Amendment authority over blacks’ citizenship, education, marriage, and suffrage.
Republican congressmen, hoping to cement freemen’s social, economic, and educational
rights, now relied on state constitutional framers.1037 Finally, Lincoln’s ten percent plan
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showed congressmen that Unionist state constitutional framers could exclude exConfederates and decisively settle disputes over citizenship, states’ rights, and slavery in
favor of blacks and Republicans.1038
Two weeks after the Senate passed the Thirteenth Amendment, both houses
passed the Wade-Davis Bill, deferring the bulk of constitutional Reconstruction to
Unionist state constitutional conventions. These congressional requirements were more
demanding than Lincoln’s ten percent plan.1039 Worried his tenuous Louisiana
government would not meet the Bill’s requirements, Lincoln quietly pocket-vetoed the
Bill.1040
After the House rejected abolition, Congress moved on to hundreds of other
amendment proposals, leaving unchallenged Southern Republicans to quickly reform
their state constitutions to abolish slavery without compensation. West Virginia’s
Constitution outlawed slavery in 1863, and Arkansas, Nevada, Louisiana, and Maryland
did so the following year. In 1865 Tennessee, Alabama, Georgia, Missouri, South
Carolina, and Florida’s constitutions emancipated slaves. Georgia’s required the
legislature grant people of color special protection by law, and Florida’s granted blacks
an ostensibly full complement of rights, including the right to testify in trials.1041 Most of
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the South had settled on immediate uncompensated emancipation through state
constitutional revision.
These state clauses quieted House debate over abolition and compensation. In
January 1865, the House’s newly-elected Republican supermajority pushed a vote on the
proposed Thirteenth Amendment. States’ rights Democrats now praised the
Amendment’s first section for upholding the state abolition clauses. Moreover, these state
clauses preempted Congress from aggressively implementing abolition under the
Amendment’s second section, assuaging Democrats’ worries. Democrats who earlier
opposed the Amendment now supported it. As Pennsylvania Democrat Alexander
Coffroth put it:
“In June last my objection to this amendment was that it was taking away the
property of people of the States that remained true to the Union… Since that time
Missouri and Maryland have abolished slavery by their own action, and the
Governor of Kentucky in his message recommends to the Legislature of that State
gradual emancipation. The same objection which was then urged against this
amendment cannot now be urged.”1042
States’ rights Democrats now appeased, they joined House Republicans to pass the
Amendment, sending it to the states for ratification. Congressmen largely stopped
proposing amendments on abolition and compensation emancipation.1043
The state abolition clauses also preempted controversies during the ratification of
the Thirteenth Amendment. By the Amendment’s ratification, nearly every state had
already voluntarily abolished slavery,1044 such that state legislators accepted the
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redundant, uncontroversial federal Amendment.1045 Seventeen legislatures ratified the
Amendment in the first month alone. Longstanding New England abolition provisions
“kept the amendment from emerging there as a controversial issue,” securing immediate
ratification in New England, per Michael Vorenberg.1046 The federal abolition clause
reaffirmed the newer state clauses.1047 For example, Unionist governments in Louisiana,
Tennessee, Arkansas, Missouri, Maryland, Virginia, and Nevada, having recently
abolished slavery, ratified the Amendment within weeks, many unanimously. Framers in
the unreconstructed deep South postponed ratification votes until their states formed
permanent legislatures in late 1865.1048 Across the Union, state constitutional revision
quieted debate over immediate uncompensated abolition, easing the Amendment’s

These six states abolished slavery as follows. First, Delaware forbade international slave trading in 1831,
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compensated emancipation in 1862. However, rural legislators blocked abolition until overruled by the
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Article IV, Section 19. Third, Kentucky’s Constitution of 1850, Article XIII, Section 3 forbade abolition
until it was superseded by the federal Thirteenth Amendment. And fourth, North Carolina did not
constitutionally abolish slavery until 1868. See the North Carolina Constitution of 1868, Article I, Section
33. Fifth, Mississippi’s failed 1865 convention proposed abolition, which ultimately came through military
occupation, affirmed under the Mississippi Constitution of 1869, Article I, Section 19. Finally, Texas’ 1866
Constitution, Article VIII, Section 1 abolished slavery, affirming the federal amendment. Tennessee, a
seventh case, proposed an abolition amendment in 1865, which was ratified on February 22, 1866, after the
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ratification.1049 In sum, the Amendment did not expressly require Congress force
abolition on the states, as some scholars claim,1050 but rather deferred to the states’
existing abolition clauses.1051
Oddly, the Thirteenth Amendment helped preserve a type of slavery some states
had banned. Prior to the Amendment, only half of Southern states allowed convict
slavery.1052 But in February 1864 Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Lyman
Trumbull proposed a clause allowing slavery “as a punishment for crime whereof the
party shall have been duly convicted,” and the clause passed the Senate with little
debate.1053 Subsequently and perhaps thanks to the Amendment, four more Southern
states passed clauses for convict slavery,1054 much to the frustration of antislavery

1049

After ratifying the Amendment, Illinois Republicans reinterpreted their state constitution to expand
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congressmen.1055 In affirming these state clauses, Trumbull widened the convict slavery
loophole, closed by a few previous state framers,1056 letting Southern prisons lease
convict laborers to private parties. The state and federal provisions harmonized, likely
preempting controversy over convict slavery, with the unanticipated and likely
unintended consequence of retrenching agricultural slavery. Thus to study the federal
Amendment without the accompanying state clauses is to misunderstand the federal
clause’s enforcement.
Following Lincoln’s assassination in April 1865, Andrew Johnson assumed the
presidency. Johnson, a repentant former slaveholder and Tennessee Democrat and a strict
constructionist, found no explicit justification for federal interference in state
constitutionalism.1057 A provision re-enfranchising ex-Confederates holding less than
$20,000 in taxable property sent a mix of moderate ex-Confederate and Unionist white
yeomen to state conventions in Mississippi, Alabama, Florida, Georgia, and the Carolinas
in the summer of 1865. These delegates repealed property qualifications on officeholding and reapportioned legislative seats away from lowland planter counties, but
maintained antebellum prohibitions on black voting and citizenship. That autumn deep
South states elected ex-Confederates to Congress and the state legislatures, which in
Mississippi and South Carolina forced free blacks into contracted plantation labor under
1055

As Representative John Farnsworth put it: “Yet we find those states now reducing these men again to
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punishment of jailing or fine.1058 Other Southern states soon switched to facially raceneutral laws coercing blacks into agricultural apprenticeships and labor.1059
Dissatisfied with these six deep South constitutions of 1865, congressional
Republicans first refused to seat Southern representatives and then proposed the Civil
Rights Act of 1866. The Act expanded blacks’ rights to litigate and negotiate labor
contracts in the North and South, but did not expand their broader political and electoral
privileges, which remained the states’ prerogative. 1060 As Lyman Trumbull explained,
“the granting of civil rights does not, and never did in this country, carry with it rights, or,
more properly speaking, political privileges…The right to vote and hold office in the
States depends upon the legislation of the various States.”1061 Even so, congressional
Democrats took the Act as federal overreach, replying that Dred Scott outlawed black
birthright citizenship, and Johnson vetoed the Act, which survived only thanks to a
congressional override. However, Johnson successfully vetoed an appropriations bill
supporting free blacks through the Freedmen’s Bureau.1062
In June 1866 Congress’ Joint Committee on Reconstruction circumvented
Johnson’s veto by calling for a second round of state constitutional conventions. The
Committee, led by Thaddeus Stevens and William Pitt Fessenden, had several aims. First,
in deferring black enfranchisement to new state constitutional conventions, Republicans
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avoided direct conflict with Democrats and Johnson’s yeoman state governments.1063
Johnson, bound to a states’ rights platform, had been outmaneuvered, and in his 1866
annual message to Congress praised the plan for promising Southern states eventual
congressional representation. Second, waiting on these conventions, congressional
Republicans could keep refusing to seat Southerners, perhaps in the meantime passing a
federal amendment for black citizenship.1064 Finally, some radical Republican
congressmen wanted to protect blacks’ state citizenship, voting rights, education, and
economic and marriage rights. All of these fell under the states’ police powers, a
centuries-old authority that most Republicans, including Trumbull, placed beyond the
reach of Congress and the 1866 Civil Rights Act.1065 Protecting a full complement of
black social rights required deference to the states.
The Joint Committee also proposed the Fourteenth Amendment to entrench their
federal civil rights platform and to complement these state reforms. Thaddeus Stevens
revived successful House amendment proposals to repudiate Confederate War debt and
reapportion representatives,1066 bundling these with provisions promising birthright
federal and state citizenship and forbidding compensated emancipation, office-holding by
ex-Confederates, and state infringement on federal due process, equal protection, and
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privileges and immunities rights.1067 Congressmen had already proposed dozens of
amendments on each of these issues,1068 which Stevens united into a single omnibus
proposal. This Amendment carried nearly the whole Republican’s constitutional agenda.
Stevens’ amendment was designed to work in tandem with state constitutional
reform. Southern state framers had already repudiated Confederate War debt, forbade
compensated emancipation and office-holding by ex-Confederates, and were extending
equal protection and suffrage rights.1069 Further, the Joint Committee hesitated to
interfere in state constitutionalism. The Committee’s Majority Report clarified that
Fourteenth Amendment’s reapportionment provision “would be gentle and persuasive”
on the states, as committee members doubted “whether Congress had power, even under
the amended Constitution, to prescribe the qualifications of voters in a State, or could act
directly on the subject.” Further, the Committee was skeptical that “the States would
consent to surrender a power they had always exercised, and to which they were
attached.”1070 Finally, in exchange for Southerners’ ratification, the Committee
considered an enabling act immediately recognizing each Southern state, but instead
settled on piecemeal restoration through the state conventions.1071 If the Committee’s
Majority Report and the Amendment’s Section 2, promising compliant Southerners
statehood and congressional representation, was a carrot, the rest of the Fourteenth
1067
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Amendment was the stick.1072 Deference to the states and the Fourteenth Amendment
were drafted jointly, so that neither worked without the other.
The Amendment passed the House on May 11, 1866 after only three days’ debate,
and passed the Senate three weeks later after revisions to the first section. Johnson replied
that Congress, in excluding Southerners, had failed quorum, invalidating the Amendment.
Unable to veto the proposal, he urged states to reject it.1073 Delaware, Maryland, and
Kentucky obliged, and in the winter of 1866-7, all eleven ex-Confederate states, save
Tennessee, refused ratification. Republicans were incensed. Charles Sumner proposed
coercing the states into ratification and state constitutional reform under the Thirteenth
Amendment’s Section 2 and the Guarantee Clause.1074 But Northern states ratified the
Amendment, and when critics replied that Sumner’s plan and a broad reading of the
Guarantee Clause allowed enfranchising women and children across the Union, moderate
Republicans balked.1075 Instead Congress intervened only in the South. The
Reconstruction Acts of 1867 enfranchised Southern blacks, disenfranchised exConfederates, and imposed military rule on Southern states until they ratified the
Fourteenth Amendment and accompanying new state constitutions.1076 In mid-1867, the
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Army organized voter registration, elections, state constitutional and ratification
conventions.1077
Congress’ Joint Committee Report and Reconstruction Acts pushed on the states
controversies over black citizenship and ex-Confederate debt and rights. This destabilized
state constitutionalism, prompting a second set of Southern constitutions which now
granted blacks citizenship and equal protection, often exceeding the minimum mandated
by the Fourteenth Amendment.1078 For example, under Army coercion,1079 Georgians in
1865 incorporated the text of the Fourteenth Amendment into Georgia’s bill of rights and
additionally granted blacks the vote and free public schooling.1080 Other Southern states
elected blacks and Northern carpetbaggers, mainly Republicans, to so-called “black and
tan” conventions, over the protestations and boycotts of unreconstructed whites. African
Americans comprised about a third of the delegates across the South.1081 Of the forty-six
delegates to Florida’s 1868 Convention, eighteen were African Americans and forty-three
were Republicans, who together designed a new government that quickly ratified the
Fourteenth Amendment.1082 Arkansas’ 1868 Convention of seventy-five delegates
included sixty Republicans, of whom eight were African Americans, and established
universal male suffrage, free and unsegregated public schools, and equal protection for all
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races.1083 Louisiana’s radical convention, held the same year, awarded state citizenship by
birthright and naturalization regardless of race or previous servitude, required
officeholders by oath publicly affirm racial equality, and forbade racial discrimination in
state, parish or municipally-licensed public places, including schools, and the 1879
Convention funded a university in New Orleans for black students.1084 Conventions in
Mississippi, Alabama, North Carolina, and Virginia ratified similarly egalitarian state
constitutions.1085
These state conventions, prompting the election of new legislators and the
drafting of new egalitarian clauses, eased the Fourteenth Amendment’s passage. Before
ratification of the Amendment, at least ten of the sixteen ex-Confederate or slaveholding
states had already ratified similar state constitutional equality clauses, and two more
followed in the next two years.1086 Since many Southerners already lived under an
equality clause, they likely had fewer grounds to challenge the proposed federal Equal
Protection Clause.
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Further, these state clauses helped elaborate the federal one. Like most Southern
constitutional provisions, the state equality clauses were long and detailed, and unlike
prior Revolutionary-era state declarations of individuals’ natural equality, the new
equality clauses obligated state enforcement.1087 For example, following Congress’
instructions, Georgia’s 1868 Convention drafted a constitution mandating birthright
citizenship and equal protection, to be backed by legislation, as did Alabama’s.1088
Moreover, these provisions complemented other clauses that drew on states’ exclusive
police powers to allow blacks state citizenship, fair working hours, fair wages, free
integrated schooling, interracial marriage, voting privileges, office-holding rights, and
militia service.1089 For example, through the state’s police powers, Louisiana’s 1864
Convention granted workers limited hours and a minimum wage, an authority unavailable
to Congress. Many Southern state constitutions also stripped ex-Confederates’ citizenship
and voting rights,1090 affirming the Fourteenth Amendment’s Section 3. Congress could
not have expounded the contentious Fourteenth Amendment or built a black, Republican
Southern coalition without accompanying state constitutional revision.
1087
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Unionist state constitutional framers did not extend their police powers so far as
to advocate compact theory or nullification. Lincoln and Congress rejected compact
theory’s claim that the states predated the Union,1091 as did Reconstruction state framers.
North Carolina’s 1868 Convention recognized the supremacy of the federal Constitution
and rejected a right to secession.1092 Similarly, Louisiana’s 1868 Constitution voided the
state’s secession act and constitution, declared “citizens of this State owe allegiance to
the United States; and this allegiance is paramount to that which they owe to the State,”
and required state officeholders swear allegiance to the federal Constitution and laws. 1093
These clauses helped quiet the old nullification question.
While most Southern constitutions expressly enfranchised blacks by 1868,1094 the
federal Constitution did not.1095 This undermined the constitutionality of Congress’
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Speeches and Writings (New York: Library of America, 1861), 309–10. There are two problems with
Lincoln’s view. First, the Declaration’s “mutual pledge” was not a bond between the states, but between the
document’s signers, immediately prefacing their signatures. Second, against Lincoln’s claim that “Not one
of [the states] ever had a State constitution, independent of the Union,” four states drafted constitutions
before the Continental Congress declared a union of states on July 4, 1776. These four states were New
Hampshire (January 5, 1776), South Carolina (May 26, 1776), Virginia (June 29, 1776), and New Jersey
(July 2, 1776). Lincoln claimed these four constitutions were “dependent on, and preparatory to, coming
into the Union.” While the framers of these four state constitutions expected and needed eventual military
union, they did not need union for constitutional or legal legitimacy. For legitimacy, these first state
framers looked to the authorization of the people of their respective states. Hence, legally and
constitutionally, these states predate the Union which Lincoln traces to the Declaration.
1092
See the North Carolina Constitution of 1868, Article I, Section 4-5.
1093
See the Louisiana Constitution of 1868, Title I, Article 2 and 13.
1094
Note that these Southern states were the exception, as other states had already disenfranchised blacks.
In 1865 only six states in the Union, five of them in New England, allowed blacks to vote, and only five on
equal terms, leaving only six percent of the nation’s black population enfranchised. Beaumont, The Civic
Constitution, 159.
1095
Sumner was an outlier in arguing the Guarantee Clause and the Thirteenth Amendment’s second
section let Congress enfranchise blacks in the states. The Fourteenth Amendment, Section 2 let Congress
sanction states for restricting the franchise, but did not allow direct congressional intervention in franchise

278

Reconstruction Acts enfranchising Southern blacks.1096 Further, abolition vacated the
Three-Fifths Clause, granting Southern blacks and states even greater representation in
the House and Electoral College and greater national importance. Republicans therefore
offered federal amendments to legitimize and entrench the Reconstruction Acts and
Southern state franchise clauses. Prior to the War, congressmen did not propose a single
franchise amendment, but between 1866 and 1869, they offered at least seventy-eight.1097
In 1868 Republicans renewed their congressional majority, offering more suffrage
amendment proposals, one of which passed the House. The Senate proposed an alternate
provision, spurring a protracted reconciliation battle, ending with a bare-bones
compromise in the last days of the final session of the Fortieth Congress. The brief
Fifteenth Amendment only protected American citizens’ rights to vote regardless of race
or previous enslavement, as enforced by Congress. Unlike other proposals, it did not
prohibit restrictions based on property, origin, intelligence or literacy, gender, or ones on
office-holding.1098
State constitutional revision paved the way for ratification, preempting
controversies over the Amendment. When the Fifteenth Amendment was ratified, every
Southern state had reformed their franchise laws and at least eleven of the sixteen exlaw. Note also that on the eve of war in 1861 Steven Douglas, John Crittenden, and George Pugh proposed
five amendments to appease Southerners by disenfranchising blacks, the first major congressional foray
into a suffrage amendment. Ames, The Proposed Amendments, 226.
1096
As noted, radicals like Thaddeus Stevens sought to treat the ex-Confederate states as territories subject
to congressional oversight, including franchise regulation, under the Territories Clause. However, by 1867
all of the ex-Confederate states had been readmitted to the Union, weakening this position. Congress did
use this authority to propose enfranchising Montana blacks, and enfranchised African Americans in the
District of Columbia under the District Clause. See Article I, Section 8, Clause 17. Kyvig, Explicit and
Authentic Acts, 176–77.
1097
In 1866, Congress roundly rejected ten proposals to enfranchise blacks, including an ornately-worded
resolution by Sumner promising black enfranchisement and the end of aristocracy and oligarchy. Six more
failed the following year.
1098
Ames, The Proposed Amendments, 229–35; Kyvig, Explicit and Authentic Acts, 176–81; Vile,
Encyclopedia of Constitutional Amendments, Proposed Amendments, and Amending Issues, 1789-2002,
188–89.
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Confederate and ex-slave states had already enfranchised black men, almost all through
constitutional reform.1099 Universal manhood suffrage was already the constitutional
status quo in the South. 1100 Some Northern states repealed racial franchise restrictions
just before the Amendment’s passage, while others did so by ratifying the federal
Amendment.1101 A dozen states across the North and deep South approved the
Amendment within a month, with another five following that spring.1102 Serious legal
controversies were limited to the border states like West Virginia, 1103 which had avoided

1099

Between the passage of the Military Reconstruction Act in March of 1867 and the year’s end, every
Southern state but one revised its suffrage laws. Texas had enfranchised all citizens in 1866. See Table 17
in the appendix for state constitutional franchise provisions. Kyvig, Explicit and Authentic Acts, 173.
1100
For example, Georgia and North Carolina allowed universal manhood suffrage in 1868, the later
without property qualification. See the Georgia Constitution of 1868, Article II, Section 2 and the North
Carolina Constitution of 1868, Article I, Section 22 and Article VI, Section 1. Georgia’s clause reversed
black disenfranchisement under the state’s 1865 Constitution, Article V, Section 1. See also Table 17 in the
appendix. Note that Virginia’s Constitution was ratified the same year as the Fifteenth Amendment, but
drafted the year before. Tennessee’s Constitution was not ratified until 1870, but the state had already
enfranchised black men by statute three years earlier. Hill, The Georgia State Constitution, 7–10.
1101
Referenda in Connecticut, Minnesota, Wisconsin, the Colorado Territory, and the District of Columbia
in 1865 showed Republican support for enfranchising blacks. In 1868, Minnesotans passed an amendment
removing the stipulation that voters be white. Michiganders did the same the following year via
amendment. But Voters in the Democratic strongholds of Ohio and New Jersey refused reforms
enfranchising blacks in 1867. And racial disenfranchisement survived in Kansas until 1918 and Oregon
until 1926. Kyvig, Explicit and Authentic Acts, 177–78; Allen, “Framing Government for a Frontier
Commonwealth: The Minnesota Constitution(s),” 522; David Houghton, “Michigan: Four Constitutions,
Four New Beginnings,” in The Constitutionalism of American States, ed. George E. Connor and
Christopher W. Hammons (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2008), 444; Heller and Schumaker,
“The Kansas Constitution: Conservative Politics through Republican Dominance,” 498; Leichter,
“Oregon’s Constitution: A Political Richter Scale,” 760.
1102
Virginia, Mississippi, Georgia and Texas ratified the Amendment to end military rule. Livingston,
Federalism and Constitutional Change, 205; Kyvig, Explicit and Authentic Acts, 181–82.
1103
In West Virginia, radical Republicans passed an 1866 state amendment stripping the vote and property
rights from increasingly angry ex-Confederates. But on taking office, the moderate Republican governor
William Stevenson urged ratifying the Fifteenth Amendment in order to enfranchise ex-Confederates. After
a federal judge backed Stevenson, voters elected Democrats to the governorship, legislature, and
congressional seats, passing an amendment enfranchising ex-Confederates. Two years later exConfederates, led by Virginia’s Confederate lieutenant governor, held a second constitutional convention,
forbidding loyalty oath requirements and nearly disenfranchising blacks. Cleverly, state framers had turned
the Fifteenth Amendment against Congress’ intent, toward redeeming the antebellum constitutional order.
Thus, to study the Fifteenth Amendment without corresponding state constitutional provisions is to
misunderstand the Amendment. See the West Virginia Constitution of 1872, Article III, Section11, Article
IV, Section 5, and Article VI, Section 43. Bastress, The West Virginia State Constitution, 15–21; DiClerico,
“The West Virginia Constitution: Securing the Popular Interest,” 216–20.
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constitutional reconstruction.1104 Delegates to Tennessee’s 1870 Convention, many of
them ex-Confederates, opposed the Fifteenth Amendment and black suffrage, but
capitulated as other states moved the Amendment to ratification.1105 As delegate Henry R.
Gibson put it: “universal suffrage will be the supreme law of the land, whether Tennessee
participates in such ratification or not.”1106
The Fifteenth Amendment was Congress’ last attempt at constitutional
reconstruction. In 1870 Congress proposed only six amendments, and yearly number of
amendment proposals would stay within a few dozen until the Great Depression and New
Deal. Federal troops largely withdrew from the South in 1877, depriving Congress of a
means of enforcement against intransigent Southerners, closing this chapter of the
Reconstruction. The fate of Reconstruction, and the Southern black vote, fell to the new
state governments.1107
Some Reconstruction scholars assert Lincoln and the Thirty-Eight and ThirtyNinth Congresses forced a civil rights agenda on intransigent ex-Confederate states.1108
But this misses how black and Republican state framers paved the way for
1104

Kentucky, a loyalist state, had avoided constitutional reconstruction, and thus only enfranchised blacks
with the Fifteenth Amendment’s passage. Still, delegates passed a poll tax over intense debate, which was
only levied in 1890 as the state formalized Jim Crow. Delaware refused ratification, and neighboring
Maryland instituted a prohibitively high property qualification for blacks in 1870. And Missouri voters
defeated an 1868 amendment enfranchising blacks only to accept the Fifteenth Amendment two years later.
Isidor Loeb, Constitutions and Constitutional Conventions in Missouri (State Historical Society of
Missouri, 1920), 20; Tarr, Understanding State Constitutions, 107; Ireland, The Kentucky State
Constitution, 8.
1105
The state had already enfranchised blacks by statute in 1867. Laska, “The Tennessee Constitution: An
Unlikely Path toward Conservatism,” 360.
1106
See the Tennessee Constitution of 1870, Article IV, Section 1. See also Journal of the Proceedings of
the Convention of Delegates Elected by the People of Tennessee, to Amend, Revise, Or Form and Make a
New Constitution, for the State (Nashville: Jones, Purvis & Company, 1870), 303; Laska, The Tennessee
State Constitution, 14–18.
1107
Rollback of egalitarian provisions began in the mid-1870s, a prelude to Jim Crow. Dealey, Growth of
American State Constitutions, 83.
1108
For example, David Kyvig asserts “Defense of states’ rights remained a concern in many quarters
during the effort to devise new constitutional provisions. Once the new amendments were ratified, they
were interpreted in ways that preserved state power even at the expense of [blacks’] civil rights.” Kyvig,
Explicit and Authentic Acts, 155.
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Reconstruction. After 1865, almost every Southern and ex-Confederate state constitution
included clauses for abolition, equal protection, and universal male suffrage, and almost
all of these clauses passed before or with their federal counterparts. These provisions
aided the passage and ratification of the Reconstruction Amendments, and after
ratification, elaborated these poorly-defined new amendments. In cooperating with
Lincoln and congressional Republicans, state framers harmonized state and national
constitutional law on abolition and black citizenship, quieting controversies around
Reconstruction. The Union-imposed state governments helped form and stabilize the new
postwar constitutional order. This closed the first era of American constitutional
development.
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CONCLUSION
“Turn the eyes upside down, by looking at the landscape through your legs, and how
agreeable is the picture, though you have seen it any time these twenty years!”
Ralph Waldo Emerson, 18361109

Scholars of American constitutionalism myopically focus on the federal
Constitution, overlooking the states. But almost all American constitutional revision and
amendment happens at the state level. This state revision resolves national constitutional
controversies, preventing national inter-branch conflict and constitutional amendment.
One cannot understand the development of national institutions or the Constitution
without studying the states. This inverts the old and familiar picture of American
constitutionalism, revealing how the states drive national constitutional development.
This dissertation develops this claim in two parts. The first part theorizes that the
states guide and stabilize national constitutionalism. The first chapter recounts the
common, separate explanations of national constitutional stability and state constitutional
instability. The second chapter revises these by proposing that state constitutional
instability secures national stability, and the third chapter explains how to observe state
and federal constitutional reform.
The second part of the dissertation defends the contention that state constitutional
revision stabilizes the federal Constitution. The fourth chapter shows that Revolutionaryera state constitutional framing settled national debates over slavery, frontier regulation,
and legislative sovereignty and unicameralism, quieting these issues at the federal
Convention. And in imitating the state constitutions, these federal delegates made the

1109

Ralph Waldo Emerson, “Nature,” in The Selected Writings of Ralph Waldo Emerson, ed. Brooks
Atkinson (New York: Modern Library, 1836), 28.
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proposed Constitution palatable to state legislatures and ratifying conventions, easing its
passage.
The states stabilized the young Constitution. As the fifth chapter shows, Northern
state framers abolished slavery and Southern ones protected it, maintaining a peaceful
bisectional compromise and preventing congressional intervention or a national
amendment on slavery. Similarly, while Jeffersonian congressmen proposed national
amendments regulating elections, state framers enfranchised almost all adult white males
and selected House members by single districts and presidential electors by popularlyselected general ticket, shaping the election and subsequent incentives of presidents and
House members. Congress accepted this outcome and stopped proposing amendments on
electoral regulation. And after the states passed comprehensive constitutional provisions
regulating local banks, the antebellum Congress too abandoned proposals for a federal
amendment to establish a national bank.
The sixth chapter recounts the collapse of the bisectional slavery compromise, the
Civil War, and consequent federal and state constitutional reform. Reconstruction state
constitutional conventions resolved national debates over abolition and black citizenship
and enfranchisement, helping congressmen design and pass the later Reconstruction
Amendments and ensuring swift ratification by the states. These many detailed state
clauses elaborated, buttressed, and harmonized with the brief and ambiguous federal
Reconstruction Amendments. State constitutionalism guided America through the
Reconstruction and into the postwar order.
There are a few limitations to this dissertation and directions for future work. The
study ends with Reconstruction, when Confederate states ceded the power to nullify and
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interpret the federal Constitution. One might object that subsequent states lost the legal
authority to mediate national constitutional development. While the states did lose some
legal authority to nullify national constitutional provisions, they still maintain their more
subtle political role in resolving national controversies. Continuing this study from the
Reconstruction to the present can demonstrate this. Similarly, ending in 1877, this
dissertation is limited in the constitutional issues it covers. An extension can explain how
subsequent state constitutional framing resolved national questions over female suffrage,
polygamy, prohibition, economic and labor rights, the New Deal, the equal rights
amendment, and same sex marriage. Finally, while this dissertation disaggregates
proposed federal amendments by topic area, it does not collect and catalogue the state
amendments or provisions. A later study can fill this gap.
In conclusion, there are three lessons from this dissertation. The first is for
political scientists and public law scholars. Most American constitutional reform happens
at the state level. The states have proposed hundreds of constitutions and ratified
thousands of amendments, while the federal government has ratified a single constitution
with only twenty-seven amendments. Yet scholars focus on the federal document to the
exclusion of the states, and so miss almost all of American constitutional reform. More
importantly, state constitutionalism often quiets national constitutional debates.
Accordingly, national constitutional conflict or stability that scholars trace to the national
institutions or actors may instead be caused by the states. To understand how an
individual branch relates to the Constitution, one must study the state constitutions.
Relatedly, since branches strategically defer issues to the states to prevent or to force
inter-branch conflict, one cannot understand interaction between the national branches
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without studying the states. Finally, states help determine timing and scope of national
partisan and constitutional realignments and keep some issues from reaching the national
branches. To study only the national branches is to systematically miss major issues in
American constitutionalism. In sum, since most accounts ignore the states, they cannot
explain what they claim to explain. As a field, American constitutional development is
fundamentally flawed. This dissertation offers a provisional, partial solution.
The second lesson is for political and constitutional theorists. Constitutions face a
dilemma. Many constitutions claim popular authorization, but also impose supermajority
requirements for amendment, blocking some democratically authorized reforms.
Similarly, America’s federal Constitution claims authorization by the American people,
but only members of Congress, state legislators, and constitutional convention delegates
can vote on proposed amendments, excluding almost all Americans from the reform
process. Moreover, ratification deadlines and Article V’s supermajority requirements
block almost all proposed federal amendments, including many with broad, democratic
support. The Constitution lacks popular legitimacy.
But the state constitutions respond to democratic reforms. Americans revise their
state constitutions through initiatives, referenda, legislative amendments, legislative
conventions, popular conventions, and extralegal popular tactics. Conventions, for
example, have ranged from summits between august former presidents and federal
framers to nighttime meetings of farmers and pioneers in frontier taverns. Further, all
contemporary state constitutions and most previous ones set lower bars to reform than
does the federal constitution. The state constitutions are more legitimate than their
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inflexible federal counterpart, and so improve the democratic legitimacy of the American
constitutional system.
The last lesson is for citizens. Visit the National Archives. The original
Constitution stands in an altar in the Archives’ rotunda, surrounded by a press of bodies –
boy scouts, schoolchildren, and tourists, arms extended to touch the altar. For many
visitors, this is humbling. It should not be. The American Constitution blocks the
democratic will. But the state constitutions invite popular reform. Through the states,
Americans can achieve their democratic aspirations. The challenge to citizens is to realize
this through state constitutional reform.
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1
1
1
68
103
1
1
1

St
SC
SC
SC
SC
SC
SC
SC
SC
SD
SD
SD
SD
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TX
TX
TX
TX
TX
TX
TX
TX
TX
TX
UT
UT
UT
UT
UT
UT
UT
VA
VA
VA
VA
VA
VA
VA
VA
VA
VT
VT
VT
VT
VT
VT
VT
VT
VT

Year
1790
1861
1865
1868
1895
1948
1966
1969
1883
1885
1889
1969
1796
1835
1870
1945
1861
1836
1845
1861
1866
1869
1876
1959
1968
1973
1974
1849
1856
1862
1872
1882
1887
1895
1776
1816
1830
1851
1861
1864
1869
1902
1970
1777
1786
1793
1814
1822
1828
1836
1843
1850

P
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
3
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

O
3
4
5
6
7
8
8
8
1
1
1
2
1
2
3
4
3
1
1
2
3
4
5
6
6
6
6
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
3
4
4
4
5
6
1
2
3
4
4
4
4
4
4

R
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
1
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0

V
0
0
0
1
0
4
1
1
1
1
1
3
0
1
1
4
4
1
1
1
1
1
1
3
1
3
2
4
4
4
4
4
3
1
0
1
1
1
2
1
1
0
1
0
0
0
4
4
4
4
4
4

Dr
71
4
3
1
120

S

5
1
5
1
1
127
1
39
35
146
5
3
1
16
5
3
7
140
1
1
5
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
121
54
1
21
18
1
1
33
68
45
9
7
223
3
3
3
3
3
3
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St Year P O R V Dr
S St
Year P O
KS 1859 1 1 1 1 157
NJ 1944 3 3
KS 1957 2 2 0 3
1 NJ 1947 1 3
KS 1961 2 2 0 1
1 NJ 1947 2 3
KS 1968 2 2 0 1
1 NM 1848 1 1
KY 1792 1 1 1 0 7
NM 1849 1 1
KY 1794 1 2 0 4
3 NM 1850 1 1
KY 1799 1 2 1 0 51
NM 1872 1 1
KY 1850 1 3 1 1 41
NM 1889 1 1
KY 1861 1 4 0 4
3 NM 1907 1 1
KY 1891 1 4 1 1 125
NM 1911 1 1
KY 1950 2 5 0 4
5 NM 1963 2 2
KY 1960 2 5 0 4
5 NM 1969 1 2
KY 1966 2 5 0 2
1 NM 1969 2 2
KY 1987 2 5 0 1
1 NV 1851 1 1
LA 1812 1 1 1 0 33
NV 1854 1 1
LA 1845 1 2 1 1 7
NV 1859 1 1
LA 1852 1 3 1 1 9
NV 1863 1 1
LA 1861 1 4 1 0 3
NV 1864 1 1
LA 1864 1 5 1 1 4
NY 1777 1 1
LA 1868 1 6 1 1 0
NY 1801 1 2
LA 1879 1 7 1 1 7
NY 1822 1 2
Table 8: Proposals for State Constitutions, 1776-2017.

R
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
1

V
3
1
2
4
4
1
2
2
4
1
4
1
1
3
3
3
2
1
0
0
1

Dr

S
1

69
5
4
4
1
4
1
4
105
5
1
5
1
1
1
1
152
45
1
24

St
VT
VT
VT
VT
VT
VT
WA
WA
WA
WA
WI
WI
WI
WI
WV
WV
WV
WV
WV
WV
WY

Year
1857
1870
1910
1920
1931
1940
1878
1889
1935
1968
1846
1848
1960
1964
1861
1861
1863
1872
1929
1957
1889

State Year Pro. Order Source State Year Pro. Order Source State Year Pro.
CT
1965 2
3
5
NH
1963 2
3
5
TN
1959 1
CT
1968 2
3
5
NJ
1966 1
4
4
TN
1965 1
FL
1955 2
6
5
NY
1837 2
3
1
TN
1971 1
IL
1965 2
4
5
NY
1890 2
4
3
TN
1977 1
IL
1969 1
4
5
OH
1969 2
3
5
UT
1969 2
KS
1963 2
2
3
OK
1969 2
2
5
VA
1927 2
MA
1967 2
2
1
PA
1959 2
5
3
VA
1945 1
MI
1960 2
4
5
PA
1967 2
5
5
VA
1956 1
MI
1961 2
4
5
RI
1944 1
3
1
VT
1950 2
MI
1961 2
4
5
RI
1951 1
3
1
VT
1959 2
MN
1962 2
2
5
RI
1955 1
3
1
VT
1968 2
MO
1961 2
5
5
RI
1958 1
3
1
WA 1965 2
NC
1913 2
3
3
RI
1973 1
3
1
WI
1973 2
NE
1969 2
4
1
TN
1953 1
4
1
Table 9: Excluded State Constitutional Conventions and Committees, 1776-2017.

P
1
1
2
2
2
2
1
1
2
2
1
1
2
2
1
1
1
1
2
2
1

Order
4
4
4
4
2
6
6
6
4
2
2
2
2

O
4
4
4
4
4
4
1
1
2
2
1
1
2
2
1
1
1
2
3
3
1

R
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
1

V
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
1
4
3
2
1
4
3
3
1
1
1
4
4
1

Dr

S
3
3
3
3
3
3
3

127
3
4
1
168
5
1
1
1
9
144
1
5
127

Source
1
1
1
1
5
1
1
4
3
5
5
5
1

For Procedure (P/Pro.), 1 indicates proposal by convention, 2, by commission, and 3, by legislature.
For Order (O), 1 indicates the proposal was the state’s first, 2, the second, etc.
For Ratification (R), 0 indicates the proposal was not fully ratified, and 1, that it was fully ratified.
For Vote (V), 0 indicates ratification without vote, 1, voters approve ratification, 2, voters reject
ratification, 3, no ratification and no ratification vote, 4, source does not specify.
Duration (Dr) is the duration of a ratified constitution in years.
For Source (S), 1 indicates source was the Reference Guides to the State Constitutions of the United States,
2, a primary source, 3, Cynthia E. Browne, ed., State Constitutional Conventions from Independence to the
Completion of the Present Union, 1776-1959: A Bibliography (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1973)., 4,
another source, and 5, from Albert L. Sturm, Thirty Years of State Constitution-Making, 1938-1968: With
an Epilogue: Developments During 1969 (National Municipal League, 1970).
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Appendix B: Time Series Plots
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Figure 9: Rates of Proposals for Federal Amendments and State Constitutions, 1775-2017.
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Figure 10: Proposed Federal Amendments, Unratified and Ratified State Constitutions, 1775-2017.
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Figure 11: Proposed Federal Amendments and Ratified State Amendments, 1775-2017.
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Figure 12: Congressional Polarization and State Constitutional Revision by Two-Year Bins, 1879-2013.
Polarization data from Poole and Rosenthal.
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Figure 13: State Constitutional Replacement and U.S. Supreme Court Caseload, 1859-2013.
Data from Federal Judiciary Center. Caseload in number of cases.
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Figure 14: State Constitutional Amendments Ratified, 1789-1877.
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Figure 15: Trends in State Constitutional Revision by Region, 1776-2017.
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Appendix C: Maps

The above map indicates the number of ratified state constitutions and the below map indicates the
number of proposed constitutions per state. Darker shading indicates a greater number of ratified
proposals.
Figure 16: Geographic Distribution State Constitutions, 1776-2017.
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Top left:
1776-1799
Top right:
1800-49
Bottom:
1850-77
Note that for
some Western
territories, this
map uses
modern state
borders. Darker
shading
indicates a
greater number
of ratified
proposals.

Figure 17: Geographic Distribution of Attempts to Draft New State Constitutions, 1776-1877.
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Appendix D: Proposed Federal and State Constitutional Provisions by Topic
Topic
Search Term(s)
Count Concurrent Power?
Judicial Design/Powers
“Jud”, “Court”
689
No
Congressional Design/Powers
“Congress”, “Senat”, “Representatives”
2274 No
Executive Selection/Powers
“Elector”, “President”, “Executive”
1800 No
Federal Office Term Limits
“Term”
1060 No
Slavery
“Slave”
213
Yes
Treaties
“Treat”
221
No
War Powers
“War”
168
No
Suffrage
“Suffrage”, “Franchise”, “Right to Vote”
549
Yes
Equal Rights
“Equal Rights”
1137 Yes
Religious (Dis)establishment/Prayer “Relig”, “God”, “Christ”, “Prayer”
838
Yes
Item Veto
“Item”
304
No
Prohibition
“Alcohol”, “Liquor”, “Eighteenth Amendment”
210
Yes
Marriage
“Marriage”, “Polygamy”
151
Yes
Taxes
“Tax”
584
Yes
Child Labor
“Child Labor”, “Employment”
73
Yes
Legislative Apportionment
“Apportionment”
385
Yes
Regulation of D.C.
“Columbia”
232
No
School Busing
“Busing”, “Assignment”, “ Freedom of Choice”, “School” 235
Yes
Abortion
“Abortion”, “Life”
336
Yes
Flag Desecration
“Flag”
106
Yes
Balanced Budget
“Budget”
644
No
Campaign Finance
“Expenditure”, “Contribution”
99
Yes
Table 10: Proposed Federal Amendments by Topic Area, 1788-2014.
Note: “Count” indicates count of proposals matching search term(s). These are approximate counts. An
individual amendment can match for multiple search terms and thus topics, such that these categories are
not exclusive of each other. Because of the coding method used, these are minimum counts.
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Issue

Years

Congress
Representatives Chosen by District
Apportionment
Exclusion from Executive Office
Term Limits
Recall of Congressmen
Compensation
Executive
Choice of President/Executive
Selecting Electors
Direct Election
Term Limits
Veto
Election not to Devolve on Congress
Judiciary
Removal
Term Limits
Finance
Banks
Internal Improvements
Tax
Embargo
Slavery

1800-49
1800-40s
1800-20s
1800s, 1840s
1810-30s
1810s
1800s
1810s
1800-40s
1810-30s
1810-30s
1820s
1820-40s
1830s
1820s
1800-40s
1810s
1830-40s
1800-40s
1810-30s
1810-20s
1810s, 1840s
1810s
1800-40s
1850-77

Search Terms

Count

“Congress”, “Senat”, “Representatives”
“District”
“Apportion”
“Exclude”
Term
“Recall”
“Compen”
“Elector”, “President”, “Executive”
“Choice”
“Elector”
“Direct”
“Term”
“Veto”
“Congress”
“Jud”, “Court”
“Removal”
“Term”

142
34
7
23
9
4
7
83
65
48
6
5
12
5
25
11
8
57
21
22
9
5
19

“Bank”
“Improvements”
“Tax”
“Embargo”
“Slave”, “Color”

Congress
“Congress”, “Senat”, “Representatives”
Apportionment
1864-9
“Apportion”
Election of Senators by the People
1850-2, 72-4 “People”
Executive
“Elector”, “President”, “Executive”
Choice of President/Executive
1864-77
“Choice”
Term Limits
1864-7, 71-7 “Term”
Veto
1872-7
“Veto”
Judiciary
“Jud”, “Court”
Term Limits
1851-2, 67-9 “Term Limits”
Slavery
“Slave”
Slavery Prohibited
1860-7
“Prohibit”
Fugitive Slaves
1860-4
“Fugitive”
Territorial Slavery
1860-4
“Territor”
Property in Slaves Protected
1860-1
“Property”
Slave Trade
1860-1, 64
“Trade”
Slavery in District of Columbia
1860-1, 64
“District”
Compensated Emancipation
1861, 64-6
“Compen”
Free-Slave State Division Line
1861
“Division”
Travel with Slaves
1860-1, 64
“Travel”
Admission of Territories
1860-1, 64
“Admission”
Citizenship
1867
“Citizen”
Civil Rights
1865-9
“Civil”
Suffrage
1866-70
“Suffrage”, “Franchise”, “Right to Vote”
Payment of Rebel Debt
1865-73
“Debt”
Taxes
1861-76
“Tax”
Religious (Dis)establishment
1876
“Relig”, “God”, “Christ”, “Prayer”
Table 11: Proposed Federal Amendments by Topic Area, 1800-77.

Note that “Count”
indicates the
number of proposed
amendments
matching the search
term(s). Proposed
amendments
matching general
topics are then
sorted by matching
subtopic search
terms. An
individual
amendment can
match for multiple
search terms and
thus topics, such
that these categories
are not exclusive of
each other. Because
of the coding
method used, these
are minimum
counts.

131
113
22
71
22
16
10
22
9
199
59
44
36
7
31
17
19
4
6
19
21
37
89
28
21
7
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Year Sponsor State Amendment Topic
Year Sponsor
State Amendment Topic
1788
Limit US credit
1819 Lowrie
PA
Establishing a national bank
1788
No congressional law on state currency 1820 Noble
IN
Establishing a national bank
1788
Limit US credit
1820 Baldwin
PA
Establishing a national bank
1793
Bankers ineligible for Congress
1820 Trimble
OH
Establishing a national bank
1793
Bankers ineligible for Congress
1821 Dickerson NJ
Establishing a national bank
1793
Bankers ineligible for Congress
1822 Walworth NY
Bankruptcy, effect of State acts
1806 Jefferson
Internal improvements
1822 Monroe
Internal improvements
1813 Jackson VA
Establishing a national bank
1822 Talbot
KY
Internal improvements
1813
Establishing a national bank
1823 Reid
GA
Internal improvements
1813
Internal improvements, roads
1823 Smith
MD
Internal improvements
1813
Internal improvements, roads
1824 Van Buren NY
Internal improvements
1813
Internal improvements, canals
1825 Bailey
MA
Internal improvements
1814 Jackson VA
Establishing a national bank
1825 Van Buren NY
Internal improvements
1814
Internal improvements, roads
1832
Chartering of bank
1814 Jackson VA
Internal improvements, canals
1832
Internal improvements
1814 Jackson VA
Establishing a national bank
1832
Internal improvements
1815 Madison
Internal improvements
1832
Internal improvements
1816 Madison
Internal improvements
1836
Issuing of bank notes
1817
Internal improvements
1837
State bank paper
1817 Barbour VA
Internal improvements
1838 Garland
LA
State bank notes
1819
Establishing a national bank
1840 Buchanan PA
State bank notes prohibited
Table 12: Proposed Federal Amendments to Regulate Banking and Internal Improvements, 1788-1860.
Year Sponsor
State Amendment Topic
1788
Abolition of the slave trade
1803
Importation of slaves prohibited
1804
Importation of slaves prohibited
1805 Varnum
MA
Importation of slaves prohibited
1805
Importation of slaves prohibited
1806 Oliver
VT
Importation of slaves prohibited
1806 Tennoy
NH
Importation of slaves prohibited
1806 Wright
MD
Importation of slaves prohibited
1808 Maclay
PA
Importation of slaves punishable
1818 Livermore NH
Slavery prohibited
1839
Hereditary slavery abolished after 1842
1839
No slave state to be admitted
1839 Adams
MA
Slavery abolished after 1845 in D.C.
1850 Daniel
NC
To prevent the abolition of slavery
1858
Recognition of the right of property in slaves
1858
Territorial slavery protected
Table 13: Proposed Federal Amendments to Regulate Slavery, 1788-1859.
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Document

NH

SC

VA1

VA2

NJ

US1

S2

X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

Preamble
Law of nature and nature’s God
Natural equality
Rights to life, liberty, happiness, and/or property
Government by consent
Right to alter and abolish government
Right to institute new government
Abolition after long train of abuses

X

1
1
2
3
3

X

X

Grievances against the Crown
Refused assent to laws
Forbade governors to pass laws
X
Refused legislative representation
Called colonial legislatures at inconvenient times and places
Dissolved colonial legislatures
X
Refused elections; legislative power for the people; colonies vulnerable
Refused colonies’ authority over naturalization and land
Refused laws establishing judiciary powers
Controlled judges’ salaries and tenure
X
Established new officers
Established standing armies without colonial legislative consent
X
Rendered military power superior to civil power
Subjected colonists to foreign law
Quartered troops among colonists
Protected troops and officers from colonial trial
Cut colonial trade with foreign nations or each other
X
Imposed taxes without consent
Refused colonists trial by jury
Required trial in Britain for colonists
Passed Quebec Act of 1774
Abolished or altered colonial charters
Suspended colonial legislatures
Abdicated government by declaring war against colonists
Made war against colonists’ seas, coasts, and towns
X
Hired foreign mercenaries against colonists
Imprisoned or impressed colonists into military service
Incited domestic insurrection and Indian revolt
Incited domestic insurrection by promising reward
Prohibited abolition of slavery and encouraged slave revolt
Conclusion
Petitions to the Crown unanswered
Petitions to the British people unanswered
Necessity of rebellion
Colonies declared independent
Colonists never accepted Parliamentary supremacy
Renunciation of ties to the British
Not Included in US Declaration
Suspension of laws requires popular consent
Frequent recurrence to fundamental principles
Appeal to English constitutional rights
X
Appeal to reconciliation with Britain
X
Objection to George III’s asserting Parliamentary supremacy
Objection to the Boston Port Act of 1774
Objection to governors’ withdrawing civil officers
Objection to royal judges refusing to hear suits
Total Provisions
10
Number of Provisions Reiterated in US Declaration
8

X
X

X
6, X

X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X

X
X
X
X

13, X
13, X
X
X

X
X

X
X
X
X

6, X
X
8, 11, X
8, X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X

X

X

X

X

X
X
X
X

X

X

X
X
X
X
X
X

39
35

38
38

X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X

X

X

7
15
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
20
15

22
19

30
27

10
6

Note:
The interpretation of
some provisions is
ambiguous, so this
categorization
necessarily partly
reflects the author’s own
interpretation of the
provisions’ meanings.
The table is not a
comprehensive list of
rights listed under these
state constitutions, but
only those rights that
the constitutions
explicitly claim were
violated under British
rule. Provisions are
listed by the order they
appear in the
Declaration, with the
section number when
applicable.
Note on Abbreviations:
NH – 1776 New
Hampshire Constitution
(drafted Dec. 21 1775
– Jan. 5, 1776)
SC – 1776 South
Carolina Constitution
(drafted Feb. – May 26,
1776)
VA1 and VA2 – first
two drafts of the 1776
Virginia Constitution
(drafted May 6 – June
29, 1776)
NJ – 1776 New Jersey
Constitution (drafted
May 26 – July 2, 1776)
USD1 and USD2 – first
two drafts of the United
States Declaration of
Independence (June 11
– July 2, 1776)

Table 14: State and National Declarations of Independence
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Year

St.

Rat

Bank
Reserves
Bank Art.,
Sec. 1

Limits on
Incorporation
Bank Art., Sec. 1

1819

AL

Yes

1836

AR

Yes

Bank Art., Sec. 1

1860
1849

AZ
CA

No
Yes

Art. IV, Sec. 34

1818
1776
1792

CT
DE
DE

Yes
Yes
Yes

1831

DE

Yes

1776
1817
1812
1810

DE
FL
FL
FL

Yes
No
No
No

1839

FL

Yes

1776
1777
1789

GA
GA
GA

No
Yes
Yes

1798

GA

Yes

1844

IA

No

Art. IX, Sec. 1-6

1846

IA

Yes

Art. IX, Sec. 2

1857

IA

Yes

1818

IL

Yes

1848

IL

Yes

1816

IN

Yes

1851

IN

Yes

1858

KS

No

1857

KS

No

1855

KS

No

1859

KS

Yes

1792

KY

Yes

1799

KY

Yes

Currency
Regulation
Bank Art.,
Sec. 1

Art. IV, Sec.
34, 35

Limits on State
Debt

Art. VIII, Art.
XI, Sec. 10

Liability &
Loss
Bank Art.,
Sec. 1
Bank Art.,
Sec. 1

Debtors'
Rights

Art. IV, Sec.
36

Art. I, Sec.
15

Bankers in
Office

Oversight for
Banks

Art. V, Sec. 3

Art. XII, Sec.
11, 14

Art. IV, Sec.
23
Art. IV, Sec.
23

Art. IX, Sec. 1

Art. VII,
Sec. 1

Art. VI,
Sec. 10
Art VI.,
Sec. 17

Art. II, Sec. 17

Art. VII.
Sec. 14
Art. XIII,
Sec. 6

Art. VII,
Sec. 8

Art. X,
Sec. 1
Art. XI,
Sec. 7

Art. XVII,
Sec. 2, 4
Art. XIII,
Sec. 2-4

Art. XIII, Sec. 15, 12-3

Art. VIII, Sec. 1,
5
Art. VII, Sec. 21

Art. XIII,
Sec. 8

Art. IX, Sec.
1
Art. VIII,
Sec. 7-8, 11

Art. XIII, Sec.
7, 10

Art. VII, Sec.1,
Art. IX, Sec. 7
Art. VIII, sec. 1,
Art. IX, Sec. 2
Art. VI, Art.
VIII, Sec. 3-4

Art. IX, Sec. 1,
7
Art. IX, Sec. 2

Art. IV,
Sec. 7
Art. IV,
Sec. 7
Art. II, Sec.
18
Art. II, Sec.
19

Art. VIII, Sec.
3, 9

Art. XVII, Sec.
12
Art. VIII,
Sec. 15

Art. III, Sec. 35,
Art. X, Sec. 1, 5
Art. X, Sec. 1

Art. X, Sec.
4

Art. XI, Sec. 1-4,
13
Art. XIV, Sec. 1,
Art. XVII, Sec. 1

Art. XI, Sec.
3, 5
Art. XVII,
Sec. 2-5, 7

Art. XII, Sec. 1, 4

Art. XII, Sec.
4

Art. XIII, Art.
XVII, Sec. 1
Art. XIII, Sec. 1

Art. XVII,
Sec. 4-5
Art. XIII,
Sec. 2, 4, 67

Art. III, Sec. 37,
Art. X, Sec. 3
Art. X, Sec. 5-6,
Art. XI, Sec. 12
Art. X, Art. XI,
Sec. 5, Art. XIV,
Sec. 5-6
Art. IX, Sec. 34, Art. XII, Sec.
3, 7
Art. IX, Art.
XVII, Sec. 8
Art. X, Finance,
Sec. 7, Art. XIII,
Sec. 5

Art. X, Sec.24
Art. XI, Sec.
5-6
Art XIV, Sec.
2, Art. XVII,
Sec. 5
Art. XII, Sec.
6
Art. XVII, Sec.
3

Art. I, Sec.
17
Art. I, Sec.
22
Art. I Sec.
15

Art. XI, Sec. 11
Art. XVII, Sec.
9
Art. XII, Sec. 5

Art. I Sec.
15

Art. XVII, Sec.
7, 9
Art. XIII, Sec.
8-9

Art. XI,
Sec. 17
Art. X, Sec.
17
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Year

St.

Rat

1850
1812
1845
1852
1778
1780
1792
1776
1851

KY
LA
LA
LA
MA
MA
MD
MD
MD

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes

1776
1780
1819
1835
1850

MD
ME
ME
MI
MI

Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes

1857

MN

Yes

1846

MO

No

1820

MO

Yes

1817

MS

Yes

1831

MS

Yes

1823
1835
1776
1776
1779
1781

NC
NC
NC
NC
NH
NH

No
No
No
Yes
No
No

1782

NH

No

1851

NH

No

1832
1776
1784

NH
NH
NH

No
Yes
Yes

1792

NH

Yes

1776
1844

NJ
NJ

Yes
Yes

1846
1849
1850

NM
NM
NM

No
No
No

Bank
Reserves

Limits on
Incorporation

Currency
Regulation

Limits on State
Debt

Liability &
Loss

Art. 119

Art. 122-5
Art. 109
Art. XII, Sec. 2

Art. 118-9

Art. 113-4, 121
Art. 108-11

Art. 120-1

Art. III, Sec. 45,
47

Art. III, Sec. 22

Art. III, Sec.
45

Debtors'
Rights

Bankers in
Office

Art. III,
Sec. 39,
44

Oversight for
Banks

Art. III, Sec. 45

Art. XIV

Art. XV,
Sec. 4

Art. XV, Sec. 1, 8

Art. XV, Sec.
4

Art. XIV

Art. XV, Sec.
3, 7

Art. VI,
Sec. 33

Art. IX,
Sec. 13

Art. X, Sec. 2

Art. IX, Sec.
13

Art. IX, Sec. 57, 10

Art. I, Sec.
12

Art. IX, Sec. 11

Art. VIII, Sec. 1

Art. VIII,
Sec. 1, 3

Art. III, Sec. 31,
Art. VIII, Sec. 2

Art. IX, Sec. 8,
13, Art. X,
Sec. 1, 3
Art. VIII, Sec.
2

Art. XI,
Sec. 17
Art. XIII,
Sec. 17
Art. I, Sec.
18
Art. I, Sec.
18
Sec. 34

Art. VIII, Sec.
2, 4

Art. VIII

Art. VIII
Art. VI, Gen.,
Sec. 9
Art. VII, Sec. 9

Art. III,
Legislative,
Sec. 30

Art. XV, Sec.
10

Sec. 39

Part II, Art. 41

Part II, Art. 112

Part II,
House
Part II,
House
Part II, Art.
25

Part II, Art. 41,
80

Part II,
House
Part II,
House
Art. IV, Sec. 7,
Cl. 8

Art. IV, Sec. 6,
Cl. 3-4

Art. IX, Sec. 8-

Art. IX, Sec. 11,

Art. I, Sec.
17

Art. IV, Sec. 6,
Cl. 3-4, Sec. 7,
Cl. 8

Art. IX, Sec. 10
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Year

St.

Rat

Bank
Reserves

Limits on
Incorporation
10

1777
1821
1846

NY
NY
NY

Yes
Yes
Yes

1802

OH

Yes

1851

OH

Yes

1843
1845
1857

OR
OR
OR

No
No
Yes

1776

PA

Yes

1790

PA

Yes

1838

PA

Yes

1824
1841
1842

RI
RI
RI

No
No
No

1841

RI

No

Art. IX, Sec. 9

Art. IX, Sec. 7

1790
1842

RI
RI

No
Yes

Art. IV, Sec. 17

Art. IV, Sec. 13

1776
1778
1790
1785
1784

SC
SC
SC
TN
TN

Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No

1796
1834
1833
1827
1835
1836

TN
TN
TX
TX
TX
TX

Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No

1840
1845

TX
TX

No
Yes

1849
1856
1776
1776
1830
1850

UT
UT
VA
VA
VA
VA

No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes

Art. VII, Sec. 9
Art. VII, Sec. 1,
4, 9

Currency
Regulation

Limits on State
Debt
22

Liability &
Loss

Art. VII, Sec.
4-7

Art. VII

Art. VII, Art.
VII, Sec. 2, 8

Art. XIII, Sec. 12

Art. XI, Sec. 1-2

Art. XI, Sec.
1

Debtors'
Rights

Art. VIII, Art.
XII, Sec. 3, 6

Art. XIII, Sec.
3

Art. VIII,
Sec. 15
Art. I, Sec.
15

Art. IX, Sec. 2,
Art. XI, Sec. 610

Art. XI, Sec. 3,
5

Art. I, Sec.
19

Bankers in
Office

Art. XIII, Sec.
2, 7

Ch. II, Sec.
28
Art. IX,
Sec. 16
Art. VIII,
Sec. 16

Art. I, Sec. 25

Art. IV, Sec. 13

Oversight for
Banks

Art. I, Sec. 25

Art. I, Sec.
7

Art. IV, Sec. 10
Art. IX, Sec. 9,
11

Art. I, Sec.
16
Art. 41
Sec. 30
Dec. of
Rights,
Sec. 39
Art. XI, Sec. 18
Art. I, Sec. 18
Art. 15

Art. 30
Art. 3

Art. VI, Dec. of
Rights, Sec. 12
Art. VII, Sec. 302

Art. VII, Sec.
32

Art. VII, Sec.
31, 3

Art. IV, Sec. 26-

Art. I, Sec. 14,
Art. VII, Sec.
22

Art. IV, Sec.

Art. IV, Sec. 7

Art. IV, Sec.
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Year

St.

Rat

1777
1786
1793
1846

VT
VT
VT
WI

Yes
Yes
Yes
No

1848

WI

Yes

Total Regulations
Pct. of Documents with
Regulation

Bank
Reserves

Limits on
Incorporation

Currency
Regulation

Limits on State
Debt
31

Liability &
Loss
28

Debtors'
Rights

Art. X, Sec. 1-2,
5, Art. XI, Sec. 1

Art. X, Sec.
3, 6

Art. XI, Sec. 2,
Art. XII
Art. VIII, Sec. 34, 6-10, Art. XI,
Sec. 3
31
29.0

Art. XII

Art. XVI,
Sec. 16
Art. I, Sec.
16-7

Art. I, Sec.
1, 4
12
11.2

38
35.5

19
17.8

22
20.6

45
42.1

Bankers in
Office

Oversight for
Banks
26-7
Ch. 2, Sec. 25
Ch. 2, Sec. 30
Ch. 2, Sec. 33
Art. X, Sec. 7
Art. I, Sec. 5

5
4.7

30
28.0

Table 15: State Constitutional Banking, Corporate, and Debt Regulations, 1776-1860.
This table lists regulations to state constitutions prior to any amendment, and does not include regulations
made by amendment. Similar clauses in the same document are classed as a single regulation. For
“Ratified,” “Yes” indicates the document was ratified as a new state constitution, and “No,” that it was not.
Note on abbreviations: DE 1776 is the 1776 Delaware Declaration of Rights, FL 1810 and 1812 are
respectively the 1810 Constitution of East Florida and 1812 Constitution of West Florida, GA 1776 is a
colonial statute, MD 1776 is the 1776 Maryland Declaration of Rights, ME 1780 is the 1780 constitution of
the failed state of New Ireland in modern Maine, NC 1776 is the 1776 North Carolina Declaration of
Rights, NH 1832 is the 1832 constitution of the failed state of the Indian Stream Republic in modern New
Hampshire, RI 1790 is the 1790 Rhode Island Declaration of Rights, TX 1827 and TX 1840 respectively
refer to the constitutions of the failed states of Coahuila & Texas and Rio Grande in modern Texas, TN
1784 and TN 1785 respectively refer to the constitutions of the failed states of Franklin and Frankland in
modern Tennessee, and VA 1776 is the 1776 Virginia Declaration of Rights.
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Year

St.

Rat.

1819

AL

Yes

1836

AR

Yes

1860
1849
1776
1839

AZ
CA
DE
FL

No
Yes
Yes
Yes

1810
1789

FL
GA

No
Yes

1798
1844
1846
1857
1818
1848
1816
1851
1858
1857

GA
IA
IA
IA
IL
IL
IN
IN
KS
KS

Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No

1855
1859
1792

KS
KS
KY

No
Yes
Yes

1799

KY

Yes

1850
1851

KY
MD

Yes
Yes

1780
1835
1850
1857
1820

ME
MI
MI
MN
MO

No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

1846

MO

No

1817

MS

Yes

1831

MS

Yes

1850
1802

NM
OH

No
Yes

1857
1845
1842
1842
1796
1834

OR
OR
RI
RI
TN
TN

Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes

No Forced
Emancipation
Slavery
Article, Sec.1
Eman. Art.,
Sec. 1

Slaves’ Jury
Rights
Slavery Article,
Sec.2
Art. IV, Sec.
25

Outlawing
Harming Slaves
Slavery Art., Sec.
3
Art. IV, Sec. 25

Taxing and
Representing Slaves

Slave Immigration

Abolishing Slavery

Art. IV, Sec. 23, Art.
VII, Eman., Sec. 1
Cen. Art. Sec. 1

Art. XVI, Sec.
1
Art. V, Sec. 1
Art. IV, Sec.
11

Art. IX, Sec. 1
Art. V, Sec. 2

Art. 26
Art. XVI, Sec. 2-4

Art. V, Sec. 1
Art. IV, Sec. 12

Art. V, Sec. 1
Art. IV, Sec. 11

Art. IV, Sec. 12

Art. IV, Sec. 11

Art. VI, Sec. 2
Art. XIV
Art. XIII, Sec. 1
Art. VII, Sec.
2, Art. XV,
Sched., Sec.
14

Art. VII, Sec. 3

Art. VII, Sec. 4

Art. II, Sec. 22
Art. II, Sec. 23
Art. I, Sec. 23
Art. VI, Sec. 1, 3
Art. XIII, Sec. 16
Art. VIII, Art. XI, Sec. 7
Art. I, Sec. 37
Art. I, Sec. 6

Art. VII, Sec. 2

Art. I, Sec. 21
Art. VII, Sec.
1
Art. VII, Sec.
1
Art. X, Sec. 1
Art. III, Sec.
42

Art. I, Sec. 18
Art. 26

Art. VII, Sec. 1

Art. VII, Sec. 1

Art. VII, Sec. 2

Art. VII, Sec. 1

Art. VII, Sec. 1

Art. X, Sec. 3

Art. X, Sec. 1

Art. X, Sec. 1

Art. I, Sec. 6
Art. I, Sec. 6

Dec. of Rights, Art. I
Art. XI, Sec. 1
Art. XVIII, Sec. 11
Art. I, Sec. 2
Art. III, Sec.
26
Art. III, Sec.
26
Art. VI,
Slaves, Sec.
1
Art. IX, Sec.
1

Art. III, Sec.
27
Art. III, Sec.
29
Art. V, Sec. 7,
Art. VI, Slaves,
Sec. 2
Art. IX, Sec. 3

Art. III, Sec. 26,
28
Art. III, Sec. 28,
30
Art. VI, Slaves,
Sec. 1

Art. III, Sec. 26

Art. IX, Sec. 1

Art. IX, Sec. 1-2

Art. III, Sec. 26-8
Art. VI, Slaves, Sec.
1

Art. I, Sec. 1
Art. VII, Sec. 5, Art.
VIII, Sec. 2
Art. I, Sec. 4
Art. I, Sec. 4
Art. I., Sec. 4
Art. I, Sec. 19
Art. II, Sec.
31

Art. I, Sec. 26
Art. II, Sec. 28
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Year

St.

Rat.

1845

TX

Yes

1836

TX

No

1850

VA

Yes

1777
VT
1786
VT
1793
VT
1846
WI
1848
WI
Total Regulations

No Forced
Emancipation
Art. VIII, Sec.
1
Art. VI,
General, Sec.
9
Art. IV, Sec.
21

Slaves’ Jury
Rights
Art. VIII, Sec.
2

Outlawing
Harming Slaves
Art. VIII, Sec. 1, 3

Taxing and
Representing Slaves

Slave Immigration
Art. VIII, Sec. 1
Art. VI, General,
Sec. 9

Art. IV, Sec. 2-3, 36

Art. IV, Sec. 19

Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
18

Abolishing Slavery

11

14

5

Ch. 1, Sec. 1
Ch. 1, Sec. 1
Ch. 1, Art. 1
Art. XVI, Sec. 2
Art. I, Sec. 2
27

21

Table 16: State Constitutional Slavery Regulations, 1776-1860.
This table lists regulations to state constitutions prior to any amendment, and does not include regulations
made by amendment. Similar clauses in the same document are classed as a single regulation. For
“Ratified,” “Yes” indicates the document was ratified as a new state constitution, and “No,” that it was not.
Note on abbreviations: FL 1810 is the 1810 Constitution of East Florida, ME 1780 is the 1780 constitution
of the failed state of New Ireland in modern Maine, and TX 1836 is Texas’ interim 1836 Constitution.
State

Slavery Abolished

Year

Convict Slavery Legal

Year

Equality/Equal Protection

Year

Universal Male Franchise

Year

AL
AR
DE
FL
GA
KY
LA
MD
MO
MS
NC
SC
TN
TX
VA
WV

Art. I, Sec. 34
Art. V, Sec. I

1865
1864

Art. I, Sec. 34
Art. V, Sec. I

1865
1864

Art. I, Sec. 1-2
Art. I, Sec. 3

1867
1868

Art VII, Sec. 2
Art. VIII, Sec. 2

1867
1868

Art. XVI, Sec. 1
Art. I, Sec. 20

1865
1865

Art. XVI, Sec. 1
Art. I, Sec. 20

1865
1865

1868
1868

1864
1864
1865
1869
1868
1865
1870
1866
1870
1863

Title I, Art. 1
Dec. of Rights, Art. 24
Art. I, Sec. 2
Art. I, Sec, 19
Art. I, Sec. 33
Art. IV, Sec. 11
Art. I, Sec. 33
Art. VIII, Sec, 1
Art. I, Sec. 19

1864
1864
1865
1869
1868
1865
1870
1866
1870

1868
1868
1850
1868
1864

Ordinance, Sec. 6
Art. II, Sec. 1

Title I, Art. 1
Dec. of Rights, Art. 24
Art. I, Sec. 2
Art. I, Sec, 19
Art. I, Sec. 33
Art. IV, Sec. 11
Art. I, Sec. 33
Art. VIII, Sec, 1
Art. I, Sec. 19
Art. XI, Sec. 7

Dec. of Rights, Sec. 1
Art. I, Sec. 2
Art. XIII, Section 1
Title I, Art. 1-2
Dec. of Rights, Art. 1

Title VI, Art. 98

1868

Art. VII, Sec. 3
Art. I, Sec. 1
Art. I, Sec 39

1869
1868
1868

Art. I, Sec. 2
Art. I, Sec. 1, 20

1866
1870

Art. VII, Sec. 2
Art. VI, Sec. 1
Art. VIII, Sec. 8
Art. I, Sec. 5, Art. IV, Sec. 1
Art. I, Sec. 16
Art. III, Sec. 1

1869
1868
1868
1870
1866
1870

Table 17: Abolition, Equal Protection, and Enfranchisement in Ex-Confederate and Slaveholding States,
1865-70.
Note: Tennessee's 1866 amendment to Art. I, Sec. 1 abolished slavery except for convict slavery.
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Appendix E: Miscellaneous
State

1: Fed.
Pro. 1yr
0.29

Total Const. Proposals
Unratified Const. Proposals
Ratified Const. Proposals
Ratified Amendments
Observations

2: Fed.
Pro. 1yr

3: Fed.
Pro. 1yr

4: Fed.
Pro. 1yr

5: Fed.
Pro. 5yr
0.43

0.44

6: Fed.
Pro. 5yr

228

8: Fed.
Pro. 5yr

0.64
-0.038

228

7: Fed.
Pro. 5yr

228

-0.062
0.36
196

50

50

0.76
42

50

Table 18: Correlation between Proposed Federal Amendments and State Constitutions, 1791-2014.
12

Ratified Constitutions

MD

10
8
6

HI
AZ
VA CA
MO MT
KS
NC

4
2

ARID

0
0
20

50

100 Age of State

Proposed Constitutions

15
10
5
0

ND
NJ
CT
IL
NY
CO
PA VTNH
IN
WV
TX DE OH
LA
RI
MS WY

ID
AR

150

KY
MN
200

IA
TN
WA
SC
MA OK
MI
GA
UT
WI
NE
FL
NV
SD
OR
NM
ME
250

IA
NM
OK
WI
CT
MD
NE
SD
NY
VAHICA
MA TN
NC
WA
MO
KS
SC
NV
VTND
LA
MT
AZ
MI
NJ
RI
GA
DE
OH
UT
ME
IN
WV
TX
MSWY
MN
OR
FL
CO
IL
KY
PA
NH

0
50
100 Age of State 150
Figure 18: State Age and Constitutional Turnover, 1776-2017.
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6.9

Approval WY

6.8

AZ
SD
ND
KS
MA
ME
CO
WI
WA
NV
NM
MN
ID
OR
OK
UT

6.7
6.6
6.5

NE
WV
NH
CA
IA
IN
MT
OH

CT
VT
RI
NJ
NC
TN

6.4

DE
NY

PA
TX

FL

IL
MO
MI
MD
KY

AR

VA
AL

LA
SC

GA

MS

0

2

4

6

Number of Ratified Constitutions by State

Approval

6.9

NE
WV

6.7

FLTX
LA

6.5

10

12

ME

MA

WY

6.8

6.6

8

PA NY
DE
MT

AZ

VT
RI
NJ
CTCA
IA

ARVAMI
MO
IL KYMD TNNC

INNM
OH
OK

GA AL
SC

NHND
SD

KS

WA CO NVMNWI
ID

OR

UT

6.4

MS
0

50

100

150

200

250

Average Duration of Ratified Constitutions

Figure 19: State Constitutional Approval and Stability, by State.
For approval data, see Stephanopoulos and Versteeg. State constitutional approval is measured on a tenpoint scale, which is clustered around the national mean (6.7) because the study’s authors use a multilevel
regression and poststratification technique. See Nicholas Stephanopoulos and Mila Versteeg, “The
Contours of Constitutional Approval,” SSRN Scholarly Paper (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research
Network, August 18, 2015), 21–22, http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2646773. For each state,
Stephanopoulos and Versteeg give an average approval range of 0.1, which in this figure is rounded down
to the nearest tenth of a point (i.e. Mississippi’s score is rounded down from 6.4 – 6.5 to 6.4). Data
excludes Alaska and Hawaii.
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State

Year

Rat

CT

1818

Yes

DE
GA

1831
1833
1839

Yes
No
No

IL

1848

Yes

LA

1845

Yes

MA

1820

No

MO
MS
NC

1845
1832
1823
1833
1835

No
Yes
No
No
No

NJ

1844

Yes

NY

1801

No

1822

Yes

1837

No

1846

Yes

1833

No

1838

Yes

1824
1841 (x2)
1842
1835

No
No
Yes
Yes

1816
1830
1814

No
Yes
No

1822
1828
1836
1843

No
No
No
No

PA

RI
TN
VA
VT

Upper
House
1817
1818
ND
1838
1839
1842
1844
1822
1823
ND
ND
ND
1835
1836
1843
1844
1801
1802
1821
1822
1838
1839
1846
1847

D/DR
T
T

0
7

Party:
F/NR/W
F
12
F
5

U
U

50
28

SR
SR

D
D
DR
DR

D
D
D
D
DR
DR
BK
BK
D
D
D
D

8
9
9
24

33
24
12
6
21
21
13
32
18
12
21
8

W
W
F
F

W
W
W
W
F
F
CL
CL
W
W
W
W

37
46

1

9
8
31
16

30
26
6
13
22
11
18
0
14
20
10
24

1838
1839
ND

D
D

15
17

W
W

18
16

1835
1837
ND
ND
N/A

D
D

7
14

W
W

18
11

N/A
N/A

Party:
Other

2

1

1

Lower
House
1816
1817

Party:
D/DR
T
90
T
105

Party:
F/NR/W
F
111
F
96

ND
1837
1838
1852
1854
1844
1846
1819
1820

U
U
D
D
D
D
DR
DR

88
96
56
34
26
55
161
64

SR
SR
W
W
W
W
F
F

103
76
18
41
34
43
231
87

D
D
D
D
DR
DR
BK
BK
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D

62
54
35
18
34
67
58
71
90
28
74
52
62
28
28
72

W
W
W
W
F
F
CL
CL
W
W
W
W
W
AM
W
W

58
66
23
40
43
39
30
33
38
100
51
76
11
72
72
7

D
D

25
42

W
W

46
33

DR
DR

124
104

F
F

85
108

ND
ND
ND
1836
1840
1843
1844
1799
1800
1819
1820
1836
1837
1845
1846
1834
1835
1835
1836
ND
1835
1837
ND
ND
1812
1813
ND
ND

Party:
Other

1

16
42

31
1
34
22
2

Note on
Abbreviations:
“DR” –
DemocraticRepublicans
“D” –
Democrats
“F” –
Federalists
“NR” –
National
Republicans
“W” –
Whigs
“T” –
Toleration
Party
“U” –
Union Party
“SR” –
Southern
Rights Party
“BK” –
Bucktail
“CL” –
Clintonian
“AM” –
Anti-Masonic
“O” – Other.

27
21

4

Table 19: State Constitutional Replacement and Change in Partisan Control of State Legislatures, 1800-49.
Note: This figure lists all thirty-one attempts to replace a standing state constitution between 1800 and 1840. The figure
also lists whether the state legislature shifted control three sessions before or after an attempted constitutional
replacement, and if so, the figure lists the years and magnitude of that shift. Control of the legislature shifts when a
party or inter-party coalition loses a simple majority. Columns list the vote share of the Democratic-Republican Party,
its successor, the Democratic Party, measured against the Federalists, National Republicans, Whigs, or an allied local
party. Note on coding: For “Order,” 1 indicates the proposal was the state’s first, 2, the second, and so on. “ND”
indicates the data for these years is not available from the data compiled by Michael Dubin. “N/A” indicates the state
was unicameral. All proposals were made by constitutional conventions, save for legislative proposals by Pennsylvania
and North Carolina in 1833.
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State
AL
AR
CA
CT
DE
FL
GA
IA
IL
IN
KY
LA
MA
MD
ME
MI
MO
MS
NC
NH
NJ
NM
NY
OH
OR
PA
RI
SC
TN
TX
VA
VT
WI

Stability of Constitutional Politics around and after Constitutional Convention(s) or Amendments(s)
1819, stable: sparse settlement by whites and little party organization at state’s founding
1836, stable: sparse settlement by whites and little conflict at the state’s founding
1849, unstable: in 1836 and 1845, separatist Californians elect extralegal governments to secede from Mexico; a balance of delegates from the state’s diverse
regions and ethnic groups assures a moderate convention and constitution
1818, 1845(A), stable: the Republican-aligned Toleration Party captures the legislature from Federalists in 1818 on a platform of religious disestablishment and
franchise expansion; Connecticut is a single party state from 1776 until the 1830s
1831, stable: Federalist control 1796-1820 and peaceful elections and power sharing through the Jacksonian era
1838, stable: state has a dispersed, unorganized population of only 50,000, of which 20,000 are slaves excluded from political participation
1833(F), 1838(F), stable: legislature calls two failed conventions, but otherwise little agitation for constitutional reform
1844(F), 1846, stable: Iowans push for constitutional reform peacefully, resulting in a convention in 1857
1818, 1848, stable: tension between French slaveholders and recent, antislavery settlers is resolved by allowing limited de facto slavery
1816, stable: tension between French slaveholders and recent, antislavery settlers dissipates as slaveholders free slaves or move to neighboring Illinois
1850, stable: legislature regularly submits constitutional questions to voters via referenda
1812, 1845 stable: French planters disenfranchise white small farmers at the 1812 Convention, but after increased settlement by small farmers, the 1845
Convention repeals these restrictions
1821(F, A), stable: tension between western small farmers and eastern towns is largely resolved by aggregating the opinions of town meetings and by a series of
constitutional amendments
1802(A), unstable: malapportionment over-represents eastern shore planters, underrepresenting Baltimore, and the state approaches revolution, forcing reform
in 1837; renewed discord forces the legislature to call a convention in 1850
1819, stable: separation from Massachusetts appeases Maine separatists, and subsequent intrastate political conflict does not implicate the Maine Constitution
1835, 1850(F), stable: state is sparsely populated by farmers, who make up a majority of the state’s fairly inclusive convention
1820, 1845(F), stable: Jacksonians quickly organize the state; by 1840, a stable two-party system has emerged
1817, 1832, stable: after movements for repeal for suffrage expansion and judicial elections, the legislature capitulates and calls a peaceful convention
1823(F), 1833(L), 1835 (F, A), stable: reapportionment appeases dissatisfied western voters
1847(S), 1850(F), stable: conflict is channeled by parties into elections; Jacksonians control the state from 1827 until the 1850s
1807(S), 1844, stable: the state is small and homogenous, avoiding the tension between easterners and frontiersmen that upset other states
1848(F), 1849(F), 1850(F), unstable: state is divided between Anglo-American settlers, Spanish-Mexicans, and Indians; the latter two rebel against the former
in the failed 1847 Taos Revolt
1801(F), 1804(S), 1821, 1826(A), 1837(F), 1846, stable/unstable: small western farmers and New York City workingmen organize, but are appeased by
ongoing statutory and constitutional reform; along the Hudson, tenant farmers rebel in 1839, leading to the 1846 Convention
1802, stable: class divisions in Ohio’s frontier society are weak and are resolved through political and legal means
1843(F), 1845(F), stable: the federal government resolves border disputes with Great Britain; most intrastate conflict is co-opted by parties
1833(F), 1838, unstable: tax policies result in the Whiskey Rebellion (1794) and Frie’s Rebellion (1800), and a disputed election leads to armed mobilizing and
the Buckshot War (1838); otherwise, state mobilizing occurs through mass parties
1824(F), 1834(F), 1841(F), 1842, unstable: longstanding resentment over malapportionment and suffrage restriction lead to a separatist “People’s
Constitution” and legislature in the Dorr War
1810(A), stable: tensions between costal planters and upcountry small farmers are resolved when the former take the legislature in 1800 and reform suffrage
and apportionment law
1835, stable: main constitutional contention is over judicial design, which seems not to align with class or race tensions
1836(F), 1845: in 1836 Anglo-American Texans revolt and secede from Mexico, joining the Union in 1845
1804(S), 1816(F), 1829, 1850: token reforms appease Blue Ridge farmers, keeping the state legislature under the control of eastern counties
1814(F), 1822(F), 1828(F), 1836(F), 1843(F), 1850(F): constitutional revision comes through the combination of meetings of the state Council of Censors
and state conventions
1846(F), 1848, stable: conventions are the main site of constitutional change in early Wisconsin

Table 20: State Constitutional Politics and Instability, 1800-50.
Note: Years indicate a successful convention, unless designated as the year of an amendment (A) or of a failed
convention (F) or legislative committee (L) that did not ratify an entirely new constitution. A state’s constitutional
politics is considered unstable if it saw regular constitutional agitation by white males via extralegal riots, militia
mobilizing, or illegal constitutional conventions. Sources: Oxford Commentaries on the State Constitutions of the
United States, Paul Goodman, “The First American Party System,” in The American Party System: Stages of Political
Development, ed. William N. Chambers and Walter Dean Burnham (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967);
Richard P. McCormick, “Political Development and the Second Party System,” in The American Party System: Stages
of Political Development, ed. William N. Chambers and Walter Dean Burnham (New York: Oxford University Press,
1967).

309

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Ablavsky, Gregory. “Making Indians ‘White’: The Judicial Abolition of Native Slavery in Revolutionary
Virginia and Its Racial Legacy.” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 159, no. 5 (April 1,
2011): 1457–1531.
———. “The Savage Constitution.” Duke Law Journal 63 (2014): 999.
Ackerman, Bruce. “Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution.” Yale Law Journal 93 (1984): 1013–72.
———. We the People: Foundations. Vol. I. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1993.
———. We the People: Transformations. Vol. II. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1998.
Adamany, David. “Legitimacy, Realigning Elections, and the Supreme Court.” Wisconsin Law Review
1973 (1973): 790.
Adams, John. “Autobiography.” In The Works of John Adams, Second President of the United States: With
A Life of the Author, Notes and Illustrations, edited by Charles Francis Adams, Vol. II. Boston:
Little, Brown, 1775.
———. “Diary.” In The Works of John Adams, Second President of the United States: With A Life of the
Author, Notes and Illustrations, edited by Charles Francis Adams, Vol. II. Boston: Little, Brown,
1775.
———. “Letter to James Madison, June 17, 1817.” In The Works of John Adams, Second President of the
United States: With a Life of the Author, Notes and Illustrations, edited by Charles Francis
Adams, Vol. X. Boston: Little, Brown, 1817.
———. “Letter to James Sullivan, May 26, 1776.” In The Works of John Adams, Second President of the
United States: With a Life of the Author, Notes and Illustrations, edited by Charles Francis
Adams, Vol. IX. Boston: Little, Brown, 1776.
———. “Letter to John Taylor, April 9, 1814.” In The Works of John Adams, Second President of the
United States: With a Life of the Author, Notes and Illustrations, edited by Charles Francis
Adams. Boston: Little, Brown, 1814.
———. “Letter to Joseph Palmer, September 26, 1774.” In The Works of John Adams, Second President of
the United States: With a Life of the Author, Notes and Illustrations, edited by Charles Francis
Adams, Vol. I. Boston: Little, Brown, 1774.
———. “Letter to Patrick Henry, June 3, 1776.” In The Works of John Adams, Second President of the
United States: With A Life of the Author, Notes and Illustrations, edited by Charles Francis
Adams, Vol. IX. Boston: Little, Brown, 1776.
———. “Letter to Richard Henry Lee, November 15, 1775.” In The Works of John Adams, Second
President of the United States: With a Life of the Author, Notes and Illustrations, edited by
Charles Francis Adams, Vol. IV. Boston: Little, Brown, 1775.
———. “Letter to Timothy Pickering, August 6, 1822.” In The Works of John Adams, Second President of
the United States: With A Life of the Author, Notes and Illustrations, edited by Charles Francis
Adams, Vol. II. Boston: Little, Brown, 1822.
———. “Letter to William Tudor, March 29, 1817.” In The Works of John Adams, Second President of the
United States: With a Life of the Author, Notes and Illustrations, edited by Charles Francis
Adams, Vol. X. Boston: Little, Brown, 1817.
———. The Works of John Adams, Second President of the United States: With A Life of the Author, Notes
and Illustrations. Edited by Charles Francis Adams. Vol. III. Boston: Little, Brown, 1851.
———. The Works of John Adams, Second President of the United States: With A Life of the Author, Notes
and Illustrations. Edited by Charles Francis Adams. Vol. IX. Boston: Little, Brown, 1854.
———. “Thoughts on Government.” In The Works of John Adams, Second President of the United States:
With a Life of the Author, Notes and Illustrations, edited by Charles Francis Adams, Vol. IV.
Boston: Little, Brown, 1776.
Adams, Willi Paul. The First American Constitutions: Republican Ideology and the Making of the State
Constitutions in the Revolutionary Era. Rowman & Littlefield, 2001.
Aldrich, John Herbert. Why Parties?: A Second Look. University of Chicago Press, 2011.

310

Allen, Barbara. “Framing Government for a Frontier Commonwealth: The Minnesota Constitution(s).” In
The Constitutionalism of American States, edited by George E. Connor and Christopher W.
Hammons. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2008.
“Amending America: Proposed Amendments to the United States Constitution, 1787 to 2014.” National
Archives and Records Administration Data Catalog, 2016. http://www.archives.gov/open/datasetamendments.html.
Ames, Herman Vandenburg. The Proposed Amendments to the Constitution of the United States during the
First Century of Its History. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1897.
Ashley, James Mitchell. “Constitution Worship.” In Public Opinion: A Comprehensive Summary of the
Press throughout the World on All Important Current Topics, Vol. XIX. New York: Public
Opinion Company, 1895.
Bailyn, Bernard. The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution. Belknap Press of Harvard University
Press, 1967.
———. The Peopling of British North America: An Introduction. New York: Knopf Doubleday Publishing
Group, 1986.
Baker, H. Robert. The Rescue of Joshua Glover: A Fugitive Slave, the Constitution, and the Coming of the
Civil War. 1 edition. Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2007.
Bakken, Gordon Morris. Rocky Mountain Constitution-Making, 1850-1912. Greenwood Press, 1987.
Bancroft, George. History of the Formation of the Constitution of the United States of America. New York:
D. Appleton & Company, 1882.
Bastress, Robert M. The West Virginia State Constitution: A Reference Guide. Westport, CT: Greenwood
Press, 1995.
Beard, Charles Austin. An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States. Macmillan,
1921.
Beaumont, Elizabeth. The Civic Constitution: Civic Visions and Struggles in the Path Toward
Constitutional Democracy. Oxford University Press, 2013.
Beck, Paul Allen. “A Socialization Theory of Party Realignment.” edited by Richard G. Niemi. JosseyBass, 1974.
Becker, Carl Lotus. The Declaration of Independence: A Study in the History of Political Ideas. New York:
Harcourt, Brace, 1922.
Beeman, Richard. Plain, Honest Men: The Making of the American Constitution. Random House
Publishing Group, 2009.
———. The Penguin Guide to the United States Constitution: A Fully Annotated Declaration of
Independence, U.S. Constitution and Amendments, and Selections from The Federalist Papers.
New York: Penguin, 2010.
Beienburg, Sean. “Contesting the U.S. Constitution through State Amendments: The 2011 and 2012
Elections.” Political Science Quarterly 129, no. 1 (2014): 55–85. doi:10.1002/polq.12146.
Belz, Herman. A New Birth of Freedom: The Republican Party and Freedmen’s Rights, 1861 to 1866. New
York: Fordham Univ Press, 2000.
Berkowitz, Daniel, and Karen Clay. “American Civil Law Origins: Implications for State Constitutions.”
American Law and Economics Review 7, no. 1 (April 1, 2005): 62–84.
Besso, Michael. “Constitutional Amendment Procedures and the Informal Political Construction of
Constitutions.” Journal of Politics 67, no. 1 (2005): 69–87. doi:10.1111/j.14682508.2005.00308.x.
Bickel, Alexander M. The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics. Yale
University Press, 1986.
Bland, Richard. “An Inquiry into the Rights of the British Colonies.” In Tracts of the American Revolution,
1763-1776, edited by Merrill Jensen. Bobbs-Merrill, 1967.
Boyd, Julian P. “Editorial Note: The Declaration of Independence.” In The Papers of Thomas Jefferson:
1760-1776, edited by Julian P. Boyd, Vol. I. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950.
———. “Editorial Note: The Virginia Constitution.” In The Papers of Thomas Jefferson: 1760-1776,
edited by Julian P. Boyd, Vol. I. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950.
Branning, Rosalind L. Pennsylvania Constitutional Development. University of Pittsburgh Press, 2004.

311

Braxton, Carter. “An Address to the Convention of the Colony and Ancient Dominion of Virginia; on the
Subject of Government in General, and Recommending a Particular Form to Their Consideration.”
In The Founders’ Constitution: Major Themes, edited by Philip B. Kurland and Ralph Lerner.
Indianapolis, Ind: Liberty Fund, 1776.
Brennan, William J., Jr. “State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights.” Harvard Law Review
90, no. 3 (January 1, 1977): 489–504. doi:10.2307/1340334.
Bretting, John, and F. Chris Garcia. “New Mexico’s Constitution" Promoting Pluralism in La Tierra
Encantada.” In The Constitutionalism of American States, edited by George E. Connor and
Christopher W. Hammons. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2008.
Bridges, Amy. “Managing the Periphery in the Gilded Age: Writing Constitutions for the Western States.”
Studies in American Political Development 22, no. 01 (March 2008): 32–58.
doi:10.1017/S0898588X08000035.
Browne, Cynthia E., ed. State Constitutional Conventions from Independence to the Completion of the
Present Union, 1776-1959: A Bibliography. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1973.
Browne, John Ross. Report of the Debates in the Convention of California, on the Formation of the State
Constitution, in September and October, 1849. Washington: Printed by John T. Towers, 1850.
Brunhouse, Robert Levere. The Counter-Revolution in Pennsylvania, 1776-1790. Harrisburg : Pennsylvania
Historical Commission, 1942.
Bryce, James. The American Commonwealth. Vol. I. London: Macmillan, 1888.
Buchanan, James. Message from the President of the United States to the Two Houses of Congress at the
Commencement of the Second Session of the Thirty-Sixth Congress. Washington: George W.
Bowman, 1860.
Buchanan, James MacGill, and Gordon C. Tullock. The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of
Constitutional Democracy. Liberty Fund, Incorporated, 1962.
Burgess, John William. Political Science and Comparative Constitutional Law: Sovereignty and Liberty.
Vol. I. Boston: Ginn and Company, 1902.
Burgess, Michael, and G. Alan Tarr. “Introduction: Sub-National Constitutionalism and Constitutional
Development.” In Constitutional Dynamics in Federal Systems: Sub-National Perspectives, edited
by Michael Burgess and G. Alan Tarr. McGill-Queen’s Press - MQUP, 2012.
Burke, Edmund. “Speech on Conciliation with America.” In The Works of the Right Honorable Edmund
Burke: With a Biographical and Critical Introduction by Henry Rogers, edited by Henry Rogers,
Vol. I. London: Henry G. Bohn, 1775.
Burnham, Walter Dean. Critical Elections: And the Mainsprings of American Politics. W. W. Norton &
Company, 1970.
Calhoun, John Caldwell. “Speech on the Slavery Question, Delivered in the Senate, March 4, 1850.” In
Speeches of John C. Calhoun Delivered in the House of Representatives and in the Senate of the
United States, edited by Richard Kenner Crallé. New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1850.
Canning, Bonnie, ed. State Constitutional Conventions, Revisions, and Amendments, 1959-1976: A
Bibliography. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1977.
Caplan, Russell L. Constitutional Brinksmanship : Amending the Constitution by National Convention:
Amending the Constitution by National Convention. New York: Oxford University Press, 1988.
Carmines, Edward G., and James A. Stimson. Issue Evolution: The Race and the Transformation of
American Politics. Princeton University Press, 1989.
Carter, John W. “Religion and State Constitution Making.” Catholic University of America, 2009.
Carter, Nathaniel Hazeltine, and William Leete Stone. Reports of the Proceedings and Debates of the
Convention of 1821, Assembled for the Purpose of Amending the Constitution of the State of New
York: Containing All the Official Documents, Relating to the Subject, and Other Valuable Matter.
Albany: E. amd E. Hosford, 1821.
Casper, Jonathan D. “The Supreme Court and National Policy Making.” The American Political Science
Review 70, no. 1 (March 1, 1976): 50–63. doi:10.2307/1960323.
Cayton, Adam. “Why Are Some Institutions Replaced While Others Persist? Evidence from State
Constitutions.” State Politics & Policy Quarterly, July 22, 2015, 1532440015594663.
doi:10.1177/1532440015594663.

312

Chambers, William N. “Party Development and the American Mainstream.” In The American Party
System: Stages of Political Development, edited by William N. Chambers and Walter Dean
Burnham. New York: Oxford University Press, 1967.
Chambers, William N., and Walter Dean Burnham, eds. American Party Systems: Stages of Political
Development. New York: Oxford University Press, 1975.
Chaput, Erik J. The People’s Martyr: Thomas Wilson Dorr and His 1842 Rhode Island Rebellion.
Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2013.
Cheyney, Edward Potts. The Anti-Rent Agitation in the State of New York, 1839-1846. Philadelphia: Porter
& Coates, 1887.
Clotfelter, Charles T., and Philip J. Cook. Selling Hope: State Lotteries in America. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1989.
Cohen, Jacob. Statistical Power Analysis for the Behavioral Sciences. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1988.
Coleman, Christopher B. “The Development of State Constitutions.” Indiana Magazine of History, June 1,
1911.
Conley, Patrick T., and Robert Flanders. The Rhode Island State Constitution: A Reference Guide.
Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2007.
Corwin, Edward S. “Worship of the Constitution.” Constitutional Review 4 (1920): 3–10.
Council of State Governments. “State Constitutions.” In The Book of the States 2014, Vol. 46. Council of
State Government, 2014.
———. The Book of the States 2015. Council of State Government, 2015.
Countryman, Edward. The American Revolution. Macmillan, 1985.
Crosswell, Sherman, and R. Sutton. Debates and Proceedings in the New-York State Convention, for the
Revision of the Constitution. Albany: The Albany Argus, 1846.
Curley, Edwin. “Introduction to Hobbes’ Leviathan.” In Leviathan: With Selected Variants from the Latin
Edition of 1668, edited by Edwin Curley. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1994.
Dahl, Robert Alan. “Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker.”
Journal of Public Law 6 (1957): 279.
———. How Democratic Is the American Constitution? New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press, 2001.
D’Alemberte, Talbot. The Florida State Constitution: A Reference Guide. New York: Greenwood Press,
1991.
Davis, Richard. Proposed Amendments to the Constitution of the United States Introduced in Congress
from the 91st Congress, 1st Session through the 98th Congress, 2d Session, January 1969December 1984. CRS Report No. 85-36 GOV. Washington: Congressional Research Service,
1985.
Dealey, James Quayle. Growth of American State Constitutions from 1776 to the End of the Year 1914.
Boston: Ginn and Company, 1915.
Dickinson, John. “Letter IV, April 19, 1788.” In Pamphlets on the Constitution of the United States:
Published During Its Discussion by the People, 1787-1788, edited by Paul Leicester Ford.
Brooklyn, NY, 1788.
———. “Letters from a Farmer in Pennsylvania to the Inhabitants of the British Colonies.” In Tracts of the
American Revolution, 1763-1776, edited by Merrill Jensen. Bobbs-Merrill, 1967.
DiClerico, Robert E. “The West Virginia Constitution: Securing the Popular Interest.” In The
Constitutionalism of American States, edited by George E. Connor and Christopher W. Hammons.
Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2008.
Dinan, John. “Court-Constraining Amendments and the State Constitutional Tradition.” Rutgers Law
Journal 38 (2007 2006): 983.
———. “State Constitutions and American Political Development.” In Constitutional Dynamics in Federal
Systems: Sub-National Perspectives, edited by Michael Burgess and G. Alan Tarr. McGillQueen’s Press - MQUP, 2012.
———. The American State Constitutional Tradition. Larwrence: University Press of Kansas, 2006.
Dippel, Horst. “The Rise of Modern Constitutionalism, 1776 - 1849,” n.d. http://www.modernconstitutions.de.

313

Dixon, Rosalind, and Richard Holden. “Constitutional Amendment Rules: The Denominator Problem.” In
Comparative Constitutional Design, edited by Tom Ginsburg. Cambridge University Press, 2012.
Dodd, Walter Fairleigh. “Judicial Control over the Amendment of State Constitutions.” Columbia Law
Review 10, no. 7 (November 1, 1910): 618–38. doi:10.2307/1110983.
———. “The Function of a State Constitution.” Political Science Quarterly 30, no. 2 (June 1, 1915): 201–
21. doi:10.2307/2141919.
———. “The Problem of State Constitutional Construction.” Columbia Law Review 20, no. 6 (June 1,
1920): 635–51. doi:10.2307/1111866.
Dougherty, John Hampden. Power of Federal Judiciary over Legislation: Its Origin, the Power to Set
Aside Laws, Boundaries of the Power, Judicial Independence, Existing Evils and Remedies. New
York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1912.
Dougherty, Keith L. Collective Action under the Articles of Confederation. New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2001.
Douglass, Frederick. “Life and Times of Frederick Douglass.” In Autobiographies. Library of America,
1893.
———. “The Fugitive Slave Law.” In The Essential Douglass: Selected Writings and Speeches, edited by
Nicholas Buccola. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1852.
Dubin, Michael J. Party Affiliations in the State Legislatures: A Year by Year Summary, 1796-2006.
McFarland, 2007.
Dulany, Daniel. “Considerations on the Propriety of Imposing Taxes in the British Colonies, For the
Purpose of Raising a Revenue, by Act of Parliament.” In Tracts of the American Revolution, 17631776, edited by Merrill Jensen. Bobbs-Merrill, 1967.
Dumbauld, Edward. “State Precedents for the Bill of Rights.” Journal of Public Law 7 (1958): 323.
Dunn, John. Political Obligation in Its Historical Context: Essays in Political Theory. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1980.
Eaton, Amasa M. “Recent State Constitutions.” Harvard Law Review 6, no. 2 (1892): 53–72.
doi:10.2307/1321703.
Egle, William Henry, and Joseph Ritner. “The Buckshot War.” The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and
Biography 23, no. 2 (1899): 137–56.
Elazar, Daniel J. American Federalism: A View from the States. Crowell, 1972.
———. “From the Editor of Publius: State Constitutional Design in the United States and Other Federal
Systems.” Publius 12, no. 1 (January 1, 1982): 1–10. doi:10.2307/3329669.
———. “The Principles and Traditions Underlying State Constitutions.” Publius 12, no. 1 (January 1,
1982): 11–25. doi:10.2307/3329670.
Elkins, Zachary, Tom Ginsburg, and James Melton. The Endurance of National Constitutions. Cambridge ;
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
Elster, Jon. Ulysses and the Sirens: Studies in Rationality and Irrationality. Cambridge University Press,
1979.
Emerson, Ralph Waldo. Journals and Miscellaneous Notebooks of Ralph Waldo Emerson, Volume VII:
1838-1842. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969.
———. “Nature.” In The Selected Writings of Ralph Waldo Emerson, edited by Brooks Atkinson. New
York: Modern Library, 1836.
———. “The Fugitive Slave Law.” In The Selected Writings of Ralph Waldo Emerson, edited by Brooks
Atkinson. New York: Modern Library, 1854.
Essah, Patience. A House Divided: Slavery and Emancipation in Delaware, 1638-1865. Charlottesville:
University of Virginia Press, 1996.
Farrand, Max, ed. The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787. Vol. II. New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1911.
———, ed. The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787. Vol. I. New Haven: Yale University Press,
1911.
Fehrenbacher, Don Edward. Constitutions and Constitutionalism in the Slaveholding South. University of
Georgia Press, 1989.

314

———. The Dred Scott Case: Its Significance in American Law and Politics. New York: Oxford
University Press, 2001.
———. The Slaveholding Republic: An Account of the United States Governments Relations to Slavery.
Edited by Ward M. McAfee. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001.
Fess, Simeon Davison. Ratification of the Constitution and Amendments by the States. Senate Document
240. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1931.
Finkelman, Paul. An Imperfect Union: Slavery, Federalism, and Comity. Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 1981.
———. “Evading the Ordinance: The Persistence of Bondage in Indiana and Illinois.” Journal of the Early
Republic 9, no. 1 (1989): 21–51. doi:10.2307/3123523.
———. “Prigg v. Pennsylvania and Northern State Courts: Anti-Slavery Use of a Pro-Slavery Decision.”
Civil War History 25, no. 1 (1979): 5–35. doi:10.1353/cwh.1979.0030.
———. Slavery and the Founders: Race and Liberty in the Age of Jefferson. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe,
2001.
———. Slavery in the Courtroom: An Annotated Bibliography of American Cases. Washington: Library of
Congress, 1985.
———. “Story Telling on the Supreme Court: Prigg v Pennsylvania and Justice Joseph Story’s Judicial
Nationalism.” The Supreme Court Review 1994 (1994): 247–94.
Finkenbine, Roy E. “Belinda’s Petition: Reparations for Slavery in Revolutionary Massachusetts.” The
William and Mary Quarterly, Third Series, 64, no. 1 (January 1, 2007): 95–104.
Finn, John E. “Transformation or Transmogrification? Ackerman, Hobbes (as in Calvin and Hobbes), and
the Puzzle of Changing Constitutional Identity.” Constitutional Political Economy 10, no. 4
(November 1, 1999): 355–65. doi:10.1023/A:1009023000354.
Fino, Susan P. The Michigan State Constitution: A Reference Guide. Annotated edition edition. Westport,
CT: Greenwood Press, 1996.
Fiske, John. Civil Government in the United States: Considered with Some Reference to Its Origins.
Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1891.
———. The Critical Period of American History, 1783-1789. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1892.
Foner, Eric. A Short History of Reconstruction. New York: Harper & Row, 1990.
———. “Why Is There No Socialism in the United States?” History Workshop, no. 17 (April 1, 1984): 57–
80.
Ford, Paul Leicester. “The Adoption of the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776.” Political Science Quarterly
10, no. 3 (September 1, 1895): 426–59. doi:10.2307/2139954.
Ford, Worthington Chauncey, ed. Journals of the Continental Congress: 1774-1789. Vol. I. Washington:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1904.
———, ed. Journals of the Continental Congress: 1774-1789. Vol. II. Washington: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1905.
———, ed. Journals of the Continental Congress 1774-1789. Vol. IV. U.S. Government Printing Office,
1906.
———, ed. Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774-1789. Vol. V. U.S. Government Printing Office,
1906.
———. Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774-1789. Vol. VIII. Washington: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1907.
———, ed. Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774-1789. Vol. XVIII. Washington: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1910.
Frank, Jason A. Constituent Moments: Enacting the People in Postrevolutionary America. Duke University
Press, 2010.
Freehling, William W. “The Louisiana Purchase and the Coming of the Civil War.” In The Louisiana
Purchase and American Expansion, 1803-1898, edited by Sanford Levinson and Bartholomew
Sparrow. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005.
Friedman, Lawrence M. “State Constitutions in Historical Perspective.” Annals of the American Academy
of Political and Social Science 496 (March 1, 1988): 33–42.

315

———. “The Endurance of State Constitutions: Preliminary Thoughts on the New Hampshire
Constitution.” Wayne Law Review 60 (2014).
Fritz, Christian G. “Alternative Visions of American Constitutionalism: Popular Sovereignty and the Early
American Constitutional Debate.” SSRN Scholarly Paper. Rochester, NY: Social Science
Research Network, 1997. http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1447962.
———. “The American Constitutional Tradition Revisited: Preliminary Observations on State
Constitution-Making in the Nineteenth-Century West.” Rutgers Law Journal 25 (1994): 945.
Funston, Richard. “The Supreme Court and Critical Elections.” The American Political Science Review 69,
no. 3 (September 1, 1975): 795–811. doi:10.2307/1958390.
Gallie, Peter J. Ordered Liberty: A Constitutional History of New York. New York: Fordham University
Press, 1995.
———. The New York State Constitution: A Reference Guide. New York: Greenwood Press, 1991.
Gardner, James A. Interpreting State Constitutions: A Jurisprudence of Function in a Federal System.
University of Chicago Press, 2005.
Garraty, John A., ed. Quarrels That Have Shaped the Constitution. New York: Harper & Row, 1964.
Garrison, William Lloyd. “Letter to Samuel J. May, July 17, 1845.” In Letters of William Lloyd Garrison:
1841-1849, edited by Walter McIntosh Merrill, Vol. III. Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1845.
———. “Letter to the Editor of the London Patriot, August 6, 1833.” In The Letters of William Lloyd
Garrison: I Will Be Heard, 1822-1835, edited by Walter McIntosh Merrill, Vol. I. Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1833.
Gillman, Howard, and Mark A. Graber. The Complete American Constitutionalism, Volume One:
Introduction and the Colonial Era. Oxford University Press, 2015.
Goodman, Paul. “The First American Party System.” In The American Party System: Stages of Political
Development, edited by William N. Chambers and Walter Dean Burnham. New York: Oxford
University Press, 1967.
Goss, Kay Collett. The Arkansas State Constitution: A Reference Guide. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press,
1993.
Gossett, Amy. “The Louisiana Experience: Culture, Clashes, and Codification.” In The Constitutionalism of
American States, edited by George E. Connor and Christopher W. Hammons. Columbia:
University of Missouri Press, 2008.
Graber, Mark A. Dred Scott and the Problem of Constitutional Evil. Cambridge University Press, 2006.
———. “The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the Judiciary.” Studies in American
Political Development 7, no. 01 (1993): 35–73. doi:10.1017/S0898588X00000687.
Graham, Cole Blease. The South Carolina State Constitution: A Reference Guide. Westport, CT:
Greenwood Press, 2007.
Green, Fletcher Melvin. Constitutional Development in the South Atlantic States, 1776-1860: A Study in the
Evolution of Democracy. University of North Carolina Press, 1930.
Greene, Jack P. Negotiated Authorities: Essays in Colonial Political and Constitutional History. University
Press of Virginia, 1994.
———. Peripheries and Center: Constitutional Development in the Extended Polities of the British Empire
and the United States, 1607-1788, 1990.
———. The Constitutional Origins of the American Revolution. Cambridge University Press, 2011.
Grey, Thomas C. “The Constitution as Scripture.” Stanford Law Review 37, no. 1 (1984): 1–25.
doi:10.2307/1228651.
Griffin, Stephen M. “Constitutional Theory Transformed.” In Constitutional Culture and Democratic Rule,
edited by John Ferejohn, Jack N. Rakove, and Jonathan Riley. Cambridge University Press, 2001.
Grimes, Alan Pendleton. Democracy and the Amendments to the Constitution. Lexington, MA: Lexington
Books, 1978.
Grodin, Joseph R., Calvin R. Massey, and Richard B. Cunningham. The California State Constitution: A
Reference Guide. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1993.
Gutzman, Kevin R. C. Virginia’s American Revolution: From Dominion to Republic, 1776-1840.
Lexington Books, 2007.

316

Haffenden, Philip S. “The Crown and the Colonial Charters, 1675-1688: Part I.” The William and Mary
Quarterly, Third Series, 15, no. 3 (July 1, 1958): 298–311. doi:10.2307/1915619.
———. “The Crown and the Colonial Charters, 1675-1688: Part II.” The William and Mary Quarterly,
Third Series, 15, no. 4 (October 1, 1958): 452–66. doi:10.2307/2936901.
Hale, Matthew. The History of the Common Law of England and an Analysis of the Civil Part of the Law.
6th ed. London: Butterworth, 1820.
Hall, Kermit. “Mostly Anchor and Little Sail: The Evolution of American State Constitutions.” In Toward
a Usable Past: Liberty Under State Constitutions, edited by Paul Finkelman and Stephen E.
Gottlieb. University of Georgia Press, 2009.
Hall, Kermit, and James W. Ely. An Uncertain Tradition: Constitutionalism and the History of the South.
University of Georgia Press, 1989.
Hamilton, Alexander, James Madison, and John Jay. The Federalist: With Letters of Brutus. Edited by
Terence Ball. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1788.
Hammond, Bray. Banks and Politics in America: From the Revolution to the Civil War. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1957.
———. “The Bank Cases.” In Quarrels That Have Shaped the Constitution., edited by John A. Garraty.
New York: Harper & Row, 1964.
Hammond, John Craig. Slavery, Freedom, and Expansion in the Early American West. Charlottesville:
University of Virginia Press, 2007.
Hammons, Christopher W. “Was James Madison Wrong? Rethinking the American Preference for Short,
Framework-Oriented Constitutions.” The American Political Science Review 93, no. 4 (December
1, 1999): 837–49. doi:10.2307/2586116.
Hardin, Russell. “Why a Constitution.” In The Federalist Papers and the New Institutionalism, edited by
Bernard Grofman and Donald Wittman. Algora Publishing, 1989.
Hargrave, Lee. The Louisiana State Constitution: A Reference Guide. New York: Greenwood Press, 1991.
Harris, Daryl B. Proposed Amendments to the Constitution: 99th-101st Congress (1985-1990). CRS Report
No. 92-555 GOV. Washington: Congressional Research Service, 1992.
Hartz, Louis. The Liberal Tradition in America: An Interpretation of American Political Thought since the
Revolution. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 1955.
Heller, Francis Howard. The Kansas State Constitution: A Reference Guide. Westport, CT: Greenwood
Press, 1992.
Heller, Francis Howard, and Paul D. Schumaker. “The Kansas Constitution: Conservative Politics through
Republican Dominance.” In The Constitutionalism of American States, edited by George E.
Connor and Christopher W. Hammons. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2008.
Henretta, James A. “The Rise of ‘Democratic-Republicanism:’ Political Rights in New York and the
Several States, 1800-1915.” In Toward a Usable Past: Liberty Under State Constitutions, edited
by Paul Finkelman and Stephen E. Gottlieb. University of Georgia Press, 2009.
Henry, John. “Virginia Stamp Act Resolutions.” In Journals of the House of Burgesses of Virginia, 17701772, edited by John Pendleton Kennedy. Richmond, Va.: The Colonial Press, E. Waddey Co.,
1906.
Hershkoff, Helen. “Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of Federal Rationality Review.”
Harvard Law Review 112, no. 6 (April 1, 1999): 1131–96. doi:10.2307/1342383.
———. “Positive Rights and the Evolution of State Constitutions.” Rutgers Law Journal 33 (2002 2001):
799.
Hershkoff, Helen, and Stephen Loffredo. “State Courts and Constitutional Socio-Economic Rights:
Exploring the Underutilization Thesis.” Penn State Law Review 115 (2011 2010): 923.
Hicks, John Donald. The Constitutions of the Northwest States. Montana Constitutional Convention
Commission, 1923.
Hill, Melvin B. The Georgia State Constitution: A Reference Guide. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press,
1994.
Hill, Melvin B., and Laverne Williamson Hill. “Georgia: Tectonic Plates Shifting.” In The
Constitutionalism of American States, edited by George E. Connor and Christopher W. Hammons.
Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2008.

317

Hill, William C. The Vermont State Constitution: A Reference Guide. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press,
1992.
Hirschl, Ran. Towards Juristocracy: The Origins and Consequences of the New Constitutionalism. Harvard
University Press, 2009.
Hoffecker, Carol E., and Barbara E. Benson. “Festina Lente: The Development of Constitutionalism in
Delaware.” In The Constitutionalism of American States, edited by George E. Connor and
Christopher W. Hammons. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2008.
Hofstadter, Richard. The Idea of a Party System: The Rise of Legitimate Opposition in the United States,
1780-1840. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969.
Holst, Hermann Von. The Constitutional and Political History of the United States. Translated by John
Lalor. Vol. II. Chicago: Callaghan and Company, 1888.
Holst, Hermann Von von. The Constitutional and Political History of the United States. Translated by Ira
Hutchinson Brainerd. Vol. I. Washington: Callaghan, 1877.
Horton, Lois E. “From Class to Race in Early America: Northern Post-Emancipation Racial
Reconstruction.” Journal of the Early Republic 19, no. 4 (December 1, 1999): 629–49.
doi:10.2307/3125136.
Horton, Wesley W. “Annotated Debates of the 1818 Constitutional Convention.” Connecticut Bar Journal
65 (1991).
———. The Connecticut State Constitution: A Reference Guide. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1993.
Horwitz, Morton J. “A Historiography of the People Themselves and Popular Constitutionalism.” ChicagoKent Law Review 81 (2006): 813.
Houghton, David. “Michigan: Four Constitutions, Four New Beginnings.” In The Constitutionalism of
American States, edited by George E. Connor and Christopher W. Hammons. Columbia:
University of Missouri Press, 2008.
Houston, Horace K. “Another Nullification Crisis: Vermont’s 1850 Habeas Corpus Law.” The New
England Quarterly 77, no. 2 (2004): 252–72.
Huntington, Samuel P. American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony. Harvard University Press, 1981.
Hutson, James H. Pennsylvania Politics 1746-1770: The Movement for Royal Government and Its
Consequences. Princeton University Press, 1972.
Ireland, Robert F. The Kentucky State Constitution: A Reference Guide. Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press,
1999.
Jackson, Andrew. “Proclamation to the People of South Carolina.” In The Political Register, Vol. I.
Washington: Duff Green, 1832.
Jacobsohn, Gary. “Constitutional Identity.” The Review of Politics 68, no. 03 (June 2006): 361–397.
doi:10.1017/S0034670506000192.
———. Constitutional Identity. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2010.
———. “Rights and American Constitutional Identity.” Polity 43, no. 4 (October 2011): 409–31.
doi:10.1057/pol.2011.10.
Jameson, John Alexander. A Treatise on Constitutional Conventions: Their History, Powers, and Modes of
Proceeding. Chicago: Callaghan and Company, 1887.
Jefferson, Thomas. “Letter to Augustus B. Woodward, August 25, 1825.” In The Works of Thomas
Jefferson Volume 2, edited by Paul Leicester Ford. New York, NY: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1825.
———. “Letter to Henry Lee, May 8, 1825.” In The Works of Thomas Jefferson, edited by Paul Leicester
Ford, Vol. 12. New York, NY: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1825.
———. “Letter to James Madison, September 6, 1789.” In The Works of Thomas Jefferson, edited by Paul
Leicester Ford, Vol. VI. New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1791.
———. “Notes of Proceedings in the Continental Congress, 7 June to 1 August 1776.” In The Papers of
Thomas Jefferson: 1760-1776, edited by Julian P. Boyd, Vol. I. Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1776.
———. “Notes on the State of Virginia.” In Thomas Jefferson : Writings, edited by Merrill D. Peterson.
New York, N.Y: Library of America, 1785.
———. The Papers of Thomas Jefferson: 1760-1776. Edited by Julian P. Boyd. Vol. I. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1950.

318

Jensen, Merrill. “Introduction: The Pamphlet Writers and Their Times.” In Tracts of the American
Revolution, 1763-1776. Bobbs-Merrill, 1967.
Johnson, David Alan. Founding the Far West: California, Oregon, and Nevada, 1840-1890. University of
California Press, 1992.
Jordan, Winthrop D. “Enslavement of Negroes in America to 1700.” In Colonial America: Essays in
Politics and Social Development, edited by Stanley Nider Katz. Little, Brown, 1976.
Journal of the House of Delegates of Virginia. Richmond: Samuel Sheperd, 1844.
Journal of the Proceedings of the Convention of Delegates Elected by the People of Tennessee, to Amend,
Revise, Or Form and Make a New Constitution, for the State. Nashville: Jones, Purvis &
Company, 1870.
“Journal of the Provincial Convention.” In Journals of the Provincial Congress, Provincial Convention,
Committee of Safety and Council of Safety of the State of New-York 1775-1776-1777., Vol. I.
Albany: Thurlow Weed, 1842.
Kaminski, John P. A Necessary Evil?: Slavery and the Debate Over the Constitution. Rowman &
Littlefield, 1995.
Kaminski, John P., Gaspare J. Saladino, Richard Leffler, Charles H. Schoenleber, and Margaret A. Hogan,
eds. The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution. Vol. IV. Charlottesville, Va:
University of Virginia Press, 2009.
Kammen, Michael G. A Machine That Would Go of Itself: The Constitution in American Culture. St.
Martin’s Press, 1986.
Kateb, George. “Self-Reliance, Politics, and Society.” In A Political Companion to Ralph Waldo Emerson,
edited by Alan M. Levine and Daniel S. Malachuk. The University Press of Kentucky, 2011.
Kettner, James H. The Development of American Citizenship, 1608-1870. Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 1978.
Key, V. O. “A Theory of Critical Elections.” The Journal of Politics 17, no. 01 (February 1955): 3–18.
doi:10.2307/2126401.
———. American State Politics: An Introduction. 1st ed. New York: Knopf, 1956.
———. “Secular Realignment and the Party System.” The Journal of Politics 21, no. 02 (May 1959): 198–
210. doi:10.2307/2127162.
———. Southern Politics in State and Nation. New York: Vintage Books, 1963.
Keyssar, Alexander. The Right to Vote: The Contested History of Democracy in the United States. New
York: Basic Books, 2000.
Kramer, Larry D. The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial Review. Oxford
University Press, 2004.
Kruman, Marc W. Between Authority and Liberty: State Constitution-Making in Revolutionary America.
UNC Press Books, 1997.
Kyvig, David E. Explicit and Authentic Acts: Amending the U.S. Constitution, 1776-1995. University Press
of Kansas, 1996.
Larson, Robert W. New Mexico’s Quest for Statehood, 1846-1912. University of New Mexico Press, 2013.
Laska, Lewis L. “The Tennessee Constitution: An Unlikely Path toward Conservatism.” In The
Constitutionalism of American States, edited by George E. Connor and Christopher W. Hammons.
Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2008.
———. The Tennessee State Constitution: A Reference Guide. New York: Greenwood Press, 1990.
Lasser, William. “The Supreme Court in Periods of Critical Realignment.” The Journal of Politics 47, no.
04 (November 1985): 1174–1187. doi:10.2307/2130812.
Lassiter, Matthew D. The Silent Majority: Suburban Politics in the Sunbelt South. Princeton University
Press, 2006.
“LATE FROM ARIZONA.; A Provisional Government Convention in Session--Constitution Adopted-Election of a Governor--Two Days’ Proceedings Entire.” The New York Times, April 26, 1860,
sec. News.
Lee, Frances E. Sizing up the Senate: The Unequal Consequences of Equal Representation. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1999.
Leedham, Charles. Our Changing Constitution. New York: Dodd, Mead, 1964.

319

Leichter, Howard. “Oregon’s Constitution: A Political Richter Scale.” In The Constitutionalism of
American States, edited by George E. Connor and Christopher W. Hammons. Columbia:
University of Missouri Press, 2008.
Levinson, Sanford. Framed: America’s 51 Constitutions and the Crisis of Governance. Oxford University
Press, 2012.
———. Our Undemocratic Constitution: Where the Constitution Goes Wrong (And How We the People
Can Correct It). Oxford University Press, 2006.
———. “Pledging Faith in the Civil Religion; Or, Would You Sign the Constitution?” William and Mary
Law Review 29 (1988 1987): 113.
Levinson, Sanford, and Bartholomew Sparrow. “Introduction.” In The Louisiana Purchase and American
Expansion, 1803-1898, edited by Sanford Levinson and Bartholomew Sparrow. Lanham, MD:
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005.
Lieberman, Robert C. “Ideas, Institutions, and Political Order: Explaining Political Change.” American
Political Science Review 96, no. 04 (2002): 697–712. doi:10.1017/S0003055402000394.
Lincoln, Abraham. “Message to Congress in Special Session, July 4, 1861.” In Abraham Lincoln: Selected
Speeches and Writings. New York: Library of America, 1861.
Lindquist, Stefanie A., and Pamela C. Corley. “National Policy Preferences and Judicial Review of State
Statutes at the United States Supreme Court.” Publius: The Journal of Federalism 43, no. 2 (April
1, 2013): 151–78. doi:10.1093/publius/pjs044.
Livingston, William S. Federalism and Constitutional Change. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1956.
Lloyd, Gordon. “The 1849 California Constitution: An Extraordinary Achievement by Dedicated, Ordinary
People.” In The Constitutionalism of American States, edited by George E. Connor and
Christopher W. Hammons. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2008.
Locke, John. Two Treatises of Government and A Letter Concerning Toleration. Edited by Ian Shapiro.
Yale University Press, 2003.
Loeb, Isidor. Constitutions and Constitutional Conventions in Missouri. State Historical Society of
Missouri, 1920.
Lomazoff, Eric. “Turning (Into) ‘The Great Regulating Wheel’: The Conversion of the Bank of the United
States, 1791–1811.” Studies in American Political Development, 2012.
Lovejoy, David S. “Rights Imply Equality: The Case Against Admiralty Jurisdiction in America, 17641776.” The William and Mary Quarterly, Third Series, 16, no. 4 (October 1, 1959): 460–84.
doi:10.2307/1920215.
Lowell, A. Lawrence. “The Responsibilities of American Lawyers.” Harvard Law Review 1, no. 5 (1887):
232–40. doi:10.2307/1321338.
Lutz, Donald S. “Political Participation in Eighteenth-Century America.” In Toward a Usable Past: Liberty
Under State Constitutions, edited by Paul Finkelman and Stephen E. Gottlieb. University of
Georgia Press, 2009.
———. Popular Consent and Popular Control: Whig Political Theory in the Early State Constitutions.
Louisiana State University Press, 1980.
———. “The Purposes of American State Constitutions.” Publius 12, no. 1 (January 1, 1982): 27–44.
doi:10.2307/3329671.
———. “The State Constitutional Pedigree of the U.S. Bill of Rights.” Publius: The Journal of Federalism
22, no. 2 (March 20, 1992): 19–45.
———. “The United States Constitution as an Incomplete Text.” Annals of the American Academy of
Political and Social Science 496 (March 1, 1988): 23–32.
———. “Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment.” The American Political Science Review 88, no.
2 (June 1, 1994): 355–70. doi:10.2307/2944709.
Lynch, Michael J. “Other Amendments: The Constitutional Amendments That Failed.” Law Library
Journal 93 (2001): 303.
Lynd, Staughton. “The Compromise of 1787.” Political Science Quarterly 81, no. 2 (1966): 225–50.
doi:10.2307/2147971.
Madison, James. “The Journal of the Constitutional Convention, Part II.” In The Writings of James
Madison, Comprising His Public Papers and His Provate Correspondence, Including Numerous

320

Letters and Documents Now for the First Time Printed, edited by Gaillard Hunt, Vol. IV. New
York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1787.
———. “The Vices of the Political System of the United States.” In Writings, edited by Jack Rakove.
Library of America, 1999.
Maier, Pauline. American Scripture: Making the Declaration of Independence. Knopf Doubleday
Publishing Group, 1997.
———. “Popular Uprisings and Civil Authority in Eighteenth-Century America.” In Colonial America:
Essays in Politics and Social Development, edited by Stanley Nider Katz. Little, Brown, 1976.
Maltz, Earl M. “Slavery, Federalism, and the Structure of the Constitution.” The American Journal of Legal
History 36, no. 4 (1992): 466–98. doi:10.2307/845555.
Marshfield, Jonathan L. “Models of Substantial Constitutionalism.” Penn State Law Review 115 (2011
2010): 1151.
Mason, Matthew. Slavery and Politics in the Early American Republic. Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 2006.
Mast, Tory. “The History of Single-Member Districts for Congress: Seeking Fair Representation Before
Full Representation.” Voting and Democracy Report. Fair Vote Program for Representative
Government, 1995.
May, Janice C. “Constitutional Amendment and Revision Revisited.” Publius: The Journal of Federalism
17, no. 1 (January 1, 1987): 153–79.
———. The Texas State Constitution. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011.
Mayhew, David R. Electoral Realignments: A Critique of an American Genre. Yale University Press, 2002.
McCloskey, Robert G. The American Supreme Court. University of Chicago Press, 2004.
McColley, Robert. Slavery and Jeffersonian Virginia. Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 1964.
McConville, Brendan. The King’s Three Faces: The Rise & Fall of Royal America, 1688-1776. University
of North Carolina Press, 2007.
McCormick, Richard P. “New Perspectives on Jacksonian Politics.” The American Historical Review 65,
no. 2 (January 1, 1960): 288–301. doi:10.2307/1842870.
———. “Political Development and the Second Party System.” In The American Party System: Stages of
Political Development, edited by William N. Chambers and Walter Dean Burnham. New York:
Oxford University Press, 1967.
McGirr, Lisa. Suburban Warriors: The Origins of the New American Right. Princeton University Press,
2002.
McHugh, James T. Ex Uno Plura: State Constitutions and Their Political Cultures. SUNY Press, 2003.
McKinley, Albert Edward. The Suffrage Franchise in the Thirteen English Colonies in America.
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1905.
McLauchlan, William P. The Indiana State Constitution: A Reference Guide. Greenwood Press, 1996.
McManus, Edgar J. A History of Negro Slavery in New York. Syracuse University Press, 1970.
McPherson, Edward, ed. “Majority Report of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction.” In A Political
Manual for 1866: Including a Classified Summary of the Important Executive, Legislative, and
Politico-Military Facts of the Period. Washington: Philp & Solomons, 1866.
Meacham, Jon. American Lion: Andrew Jackson in the White House. Random House Publishing Group,
2008.
Mehta, Jal. “The Varied Roles of Ideas in Politics: From ‘Whether’ to ‘How.’” In Ideas and Politics in
Social Science Research, edited by Daniel Beland and Robert Henry Cox. Oxford University
Press, 2010.
Menschel, David. “Abolition without Deliverance: The Law of Connecticut Slavery 1784-1848.” The Yale
Law Journal 111, no. 1 (October 1, 2001): 183–222. doi:10.2307/797518.
Miller, Joshua. “The Ghostly Body Politic: The Federalist Papers and Popular Sovereignty.” Political
Theory 16, no. 1 (February 1, 1988): 99–119.
———. The Rise and Fall of Democracy in Early America, 1630-1789: The Legacy for Contemporary
Politics. Penn State Press, 1999.

321

Mittal, Sonia, and Barry R. Weingast. “Self-Enforcing Constitutions: With an Application to Democratic
Stability In America’s First Century.” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 29, no. 2
(April 1, 2013): 278–302. doi:10.1093/jleo/ewr017.
Moore, George Henry. Notes on the History of Slavery in Massachusetts. D. Appleton & Company, 1866.
Morrison, Mary Jane. The Minnesota State Constitution: A Reference Guide. Westport, CT: Greenwood
Press, 2002.
Mowry, Arthur May. The Dorr War: Or, The Constitutional Struggle in Rhode Island. Providence: Preston
& Rounds, 1901.
Musmanno, Michael Angelo. Proposed Amendments to the Constitution: A Monograph on the Resolutions
Introduced in Congress Proposing Amendments to the Constitution of the United States of
America. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1929.
Nash, Gary B. The Unknown American Revolution: The Unruly Birth of Democracy and the Struggle to
Create America. Penguin, 2006.
Nelson, Eric. The Royalist Revolution: Monarchy and the American Founding. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 2014.
Nevins, Allan. The American States: During and after the Revolution 1775-1789. New York, 1927.
Newman, Richard S. The Transformation of American Abolitionism: Fighting Slavery in the Early
Republic. Univ of North Carolina Press, 2002.
Nicholls, Michael L. “‘The Squint of Freedom’: African‐American Freedom Suits in Post‐revolutionary
Virginia.” Slavery & Abolition 20 (August 1, 1999): 47–62. doi:10.1080/01440399908575277.
Niles, Franklyn C. “Change and Continuity in Arkansas Politics after the 1874 Arkansas State
Constitutional Convention.” In The Constitutionalism of American States, edited by George E.
Connor and Christopher W. Hammons. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2008.
Norton, Anne. “Transubstantiation: The Dialectic of Constitutional Authority.” The University of Chicago
Law Review 55, no. 2 (April 1, 1988): 458–72. doi:10.2307/1599813.
Novkov, Julie. “Bringing the States Back In: Understanding Legal Subordination and Identity through
Political Development*.” Polity 40, no. 1 (2008): 24–48. doi:10.1057/palgrave.polity.2300093.
O’Brien, William. “Did the Jennison Case Outlaw Slavery in Massachusetts?” The William and Mary
Quarterly, Third Series, 17, no. 2 (April 1, 1960): 219–41. doi:10.2307/1943353.
Oesterle, Dale A., and Richard B. Collins. The Colorado State Constitution: A Reference Guide. Westport,
CT: Greenwood Press, 2002.
Oldfield, John R. Popular Politics and British Anti-Slavery: The Mobilisation of Public Opinion Against
the Slave Trade, 1787-1807. Manchester University Press, 1995.
Onuf, Peter S. “State Politics and Republican Virtue: Religion, Education, and Morality in Early American
Federalism.” In Toward a Usable Past: Liberty Under State Constitutions, edited by Paul
Finkelman and Stephen E. Gottlieb. University of Georgia Press, 2009.
———. The Origins of the Federal Republic: Jurisdictional Controversies in the United States, 17751787. University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983.
Orfield, Lester B. The Amending of the Federal Constitution. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press,
1942.
Orth, John V. The North Carolina State Constitution: A Reference Guide. 2 edition. Westport, CT:
Greenwood Press, 1993.
———. The North Carolina State Constitution: With History and Commentary. Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 1993.
Owsley, Frank L. State Rights in the Confederacy. Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, 1925.
Paine, Thomas. Common Sense, The Rights of Man and Other Essential Writings of Thomas Paine. New
York: Signet Classics, 2003.
———. “The Rights of Man.” In Common Sense, The Rights of Man and Other Essential Writings of
Thomas Paine. New York: Signet Classics, 1791.
Parkinson, George. “Antebellum State Constitution-Making: Retention, Circumvention, Revision.”
University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1972.
Parsons, Craig. “Ideas, Positions, and Supranationality.” In Ideas and Politics in Social Science Research,
edited by Daniel Beland and Robert Henry Oklahoma. Oxford University Press, 2010.

322

Pease, Jane H., and William H. Pease. “Confrontation and Abolition in the 1850s.” The Journal of
American History 58, no. 4 (March 1, 1972): 923–37. doi:10.2307/1917851.
Perman, Michael. The Road to Redemption: Southern Politics, 1869-1879. Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina, 1984.
Pitkin, Hanna Fenichel. “Idea of a Constitution, The.” Journal of Legal Education 37 (1987): 167.
Pope, James Gray. “An Approach to State Constitutional Interpretation.” Rutgers Law Journal 24 (1993
1992): 985.
“Population of 33 Urban Places: 1800.” United States Bureau of the Census, June 15, 1998.
“Population of 90 Urban Places: 1830.” United States Bureau of the Census, June 15, 1998.
Proposed Amendments to the Constitution of the United States Introduced in Congress from the 69th
Congress, 2d Session through the 87th Congress, 2d Session, December 6, 1926 to January 3,
1963. S. Doc. No. 163, 87th Cong. 2d Sess. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1963.
Proposed Amendments to the Constitution of the United States Introduced in Congress from the 88th
Congress, 1st Session through the 90th Congress 2d Session, January 9, 1963 to January 3, 1969.
S. Doc. No. 91-38, 91st Cong. 2d Sess. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1969.
“Provincial Conference.” In The Proceedings Relative to Calling the Conventions of 1776 and 1790: The
Minutes of the Convention That Formed the Present Constitution of Pennsylvania, Together with
the Charter to William Penn, the Constitutions of 1776 and 1790, and a View of the Proceedings
of the Convention of 1776, and the Council of Censors. John S. Wiestling, 1776.
Raghunath, Raja. “A Promise the Nation Cannot Keep: What Prevents the Application of the Thirteenth
Amendment in Prison.” William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal 18 (2010 2009): 395–444.
Rakove, Jack. “Constitutional Problematics, circa 1787.” In Constitutional Culture and Democratic Rule,
edited by John Ferejohn, Jack N. Rakove, and Jonathan Riley. Cambridge University Press, 2001.
Rakove, Jack N. Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the Making of the Constitution. New York:
Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, 2010.
———. “The First Phases of American Federalism.” In Comparative Constitutional Federalism: Europe
and America, edited by Mark V. Tushnet. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1990.
Read, James H. “The Limits of Self-Reliance: Emerson, Slavery, and Abolition.” In A Political Companion
to Ralph Waldo Emerson, edited by Alan M. Levine and Daniel S. Malachuk. The University
Press of Kentucky, 2011.
Reed, Douglas S. “Popular Constitutionalism: Towards a Theory of State Constitutional Meanings.”
Rutgers Law Journal 30 (1999 1998): 871.
Riker, William H. “The Heresthetics of Constitution-Making: The Presidency in 1787, with Comments on
Determinism and Rational Choice.” The American Political Science Review 78, no. 1 (March 1,
1984): 1–16. doi:10.2307/1961245.
Robertson, David Brian. The Constitution and America’s Destiny. Cambridge University Press, 2005.
———. The Original Compromise: What the Constitution’s Framers Were Really Thinking. New York:
Oxford University Press, 2013.
Robinson, Donald L. Slavery in the Structure of American Politics, 1765-1820. New York: Harcourt Brace
Jovanovich, 1971.
Rodgers, Daniel T. Contested Truths: Keywords in American Politics Since Independence. Harvard
University Press, 1998.
Rogin, Michael. “The Two Declarations of American Independence.” Representations 55 (July 1, 1996):
13–30. doi:10.2307/3043733.
Rolater, Fred S. “The American Indian and the Origin of the Second American Party System.” The
Wisconsin Magazine of History 76, no. 3 (April 1, 1993): 180–203.
Rosenberg, Gerald N. The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change? 2nd ed. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 2008.
Rosenberg, Norman L. “Personal Liberty Laws and Sectional Crisis: 1850-1861.” Civil War History 17, no.
1 (1971): 25–44.
Rosenfeld, Michel. The Identity of the Constitutional Subject: Selfhood, Citizenship, Culture, and
Community. Routledge, 2010.

323

Salokar, Rebecca Mae. “Florida: Defining and Redefining Citizenship and Community.” In The
Constitutionalism of American States, edited by George E. Connor and Christopher W. Hammons.
Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2008.
Satz, Ronald N. American Indian Policy in the Jacksonian Era. University of Oklahoma Press, 2002.
Scalia, Laura J. America’s Jeffersonian Experiment: Remaking State Constitutions, 1820-1850. Northern
Illinois University Press, 1999.
Schamel, Charles E., Mary Rephlo, Rodney Ross, David Kepley, Robert W. Coren, and James Gregory
Bradsher, eds. Guide to the Records of the United States House of Representatives at the National
Archives, 1789-1989. National Archives and Records Administration, 1989.
Schapiro, Robert A. “Identity and Interpretation in State Constitutional Law.” Virginia Law Review 84, no.
3 (April 1, 1998): 389–457. doi:10.2307/1073668.
Schattschneider, Elmer Eric. The Semi-Sovereign People: A Realist’s View of Democracy in America. Holt,
Rhineart, and Winston, 1975.
Schuman, David. “The Creation of the Oregon Constitution.” Oregon Law Review 74 (1995): 611.
Selsam, J. Paul. The Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776: A Study in Revolutionary Democracy.
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1936.
Selsam, J. Paul, and Joseph G. Rayback. “French Comment on the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776.” The
Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography 76, no. 3 (July 1, 1952): 311–25.
Shaeffer, John N. “Public Consideration of the 1776 Pennsylvania Constitution.” The Pennsylvania
Magazine of History and Biography 98, no. 4 (October 1, 1974): 415–37.
Silbey, Joel H. The American Political Nation, 1838-1893. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991.
Skowronek, Stephen. The Politics Presidents Make: Leadership from John Adams to George Bush.
Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press, 1993.
Smith, Chuck. The New Mexico State Constitution: A Reference Guide. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press,
1996.
Smith, Rogers M. “Beyond Tocqueville, Myrdal, and Hartz: The Multiple Traditions in America.” The
American Political Science Review 87, no. 3 (1993): 549–66. doi:10.2307/2938735.
———. Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions of Citizenship in U.S. History. New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1997.
———. “Ideas and the Spiral of Politics: The Place of American Political Thought in American Political
Development.” American Political Thought 3, no. 1 (March 2014): 126–36. doi:10.1086/675651.
Sosin, Jack M. English America and the Revolution of Sixteen Eighty-Eight: Royal Administration and the
Structure of Provincial Government. University of Nebraska Press, 1985.
Stark, Jack. The Iowa State Constitution: A Reference Guide. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1998.
———. The Wisconsin State Constitution: A Reference Guide. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1997.
Steinglass, Steven H., and Gino J. Scarselli. The Ohio State Constitution: A Reference Guide. Greenwood
Press, 2004.
Stephanopoulos, Nicholas, and Mila Versteeg. “The Contours of Constitutional Approval.” SSRN
Scholarly Paper. Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, August 18, 2015.
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2646773.
Story, Joseph. “Letter to Sarah Story, March 7, 1829.” In The Constitutional and Political History of the
United States, edited by Hermann Von Holst, translated by John Lalor, Vol. II. Chicago:
Callaghan and Company, 1829.
Sturm, Albert L. “The Development of American State Constitutions.” Publius 12, no. 1 (January 1, 1982):
57–98. doi:10.2307/3329673.
———. Thirty Years of State Constitution-Making, 1938-1968: With an Epilogue: Developments During
1969. National Municipal League, 1970.
Sundquist, James L. Dynamics of the Party System: Alignment and Realignment of Political Parties in the
United States. Brookings Institution Press, 1983.
Tansill, Charles Callan. Proposed Amendments to the Constitution of the United States: Introduced in
Congress from December 4, 1889, to July 2, 1926. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1926.
Tarr, G. Alan. Constitutional Politics in the States: Contemporary Controversies and Historical Patterns.
Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1996.

324

———. “Explaining Sub-National Constitutional Space.” Penn State Law Review 115 (2011 2010): 1133.
———. Understanding State Constitutions. Princeton University Press, 1998.
tenBroek, Jacobus. Equal under Law: The Antislavery Origins of the Fourteenth Amendment. Collier
Books, 1965.
Thayer, Theodore. Pennsylvania Politics and the Growth of Democracy: 1740 - 1776. Pennsylvania
Historical and Museum Commission, 1953.
The Congressional Globe: Fortieth Congress, First Session. Washington, 1867.
The Congressional Globe: Fortieth Congress, Third Session. Washington: F. & J. Rives and George A.
Bailey, 1869.
The Congressional Globe: Thirty-Eighth Congress, First Session. Washington: John C. Rives, 1864.
The Congressional Globe: Thirty-Eighth Congress, Second Session. Washington: F. & J. Rives, 1865.
The Congressional Globe: Thirty-Fifth Congress, Second Session. Vol. I. Washington: John C. Rives,
1859.
The Congressional Globe: Thirty-First Congress, First Session. Vol. XXI Part II. Washington: John C.
Rives, 1850.
The Congressional Globe: Thirty-First Congress, First Session. Vol. XXI-Part I. Washington: John C.
Rives, 1850.
The Congressional Globe: Thirty-Ninth Congress, First Session. Washington: F. & J. Rives, 1866.
The Congressional Globe: Thirty-Ninth Congress, Second Session. Vol. I. Washington, 1867.
The Congressional Globe: Twenty-Third Congress, Second Session. Washington: John C. Rives, 1835.
The Constitution and Schedule of the Provisional Government of the Territory of Arizona, and the
Proceedings of the Convention Held at Tucson. Tucson: J. Howard Wells, 1860.
The Debates and Proceedings in the Congress of the United States: Eighth Congress, First Session.
Washington: Gales and Seaton, 1852.
The Debates and Proceedings in the Congress of the United States: Fifteenth Congress, First Session.
Washington: Gales and Seaton, 1854.
The Debates and Proceedings in the Congress of the United States: Fifth Congress, Second Session.
Washington: Gales and Seaton, 1851.
The Debates and Proceedings in the Congress of the United States: Sixth Congress, First Session.
Washington: Gales and Seaton, 1855.
Thorpe, Francis Newton. “Recent Constitution-Making in the United States.” The ANNALS of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science 2, no. 2 (November 1, 1891): 1–57.
doi:10.1177/000271629100200201.
Tinkle, Marshall J. The Maine State Constitution: A Reference Guide. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press,
1992.
Tocqueville, Alexis de. Democracy in America. Edited by Jacob Peter Mayer. New York: Harper Collins,
1835.
Toombs, Robert Augustus. “Letter to E.B. Pullin and Others, December 13, 1860.” In The Correspondence
of Robert Toombs, Alexander H. Stephens, and Howell Cobb, edited by Ulrich B. Phillips.
Washington: Government Printing Office, 1860.
Treanor, William Michael. “Case of the Prisoners and the Origins of Judicial Review.” University of
Pennsylvania Law Review 143 (1994): 491.
———. “Judicial Review before ‘Marbury.’” Stanford Law Review 58, no. 2 (November 1, 2005): 455–
562.
Tribe, Laurence H. “Idea of the Constitution: A Metaphor-Morphosis, The.” Journal of Legal Education 37
(1987): 170.
Tsesis, Alexander. The Thirteenth Amendment and American Freedom: A Legal History. New York: New
York University Press, 2004.
Turner, Frederick Jackson. The Frontier in American History. Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 1920.
Tushnet, Mark. Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts. Princeton University Press, 2000.
Tyler, John. “Letter to Samuel King, May 7, 1842.” In A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the
Presidents: Prepared Under the Direction of the Joint Committee on Printing, of the House and

325

Senate, Pursuant to an Act of the Fifty-Second Congress of the United States, Vol. V. Bureau of
National Literature, 1842.
Unger, Harlow Giles. Lion of Liberty: Patrick Henry and the Call to a New Nation. Da Capo Press, 2011.
“United States Resident Population by State: 1790 - 1990.” New Jersey Department of Labor and
Workforce Development, n.d.
Valelly, Richard M. The Two Reconstructions: The Struggle for Black Enfranchisement. University of
Chicago Press, 2004.
Van Buren, Martin. “Mr. Van Buren Against the Property Qualification for the Right of Suffrage.” In The
Extra Globe, Containing Political Discussions, Documentary Proofs, &C., edited by Francis
Preston Blair and Amos Kendall, Vol. IV. Washington: The Globe, 1820.
Versteeg, Mila, and Emily Zackin. “American Constitutional Exceptionalism Revisited.” SSRN Scholarly
Paper. Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, March 26, 2014.
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2416300.
———. “Constitutions Unentrenched: Toward an Alternative Theory of Constitutional Design.” American
Political Science Review 110, no. 4 (2016).
Vile, John R. Encyclopedia of Constitutional Amendments, Proposed Amendments, and Amending Issues,
1789-2002. Second. Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2003.
———. Encyclopedia of Constitutional Amendments, Proposed Amendments, and Amending Issues, 17892015. Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2015.
———. “Paxton’s Case (Mass. 1761).” In Encyclopedia of the Fourth Amendment, edited by David L.
Hudson and John R. Vile. CQ Press, 2012.
———. The Constitutional Amending Process in American Political Thought. New York: Praeger, 1992.
Vorenberg, Michael. Final Freedom: The Civil War, the Abolition of Slavery, and the Thirteenth
Amendment. Cambridge University Press, 2001.
Vose, Clement E. Constitutional Change: Amendment Politics and Supreme Court Litigation Since 1900.
Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1972.
Waldron, Jeremy. “Arendt’s Constitutional Politics.” In The Cambridge Companion to Hannah Arendt,
edited by Dana Villa. Cambridge University Press, 2000.
Wallis, John. “The NBER - Maryland State Constitutions Project,” 2006. www.stateconstitutions.umd.edu.
Watson, Harry L. Liberty and Power: The Politics of Jacksonian America. New York: Hill and Wang,
1990.
Weingast, Barry R. “Designing Constitutional Stability.” In Democratic Constitutional Design and Public
Policy: Analysis and Evidence, edited by Roger D. Congleton and Birgitta Swedenborg. MIT
Press, 2006.
———. “The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law.” The American Political Science
Review 91, no. 2 (June 1, 1997): 245–63. doi:10.2307/2952354.
Whelan, Frederick. “Prologue: Democratic Theory and the Boundary Problem.” In Liberal Democracy,
edited by James Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman. New York: New York University Press,
1983.
Whittier, John Greenleaf. “Letter to ‘The Bay State,’ October 4th, 1850.” In Whittier Correspondence from
the Oak Knoll Collections, 1830-1892, edited by John Albree. Salem, Massachusetts: Essex Book
and Print Club, 1850.
Whittington, Keith E. Political Foundations of Judicial Supremacy: The Presidency, the Supreme Court,
and Constitutional Leadership in U.S. History. Princeton University Press, 2009.
Wiecek, William M. “‘A Peculiar Conservatism’ and the Dorr Rebellion: Constitutional Clash in
Jacksonian America.” The American Journal of Legal History 22, no. 3 (July 1, 1978): 237–53.
doi:10.2307/845183.
———. “Somerset: Lord Mansfield and the Legitimacy of Slavery in the Anglo-American World.” The
University of Chicago Law Review 42, no. 1 (October 1, 1974): 86–146.
Wilder, Craig Steven. Ebony and Ivy: Race, Slavery, and the Troubled History of America’s Universities.
Bloomsbury Publishing USA, 2013.
Wilentz, Sean. Chants Democratic: New York City & the Rise of the American Working Class, 1788-1850.
New York: Oxford University Press, 1984.

326

Williams, Robert F. “Experience Must Be Our Only Guide: The State Constitutional Experience of the
Framers of the Federal Constitution.” Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly 15 (1988 1987):
403.
———. The Law of American State Constitutions. Oxford University Press, Incorporated, 2009.
———. “The State Constitutions of the Founding Decade: Pennsylvania’s Radical 1776 Constitution and
Its Influences on American Constitutionalism.” Temple Law Review 62 (1989): 541.
Williams, Robert Forrest. The New Jersey State Constitution. New York: Oxford University Press, 2012.
Wilson, James. The Substance of a Speech Delivered by James Wilson, Esq.: Explanatory of the General
Principles of the Proposed Fœderal Constitution; ... in the Convention of the State of
Pennsylvania, ... 24 Nov. 1787. Philadelphia: Thomas Bradford, 1787.
Wilson, Woodrow. Constitutional Government in the United States. New York: Columbia University Press,
1908.
Winchester, Elhanan. A Plain Political Catechism: Intended for the Use of Schools, in the United States of
America: Wherein the Great Principles of Liberty, and of the Federal Government, Are Laid
Down and Explained, by Way of Question and Answer. Made Level to the Lowest Capacities. By
Elhanan Winchester. Greenfield, MA: T. Dickman, 1796.
Winkle, John W. The Mississippi State Constitution: A Reference Guide. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press,
1993.
Wolin, Sheldon. The Presence of the Past: Essays on the State and the Constitution. Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1990.
Wong, Edlie L. Neither Fugitive nor Free: Atlantic Slavery, Freedom Suits, and the Legal Culture of
Travel. NYU Press, 2009.
Wood, Gordon S. “Foreword: State Constitution-Making In the American Revolution.” Rutgers Law
Journal 24 (1993 1992): 911.
———. The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787. Norton, 1972.
———. The Radicalism of the American Revolution. Random House Digital, Inc., 1992.
Wood, Peter H. “Black Resistance and Rebellion in Eighteenth-Century South Carolina.” In Colonial
America: Essays in Politics and Social Development, edited by Stanley Nider Katz. Little, Brown,
1976.
Woods, Michael E. “A Theory of Moral Outrage: Indignation and Eighteenth-Century British
Abolitionism.” Slavery & Abolition 0, no. 0 (September 26, 2014): 1–22.
doi:10.1080/0144039X.2014.963393.
Wooster, Ralph A. The Secession Conventions of the South. Princeton University Press, 1962.
York, Neil L. “The First Continental Congress and the Problem of American Rights.” The Pennsylvania
Magazine of History and Biography 122, no. 4 (October 1, 1998): 353–83.
Young, Thomas. “To the Inhabitants of Vermont, a Free and Independent Stae, Bounding on the River
Connecticut and Lake Champlain, April 11, 1777.” In Publications of the Colonial Society of
Massachusetts: Transations, 1906-1907, Vol. IX. Boston: The Colonial Society of Massachusetts,
1777.
Zackin, Emily. Looking for Rights in All the Wrong Places: Why State Constitutions Contain America’s
Positive Rights: Why State Constitutions Contain America’s Positive Rights. Princeton University
Press, 2013.
Zilversmit, Arthur. The First Emancipation: The Abolition of Slavery in the North. University of Chicago
Press, 1967.
Zuckert, Michael P. “Completing the Constitution: The Thirteenth Amendment.” Constitutional
Commentary 4 (1987): 259–84.
Zumbrunnen, John. “Wisconsin: Rejection, Ratification, and the Evolution of a People.” In The
Constitutionalism of American States, edited by George E. Connor and Christopher W. Hammons.
Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2008.

327

